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Theoretical frameworks of values in healthcare tend to come in one of two kinds: monism 
and pluralism. However, both value-monism and value-pluralism prove inconsistent and 
unrealistic when applied to controversial cases. The lack of clarity about values in healthcare 
contributes to the contentious nature of key concepts in decision-making, such as sickness 
and futility.  
The prominent decision-making models considered in this thesis are substituted decision-
making, supported decision-making, shared decision-making, dual process theory, values-
based practice and values-based medicine. Whilst each has its strengths, each model fails to 
provide a compelling account of the role of values in decision-making, on the grounds of 
arbitrariness, incompleteness or ambiguity. 
A lack of clarity about the role of values in decision-making is particularly problematic in busy 
and pressured clinical environments. An Acute Medicine Service (AMS) is a part of a hospital 
which is dedicated to the early management of medical emergencies. The workload of an 
AMS entails a heavy decision burden concerning a broad range of clinical problems under 
time pressure.  
In this ethnographic study, I was participant-observer within an AMS over a period of 16 
months. This involved numerous informal interviews and 27 formal interviews with staff, 
patients and relatives. A thematic analysis of empirical data, borrowing insights from the 
tradition of philosophical hermeneutics, provides a plausible interpretation of the role of 
values in decision-making within an AMS. 
The data I present are organised around three main themes: restoring order, working together 
and what’s best. Within an AMS, a course of action is appraised according to three values: 
welfare, choice and effectiveness. These values are interdependent in a manner distinct from 
monism and pluralism. The implications of these findings for the philosophy of medicine and 
clinical decision-making are discussed, with some suggestions for future prescriptive models 
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For the simplicity on this side of complexity, I wouldn't give you a fig. But for the simplicity on 
the other side of complexity, for that I would give you anything I have. 
 




Chapter 1. Introduction 
What is the role of values in decision-making within an Acute Medicine Service (AMS)? 
In some ways, this is not a new question. Value theory has an extensive history within philosophy. It features 
persistent areas of difficulty: What are values? How many values are there? How are evaluative judgments 
justified? In some ways, however, this is a new question. Whilst philosophical difficulties about values may 
be old, even ancient, the application of these questions to decision-making within the context of an AMS is 
a novelty.  
However, I seek to address this question not in view of its mere novelty but in view of its importance for 
contemporary healthcare. Over the past 30 years, there has been a great deal of attention given to values 
within healthcare; organisations, professions and individuals are all said to have values. Likewise, a great 
deal of attention has been given to decision-making within healthcare, with new models of good clinical 
decision-making being proposed and promoted. 
However, relatively little attention has been paid to the relation between these two areas: values in decision-
making. Values within healthcare have been proclaimed more than studied and displayed more than 
scrutinised. Perhaps this is because values are seen to raise questions that cannot be answered, or raise 
answers that cannot be questioned. 
Similarly, models of good decision-making within healthcare make assumptions about values in order to 
endorse the model as good decision-making. Such prescriptive models are reflected in professional and legal 
guidance, and are frequently intended to apply broadly across healthcare settings including an AMS. 
However, there has been relatively little literature relating to how decision-making within an AMS is actually 
done. As a result, decision-making models are expected to be enacted within an AMS without adequate 
consideration of the theoretical or practical context of their implementation. 
This thesis consists of a circular journey in four stages1. Firstly, I critically explore theoretical issues in the 
philosophy of medicine and clinical decision-making models. I demonstrate that what is problematic about 
these issues is an inadequate account of values (Chapters 2-3). Secondly, I contextualise these issues within 
the relatively new entity of an AMS (Chapter 4). Thirdly, I provide a plausible account of how values are 
involved in decision-making within an AMS, based on ethnographic and interview data (Chapter 5-7). 
Fourthly, I return to theoretical issues in the philosophy of medicine and clinical decision-making models in 
light of empirical findings (Chapters 8-9). 
 
1 This is articulated later in terms of a research question and 6 sub-ordinate questions (see: Chapter 5 Aim and objectives). 
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In Chapter 2, I identify two key concepts in healthcare decision-making: sickness and futility. A critical 
exploration of different concepts of sickness draws connections between epistemological approaches, 
ontological preconceptions and fundamental values. Turning to futility, I note that the concept of futility has 
been characterised to a very limited extent in current literature. This is related to frameworks of the goals 
and values of healthcare. A search for a consistent and realistic framework ends in disappointment.  
In Chapter 3, I review prominent models of clinical decision-making, categorised by therapeutic relationship 
(paternalism and anti-paternalism), cognitive speed and values-consciousness. I argue that the tension 
between paternalism and anti-paternalism reflects an underlying tension between competing fundamental 
values, the selection of which is arbitrary. A prominent model of clinical decision-making adapted from 
research in cognitive psychology shows promise. However,  its anthropology seems reductionistic and its 
account of values seems incomplete. Values-conscious clinical decision-making models are more 
philosophically sophisticated but nevertheless exhibit ambiguity in important respects. 
In Chapter 4, I paint a picture of what an AMS is, according to contemporary literature. Simultaneously a 
medical specialty, an organisational unit and a place for healing, an AMS is difficult to define. The priorities 
of an AMS include managing patients urgently, in addition to other priorities that may pull in other directions. 
An AMS is thus an environment in which decision-making is both pressured and stretched. If a lack of 
understanding of the role of values in decision-making is problematic, this problem may be felt most 
exquisitely within an AMS. 
In the methodology, Chapter 4, I describe the way in which I strive to provide a plausible account of how 
values are involved in decision-making within an AMS. My empirical methodology is an ethnography of an 
AMS with semi-structured interviews. My analytic methodology is a thematic analysis of interviews and field 
notes that borrows from the discipline of philosophical hermeneutics. In this chapter I also reflect on how I 
found being in the field. 
In chapters 6, 7, and 8 I present my interpretive analysis of empirical data. Each chapter relates to one of 
three major themes: restoring order, working together and what’s best. Each chapter features a triad. 
In Restoring order, there is a triad of problems. The single aim of an AMS is to restore order but this involves 
addressing three kinds of problem. When one kind of problem is not helped, participants have a sense of 
futility. The nature of this futility depends on the kind of problem that goes unaddressed. 
In Working together, there is a triad of needs. Within an AMS, people restore order by working together to 
alleviate needs. Although this is a single collaborative effort, there are different portrayals of what the need 
actually is: professional need, personal need and organisational need. Sometimes all three needs are 
17 
 
satisfied harmoniously. When one kind of need is overlooked, however, participants experience what I have 
termed ‘cacophony’. The nature of this cacophony depends on the kind of need which remains unalleviated. 
In What’s best, there is a triad of values. Within an AMS, people work together to restore order by figuring 
out what course of action is best. A course of action is appraised according to three values simultaneously: 
welfare, choice and effectiveness. Sometimes a course of action is endorsed by all three evaluative standards. 
At other times, a decision involves value conflict, which is when things become more difficult. 
In the discussion, chapter 9, I recapitulate the narrative of the data chapters by presenting a ‘trivalent’ 
approach to decision-making within an AMS. I then employ this trivalent framework as a tool by which to 
critically appraise the theoretical issues raised in Chapters 2 and 3.  
Finally, Chapter 10 summarises the connections between this empirical study and the theoretical terrain in 
which it is situated. This interpretive account of the role of values in decision-making within an AMS proves 
fruitful ground for responding to some of the theoretical issues in the philosophy of medicine and clinical 









Chapter 2. Philosophy of Medicine 
In this chapter, I identify the lack of a framework of values in healthcare that is adequate to account for 
decision-making in times of conflict. In order to demonstrate this, I use two starting points. Firstly, an 
exploration of the concept of sickness draws connections between epistemological approaches and 
fundamental values. Fundamental values can endorse incompatible courses of action, manifesting as 
insoluble conflict in decision-making. Secondly, an extended exploration of the concept of futility shows the 
inadequacy of monist and pluralist accounts of the goals and values of healthcare in controversial cases.  
This chapter lays the theoretical groundwork for Chapter 3, which considers the frameworks of values  to 
which contemporary decision-making models are committed. 
2.1 Two key concepts in healthcare decision-making 
2.1.1 Sickness 
There is a range of terminology which can be used to describe the opposite of being well. Such terms include 
sickness, illness, disease and dysfunction. There is an extensive body of literature on the history of such terms 
and their distinguishing features. For instance, ‘illness’ is typically portrayed as emphasising the lived reality 
of a medical condition in contrast to ‘disease’ or ‘dysfunction’, which emphasises the aberrant physiology of 
a body part (Boorse, 1999; Fulford, 2000). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore each of these terms 
in detail. Instead, I seek to characterise this cluster of non-health terms; namely, what it is to not be well. 
For this purpose, I use the broad notion of ‘sickness’ to represent this cluster of unhealthy terminology.  
Susan Sontag famously contrasts being well with being sick in the poetic opening to Illness as Metaphor: 
‘Everyone who is born holds dual citizenship, in the kingdom of the well and in the kingdom of the 
sick. Although we all prefer to use only the good passport, sooner or later each of us is obliged, at 
least for a spell, to identify ourselves as citizens of that other place’ (1983: 3). 
Upon identification as ‘citizens of that other place’, people become patients: the sick. In general terms, the 
recognition of sickness is usually the motivation for clinical attention and the justification of clinical 
intervention.  
More specifically, a recognition of sickness by a patient, relative or clinician marks the beginning of the 
process of healthcare decision-making. Some survey studies have shown that adults ordinarily experience 
symptoms on a regular, even daily, basis (Dunnell and Cartwright, 1972; Banks et al., 1975). However, it is 
only once these symptoms are interpreted as a possible illness that a patient would seek medical attention, 
concerned that ‘all is not well’ (Armstrong, 2003: 3). Likewise, it is only once a patient’s presentation 
resembles an illness that a clinician would typically intervene. A patient’s experience and a clinician’s 
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assessment are thus hermeneutic enterprises that assess whether the clinical information means the patient 
is sick (2003: 3–14). 
However, it could be countered that there are instances when an intervention is administered prior to any 
recognition of sickness. For example, a general practitioner (GP) may prescribe statin medications to prevent 
a myocardial infarction even if the patient has never experienced any symptoms of cardiac ischaemia2. 
Secondly, a child may be immunised against polio-myelitis despite not showing any signs of contracting this 
disease. Thirdly, a patient on an Acute Medicine ward in a comatose state could be administered steroids in 
the absence of a diagnosis. 
The decision to initiate even such treatments as these, though, is still prompted by the recognition of a 
significant risk of sickness3. In the first example, a GP may prescribe statin medication if the risk of 
cardiovascular disease is sufficiently high to warrant it. In the second example, a child may be immunized 
against polio-myelitis because the risk of contracting the serious disease in the future is sufficient to warrant 
the extremely low harm of the intervention4. In the third example, the woman in a coma has a greatly 
increased risk of steroid-responsive sickness (and a near-certain risk of sickness of some kind, given that 
healthy people do not come in comatose states.) 
There are undoubtedly exceptions to the rule that a recognition of sickness, or risk of sickness, represents 
the start of healthcare decision-making. Sometimes healthcare decisions are made on the basis of resource 
limitations and personal demands which, arguably, are not necessarily related to a recognition of sickness. 
Nevertheless, recognising (risk of) sickness is an important early step in healthcare decision-making. As a 
result, how ‘sickness’ is conceived is an influential part of this process. 
Sontag’s metaphor of ‘dual citizenship’ (1983: 3) is a caution against posing a false dichotomy between well-
being and sickness. Bearing this warning in mind, I offer a brief taxonomy of well-being and a brief taxonomy 
of sickness. These taxonomies are epistemological rather than ontological. Rather than describing different 
states of well-being and sickness (such as getting a pay rise or breaking a leg), I intend to describe their 
different conceptualisation. 
 
2 ‘Cardiac ischaemia’ refers to a lack of blood flow to the heart. This tends to be caused by coronary artery disease and is a risk 
factor for subsequent myocardial infarction. 
3 In some instances, an increased risk of illness is itself considered an illness. This is the case in asymptomatic essential 
hypertension, for example, which is recognised as a predisposition to acute cardiovascular events such as stroke or myocardial 
infarction. 
4 There is also an additional benefit of achieving herd immunity, if there is widespread uptake of immunisation across a population. 
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2.1.1.1 Two kinds of well-being 
In an appendix to his influential book Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit proposed a categorisation of 
theories of well-being: hedonism, desire-fulfilment theories and objective list theories (1984: 493ff.). 
Philosophers of medicine have subsequently followed Parfit’s division into subjectivist theories of well-being 
(such as hedonism and desire-fulfilment) and objectivist theories (such as objective list theories). Subjectivist 
theories have been described as models of ‘taste’ and objectivist theories as models of ‘perception’ (Griffin, 
1996: 20 ff.). As philosopher of medicine Thomas Schramme puts it: ‘Either something [such as well-being] 
is valuable because it is desired (taste model) or something is desired because it is valuable (perception 
model)’5 (Schramme, 2017: 161). 
According to this categorisation, both a subjectivist approach and an objectivist approach could deem the 
same person to be well for different reasons. The two kinds of reasons are described by Parfit’s colleague, 
James Griffin, as ‘states of mind’ reasons and ‘states of the world’ reasons. The former improve the amount 
of pleasure experienced in the world and the latter improve the conditions in the world (1986: 7–20). The 
two kinds of reason are inevitably linked: improving people’s states of mind constitutes a change in the 
world, and improving the world may bring about a change in people’s states of mind. Nevertheless, the two 
approaches could be said to deal in a slightly different utilitarian currency. 
Griffin transposes Parfit’s subjectivist - objectivist framework into a binary taxonomy of his own. According 
to Griffin, there are two main conceptualisations of well-being, the first of which is a desire account. A desire 
account conceives of well-being as the fulfilment of what people want (actual-desire) (1986: 10); a narrower 
desire account might improve on this by restricting well-being to the fulfilment of only what is rationally 
wanted (informed-desire) (1986: 11). Despite this amendment, Griffin acknowledges a weakness of this 
approach once other people are introduced into the picture: 
‘Why should I accept that your mere desires make a claim on me? You may, when informed, want 
champagne, but if you do not need it, why should my obligations to you be at all engaged?’ (1986: 
40). 
Hence Griffin supplements the desire account with a second conceptualisation: the need account of well-
being. He draws a contrast between the two as follows: 
‘Desires have to do with how a subject of experience looks out on the world; needs have to do with 
whether one thing is in fact a necessary condition of another’ (1986: 41). 
 
5 Schramme goes on to introduce a second way in which objectivist and subjectivist theories can be categorised, according to a 
value-laden or value-free dimension (2017). 
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Griffin endeavours to loosely distinguish between ‘instrumental needs’ and, morally weightier ‘basic needs’, 
defining the latter as ‘what we need to survive, to be healthy, to avoid harm, to function properly’ (1986: 
42). Without using the word, Griffin’s depiction of human need entails a vision of human flourishing, a vision 
of the good life which is beyond mere opinion.  
Despite carving his binary taxonomy of well-being along the subjectivist-objectivist axis inherited from Parfit, 
Griffin comments that this need not be a strict dichotomy; there is scope for an ‘eclectic concept’ that 
borrows from both sides of the debate (1986: 42). It is not my interest here to take sides in this debate; 
rather, I wish to identify what the debating sides are. As Schramme notes, ‘the philosophical debate on well-
being is mainly concerned with the problem of whether it is subjective or objective’ (2017b: 168), namely, 
whether being well is a ‘mode of consciousness or of existence’ (2017b: 159). Proponents of the latter tend 
to presuppose a vision of perspective-independent human flourishing6 (2017b: 163). 
In summary, the way well-being is conceptualised can be grouped into two broad approaches. A subjectivist 
approach conceives of well-being in terms of pleasure, taste, states of mind, desires and modes of 
consciousness. An objectivist approach, in contrast, conceives of well-being in terms of an objective list, 
perception, need and perspective-independent human flourishing. 
2.1.1.2 Two kinds of sickness 
Having sketched two ways of conceptualising well-being, I turn to do the same for one of well-being’s 
antonyms, sickness. As with well-being, one approach approximates to an objectivist approach and the other 
to a subjectivist approach. 
2.1.1.2.1 Biomedical model 
The biomedical model of sickness is associated with the object-oriented and laboratory-oriented 
cosmologies in the history of medicine (Jewson, 1976). Nevertheless, it continues to be a prominent 
theoretical approach today, and its proponents can be broadly grouped into two camps: naturalists and 
normativists. The former consider sickness to be a value-free category whereas the latter acknowledge 
medical categories such as sickness to be inevitably value-laden (Kingma, 2017). According to normativists, 
to have a disease or illness is to have something which is bad or harmful in some way (Margolis, 1976; Agich, 
1983; Cooper, 2002). What both camps agree on, however, is that having a disease (defined as biological 
dysfunction) is a necessary condition of being sick. 
For instance, Christopher Boorse is a biological naturalist who equates health with normality. An organism 
is healthy ‘insofar as its mode of functioning conforms to the natural design of that kind of organism’ (1999,: 
 
6 Some authors might seek a basis for objective standards of human living by appeal to John Rawls’ primary social goods (1971). 
This, I contend, is simply another preconception of human flourishing, albeit one which is minimally characterised. 
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20). Boorse intentionally builds on C. Daly King’s early attempts to define health and normality ‘objectively… 
as that which functions in accordance with its design’ (1945). As one author summarises it, a biostatistical 
account ‘defines health as normal function and normal function as the statistically typical contribution to 
survival and reproduction in a reference class’ (Kingma, 2017: 52). To be sick, on this account, is to function 
abnormally.  
Normativists also construe sickness as biological dysfunction but are more explicit about the value-laden 
nature of the proper function: sickness is dysfunction-plus-harm. For example, neo-Aristotelians evaluate a 
condition as healthy or ill with reference to a presupposed view of flourishing: ‘to be a good entity of some 
sort is to do the kind of things that that sort does’ (Kingma, 2017: 59). On a neo-Aristotelian account, then, 
an eye that fails to see is not flourishing because seeing is what eyes do (and are supposed to do).  
I do not intend to provide a full critique of the biomedical model of sickness. For the purposes of this thesis, 
what is significant is that the biomedical model endeavours to conceptualise sickness in objective terms. To 
be sick is to fail to flourish in some way. For the naturalist, this failure to flourish takes the form of statistical 
abnormality associated with an impediment to evolutionary progress. For the normativist, it takes the form 
of failing to function as something should function. Whilst a biomedical model does not exclude the lived 
reality of sickness7, feeling sick is not a necessary condition of sickness; what sickness requires is biological 
abnormality compared to a vision of proper function. In this sense, the biomedical model is an objectivist 
approach to defining sickness. 
2.1.1.2.2 Social constructionism 
2.1.1.2.2.1 Biographical disruption 
However, some authors find the biomedical model of sickness unsatisfactory. Biological approaches, 
including biostatistical as well as neo-Aristotelian models, draw lines around what is proper and what is not. 
As biologist-turned-bioethicist Jackie Leach Scully comments, ‘the lines drawn around normality, 
abnormality and disability are not self-evident. These lines determine many moral choices in research and 
healthcare, and they shift according to experience and perspective’ (2004: 652). Biological functionalist 
models appeal to science for their legitimacy. However, as Scully continues, ‘science does not stand above 
the culture in which it operates, and the influences flow both ways’ (2004: 652).  
The biomedical model of sickness tends to overlook the socially constructed aspect of the concept of 
sickness. Instead of simply contrasting someone’s physiology with a biological norm, some social 
 
7 Biological naturalist Thomas Szasz arguably comes close to this in his provocative work The Myth of Mental Illness (1962). 
However, Szasz is not here denying the reality of psychological and social phenomena; rather, he is challenging the diagnostic 




constructionist approaches to sickness portray it as a culturally-embedded disruption in personal identity: a 
biographical disruption8 (Bury, 1982; Mattingly, 1991). Havi Carel writes: 
‘Becoming ill creates a need to find meaning for a new narrative: the narrative of health that has now 
been disrupted by illness’ (2013: 98). 
As well as biographical disruption, sociological accounts of sickness feature the related notions of ‘symbolic 
transformation’ (Fleischman, 1999), ‘loss of self’ (Charmaz, 1983) and perhaps most famously ‘narrative 
reconstruction’ (Williams, 1984), which is ‘the key process ill patients need to go through as they try to make 
sense of their own life stories and the place of illness within them’ (Armstrong, 2003: 76). According to a 
social constructionist approach, the patient who breaks a collar bone suffers more than a fractured clavicle; 
she experiences a fracture in her experience of life. A wounded organ is accompanied by a wounded life. 
There may conceivably be occasions when there is in fact no evident biological dysfunction but nevertheless 
the patient is sick, suffering an interrupted life story. 
If sickness is socially constructed in this way, to feel unwell is to be unwell9. There is no necessary appeal to 
biological dysfunction or statistical norms; what counts is the patient’s experience of the world. Sickness is 
not just something in the world, it is something in the life-world. The recognition of sickness is not measured 
by any scientific, objective, circumstantial yardstick; rather, sickness is recognised by its intrusion into the 
story of someone’s authentic being-in-the-world (Carel, 2017). In this way, a social constructionist model 
could be described as a subjectivist approach to defining sickness. 
In summary, the two prominent models of sickness that I have presented are reflective of the two kinds of 
well-being described above. There is an objectivist (need-based) approach to well-being and an objectivist 
(biomedical) approach to sickness, both of which make appeal to a vision of human flourishing. There is a 
subjectivist (desire-based) approach to well-being and a subjectivist (social constructionist) approach to 
sickness, both of which make appeal to aspects of personal experience. 
However, this does not exhaust the range of conceptualisations of well-being and sickness. In what follows, 
I present a third theoretical approach that could be considered another kind of social constructionism, albeit 
one that is not defined by personal experience in the same way. 
 
8 In this sense social constructionism could more accurately be termed psychosocial constructionism. 
9 This subjectivity need not be construed individualistically. On a social constructionist model, it is not merely the sick person’s 
subjectivity that counts but also the inter-subjectivity of the  community in which the sick person is situated; the sick person 




In The Genealogy of Morals (2003) and Beyond Good and Evil (1990), philologist Friedrich Nietzsche 
characterises the history of moral philosophy as a power play which is merely disguised as the logical 
deliberation of ethical ideals; rather than the desire for truth, evaluative judgments are reflective of the 
ubiquitous ‘will to power’ (1990, 2003). Appeals to authority, such as result from belief in God, supposedly 
function as a psychological means of soothing the ressentiment of the impoverished and powerless. A change 
in authority, such as a conviction that ‘God is dead and we have killed him’ (1974) would result in a revolution 
in evaluative standards, and an acknowledgement of perspectivism – ‘the doctrine that any belief is just an 
interpretation of the world from a particular point of view, there being no objective authority for values’ 
(Hicks, 2003: 77). 
The Nietzschean themes of power and the ‘revaluation of all values’ (Hicks, 2003: 72) were picked up by 
Foucault and applied to contemporary institutions such as the prison, the asylum and the clinic (1975, 1984). 
Foucault identified several means by which the medical profession has historically maintained its powerful 
posture in society, such as by ‘hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and examination’ (May, 1992: 
42–43). Authoritative evaluations within a clinical context are not simply the product of neutral, rational 
professionals; rather, they are the product of those in charge procuring their agenda through ‘anatomo-
politics of the human body’ and ‘bio-politics of the population’ (Foucault in May, 1992: 40). In Foucauldian 
terms, the professional’s evaluation of a patient’s situation is not merely the result of the clinician’s position 
of power but also constitutive of it. As Hicks summarises: 
‘Foucault shows that… what is made manifest by these hidden power relations are the disciplinary 
practices and institutions whose aim is to ‘normalize’ and ‘standardize’ human life’ (2003: 98).  
The perspectivism that Nietzsche and Foucault so fervently preached does not deny the reality of diagnosis 
or the knowledge of illness. Rather, they recognise that such knowing has an overlooked primary function: 
‘Knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting’ (Foucault in May, 1992: 154). 
On this account, a diagnosis of sickness is not primarily a truth claim about a state of affairs; it is a tool with 
the power to bring about an effect. It is architectural or, to return to Nietzsche’s terminology, genealogical. 
Feminist critic, Susan Sherwin, also characterises the role of the medical tradition in genealogical terms: 
‘With its authority to define what is normal and what is pathological and to coerce compliance to its 
norms, medicine tends to strengthen patterns of stereotyping and reinforce existing power 
inequalities’ (Sherwin, 1992: 22). 
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On this view, the controlling influence of the medical tradition is not limited to dramatic controversies. 
Rather, it extends into the everyday process of diagnosing illness, by way of regulating what is normal; 
‘exactly what constitutes disease, degeneration, defect or deficit… is decided by reference to a biomedical 
norm’ (Scully, 2004: 651), over which the profession is sovereign10.  
According to a genealogical approach, then, sickness is a concept which is used to procure the agenda of 
those in charge. Like biographical disruption, genealogy could be described as a social constructionist 
approach that defines sickness in experiential terms. However, rather than being rooted in the experience 
of a person’s challenged identity, genealogy is rooted in the experience of humanity’s ‘will to power’ (1990, 
2003). 
I have presented one objectivist account of sickness and two subjectivist accounts. To conclude, I illustrate 
these with an imaginary case.  
Winston Glover is admitted to an Acute Medicine ward with swollen legs and feeling breathless on 
minimal exertion. On the ward, he is assessed by three doctors, all of whom agree that Winston is 
sick.  
Dr Biomedicine looks across  at Winston’s ECG and notes an abnormally fast heart rate; he looks at 
Winston’s chest X-ray and notes an abnormally wide heart shadow with abnormal amounts of fluid 
present in the pleura either side: “yes, heart failure”, Dr Biomedicine concludes.  
Dr Biography sits at the bedside and listens as Winston tells how he has been lately, compared to how 
active he usually is. Winston describes his regular hobby of gardening, and his friends down at the 
vegetable plot. “I see, so this this just isn’t you at all!”, exclaims Dr Biography before sighing “oh dear, 
heart failure.” 
Dr Genealogy has just written the hospital’s heart failure protocol, which defines what level of 
breathlessness is acceptable and what is not. This protocol helps prevent over-treating with expensive 
medications. “I think it’s my heart that’s playing up, doctor”, says Winston. “I’ll be the judge of that”, 
says Dr Genealogy, gazing down alternately between Winston and the proforma boxes she is ticking 
in front of her, which determine whether Winston meets the criteria for treatment according to the 
new protocol: “okay, heart failure”, she concludes. 
 
10 A cynical perspective on the medical profession’s power was expressed lucidly by Ivan Illich, who noted the toxic societal effects 
of ‘iatrogenesis’ and put forward the pejorative notion of ‘medicalisation’ (1974). The over-reach of medical categories and 




Sickness is a key concept in healthcare decision-making. Like its counterpart, well-being, it can be 
conceptualised in objectivist and subjectivist terms. The objectivist biomedical model is typically defined in 
functional terms, in relation to human flourishing. The subjectivist social constructionist models are typically 
defined in experiential terms, in relation to narrative identity or the will to power. 
2.1.2 Futility 
If the recognition of sickness is the approximate starting point of decision-making in healthcare, futility could 
be said to represent the end point. Intuitively, death may seem to mark the end of healthcare decision-
making. After all, death is the point at which there is no more health to care for. However, drawing this line 
is problematic, as the following four scenarios illustrate. Firstly, cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) entails 
decision-making, yet it is enacted in a physiologically grey area between life and death. Secondly, organ 
transplantation preparation entails decision-making, where even in death there remains some health to care 
for: the health of another. Thirdly, a holistic approach to palliative care may deem patient care to continue 
after death. This may take the form of respecting the deceased’s body and providing bereavement support. 
Fourthly, there are instances when a patient is discharged from a healthcare service not because of death 
but because there is no more that can usefully be done. 
In view of this, it may be more precise to say that clinical care, which may start at the recognition of sickness, 
ends not necessarily with death but with the recognition of futility: when further clinical attention of a 
certain kind is not worthwhile. Should a treatment be deemed futile by the responsible clinical team, they 
are under no obligation to provide it (Ardagh, 2000: 398; Biggs, 2007); should a treatment be deemed futile 
by a patient with capacity who withdraws her consent, she is at liberty to decline it (Herring, 2012: 149). 
How futility is conceived is therefore very important in healthcare decision-making in general, and the refusal  
or withdrawal of treatment in particular. 
2.1.2.1 Futility in theory 
The extent to which the concept of futility has been characterised in medical literature is surprisingly limited, 
given the influential nature of such an ‘ethical trump card’ (Weijer and Elliott, 1995: 683). Schneiderman et 
al highlighted the potency of the concept of futility in decision-making:  
‘Futility is a professional judgment that takes precedence over patient autonomy and permits 
physicians to withhold or withdraw care deemed to be inappropriate without subjecting such a 
decision to patient approval’ (1990). 
Schneiderman et al proceeded to provide one of the most well-known depictions of futility, which rests on 
two criteria. A treatment is futile if it either lacks impact or if the impact lacks benefit (1990). However, 
‘benefit’ is arguably just as difficult to define: by what standard is benefit to be assessed? To define benefit 
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in terms of conferring some good is to simply kick the semantic can down the road; ‘good’ is notoriously 
difficult to define, as its colourful history in ethics literature demonstrates (MacIntyre, 2002). Yet without 
further characterisation, futility risks being used as a tool to sidestep proper ethical deliberation, repealing 
the ‘hard gained advances in patient autonomy’ (Schneiderman et al, 1996). 
Some efforts have been made to characterise futility further. Schneiderman et al endeavoured to delineate 
two different kinds of futility. A course of action is quantitatively futile if it was useless in the last 100 similar 
cases; it is qualitatively futile if it merely extends unconsciousness or ventilator-dependence (1990). Five 
years later, Brody and Halevy proposed a four-fold categorisation of futility: physiologic, imminent demise, 
lethal condition and qualitative futility (1995). Ardagh considers such conceptualisations to have merely 
‘”muddied the waters” of decision-making’, introducing a new term for the age-old notion of balancing 
benefits and harms (2000: 399). Others are tempted to give up on the quest of defining futility, instead 
embracing an attitude of ‘while it cannot be defined, we certainly know it when we see it’ (Halevy and Brody, 
1996: 571). 
A more forceful criticism of these conceptualisations is that they fail to address the main philosophical 
difficulty behind the notion of futility: 
‘In the most controversial cases in which futility is invoked the disagreement between doctors and 
families is not about the probability that an intervention will work but about the goals that it will 
serve’ (Weijer and Elliott, 1995: 684). 
A therapeutic intervention is futile, then, ‘when it cannot alter the likelihood of [a] defined goal emerging 
into reality’ (Mohindra, 2007: 75). However, in practice, the difficulty with the concept of futility is not what 
it means but what the goal of treatment is (Chwang, 2009: 491). 
2.1.2.2 Futility, goals and values 
Chwang considers previous literature defining futility to have been wrong-headed: ‘The concept of futility is 
univocal and easy to grasp; there is nothing complex or murky about it’ (2009: 489). For Chwang, ascertaining 
what the goals of treatment are is the difficulty; defining futility is easy: ‘futility is uselessness’ (2009: 487). 
The concept of futility is difficult to apply because there is often a lack of clarity about the fundamental goals 
of treatment. According to Gillon, this can also be expressed as a lack of clarity about the values involved in 
treatment decisions. Assessing futility involves asking the following question: 
‘how valuable or otherwise are the outcomes, and according to whose values— patients’ or their 
surrogates’, doctors’, and other health professionals’, managers’ or societies’ values?’ (1997: 339) 
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In summary, futility is a key concept in healthcare decision-making. There is no consensus on how best to 
define it. According to Chwang and Gillon, applying the concept of futility requires clarity regarding the goals 
of healthcare treatment and the values involved in healthcare decision-making. 
2.2 Goals of healthcare 
‘It is a simple fact but almost universally ignored in modern thought that when one loses sight of the end of 
one’s thought and action, the thought and action waver between fanaticism and futility’ (Buchanan in 
Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1981: 151). If this be the case, then a consideration of medicine’s goals will not 
just help define futility in medicine, but help prevent the futility of medicine. 
Thomas Schramme, in his study of the goals of medicine, recognises two main approaches to this subject: a 
consensual approach and a teleological approach (2017a). A consensual approach tends to yield a plurality 
of goals (which I refer to as goal-pluralism) whereas a teleological approach tends to yield a single ultimate 
goal (which I refer to as goal-monism). 
2.2.1 Goal-pluralism 
It is not a new claim to say that medicine pursues multiple goals. Implicit within the Hippocratic Oath is a 
range of both positive and negative obligations (Holm, 2017: 396–397). However, The Oath is arguably more 
explicit about what is excluded from the proper scope of medicine than what is included. From its wording, 
it is difficult to characterise the positive goals of medicine beyond the ‘benefit’ of the sick and the prevention 
of ‘harm and injustice’ to patients (U.S. National Library of Medicine, 2012). 
In 1979, Thomas McKeown formulated four core goals of medicine as follows: 
1. To assist us to come safely into the world 
2. To support us comfortably out of the world 
3. To protect the healthy 
4. To care for the sick and disabled (in Armstrong, 2003: 130). 
Whilst the multiplicity of goals avoids simplistic reduction to a single principle, this strength can also be a 
weakness. What if goal 1 conflicts with goal 3, such as in the case of an unborn baby coming ‘into the world’ 
and a mother whose health is threatened by the baby’s safe arrival? The doctor’s duty to ‘assist’ and to 
‘protect’ are then in unavoidable conflict. In this way, the goals are potentially incoherent. Putting it more 
mildly, adjudicating between goals in times of goal-conflict (in the absence of an overarching meta-goal) is 
arbitrary. 
When there is competition between multiple goals, decision-makers must use clinical judgment in order to 
commit to the best course of action. For example, a GP may decide that the sanctity of the baby’s life renders 
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goal 1 more important than goal 3 and thus express a conscientious objection to abortion (if it were 
requested). A different GP may decide that the mother’s well-being is the primary concern, which may 
render goal 3 more important than goal 1.  
I am not intending here to endorse one goal over the other11. Rather, I am illustrating that it is one over the 
other. In this way, goal pluralism collapses into goal monism. When decision-makers commit to a course of 
action during times of unavoidable goal-conflict, one goal trumps another. Without an overarching meta-
goal to appeal to, such adjudication between competing goals is arbitrary. 
In 1996, the Hastings Center published a more precise list of the goals of medicine. Whilst not exhaustive, 
the list was intended to be a philosophically scrutinised statement of international consensus. Like the earlier 
‘McKeown thesis’ (Bynum, 2008), it features four core goals: 
1. The prevention of disease and injury and promotion and maintenance of health 
2. The relief of pain and suffering caused by maladies 
3. The care and cure of those with a malady and the care of those who cannot be cured 
4. The avoidance of premature death and the pursuit of a peaceful death  (Hastings Center in 
Schramme, 2017a: 125) 
Whilst the plain reading of each goal may sound commonsensical, there are nevertheless contentious 
elements in this list. However, my interest here is not so much in problems within a single goal but the 
problems between multiple goals. Again, there are occasions when multiple goals come into conflict. Like 
McKeown’s earlier list, then, the Hastings Center’s list of goals of medicine also suffers from potential inter-
goal conflict, leaving the decision-maker to adjudicate between competing goals. Such adjudication is 
arbitrary and collapses goal-pluralism (in theory) into goal-monism (in practice). 
Other pluralist accounts of the goals of medicine present dualisms such as both caring and curing (Stegenga, 
2018), or curing and healing (Szawarska, 2017). My aim is not to provide a thorough investigation of each 
one. Instead, I wish to illustrate the shortcomings of goal-pluralism in general. No matter how many goals 
there are, it seems that goal-pluralism in theory collapses to goal-monism in practice. If the goals never 
conflict, they are arguably the same goal and thus a form of goal-monism from the start. If the goals do in 
fact come into conflict, then the process of operationalising such a framework collapses into arbitrary goal-
monism. 
 
11 This brief description of the case omits contextual details and anthropological considerations, which may be essential for an 
adequately nuanced ethical evaluation of the situation. 
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If a course of action is futile insofar as it fails to serve the goals of medicine, and if the ‘most controversial 
cases in which futility is invoked’ (Weijer and Elliott, 1995: 684) are cases of disagreement about the goals 
of medicine, then models of goal-pluralism do not contribute much useful ground to the futility debate. The 
most controversial cases are characterised by unavoidable goal conflict. During unavoidable goal conflict, 
goal-pluralism collapses into an arbitrary goal-monism in practice. Thus, in the most controversial cases, a 
goal-pluralist model deems a treatment to be futile insofar as it fails to serve a single goal, the selection of 
which is arbitrary. This is surely an intolerable conclusion for all but the most hardened of genealogists! 
Perhaps goal-pluralism’s alternative, goal-monism, will avoid such an ethical reductio ad absurdum. 
2.2.2 Goal-monism 
Goal-monist frameworks tends to be the product of a teleological approach to medicine. A teleological 
approach is one which ‘sees medicine as a practice with an inherent telos’ (Schramme, 2017a: 121). What 
kind of ‘practice’ is medicine? I summarise three authors’ responses to this question. 
Stanley Hauerwas describes medicine as a moral practice ‘constituted by intrinsic moral convictions that are 
operative even if not explicitly acknowledged’ (1986: 4). Hauerwas notes a false telos that is cherished by 
the modernist narrative of technical mastery, which fosters the illusion that we can overcome our limitations 
and ‘get out of life alive’ (in Sloane, 2016: 83). Instead, medicine as ‘profession’ must ‘[carry] the wisdom of 
our finitude’ (1986: 13). Recognising both the inevitability and meaningfulness of vulnerability and mortality, 
Hauerwas construes medicine’s goal as for ‘patient and physician alike to be present to one another in times 
of suffering’ in the context of a caring community (1986: 6). 
Whilst Hauerwas’ depiction of medicine’s ultimate goal can be summarised in a single sentence, what it 
entails cannot. What does it mean to be ‘present to one another’? What is a ‘[time] of suffering’ and is it 
synonymous with an episode of illness? What is a community and what does it mean for it to be caring? 
What is the role of other healthcare professionals in this portrayal? Whilst Hauerwas offers insightful 
commentary on the technological-redemption narrative of modern medicine, the theological story in which 
his own theory is embedded requires much more clarification in order to afford a coherent theological 
philosophy of medicine (Sloane, 2016: 87). Until such a time, Hauerwas’ goal-monism (in theory) permits 
such varied interpretations as to function as goal-pluralism (in practice). 
Andrew Sloane describes medicine as a social practice, according to MacIntyre’s famous (and lengthy) 
definition: 
‘any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which 
goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards 
of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result 
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that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, 
are systematically extended’ (1984: 187) 
Sloane acknowledges that, as a socially situated and socially established enterprise, medicine’s telos is thus 
intertwined with broader anthropological concerns:  
‘the nature and justification of medicine as a practice depends on an underlying understanding of 
humanity and the goods proper to our existence as humans’ (2016: 146). 
Portraying the central unit of medical practice as the clinical encounter, a central feature of being human as 
vulnerability, and the central ethos of medicine as communitarian care, Sloane is ready to present his goal-
monist conclusion: 
‘[Medicine’s] goal is to care for vulnerable people in such a way as to enable them to function as 
members of their community as well as can reasonably be expected’ (2016: 147). 
This fundamental telos of medicine Sloane paraphrases as ‘caring for this frail flesh’ (2016: 150). 
A strength of Sloane’s account is that, as a former clinician, he is alert to the complexity of medicine as a 
social practice. He acknowledges the political factors shaping healthcare delivery, the phenomenology of 
illness, the limitations of biomedical science and broader societal influences on the priorities of healthcare.  
A weakness of Sloane’s account is that, like Hauerwas’ account, its goal-monism becomes goal-pluralism 
when operationalised. What does it mean to ‘care’? What are people and how is their vulnerability to be 
assessed? What does good community-functioning entail? By what standard are expectations appraised as 
reasonable? The range of answers with which any one of these questions can be met demonstrates that 
multiple versions of ‘caring for this frail flesh’ are born as soon as this model is applied. As with Hauerwas, 
any proclaimed telos is only as useful as the clarity, comprehensiveness and consensus of the presupposed 
narrative in which it is contextualised. In the absence of such doxa12, Sloane’s goal-monism (in theory) 
disintegrates into goal-pluralism (in practice). 
By far the most prominent account of goal-monism is the teleological account of physician-philosopher 
Edmund Pellegrino13. Like Hauerwas, Pellegrino construes medicine as a moral practice ‘because its end, 
making right decisions about patients with those patients, involves values’ (1981: 151). Like Sloane, 
Pellegrino also construes medicine as a social practice, whose philosophy emerges from the experience of 
 
12 ‘Doxa’ is a Husserlian concept adopted by sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, which the latter used to refer to the subconscious, shared 
epistemic commitments of members of a social field (Deer, 2008): ‘a set of fundamental beliefs which does not even need to be 
asserted in the form of an explicit, self-conscious dogma’ (Bourdieu, 2000: 16). 
13 Much of Pellegrino’s work in the philosophy of medicine was published in conjunction with David C. Thomasma. 
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the clinical encounter (Sloane, 2016: 90) and ‘relates to the more general issues of the good life, the good 
man [sic], and the nature of man and the cosmos’ (Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1981: 281). Unlike both, 
however, Pellegrino also considers medicine to have a culturally-independent essence that ‘sets it apart from 
other activities as an enterprise of a special kind’ (in Sloane, 2016: 90). 
Pellegrino sees the patient’s trust in the physician and healthcare provider as the ‘moral center [sic]’ of 
medical practice, ‘the moment of clinical truth, that which makes medicine what it is’ (Pellegrino and 
Thomasma, 1981: 270). In view of this moral centre, medicine is charged with making decisions with a 
particular therapeutic orientation: ‘what is best for this patient?’ (1981: 178). Such decision-making is 
complex, however, requiring experiential judgement to bridge the gap between ‘medicine as assistance and 
medicine as explanation’ (1981: 67). 
Characterising the telos of medicine is a major focus of Pellegrino’s work in the philosophy of medicine. As 
he puts it, medicine ‘suffers from an abundance of means and a poverty of ends’ and ‘cannot be successful 
until it knows exactly what it is trying to achieve’ (1981: viii). Although aware of the divergence of opinion 
on this subject, Pellegrino emphasises the ‘curative intention’ of medicine as its ultimate goal: 
‘This curative intention is an end-in-view. It is immediate enough in most cases so that it can function 
as the objective of the physician-patient relationship. In this way, it acts as a definer of the 
relationship and a source of judgment about whether or not a good medical decision has been made’ 
(1981: 67). 
The curative inclination of medicine entails an instrumental value, healing, and an intrinsic value, health 
(1981: 282). Thus, on this teleological account, promoting health is the ultimate goal of medicine. In Helping 
and Healing, health is defined subjectively as ‘that state in which we feel able to do the things that we wish 
to do with a minimum of pain and discomfort’ (1997: 15). However, elsewhere Pellegrino states that 
promoting health also must minimally involve ‘organic restoration’ (1981: 72). 
Despite Pellegrino’s painstaking efforts to characterise medicine cautiously, with due attention given to 
philosophical considerations, practical realities and clinical experience, his goal-monism nevertheless 
succumbs to the same instability as the previous two examples.  
Medicine is a hermeneutic enterprise (Svenaeus, 2010). As a result it is possible, even inevitable, that its 
major doctrines afford a range of interpretations. For example, it is disputable whether curing and healing 
are as synonymous as Pellegrino supposes (Szawarska, 2017). Pellegrino’s subjectivist definition of health, 
combined with a vague notion of organic restoration, leaves this telos very difficult to circumscribe. For 
example, is someone who is addicted to narcotics made healthier by a heroine injection, after which she 
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feels able to do the things she wishes to do with minimal pain and discomfort? One interpretation of 
Pellegrino might say “yes”, another interpretation might say “no”. Such hermeneutic conflict could be 
considered conflict within a goal: intra-goal conflict. Insofar as this is the case, Pellegrino’s goal-monism (in 
theory) disintegrates into goal-pluralism (in practice). 
2.2.3 Unity and diversity 
This brief exploration of goal-pluralism and goal-monism leads to a curious conclusion. The theoretical 
diversity of goal-pluralism collapses into goal-monism in times of inter-goal conflict. The theoretical unity of 
goal-monism disintegrates into goal-pluralism in times of intra-goal conflict. Diversity unifies and unity 
diversifies. Either way, theory does not translate to practice. Both goal-pluralism and goal-monism, then, are 
inconsistent and unrealistic frameworks by which to conceive the telos of medicine. 
As a reminder, this exploration of goal-pluralism and goal-monism was prompted by an analysis of the 
concept of futility. Whether or not a course of action is futile depends on the telos of healthcare. It is futile 
if it fails to serve this teleological goal (or set of goals). In the most controversial cases of invoking ‘futility’, 
there is dispute as to what exactly the telos of clinical efforts actually is. This could take the form of inter-
goal or intra-goal conflict. A consideration of goal-pluralism and goal-monism has not resolved this problem. 
Whether a goal-pluralist or goal-monist theory is employed, such a teleological framework is inconsistent 
and unrealistic when applied to cases of controversy. 
An exploration of the concept of futility has led to a critical appraisal of the goals of medicine. I have failed 
to find a framework of goals that can be consistently and realistically applied to cases of controversy in 
clinical practice. Instead of ‘goals’, I now turn to an alternative normative category, one which is of central 
importance to this thesis: values. After exploring what values are and how many there are, I will return to 
consider how values relate to the concepts of sickness and futility. 
2.3 Values of healthcare 
2.3.1 What are values? 
2.3.1.1 In philosophy 
The theory of values has been a prominent theme in philosophy since David Hume drew a distinction 
between ‘is’ statements and ‘ought’ statements in his 1740 book A Treatise on Human Nature (Hume, 1978). 
Hume described a non sequitur which results from confusing ontological and ethical categories, which came 
to be known as the naturalistic fallacy. Seeking to avoid this error, subsequent thinkers adopted a ‘facts-and-
values’ paradigm, in which the categories of description and prescription were neatly unmixed (Davydova 




The facts-and-values paradigm continued to exercise influence in moral philosophy. This is evident in the 
model of prescriptivism presented by R.M. Hare in The Language of Morals, in which descriptive utterances 
are sharply distinguished from prescriptive ones (1963). However, this dichotomy has received fierce 
criticism within philosophy and sociology.  
Within philosophy, John Searle showed that certain facts that he called ‘institutional facts’ already entail 
evaluative notions such as ‘obligations, commitments and responsibilities’ (1969: 190). Others remarked that 
categorising human judgment by way of descriptive and prescriptive utterances is an absurd reduction in the 
first place. One author paraphrases Iris Murdoch on this topic (1970) by describing valuation as ‘a more or 
less continuous part of our waking experience’ (Sayer, 2011, p. 26).  
Within sociology, Alfred Schutz pointed out that the facts-and-values paradigm overlooks some of the 
complexities of human nature, confusing people for empirical ‘puppets’ (Davydova & Sharrock 2003: 363). 
One such complexity is that description and evaluation are inextricably intertwined. Alfred Louch explains: 
‘There are not two stages, an identification of properties and qualities in nature and then an 
assessment of them… There is only one stage: the delineation and description of occurrences in value 
terms’ (1966: 85). 
Hume’s problem, that an ‘ought’ cannot be derived from an ‘is’, sent much of modernist moral philosophy 
on an epistemological wild goose chase. As one author summarises it, ‘this way of framing this question 
comprehensively misses the point’ (Sayer, 2011: 19). In contrast to Hume and his modernist followers, an 
approach which acknowledges the inherently integrated nature of facts and values has come to be known 
as the ‘facts-plus-values’ paradigm14 (Fulford, 1999). 
However, discussion of the relationship between values and facts does not provide a workable 
characterisation of what values are. The term ‘values’ has such a broad and nebulous semantic range that 
George Orwell listed it as one of the most useless words in the English language (2013: 5–8)! For the purposes 
of this study, I will characterise what I mean by values by drawing on two sources: one ancient and one 
contemporary. 
Aristotle opens his Nichomachean Ethics with a discussion of what ‘good’ is. In this account, some goods are 
subordinate to other goods. The good is ‘that at which all things aim’ (1941: 935). The chief good must be 
something ‘which we desire for its own sake’ (1941: 935). Having commended the political life and the 
 




contemplative life in passing, Aristotle eventually identifies the chief good as happiness15, which is ‘the best, 
noblest, and most pleasant thing in the world’ (1941: 945); it is ‘final and self-sufficient, and is the end of 
action’ (1941: 942). For the purposes of this thesis, however, what is of interest is not so much Aristotle’s 
nomination of happiness as chief good but the characterisation that he offers next. 
Is happiness ‘among the things that are praised or rather among the things that are prized’ (1941: 949, 
emphasis added)? This is the question to which Aristotle turns. Things which are praised are commended 
with reference to some standard which is presupposed as good. For instance, Aristotle says that a strong 
man and a good runner are praised because they are ‘related in a certain way to something good and 
important’ such as strength and speed (1941: 949). In contrast, things which are prized are not praised with 
reference to some other standard. Prized things are ‘more divine and better’ (1941: 949). Rather, it is ‘by 
reference to these all other things are judged’ (1941: 949–950). To Aristotle, happiness is not something 
praised but prized; it is with reference to happiness that other things are esteemed as praiseworthy. 
I now rephrase Aristotle in the language of values. Things which are praised are things which are valued. This 
may include things that people prefer and wish for (Fulford, 2014). Things which are prized are values; they 
are the standards by which other things are deemed praiseworthy. They are the ‘end-points of iterative 
enquiry’ (Little, 2014b: 172)16. However, a degree of nuance must be added to this Aristotelian dichotomy 
of praised things (which are valued) and prized things (which are values). To express this, I refer to a more 
contemporary source. 
Andrew Sayer is a social and political theorist who explores the nature of values in Why Things Matter to 
People (2011). He notes that ‘values are not merely a priori… they are to some extent the product of 
interactions and experiences’ (2011: 27). Whereas Aristotle professed happiness to be the perfect prize 
through a process of contemplation, Sayer cautions that our ‘professed values’ could be different to our 
‘values in use’, given that we acquire values ‘between the two extremes of passive osmosis and extended 
reflection on experience’ (2011: 26).  
In a manner that could arguably be harmonised with Aristotelian phronesis, Sayer suggests that we ‘think of 
values as “sedimented” valuations that have become attitudes or dispositions, which we come to regard as 
justified’ (2011: 25). Sayer sees values as ‘more abstract than the particular concrete evaluations from which 
 
15 Aristotelian happiness has also been translated as ‘flourishing’ in order to avoid confusion with momentary pleasures: ‘for one 
swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy’ 
(1941: 943). 
16 The Nichomachean Ethics thus features an adumbration of Ronald Dworkin’s taxonomy of goods: things which are praised 
approximate to instrumental goods and subjective goods, and things which are prized approximate to intrinsic and inviolable goods 
(1993). However, Dworkin is less explicit about intrinsic and inviolable goods functioning as evaluative standards. I return to 
consider Dworkin’s taxonomy in the Discussion (see: Chapter 9 Trivalent framework). 
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they derive and which they in turn influence’ (2011: 25–26). Rather than a strict binary of praised things and 
prized things (values), ‘the relation between values and particular valuations is… recursive’ (2011: 26). 
In this thesis, I employ a facts-plus-values paradigm which adopts a qualified Aristotelian schema: values are 
the standards by which things are judged good or bad, which are in turn shaped and sustained by such 
judgments. 
2.3.1.2 In healthcare  
I now turn to briefly summarise what the values are, or are said to be, of UK healthcare. 
The Care Quality Commission (CQC) sets the standards by which UK healthcare organisations are monitored. 
Organisations which are deemed to be high-performing according to CQC standards are ‘allowed greater 
spending freedoms and… subject to less close performance managing’ (Newdick and Smith in Francis, 2013: 
1742). Thus, healthcare organisations are in the paradoxical situation of being free to act insofar as their 
actions are compliant with CQC standards; they are free to do what they have to do17. 
The CQC regulates according to five values nationwide:  
‘We ask the same five questions of every service – Is it safe? Is it effective? Is it caring? Is it 
responsive? Is it well-led?’ (2016: 3).  
Such standardisation is no embarrassment to the CQC, who explicitly promote the development of a ‘shared 
vision of high-quality care’ (2016: 3).  
This sentiment is shared by Lord Darzi in his report High Quality Care for All: NHS next stage final review 
(Department of Health, 2008). In this report, he laments the lack of shared vision for the NHS. To address 
this, he recommends the establishment of an NHS Constitution, which will ‘set out the purpose, principles 
and values for the NHS’. Such a statement of values would apply to the entirety of NHS organisations and 
have a regulatory function: ‘it must have bite, with means for enforcement and redress, not just warm words 
or aspirations’ (2016: 78).  
Lord Darzi’s efforts came to fruition in 2012, when the first version of the NHS Constitution was published. 
All NHS bodies, including foundation trusts, are subject to its statutory authority (Francis, 2013b: 1412). 
Whilst its general guidance is open to 10-yearly review, the seven core guiding principles which feature in 
the constitution may not. Referring to the Health Act 2009, Francis notes that the NHS Constitution’s core 
principles are unchanging (2013b: 1412). These principles are listed in table 2.1 (Department of Health, 2015: 
3–4).  
 
17 The expression is borrowed from Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (2007). 
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The NHS provides a comprehensive service, available to all 
Access to NHS services is based on clinical need, not an individual’s ability to pay 
The NHS aspires to the highest standards of excellence and professionalism 
The patient will be at the heart of everything the NHS does 
The NHS works across organisational boundaries and in partnership with other 
organisations in the interest of patients, local communities and the wider population 
The NHS is committed to providing best value for taxpayers’ money and the most effective, 
fair and sustainable use of finite resources 
The NHS is accountable to the public, communities and patients that it serves 
Table 2.1: Core principles of the NHS 
In addition to the seven guiding principles, six NHS values are articulated in the NHS Constitution. These 
values ‘provide common ground for co-operation to achieve shared aspirations, at all levels of the NHS’ and 
are listed in table 2.2 (2015: 5). 
Working together for patients 
Respect and dignity 




Table 2.2: Values of the NHS 
The following year, Lord Francis QC published his Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public 
Inquiry (2013b). One key message of volume 3 of this report suggests that the healthcare system ‘identify a 
means of ensuring a common culture of positive values... prevailing over, and driving out, negative values’ 
(2013b: 1357). Whilst pleased with the arrival of the NHS Constitution and accompanying NHS values, Francis 
considers it to have under-penetrated day-to-day NHS work. Despite a vast array of bureaucratic ‘checks and 
balances’, Mid Staffordshire Foundation Trust exhibited a culture which is ‘focused on doing the system’s 
business – not that of the patients’ (2013a: 4).  
In reaction to this, Francis suggests that compliance with NHS Constitution standards should be incorporated 
into CQC monitoring, reflected in NICE guidance and ‘owned’ more by patients and professional staff (2013b: 
1399). This has given rise to values-based recruitment (VBR), which is currently used in England ‘to select 
healthcare staff, trainees and students on the basis that their values align with those stated in the 
Constitution’ (Groothuizen et al., 2018: 1). 
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2.3.2 How many values are there? 
2.3.2.1 In healthcare  
2.3.2.1.1 Grey literature 
Lord Francis QC did not simply appropriate the NHS values in order to bolster and re-assert them. He 
suggested an amendment that identifies one value as more fundamental than the others: ‘the overriding 
value of the NHS should be that patients are put first in everything done’ (2013b: 1416, emphasis added). 
Francis diligently shows that this overriding meta-value is reflected in the professional guidance of the full 
range of healthcare professions. 
Francis points out that the General Medical Council identifies the first duty of a doctor as to ‘make the care 
of your patient your first concern’, which is followed by the duties to treat patients ‘as individuals and respect 
their dignity’ (General Medical Council, 2013). He observes that such a patient-first principle is echoed in 
nursing literature; the code of conduct for registered nurses, published by the Nursing and Midwifery 
Council, asserts that all nurses must ‘make the care of people [their] first concern, treating them as 
individuals and respecting their dignity’ (Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2008: 3). The Health and Care 
Professions Council (HCPC) regulates 15 professions, from physiotherapists to social workers. Francis 
analyses the HCPC’s code of conduct document and notes the requirement to put service users first, treating 
them with respect and dignity (2013b: 1407). Finally, Francis summarises managerial guidance which also 
endorses the primacy of patients, which he refers to as a ‘patient-centred approach’ (2013b: 1408). 
In the eyes of Lord Francis QC, then, the NHS operates according to multiple values of which one is the 
fundamental value: being patient-centred. The quality of healthcare, including decision-making, can be 
ultimately appraised by the single evaluative standard of patient-centredness. The Francis Report is thus 
extremely significant in terms of values. Where Lord Darzi proposed a form of value-pluralism, Lord Francis 
QC adds a qualification which renders this framework to be, fundamentally, a form of value-monism. 
2.3.2.1.2 Bioethics literature 
An alternative perspective is voiced by feminist ethicist Sara Fry, in The Role of Caring in a Theory of Nursing 
Ethics (1992). Although preceding the Francis Report by some 24 years, her critique of the value-base of 
healthcare somewhat undermines Lord Francis’ survey of professional guidance by challenging the supposed 
consensus on which his value-monism depends. She argues that the voice of non-medical healthcare 
professions has been stifled by the presumption that their ethics is merely a ‘subset of contemporary medical 
ethics’ (1992: 93). Fry describes a Procrustean tendency to interpret nursing ethics according to ready-made 
models of medical ethics. Such models include bioethical principlism, contract theory, human rights theory 
and Rawlsian justice theories. The effect of this tendency is to ‘espouse a masculine approach to decision-
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making and ethical analysis’ (1992: 93). If this is the case, then Francis’ survey of the ethic of all major 
healthcare professions is in fact only a survey of medical ethics in all its major guises.  
Fry proceeds to divide bioethical literature on the value foundations of healthcare into two groups. Firstly, 
there are theories which prize the principle of respect for autonomy (Engelhart, 1986), whose fundamental 
value is choice. Secondly, there are theories which prize the principle of beneficence (Pellegrino and 
Thomasma, 1988), whose fundamental value is welfare. Fry sees the problem with this as one of scope: 
‘there is no good reason to assume that autonomy and producing good are, de facto, the appropriate value 
foundations for the practice of nursing simply because they are accepted for the practice of medicine’ (1992: 
95–96). 
Some authors look for an alternative value basis for healthcare work in the notion of caring. The first major 
step in this direction came from developmental psychologist Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice, in which 
she cautiously posited that men’s moral evaluations tend to be justice-oriented whereas women’s tend to 
be care-oriented (1982).  Nel Noddings builds on Gilligan’s work, intending to maintain a consciously 
‘feminine’ approach and a focus on care, which she defines as the attitude which accompanies being 
‘charged with the protection, welfare, or maintenance of something or someone’ (1984: 9). On Noddings’ 
relational model, good healthcare depends on ‘the maintenance of conditions that will permit caring to 
flourish’ (1984: 5)18. 
With regard to the value-foundation of healthcare, I have presented a sample of models in bioethical 
literature. Some of these are consciously subversive of traditional theorising in healthcare ethics and none 
of them holds patient-centredness to be their fundamental value. Traditional models tend to portray a 
foundational value of choice or welfare; anti-traditionalist models appeal to an alternative value foundation, 
such as the value of caring.  
There are exceptions to this rule. For example, Boyer and Lindemann Nelson take a closer look at Gilligan’s 
work and note that ‘the major differences between the women and men she describes can be characterized 
as much in terms of process as in terms of what is valued’ (1992: 110, emphasis added). Accordingly, they 
suggest that caring is not simply a substitute value to replace autonomy or welfare; instead, caring is ‘an 
alternative way of responding toward that which is of value’ (1992: 107). More recent research in feminist 
 
18 William Frankena also reacts to the medico-centrism of traditional healthcare ethics and looks to caring as the foundation for a 
new approach. Frankena is the main spokesperson of moral point-of-view (MPV) theory, which consists of an agent taking two 
steps: 
1. ‘Subscribing to a particular substantive moral principle (or value) 
2. Taking a general approach, perspective, stance or vantage point from which to proceed’ (1983: 101) 
Frankena endorses caring as the ‘basis of human normative judgments’, which he characterises as similar to Kantian respect-for-
persons or Christian love (1983: 71–72). 
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ethics has responded to this call for an alternative evaluative paradigm. One of the most prominent of these 
is Eva Feder Kittay’s ‘nested relationality’ paradigm, in which the ubiquity of needs is the moral basis of caring 
(1999). Annelies van Heijst expands on Kittay’s model, highlighting that ‘mutual dependency’ entails the 
neediness of both staff and patients, as well as ‘the need of a relational web of human life for mere survival 
and for a meaningful  life’ (2011: 145). 
Whilst these alternatives from feminist ethicists do represent genuine alternatives to the choice- and 
welfare-based models of traditional medical ethics, what they offer is still a model with a base. Rather than 
stipulating a substantive value as the foundation for healthcare ethics, such feminist accounts present a 
procedural value (couched in relational terms) as the foundation of healthcare ethics. In this way, they are 
alternatives to traditional medical ethics but they are not alternatives to traditional medical foundationalism. 
Instead, they are further examples of the predominance of value-monism in contemporary healthcare 
literature. 
Nevertheless, the anti-traditionalist flavour of such accounts does highlight a space for more radical 
alternative models of healthcare values; a truly anti-traditionalist alternative might also presuppose an 
alternative mode of ethical justification. Philosophically speaking, perhaps value-foundationalism could be 
replaced with a form of coherentism or pragmatism or something else altogether. Suffice it to say that the 
vast majority of models of values in healthcare, including healthcare decision-making, are foundationalist. 
Whether such models originate from grey literature or bioethics literature, such foundationalist accounts 
are predominantly value-monist. 
2.3.2.2 In philosophy 
This exploration of values in healthcare was prompted by frustrated attempts to define futility. In order to 
provide further characterization of futility, greater clarity on the goal(s) of medicine is required. Frustrated 
by the lack of clarity (at least in controversial cases) offered by goal-pluralist and goal-monist accounts, I 
turned attention to values to see if they fare any better. 
So far, I have shown that models of the values of healthcare are typically foundationalist. Whilst the NHS 
Constitution was penned as value-pluralist by Lord Darzi, Lord Francis QC’s commentary seeks to modify it 
to a value-monist framework. Models of healthcare values in bioethical literature dispute the nature of the 
foundational value but not value foundationalism itself. Each model presented in healthcare or bioethics 
literature can be categorised as value-pluralist or value-monist. In what follows, I describe the problematic 
nature of both value-pluralism and value-monism. As with goal-pluralism and goal-monism, values are 
caught on the horns of a dilemma; pluralism and monism seem to be the only options yet neither provides 
the theoretical clarity by which to characterise futility. 
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2.3.2.3 Value pluralism 
I start with the problem with value-pluralism: 
‘If one state of affairs is better than another just in case it contains more value than the other, and 
there are two or more basic intrinsic values, then it is not clear how two states of affairs can be 
compared, if one contains more of the first value, but the other contains more of the second’ 
(Schroeder, 2016). 
Value-pluralism can be problematic because different values can endorse different states of affairs. For 
example, consider two of the five regulatory values of the CQC: caring and effective (2016). A certain course 
of action may be caring but not effective. This may be the case if, for example, a consultant were to sit and 
discuss treatment options extensively for one hour with each patient during a ward round. An alternative 
course of action may be effective but not caring. This may be the case if, for example, the same consultant 
spends 4 minutes with each individual patient in order to come up with an approximately safe plan without 
compromising ward round speed. Which of the two course of action is better? Intuition may yield a response 
to this question, but the CQC framework itself is unable to provide answers.  
To adjudicate between the two courses of action requires one value to trump the other, such as by asserting 
“it’s simply more important to be caring than to be effective”. However, any such assertion simultaneously 
reduces the pluralist framework to a form of monism in which the triumphant value functions as the value.  
The problem19 with value-pluralism is that of unavoidable inter-value conflict. Healthcare ethicist David 
Seedhouse summarises the ‘five conceivable routes towards the resolution of value conflict’ (1988: 85) as 
follows: 
1. Finding some ultimate value or ultimate ordering of values 
2. Finding a set of rules 
3. Appealing to the law 
4. Settling for relativism 
5. An appeal to the facts   
Where route 1 successfully overcomes value conflict but fails to remain pluralist, routes 2-5 successfully 
remain pluralist but fail to overcome value conflict. Value-pluralism is only action-guiding in times of inter-
value conflict when one value trumps another; value-pluralism plus controversy yields value-monism.  
 
19 Value-pluralism suffers additional problems which are not directly relevant to this thesis. These include the inexplicability and 
incommensurability of values (Schroeder, 2016). 
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In conclusion, value-pluralism falls where goal-pluralism fell; when implemented so as to guide action in 
times of inter-value conflict, value-pluralism (in theory) collapses into value-monism (in practice). 
2.3.2.4 Value monism 
Next, I turn to the problem with value-monism. A famous example of value-monism is the utilitarianism 
promoted by Jeremy Bentham, in which ‘happiness’ is the fundamental good which ought to be maximised 
absolutely20. However, all forms of value-monism (including Bentham’s) face the problem of hermeneutic 
diversity. That is to say, any one value or principle affords a range of interpretations and applications. 
For example, take monism endorsed by the Francis Report, whose ‘overriding value’ approximates to 
patient-centredness (2013b: 1416). What exactly is a ‘patient-centred approach’ (Francis, 2013b: 1408)? 
What does it mean for a patient to be central or ‘put first’ (2013b: 1416)? Does being patient-centred entail 
promoting a patient’s welfare or respecting a patient’s choice? Or perhaps both and, if so, how? Despite its 
political endorsement, what remains ‘lost in many of the discussions of patient-centered [sic] care… is the 
essential and revolutionary meaning of what it means to be patient centered’ (Epstein and Street, 2011: 
100). 
Insofar as a single fundamental value, like patient-centredness, is open to various interpretations, it 
functions as various values. In conclusion, value-monism falls where goal-monism fell: when implemented 
in times of intra-value conflict, value-monism (in theory) disintegrates into value-pluralism (in practice). 
In this way, an exploration of values in healthcare gains no further ground than the exploration of the goals 
of healthcare. Like goal-pluralism and goal-monism, value-pluralism and value-monism prove inconsistent 
and unrealistic frameworks by which to conceive of the values of healthcare. As a result, they fail to provide 
the theoretical clarity and stability necessary to further characterise the concept of medical futility. More 
significantly for our purposes, both pluralism and monism are inadequate frameworks by which to account 
for the role of values in clinical decision-making. 
2.3.3 Values and key concepts in healthcare decision-making 
This review of literature relating to the goals and values of healthcare was prompted by difficulty 
characterising the slippery concepts of sickness and futility. 
 
20 Bentham’s friend and utilitarian successor, John Stuart Mill, proved a little more ambiguous. Mill hinted at additional values 
beyond happiness (or at least different kinds of happiness) in his famous line: ‘it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a 
pig satisfied’ (Oxford Reference, 2019). Thus, it remains contentious as to whether Mill was a monist or pluralist about value 
(Schroeder, 2016: 7). 
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2.3.3.1 Futility and values 
It is unclear how to characterise futility beyond lack of ‘benefit’ (Schneiderman, Jecker and Jonsen, 1990) or 
‘uselessness’ (Chwang, 2009: 487) and how to apply the concept in controversial cases. This is because in 
controversial cases the goals and values of healthcare are often unclear or contested (Weijer and Elliott, 
1995). A search for a clear and realistic framework of the goal(s) and value(s) of healthcare decision-making 
proved relatively fruitless; pluralist frameworks collapse and monist frameworks disintegrate. A clearer and 
more realistic understanding of the goals and values of healthcare decision-making is required to enable the 
concept of futility to be applied in controversial cases. 
2.3.3.2 Sickness and values 
I now turn to the other key concept in healthcare decision-making with which this chapter started: sickness. 
What goals and values are implicit in the two kinds of sickness I presented above (see: Two kinds of 
sickness)?21 
According to an objectivist conception of sickness such as the biomedical model, sickness is a state of 
abnormal biological function. Thus the goal of a clinical course of action is to correct the abnormality or at 
least reduce its harmful effects. To return to the imaginary case of Winston Glover (see: Two kinds of 
sickness), Dr Biomedicine’s goal in treating Winston’s heart failure is to improve his heart function so as to 
get it as close to normal as possible. Whether Winston realises it or not, whether he wishes for it or not, re-
normalisation is what he needs for his well-being. The objectivist notions of normality and need are 
determined by a preconception of human flourishing. What is valued on this account is proper functioning, 
which I refer to as welfare22; more than that, welfare is the standard by which a healthcare intervention is 
judged good or bad. In shorthand, an objectivist conception of sickness such as the biomedical model 
implicitly endorses welfare as its fundamental value. 
I turn now to a subjectivist conceptualisation of sickness. What goals and values are implicit in conceiving 
sickness as biographical disruption? On this model, the goal of a clinical course of action is to enable 
continuity in life narrative. In the imaginary scenario of Winston Glover and his gardening, Dr Biography is 
concerned that Winston ‘isn’t himself’ as a result of heart failure. Winston’s social identity is largely 
constituted by his life choices, such as being a keen gardener who is well-known at the vegetable plot. The 
aim of treating his heart failure is to enable Winston to reconstruct his life narrative in accordance with his 
identity. This involves valuing his unique priorities, preferences and wishes. I refer to these collectively as 
 
21 For the purposes of this thesis I take values to be the standards by which things are judged good or bad, which are in turn shaped 
and sustained by such judgments (see: What are values?)  
22I recognise that ‘welfare’ has a broad semantic range, including different kinds of welfare such as the material view, the wish-
based mental view and the state-dependent mental view (Hansson and Grüne-Yanoff, 2018). For the purposes of this thesis, I 
restrict its meaning to proper function according to a vision of flourishing. 
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Winston’s choice.  More than that, Winston’s choice becomes the standard by which a clinical course of 
action is judged good or bad. A subjectivist conception of sickness such as the biographical disruption model 
implicitly endorses choice as its fundamental value. 
2.3.3.3 Welfare and choice 
The question of which value (welfare or choice) is fundamental has implications for bioethics. In terms of 
Beauchamp and Childress’ bioethical principles (2009), to prize welfare as the fundamental value in 
healthcare decision-making is to prioritise the bioethical principle of beneficence23; to prize choice is to 
prioritise the bioethical principle of respect for autonomy. 
Sarah Fry, whom I mentioned above (see: Bioethics literature), divides prominent bioethics theories into two 
groups: those that prize the principle of beneficence and those that prize the principle of respect for 
autonomy (1992: 95–96). Thus the contrast between the two groups of bioethics theories may have 
something in common with the contrast between the two ways of conceiving sickness: both contrasts reflect 
a difference in fundamental values, namely, welfare or choice. 
Likewise, the question of which value is fundamental has implications for clinical practice. As mentioned 
above (see: Grey literature and Value monism), patient-centredness is currently heralded as the fundamental 
value of the healthcare professions. Yet the meaning of ‘putting patients first’ is profoundly unclear (Epstein 
and Street, 2011) and can be interpreted in terms of welfare or in terms of choice. 
2.3.3.4 What about genealogy? 
Before bringing the chapter to a close, it must be noted that the genealogical conceptualisation of sickness 
has been overlooked in terms of its fundamental value. Like biographical disruption, genealogy could also be 
categorised as a subjectivist approach to defining sickness, according to cultural power structures and inter-
personal power plays. However, the implicit goal(s) and value(s) of genealogy are not easy to identify. The 
goals of restoring proper function or biographical continuity do not pay adequate attention to the dynamics 
of control that are essential to genealogy. Where a biomedical model prizes welfare and a biographical 
disruption model prizes choice, perhaps a genealogical model prizes something else. 
This chapter has covered a lot of ground since identifying some of the most prominent models of sickness. 
Each model of sickness can be characterised epistemologically (by its objectivist or subjectivist approach), 
ontologically (by its complementary account of well-being) and ethically (by its fundamental value). This is 
summarised in table 2.3. 
 














Subjectivist Desire Choice 
Social constructionism: 
 Genealogy 
Subjectivist ? ? 
Table 2.3: Concepts of sickness 
2.4 Conclusion 
I opened this chapter by introducing two concepts which are effectively the starting point and end point of 
healthcare decision-making: sickness and futility.  
A review of literature relating to the concept of sickness identified two approaches: an objectivist approach 
and a subjectivist approach. The most prominent example of an objectivist approach is the biomedical 
model, which complements a need account of well-being. The most prominent example of a subjectivist 
approach is social constructionism, which can be sub-divided as focussing on biographical disruption or 
genealogy. 
Each conceptualisation of sickness features an implicit goal and fundamental value. The biomedical model 
and the biographical disruption model prize the values of welfare and choice, respectively. These are 
different values which may endorse incompatible courses of action in a given situation. This conflict is not 
resolved by grey literature promoting patient-centredness. This is of great significance to clinical practice 
because decision-makers who presuppose a different concept of sickness may espouse a different 
fundamental value and thus be committed to incompatible courses of action. In such instances, decisions 
must be made amidst insoluble value conflict. How clinical decision-making models manage value conflict 
will be explored in Chapter 3. 
A review of literature relating to the concept of futility identified various attempts to define the term, with 
limited success. None has achieved widespread acceptance. The frustration of attempts to characterise 
futility is a result of ambiguity in the goals and values of healthcare. A survey of frameworks of the goals and 
values of healthcare identified two kinds: monist and pluralist. Whether of goals or values, the application 
of such frameworks proved inconsistent and unrealistic in controversial cases. The lack of an adequate 
account of the values of healthcare is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, attempts to characterise futility 
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will continue to be frustrated. Secondly, it remains unclear what values are actually involved (and what their 
role is) in decision-making. The second problem is taken up in the following chapter, in which I consider the 








Chapter 3. Clinical Decision-making Models 
In Chapter 2, I presented two key concepts in healthcare decision-making. A critical exploration of the 
concept of sickness showed the potential for conflict between the values which are implicit in different 
models of well-being and sickness. A critical exploration of the concept of futility identified a lack of any clear 
and realistic framework of values in healthcare decision-making.  
In this chapter, the problematic nature of values in healthcare decision-making comes into sharper focus. 
My aim here is to show that conflict in values accompanies clinical decision-making models. To this end, I 
critically explore a broad range of decision-making models in contemporary literature. I have categorised 
these models along different axes: by therapeutic relationship (paternalism and anti-paternalism), by 
cognitive speed (dual process theory) and by values-consciousness (values-based models). 
The conclusions of the previous chapter and this current chapter will be accentuated when they are 
contextualised within an Acute Medical Service (AMS) in Chapter 4. 
3.1 Therapeutic relationship: Paternalism and anti-paternalism 
The location of a decision-making model on a spectrum from paternalism to anti-paternalism is determined 
by how it conceives of ‘who holds the property rights over which decisions’ (Jensen and Mooney, 1990: 14)24. 
The paternalism – anti-paternalism spectrum could also be conceived as a dichotomy, depending on which 
decision-maker is deemed to be the majority shareholder. 
At one end of the spectrum, paternalism holds the informed doctor, as expert in their trade, to hold the 
property rights of clinical decisions: ‘doctor knows best’. On this theoretical basis, paternalism in practice 
enacts a model of substituted decision-making. According to this model, the patient is informer (and 
informative) but it is the doctor who is informed; the patient-as-agent assists the responsible clinician. 
At the other end of the spectrum, anti-paternalism holds the informed patient, as expert on their own life, 
to hold the property rights of clinical decisions: ‘patient knows best’. On this theoretical basis, anti-
paternalism tends to enact a model of supported decision-making. According to this model, the doctor is 
informer (and informative) but it is the patient who makes the informed choice; the clinician-as-agent is 
responsible for assisting the particular patient. 
 
24 Whilst sociological literature has highlighted the distributed nature of clinical decision-making (Rapley, 2008) and the role of 
non-medical healthcare professionals, the consultation between the doctor and the patient is still deemed ‘the essential unit of 
medical practice’ (Morgan, 2003: 55). As such, I focus here on the so-called ‘doctor-patient relationship’ but do not limit any 
reflections to this encounter alone. 
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3.1.1 Substituted decision-making 
The substituted decision-making of traditional paternalism, accompanied by deferential attitudes towards 
the doctor and medical thinking, has historically been the modus operandi of clinical practice; it has ‘endured 
from antiquity almost until today and… only recently has come under fire’ (Jensen and Mooney, 1990: 3). I 
will present an ancient argument and a contemporary argument for paternalism and then an exploration of 
its theoretical underpinnings. 
3.1.1.1 Arguments for paternalism 
The Hippocratic tradition has exerted a longstanding influence on modern medicine. The adoption, adaption 
and recitation of ‘the Oath’ over many centuries epitomised what it is that the medical professional professes 
(Lyons and Petrucelli, 1987: 215). Embedded within the Oath is a decision-making ethic with a paternalist 
ethos. For example, ‘I will use dietetic measures for the benefit of the sick according to my ability and 
judgment’ (Edelstein, 1967: 6, emphasis added). As Edelstein puts it, the Hippocratic physician ‘promises to 
guard his patient against the evil which they may suffer through themselves’ (1967: 23). This protectionism 
is an indication that the Hippocratic physician prioritised the welfare of his patient over the autonomy of his 
patient. As such, he practised substituted decision-making for the good of his patient and the guard of his 
art. This ethic is reminiscent of the Pythagorean philosophy which so influenced the Hippocratic tradition, 
which held knowledge to be ‘too potent and dangerous to be in the hands of ordinary lay people’ (Veatch 
and Mason Spicer, 1994: 411). Patients fare better by trusting the physician’s judgment rather than trying to 
work it out themselves; such is the ancient argument for paternalism. 
However, paternalism need not be equated with Hippocratic traditionalism. Some authors deny any ongoing 
place for the Oath but nevertheless endorse a qualified form of paternalism under certain circumstances 
(Culver and Gert, 1982, pp. 148–150; Veatch and Mason Spicer, 1994). Still others consider the for-or-against 
debate too simplistic with regard to paternalism, given it has various aspects and various definitions 
(Shinebourne and Bush, 1994). Before turning to another argument for paternalism, then, it is worth pausing, 
to consider what paternalism actually is in contemporary terms. 
 Within healthcare, Lockwood defines medical paternalism as: 
‘behaving towards someone in a way that does not respect his or her autonomy, for that person’s 
own (supposed) good’ (1985). 
More recently, medical paternalism has been defined as follows: 
‘deciding to act in an autonomous person’s best interests without taking that person’s will decisively 
into account (or deciding expressly against it)’ (Groll, 2012, in Specker Sullivan, 2016: 439). 
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Whilst no consensus exists regarding its precise definition, the normative composition of paternalism can be 
broadly traced from such preliminary definitions. In terms of the bioethical principles of Beauchamp and 
Childress (2009), a paternalist approach to decision-making could be summarised as a prioritisation of 
(supposed) beneficence over respect for autonomy. In shorthand, paternalism puts the value of welfare 
before the value of choice. 
I turn now to a relatively recent argument for paternalism. Clinicians Shinebourne and Bush make a case for 
substituted decision-making in For Paternalism in the Doctor-Patient Relationship (1994). Interestingly, they 
observe the inevitability of paternalist decision-making in situations of clinical urgency: 
‘When the heart has stopped beating, just as when the child runs in front of a car, the place for 
reasoned discussion is nil, the place for immediate, decisive action is central’ (1994: 401). 
In the next chapter, I show urgency to be a major priority of decision-making within an Acute Medical Service 
(AMS) (see: Chapter 4 Urgency). Thus, if ever there were a place for paternalist decision-making, an AMS 
may be it. 
Shinebourne and Bush question the pejorative connotations of paternalism: ‘why should acting like a father 
be construed as bad for the patient or in some way morally wrong?’ (1994: 401) and conclude that 
paternalism is desirable for patients when the stakes are high: 
‘The sicker the patient, the more vulnerable, the more regressed because of pain and anxiety, age, 
infirmity or debilitation, then in our view the more some patients will wish for an element of the sort 
of care a father may give his child’ (1994: 406). 
Shinebourne and Bush thus articulate one of the main arguments for paternalist decision-making such as 
substituted decision-making: patients want it. In times of clinical urgency and severity, patients often do not 
want information about a decision, let alone participation in it, let alone responsibility for it (Ende, Kazis and 
Ash, 1989; Beisecker and Beisecker, 1990; Ryan, 1992; Charles, Gafni and Whelan, 1997: 683). Herein lies 
one of the ironies of paternalism: it is an approach to decision-making which prioritises what a patient needs 
over what a patient wants, yet the need for paternalism is justified in terms of what patients want. 
Sometimes the urgency of the situation requires it and sometimes patients prefer it; such is the 
contemporary argument for paternalism. 
3.1.1.2 Theoretical underpinnings 
Philosopher John Kleinig explores the theoretical commitments of paternalism in general in his book 
Paternalism (1983). Alluding to John Locke, Kleinig notes the emergence of liberal society as the cultural 
moment in which paternalism became noticed and criticised: 
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‘The old idea of a natural hierarchy, presided over by the monarch as patriarch, was challenged in 
the name of an individual no longer under tutelage, but endowed with reason and natural rights, able 
to be accounted the overseer of his own life-plans’ (1983: 3). 
The contemporary contestation of paternalism is in many ways the momentum of a ball which J.S. Mill 
started rolling in his account of the sovereign individual and harm (to others) principle (1859: 223–224). By 
challenging paternalism, Mill provided the intellectual tools for subsequent writers to define and 
characterise the concept of paternalism more sharply. 
One of the most influential definitions of paternalism (in general) is that of Gerald Dworkin, who depicts it 
as ‘the interference with a person’s liberty of action justified by reason referring exclusively to the welfare, 
good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the person being coerced’ (1971: 108) As Kleinig summarises 
it, there is a hierarchy of values inherent in this definition: ‘individual freedom is abrogated in the name of 
benevolence’ (1983: 5). 
Dworkin also provides a narrower second definition in which paternalism ‘might be thought of as the use of 
coercion to achieve a good which is not recognized as such by those persons for whom the good is intended’ 
(1971: 112, emphasis added). The additional criterion (that the good not be recognised as such) renders this 
conception a kind of strong paternalism. In strong paternalism, X imposes on Y in order to procure some 
good whilst disregarding Y’s ‘capacity to choose that good for him- or herself’ (Kleinig, 1983: 14). In weak 
paternalism, however, X imposes on Y only in order to protect Y from ‘harm caused to the individual by 
conditions beyond his control’ (Beauchamp, 1978: 1197). Mill’s famous example of forcibly preventing an 
unsuspecting man from crossing an unsafe bridge (1859: 294) is thus an example of weak paternalism. 
Kleinig notes additional classifications of paternalism, such as positive or negative, active or passive, and 
direct or indirect (1983: 14). The common themes in all such depictions is that an individual’s freedom of 
choice is in some way curtailed (by way of imposition, interference or coercion) in order that some good 
might be procured (benefit or protection from harm). It seems essential to paternalism in general, then, that 
it be accompanied by normative content. Namely, a paternalist decision is one in which the duty to do good 
trumps the duty to respect autonomy. In terms of values, welfare trumps choice. 
Having established that paternalism (in general) entails a values hierarchy (welfare before choice) and is 




3.1.1.3 Shifting values 
Jensen and Mooney describe the shift away from paternalism in healthcare to reflect a change in values in 
Western societies (1990). Where traditional medicine deferred to the medical expert’s welfare assessment, 
‘now autonomy is espoused as the basic value for the modern health care system’ (1990: 3). To cherish 
autonomy over welfare is to endorse a form of anti-paternalism.  
However, the term anti-paternalism may be misleading. This is not a case of neo-Marxist revolt, the diseased 
under-class against the clinical ruling class. Rather, ‘such espousal [with autonomy] appears almost universal: 
doctors, other professional groups, patients and politicians – all are apparently advocating autonomy as the 
ethical basis of modern health care’ (1990: 3). It is simplistic, therefore, to construe the tension between 
paternalism and anti-paternalism solely in terms of a power struggle between groups. Anti-paternalism is 
not simply anti the powerful clinician; it is anti the primacy of welfare as more foundational than autonomy. 
The tension between paternalism and anti-paternalism is not merely political; it is ethical. 
Just as the broad brush-strokes of ‘paternalism’ can be refined in various ways, so Jensen and Mooney note 
that ‘autonomy’ can be characterised in at least three ways: deontological autonomy, relativistic autonomy 
and social autonomy (1990). Deontological autonomy is ‘when an individual, presented with adequate 
information about his or her situation, makes his or her own personal choice, free from any external coercion 
or interference’ (1990: 5). This is a definition in keeping with other bioethical literature (Engelhardt, 1986, 
1988; Beauchamp and Childress, 2009). Relativistic autonomy is ‘when differences in human attitudes and 
values are respected’ (Jensen and Mooney, 1990: 6).  
Social autonomy is distinct from the first two categorisations in that it ‘is not a power or resource… nor is it 
just a claim… Rather autonomy is conceived as an end’ (1990: 6). According to Jensen and Mooney, social 
autonomy is an ideal situation in which ‘we act as responsible persons in relation to our own lives and to 
those of others’ (1990: 6). Social autonomy is thus reminiscent of the depiction given in the World Health 
Organisation’s programme Health for all by the year 2000 (WHO, 1983) and some forms of relational 
autonomy in feminist sociological literature (Kittay, 1999; van Nistelrooij et al., 2017).  
Jensen and Mooney use this taxonomy of autonomy to explain shifts along the spectrum from paternalism 
to anti-paternalism: ‘as the mix of the different forms of autonomy changes over time so, in our view, does 
the distribution of these [decision-making] property rights. Who decides what?’ (1990: 14). One 
manifestation of this is a shift towards anti-paternalism in the form of supported decision-making as a 
preferable model to substituted decision-making. 
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3.1.2 Supported decision-making 
The case for supported decision-making is typically made by appeal to the bioethical principle of ‘respect for 
autonomy’ (Beauchamp and Childress, 2009). Davidson et al consider autonomy to be supported decision-
making’s ‘central principle’ (2015: 61) and quote the following maxim with approval: ‘no person should have 
another person appointed to make a decision on their behalf, if they could make the decision themselves 
with assistance and support’ (Chartres and Brayley, 2010: 1). The more autonomous a patient can be, then, 
the better. Rather than use the term ‘autonomous decision-making’, proponents of supported decision-
making prefer its more nuanced terminology in order to avoid a false dichotomy25: 
‘Law, policy and practice have… sometimes approached decision making as if people are either 
globally capable or incapable, but most people require some level of support with decision making’ 
(Davidson et al., 2015: 61). 
In 2006, the United Nations Convention for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) gave approval 
to supported decision-making in order that people with disabilities would be helped towards ‘full and 
effective participation in society on an equal basis with others’ (United Nations, 2006: 2). Specifically, the 
UNCRPD requires States to ‘take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the 
support they may require in exercising their legal capacity’ (Article 12(3)) (2006: 10). This duty is claimed to 
be incumbent upon States as a matter of ultimate values: 
‘A basic tenet of liberal–democratic philosophy is that the state has a primary role in protecting 
autonomy or the right of individuals to choose and pursue their own life path, and all the decisions 
that entail along the way’ (Bach and Kerzner, 2010: 6). 
This rights-based argument in favour of supported decision-making depends on a political philosophy which 
heralds autonomy as a primary value, if not the primary value, of liberal democracies. 
It is noteworthy that UNCRPD occurred in the short intervening period between the authorisation and the 
implementation of the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) (2005) in England and Wales, which came into force in 
2007 (Department of Health, 2007: 1). The MCA is the primary legislation relating to healthcare decision-
making (Beadle-Brown, 2015: 17). It is largely compatible with UNCRPD and articulates principles which were 
intended to make supported decision-making the standard for healthcare decision-making (Beadle-Brown, 
2015). As the MCA Code of Practice says, the statutory principles  ‘aim to assist and support people who may 
lack capacity… not to restrict or control their lives’ (Department of Health, 2007: 20). The MCA intended to 
 
25 I have spoken of supported decision-making as the opposite end of the spectrum to substitute decision-making. However, it 
may be more accurate to place ‘autonomous decision-making’ as the truly opposite pole, with supported decision-making 
functioning as a catalyst towards it. 
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move healthcare decision-making away from paternalist substituted decision-making towards anti-
paternalist supported decision-making (Essex Autonomy Project, 2012; Beadle-Brown, 2015). 
However, in practice this has reportedly not been the case. The House of Lords Select Committee in 2014 
raised concerns about how the principles of the MCA were being implemented (2014). This report 
considered the culture within healthcare organisations to be an obstacle to supported decision-making’s 
success. The committee suggested a change in professional attitudes from ‘protection and paternalism to 
enablement and empowerment’ (2014, para. 108). In terms of values, what the MCA 2005, UNCRPD and the 
House of Lords Select Committee are all promoting is a revolution; not a revolution in class hierarchy but a 
revolution in values hierarchy. Supported decision-making proponents endorse choice (not welfare) as the 
foundational value of liberal democracies in general and healthcare decision-making in particular. 
In conclusion, the tension between paternalism and anti-paternalism, between substituted decision-making 
and supported decision-making, is a tension between fundamental values: welfare versus choice. However, 
must decision-making be construed in such adversarial terms? Could it not be possible to transcend this 
dialectic by eliminating its mutual exclusivity? Rather than decisions being either substituted or supported, 
could they not be in some way shared? 
3.1.3 Shared decision-making 
I will dedicate a little more space to the consideration of shared decision-making because it has achieved 
remarkable prominence in UK healthcare literature to date. I explore the background to it, its content and 
the values it expresses. 
3.1.3.1 Background  
The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) is an extremely influential organisation in the 
UK which publishes evidence-based guidance on best clinical practice. NICE’s intention to ‘[ensure] that 
shared decision making becomes an essential part of medical practice’ (Haslam, 2016) is soon to be 
translated into the publication of national guidelines on shared decision-making (NICE, 2018b). The 
incorporation of shared decision-making into everyday clinical practice will require more than guidelines, 
however. In recognition of this, NICE is one of 40 organisations who have formed a ‘shared decision-making 
collaborative’ (2019). This collaborative includes NHS England, the General Medical Council (GMC) and the 
Academy of Medical Royal Colleges, and has produced an action plan to promote shared decision-making in 
areas such as healthcare leadership, education, and training (NICE, 2016). Once ‘instruments for measuring 
shared decision-making’ are established, NICE suggests that ‘these could then feed inspection regimes’, such 
as the Care Quality Commission, and ‘incentive schemes’, such as the Quality Outcomes Framework (2016).  
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The principles of the shared decision-making collaborative are echoed by the Coalition for Collaborative Care 
network (C4CC), which was established in 2014 (Coalition for Collaborative Care, 2019a). C4CC emphasises 
the importance of shared decision-making in the context of long-term conditions, where patients are ‘fully 
engaged as partners in decisions and planning of their care’ (2019b). C4CC features partner organisations 
from a broad range of fields. These include authoritative organisations such as Health Education England and 
Public Health England as well as charitable advocacy organisations such as Age UK, Alzheimer’s Society, 
Diabetes UK, Hospice UK and Mind. In contrast to the shared decision-making collaborative, C4CC is notably 
multidisciplinary, featuring such partners as the Royal College of Nursing, the Royal College of Occupational 
Therapists, the Royal Pharmaceutical Society and the Chartered Society of Physiotherapists (2019a). 
It is evident, then, that shared decision-making is a model which has been firmly endorsed by an extremely 
wide range of healthcare organisations. The collaboration of such organisations is serving to secure its 
implementation in the future of UK healthcare, by means of education, training, culture change and 
governance.  Even this, however, is only half the story. The rise to fame of shared decision-making was 
facilitated by a complex of various other factors, which I now sketch. 
In the UK, the last 50 years has seen a shift from the prominence of acute care to chronic care (Charles, Gafni 
and Whelan, 1997: 682; Fitzpatrick, 2008: 5). The majority of healthcare aims to manage illness in the 
community rather than cure it (Charles, Gafni and Whelan, 1997: 682). Managing chronic illnesses typically 
depends on factors such as patient education and patient compliance, and is most effective if both physician 
and patient have an active role to play in decision-making ( Charles, Gafni and Whelan, 1997: 682). Over the 
same period of time, the internet has enabled widespread access to healthcare information, which (in 
conjunction with the consumer rights movement) has nurtured an environment in which a patient can more 
naturally challenge a physician’s authority (Charles, Gafni and Whelan, 1997: 682).  
In addition to these demographic and technological changes, shared decision-making has been supported 
by ethical, legal, cultural and political factors. Ethically, patient involvement in decisions is considered 
essential to quality of life considerations (Mueller, Hook and Fleming, 2004). Legally, informed consent 
requirements have evolved to demand increased involvement and tailoring of the decision-making process 
to the particular patient (Braddock et al., 1997; Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board, 2015; Herring et 
al., 2017). Culturally, there is increased respect for diversity, including diversity in patients’ wishes 
(Richardson and Carryer, 2005). Politically, 40% of health complaints are attributed to poor communication 
in some Western countries (NSW Health Care Complaints Commission, 2005), prompting communication to 
be seen as equal in importance to the delivery of care itself (Department of Health and Ageing, 2000). What 
is more, shared decision-making was explicitly promoted in the UK Department of Health’s 2010 White 
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Paper, boldly entitled ‘liberating the NHS’ (2010). In this document, the Secretary of State for Health gave a 
statement on decision-making which packs a punch: ‘Shared decision-making will become the norm: no 
decision about me without me’ (2010: 3). And with that, the stage was set for a new model of decision-
making, a collaborative model which could be more readily incorporated into today’s healthcare climate. 
3.1.3.2 Content 
According to medical sociologist Myfanwy Morgan, shared decision-making is intended to be a means of 
transcending the paternalism – anti-paternalism dualism, replacing unilateral empowerment with a 
‘relationship of mutuality’; in such a model, patient and doctor function as ‘equal partners in the… 
consultation’ (2003: 62). In sharing the decision-making process, both patient and doctor supposedly retain 
a high level of control in decision-making (Stewart and Roter, 1989). Whilst there is ‘great fluidity’ regarding 
the definition of shared decision-making (Trede and Higgs, 2008: 45) the following key characteristics were 
articulated in the 1997 landmark publication by Charles et al (1997: 681):  
 At least two participants, physician and patient, are involved 
 Both parties share information 
 Both parties take steps to build a consensus about the preferred treatment 
 An agreement is reached on the treatment to implement  
Like Morgan, Charles et al also depict shared decision-making as an alternative to the polarity of (paternalist) 
substituted decision-making and (anti-paternalist) supported decision-making26; in these two extremes, 
control and responsibility ‘are clearly vested with the physician or the patient respectively, and whether the 
opposite party accepts the decision is not relevant’ (1997: 688).  
Given the surge in interest in the model, what more can be said of the content of shared decision-making? 
NICE offers a cursory definition: 
‘Shared decision making is when health professionals and patients work together. This puts people 
at the centre of decisions about their own treatment and care. During shared decision making, it's 
important that: 
 care or treatment options are fully explored, along with their risks and benefits 
 different choices available to the patient are discussed  
 a decision is reached together with a health and social care professional’ (2019). 
 
26 Charles et al do not use the terms ‘substituted decision-making’ and ‘supported decision-making’ in their 1997 article, as these 




This definition arguably raises more questions than it answers: What does it mean to ‘work together’? 
(Substituting a decision and supporting a decision could both be considered forms of collaboration.) What 
does it mean to be ‘at the centre’ of decisions? Is it just the individual patient in their present state who is 
centralised? How can options (and their accompanying risk-benefit analysis) possibly be ‘fully explored’? In 
whose eyes are the ‘available’ options to be determined? What if a decision cannot be reached consensually? 
What if a patient does not want to be involved in this way? Perhaps the forthcoming NICE guidelines will 
address such questions. In the meantime, I turn to already-published guidance from the GMC in order to 
further characterise the model of shared decision-making. 
3.1.3.2.1 GMC guidance on shared decision-making 
According to the GMC, all doctors have a duty to ‘respect patients’ right to reach decisions with [doctors] 
about their treatment and care’ (2013). This responsibility to work ‘in partnership’ with patients is expanded 
in the GMC’s 2008 guidance, intended to promote shared decision-making, entitled Consent: patients and 
doctors making decisions together (2008). This document outlines what the GMC considers good practice in 
decision-making, and relates to ‘all decisions about care’ (2008: 6). The underlying aim of this guidance is to 
foster a doctor-patient relationship of ‘partnership’, based on ‘openness, trust and good communication’ 
(2008: 9). 
Doctors are to give patients information that patients ‘want or need in order to make decisions’ (2008: 6). 
The content and form of this information is to be tailored according to the ‘needs, wishes and priorities’ of 
the patient (2008: 11). As in the supported decision-making model, the patient is in control of the decision 
outcome:  
‘The patient weighs up the potential benefits, risks and burdens of the various options as well as any 
non-clinical issues that are relevant to them. The patient decides whether to accept any of the 
options and, if so, which one’ (2008: 8). 
This is the GMC’s guidance for making a decision when the patient is deemed to have capacity. If the patient 
is deemed to lack capacity for the decision, the clinical team is charged to make a best interests decision in 
keeping with MCA 2005. 
3.1.3.2.2 Best interests and shared decision-making 
Nowhere in MCA 2005 is the notion of best interests actually defined (Department of Health, 2007). Instead 
there is procedural advice as to what tasks and considerations are involved in establishing what is in a 
patient’s best interests. This is where ambiguity is introduced into the equation. Whilst a patient’s ‘wishes 
and feelings, beliefs and values should be taken fully into account’, these may not always be decisive because 
they ought to be considered ‘alongside all other factors’ (Department of Health, 2007: 81).  
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In the MCA Code of Practice, an example is given to illustrate this. The scenario is of a man with learning 
difficulties called André who is unable to understand the risk of infection following a leg injury. Despite his 
resistance, the doctor can legitimately restrain him in order to administer a tetanus injection because she 
has ‘objective reasons’ for believing this course of action is in André’s best interests (Department of Health, 
2007: 81). A best interests decision leaves a door open for assessments of what is objectively good for 
someone. Some consider the preservation of life to be what enters this open door and others the continuity 
of life narrative (EWHC, 2011; Johnston, 2013). 
A best interests decision, then, combines the patient’s wishes with other factors. Putting it crudely, the 
illustration of André portrays this as an integration of the patient’s subjective intentions with the doctor’s 
‘objective reasons’. In this way, making a best interests decision is not quite synonymous with doing what 
the patient would have wanted, nor with doing what the doctor thinks is best. 
I now consider the values expressed by GMC guidance on shared decision-making. 
3.1.3.3 Values  
At first glance, shared decision-making seems to be a poorly disguised form of anti-paternalism. If a patient 
has capacity to make a decision, she makes the decision. The responsibility of the doctor is reduced to 
information provider, laying out the relative strengths of each item on the clinical menu. 
Despite the egalitarian connotations of ‘sharing’ and ‘partnership’, this model prioritises the judgment of the 
patient over that of the clinician. As the GMC summarises it: ‘the patient decides whether to accept any of 
the options and, if so, which one’ (2008: 8). A clinician is not authorised to over-rule a competent patient’s 
wishes or invalidate their capacity status on the grounds that the patient’s choice is unwise in welfare terms 
(Department of Health, 2007). If the patient has capacity, the door is not open to the doctor’s so-called 
objective reasons. Speaking of bioethical principles, respect for autonomy trumps beneficence. Speaking of 
values, choice trumps welfare. 
At second glance, however, there also remains a paternalist element within this model of shared decision-
making. The patient weighs up the ‘various options’, but it is the clinician who determines the variety of 
options from which to choose. A clinician is not obliged to offer treatment which they consider to be of no 
benefit to the patient, nor is the patient entitled to demand it (Ardagh, 2000: 398; Biggs, 2007). In this way, 
beneficence trumps respect for autonomy. Welfare trumps choice. 
Thus, in a sense, there are two phases to the shared decision-making model. There is a preparatory phase, 
during which the informing clinician lays out the appropriate options, and there is an executive phase, during 
which the now-informed patient selects a course of action (table 3.1). These phases are not necessarily clean-
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cut in temporal sequence. Rather, they are a logical sequence: only what the clinician avails is available; only 
what first passes the professional’s welfare assessment is considered in the patient’s choice. 
 
 Preparatory phase Executive phase 
Judgment Clinician decides which 
treatment options are 
available. 
Patient decides which 
available treatment option 
is most preferable. 
Fundamental value Welfare Choice 
Therapeutic relationship Paternalism Anti-paternalism 
Table 3.1: Phases of shared decision-making 
During the preparatory phase, the clinician is the dominant agent and welfare is the dominant value. During 
the executive phase, the tables are turned: the patient is the dominant agent and choice is the dominant 
value. As such, shared decision-making does not transcend the paternalism – versus – anti-paternalism 
dialectic but instead intensifies it by condensing it into a biphasic model. Rather than sailing through the 
Scylla and Charybdis of paternalism and anti-paternalism, shared decision-making offers a ferry service 
between the two. 
What about if the patient is deemed to lack capacity for the decision? Does a best interests decision fare any 
better than an informed choice at offering an alternative to paternalism and anti-paternalism?  
In terms of values, a best interests decision functions in the same way as an informed choice decision. Where 
a patient lacks the capacity to make the decision, the doctor is obliged to take into account the patient’s 
wishes, feelings, beliefs and values (Department of Health, 2007). Thus the doctor is duty-bound to respect 
even the incompetent patient’s autonomy. This remains the case even if the patient’s wishes, feelings, 
beliefs and values would align with a course of action which the doctor considers second-best. Autonomy 
trumps beneficence; choice trumps welfare. 
However, the doctor is not duty-bound to initiate a course of action which is out of bounds according to their 
welfare assessment, justified by so-called objective reasons. In best interests decisions too, a course of action 
is only available if it is within the confines of what the doctor thinks is good for the patient, really. 
Beneficence trumps autonomy; welfare trumps choice. 
Even in instances when the patient lacks capacity for the decision, then, shared decision-making exhibits the 
same biphasic features as otherwise. Firstly, the clinician circumscribes which options are available: the 
welfare assessment. Secondly, the patient’s wishes, feelings, beliefs and values are to be used to evaluate 
which of the available courses of action is preferable: the choice assessment. 
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Whether or not a patient is competent, shared decision-making features a paternalist substituted decision 
which is logically followed by an anti-paternalist supported decision. The informed doctor sets the menu, 
beneficently; the informed patient selects the course, autonomously.  
Shared decision-making has not transcended the conflict between paternalism and anti-paternalism, nor the 
corresponding value conflict between welfare and choice. Instead, the model offers an exercise in evaluative 
diplomacy, where each approach enjoys its own phase in the decision-making process and neither is to step 
over the halfway line. Thus, shared decision-making’s strength is also its weakness. Its strength is to present 
a model which does not clearly take either side in the paternalism - versus - anti-paternalism debate but 
seeks to embrace the values of both. Its weakness, however, is that it draws a line between welfare 
(preparatory phase) and choice (executive phase) arbitrarily.  
A shared decision-making model takes it for granted that there are a set number of options available. 
However, a radical paternalist approach could feel justified in presenting only one option: the best one (in 
the doctor’s welfare assessment). A radical anti-paternalist approach to the same scenario could never feel 
justified in presenting only one option, as all possibilities are equal until the patient’s wishes are expressed. 
Similarly, the manner in which treatment options are communicated is itself not a hermeneutically neutral 
enterprise; it may be influenced by the doctor’s paternalist or anti-paternalist leanings (Shinebourne and 
Bush, 1994: 400–401). 
Shared decision-making, as described by NICE and the GMC, fails to provide an alternative that transcends 
the dualism between paternalism and anti-paternalism. Furthermore, it does not justify the delineation 
between the paternalist preparatory phase and the anti-paternalist executive phase of clinical decision-
making. As a result, decision-makers are left either vacillating between the two in the hopes of an agreement 
or drawing a line arbitrarily. After all, if there were any justification for delimiting welfare and choice, such 
an action would require appeal to a third value. In the absence of a third value, a peculiar antinomy remains: 
choice trumps welfare, and vice versa. 
3.1.4 Alternative models in bioethics 
I have so far presented and explored models of decision-making in healthcare which have been influential in 
clinical practice or endorsed by influential clinical organisations. Whether decision-making be portrayed as 
substituted, supported or shared, each model is either paternalist, anti-paternalist or an arbitrary mixture 
of both. However, perhaps a fruitful means of transcending the paternalist – anti-paternalist dialectic could 




Bioethicist Robert Veatch suggests that a patient and a doctor be paired up on the basis of shared ‘”deep” 
value systems’ (1995: 11). He considers this pairing to be an improvement because ‘if a clinician is skilled 
and passionately committed to maximizing the patient’s welfare, and knows the belief and value structure 
and socioeconomic and cultural position of the patient quite well, there would be some more reason to hope 
for a good guess’ (1995: 11).  
Whilst introducing a new notion of pairing, Veatch’s account can nevertheless be categorised as an example 
of the physician-as-agent model, in which the only preferences that count are those of the patient (Charles, 
Gafni and Whelan, 1997: 684). In a physician-as-agent model, the patient’s (perceived) wishes remain in the 
decision-making driving seat. It is therefore the ‘flip side of the informed patient model’ (Charles, Gafni and 
Whelan, 1997: 684), which together form two sides of the anti-paternalist coin. One might even categorise 
Veatch’s perspective as consumerist; the patient merely needs to shop for the right doctor. More specifically, 
Veatch’s paired decision-making model is a form of supported decision-making, in which the doctor supports 
the patient’s autonomous decision by way of representative advocacy. In terms of values, autonomy is 
implicitly more fundamental than welfare; the goodness of the doctor’s ‘guess’ is measured by its relation 
to the patient’s ‘belief and value structure’. According to Veatch, choice trumps welfare. 
Julian Savulescu is a bioethicist who contrasts the subjectivist ‘consumerist reaction’ (1997: 129) of Veatch’s 
account with a more objectivist account: ‘if objectivism about value is true – that there really are states 
which are good for people regardless of whether they desire to be in them – then we should accept a more 
rationalist liberal alternative’ (1997: 115). Savulescu summarises his position as influenced by the overall aim 
of healthcare: ‘if the practice of medicine is… in part a search for what is objectively good for individuals, 
then we should promote rational dialogue between doctors and patients’ (1997: 129). Savulescu’s account 
of an ethical approach to decision-making is thus founded upon an epistemology which assumes the 
objectivism of values and the universality of a conception of rationality.  
However, it is not self-evident what rationality means in this instance. In the persistently incisive words of 
Foucault: ‘The main problem when people try to rationalise something is not to investigate whether or not 
they conform to principles of rationality, but to discover which kind of rationality they are using’ (in May, 
1992: 97).  Whilst Savulescu’s account serves to highlight the role of values in the decision-making 
relationship, it nevertheless fails to transcend the paternalism – anti-paternalism dialectic. This is because 
to smuggle a particular view of rationality in as the view of rationality simultaneously smuggles a form of soft 
paternalism into the decision-making relationship, one-sidedly determining the rules of the decision-making 
process (Specker Sullivan, 2016).  
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Savulescu’s model does make an original contribution by highlighting the interconnectedness of ethics and 
epistemology. However, in terms of values, Savulescu’s model is simply a welfare-based approach. Savulescu 
posits some ‘states’ which are ‘objectively good for people’, which can be pursued in conformity with a 
rational process which is the form of rationality. In other words, he believes in the good way of being 
(ontologically) and the good way of deliberating (epistemologically) as a basis for the good way of decision-
making (ethically). This is a remarkably illiberal ‘liberal alternative’, in which the situated and embodied 
nature of individual human agency (Hughes, 2011) is expected to cede to the hegemony of a bioethicist’s 
absolutist rationalism.  
In short, the pursuit of what is objectively good for people on the grounds of what is the objectively good 
way to go about it is a type, if not a stereotype, of welfare-based decision-making. What is atypical, however, 
is that both patient and doctor submit to a higher authority: the laws of good reasoning. Savulescu’s model 
is thus a form of paternalism in which the rationalist bioethicist is the pater. Nevertheless, it is not without 
its strengths. For example, Savulescu’s model seeks to put the brakes on what he sees as the rise of ethical 
relativism and clinical consumerism, and the model is easily employed to reinforce the traditionalist status 
quo in paternalist corners of UK healthcare, of which some may approve. The weakness of his ‘liberal’ 
welfare-based approach is that, as well as not being liberal, its beneficent objectivism is arguably not, well, 
fair. According to Savulescu’s paternalism, welfare trumps choice. 
Annemarie Mol is a sociologist and political philosopher who calls for a new movement in healthcare, 
‘patientism’, which resists the currents of both patriarchal traditionalism and liberal egalitarianism (2008: 
36). She calls for a new logic in decision-making, a logic of care. Without succumbing to paternalism by 
‘allowing [clinicians] to do whatever they like’, and without succumbing to anti-paternalism by of ‘pushing 
professionals back into their cage’ (2008: 9), Mol calls for a third way that reconfigures standards of good 
decision-making. This involves opposing what has been referred to as the ‘tyranny of autonomy’ (Foster, 
2009). However, Mol stops short of depicting a workable decision-making model for practice. Thus, the 
dichotomy remains; it is still unclear how to avoid absolutizing the value of choice without absolutizing the 
value of welfare instead. 
3.1.5 Welfare and choice 
There are, undoubtedly, numerous other iterations of how decisions should be made within healthcare. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to address them all. This survey attempts only to present some of the major 
players in the debate and to illustrate that none have successfully transcended the paternalist – anti-
paternalist dualism. The closest contender, perhaps, is shared decision-making because this model contains 
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elements of both. Even this model, however, requires appeal to an unnamed third value to justify its 
arbitration between paternalist and anti-paternalist elements.  
In conclusion, the conflict between decision-making models reflects a conflict in values. Some models appeal 
to welfare as their fundamental value; the resultant paternalist approach to decision-making is justified by 
the bioethical principle of beneficence. Some models appeal to choice as their fundamental value; the 
resultant anti-paternalist approach to decision-making is justified by the bioethical principle of respect for 
autonomy. It is noteworthy that paternalism and anti-paternalism both make appeal to a fundamental value 
rather than arguing for their fundamental values27; it is taken as given. In the battle over fundamental values, 
then, all models take sides and do so arbitrarily. 
However, shared decision-making is an exception. It appeals to both welfare and choice as its fundamental 
values; its biphasic structure is justified by both bioethical principles but is left unprincipled in its delineation 
between the two; it lacks a third value. In terms of values, where other models are arbitrarily one-sided, 
shared decision-making is arbitrarily two-sided. It remains to be seen how this theoretical tension between 
paternalism and anti-paternalism, between welfare and choice, is enacted and experienced in general, and 
within an Acute Medicine Service (AMS) in particular. 
3.2 Cognitive speed: fast and slow 
A second axis along which clinical decision-making can be categorised is the axis of cognitive speed. This may 
seem like a peculiar change of subject because speed of cognition is not something which features readily in 
clinically-oriented literature on decision-making. However, the speed of processing is a theme which has 
enjoyed prominence in recent research in cognitive psychology and is starting to be applied to clinical 
contexts. I raise it here in view of the fact that it is likely to gain traction within clinical literature in the near 
future. As such, the section that follows is as much a literature ‘pre-view’ as re-view. I start by surveying 
three dominant research paradigms in the psychology of decision-making. I then focus on one paradigm in 
particular (cognitivism), one theory in particular (dual process theory) and one model in particular (universal 
model of clinical reasoning). 
3.2.1 Psychological paradigms 
The scientific study of decision-making depends in part on the pre-empirical commitments of the researcher 
and research community; what ‘decision-making’ is depends on the paradigm through which it is studied 
 
27 Arguably, any justification of a fundamental value makes appeal to a more foundational value or to the same value and is 
therefore either self-undermining or circular. 
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(Kuhn, 1962, 2005). Broadly speaking, research into decision-making can be grouped into three scientific 
paradigms: behaviourism, cognitivism and interpretivism.  
3.2.1.1 Behaviourism 
The first studies into clinical decision-making stemmed from behaviourist psychology, according to which 
‘internal states of consciousness are excluded… as being beyond scientific study’ (Loftus and Smith, 2008: 
206). This paradigm can be broadly located within the empirico-analytical tradition, given that ‘behavioural 
laws that link stimuli to behaviour are assumed to be similar in kind to the laws of physics and chemistry’ 
(Loftus and Smith, 2008: 205–206). However, despite its initial promise, behaviourism was soon considered 
an inadequate conceptualisation of the complexities of decision-making due to its relative neglect of 
contextual detail and interpersonal interaction (Loftus and Smith, 2008). The more powerful conceptual 
framework that many adopted in place of behaviourism, which was heralded as paying due attention to the 
subtlety of mental phenomena, is the cognitivist paradigm (Patel and Arocha, 2000). 
3.2.1.2 Cognitivism 
Where behaviourism envisioned cognition as a scientifically impenetrable black box with ‘environmental 
inputs and behavioural outputs’, cognitivism employs the metaphor of cognition as ‘information processing, 
similar in kind to that carried out by computers’ (Loftus and Smith, 2008: 206). Cognitivism proposes there 
are mental structures, such as categories, prototypes, instances, schemas, scripts and networks (Gruppen 
and Frohna, 2002) which function in relation to three key core concepts: information processing, memory 
representation and problem solving (Case and Bereiter, 1984). 
Within cognitivist psychology, a subspecialty of decision theory was quick to develop. The so-called first 
generation of the psychology of decision making imagined a decision-maker to be a self-interested gambler, 
who was engaged in a mathematical game: ‘it is assumed that the player should select the option that has 
the greatest expected value’ (Beach 2005: 7). This was an approach that came to be known as the ‘expected 
utility model’ (Ubel and Loewenstein, 1999: 82). 
Despite the allure of simplicity and mathematical precision, a second generation of decision theory arose 
out of frustration with the first. The gamble analogy and expected utility model are unrealistic in their neglect 
of people’s limitations; decision makers are frequently dependent on simplifying strategies, which lead to 
information distortions such as the ‘availability heuristic’ and ‘representativeness heuristic’ (Tversky and 
Kahnemann, 1974, 1981). There are now over 50 known forms of cognitive bias (Baron, 2000). Furthermore, 
decision makers are typically unable to estimate the probabilities of unique events (Gigerenzer, 1991).  
These observations prompted a second generation of decision theory, which ‘abandons the gamble analogy 
and views decision making as a form of problem solving’ (Beach, 2005: 9). I will return to the cognitivist 
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construal of decision-making as problem solving in a moment, after summarising the contribution of a third 
paradigm: interpretivism. 
3.2.1.3 Interpretivism 
From an interpretivist perspective, decision-making within a healthcare context is considered to be ‘socially, 
historically and culturally constructed’ (Loftus and Smith 2008: 209). Interpretivism seeks to understand 
phenomena, particularly human phenomena, within their social context (Holman, 1993), presupposing that 
‘multiple interpretations of reality can exist’ (Loftus and Smith 2008: 209). In contrast to behaviourist and 
cognitivist approaches, an interpretivist approach to decision-making seeks to understand the phenomenon 
without isolating it from its social context. As Leonard explains, ‘to understand a person’s behaviour or 
expressions, one has to study the person in context, for it is only there that what an individual values and 
finds significant is visible’ (1989: 46). 
Within healthcare, research into decision-making within an interpretivist paradigm has largely arisen out of 
the non-medical professions. This is perhaps unsurprising, given the medical profession’s affinity to the 
empirico-analytical tradition, wedded as it is to ‘a positivist philosophical stance where objectivity is the key 
issue’ (Higgs and Loftus 2008: 215). Since the 1950s, interpretivist research has made major contributions to 
understanding decision-making in nursing, physiotherapy and occupational therapy (Benner, 1984; Benner 
and Tanner, 1987; Crepeau, 1991; Benner et al, 1992; Jensen et al, 2007). 
3.2.2 Dual process theory 
I return now to the cognitivist paradigm. Specifically, I draw attention to second-generation research into 
decision-making as problem-solving, which has made a significant impact on the understanding of clinical 
decision-making. 
In 1978, Elstein et al explored how diagnostic problems are resolved by medical professionals and posited a 
process of limited hypothesis generation, which then guides subsequent data collection and interpretation 
(1978). This method of ‘backward reasoning’ has been termed ‘hypothetico-deductivism’. It has been 
described as Bayesian in its probability estimation and Popperian in its hypothesis falsification, but orientates 
these epistemic tools in a problem-solving direction (Croskerry, 2009: 1022). 
However, whilst a hypothetico-deductivist approach to problem-solving is characteristic of novices, it does 
not equally reflect the approach of clinical experts. Ericsson and Simon reported that a ‘forward reasoning’ 
approach to problem solving distinguishes experts from novices, and that this is ‘one of the most robust 
findings’ in the field of clinical reasoning (Ericsson & Simon 1993: 132). Experts tend to use if-then production 
rules (Patel and Groen, 1986) and intuitive pattern recognition (Loftus and Smith, 2008). 
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Elstein anticipated a ‘clinical-statistical polarization’ between those cognitivists who valued the intuition of 
the experienced practitioner and those who valued the rationale of the quantifying theoretician (1976). In 
response, some have proposed a cognitive continuum between intuitive and analytic approaches, along 
which decision-makers take their place guided by cues and experience: cognitive continuum theory (Hamm, 
1988). Others have proposed two processes: the fast, intuitive ‘system 1’ and the slow, analytical ‘system 2’ 
(Evans, 2008; Croskerry, 2009). This dual process theory has been popularised in Daniel Kahnemann’s best-
selling book Thinking, Fast and Slow (2012) and is well corroborated by neuroscientific evidence (Mills-
Finnerty et al, 2014; van den Bos and Flik, 2015; Broche-Perez et al, 2016; Foxall, 2016). 
3.2.3 Universal model of clinical reasoning 
3.2.3.1 Summary 
Clinician in Emergency Medicine, Pat Croskerry, appreciates the workable nature of dual process theory, 
which allows for cognitive flexibility according to the specific circumstances of the clinical scenario: 
‘Many clinical situations are often characterized by too many variables or unknowns, too many 
ethical and financial restrictions, or too many other resource limitations to ever allow a simple 
quantitative approach to guide a particular clinical decision, and actuarial models simply cannot be 
applied in many clinical situations. This is the clinical reality that medical decision makers face daily’ 
(2009: 1026). 
Observing the lack of any ‘unifying approach’ to medical decision making, Croskerry incorporates cognitivist 
dual process theory into a clinical context to propose a ‘universal model for clinical reasoning’ (2009: 1022). 
System 1 processing is fast and intuitive but prone to diagnostic error; system 2 processing is analytical and 
less prone to diagnostic error but slower (2009: 1023–1024). 
In this proposal, he is careful to emphasise the interdependence of the two arms of the model. For example, 
when a clinician observes a familiar-looking rash, she may diagnose shingles by way of recognition-primed 
processing (system 1). However, upon encountering atypical, unexpected features, she may switch to system 
2 reasoning (‘rational override’). Likewise, the clinician may switch back to system 1 decision-making through 
‘inattentiveness, distraction, fatigue, and cognitive indolence’, what he terms a ‘dysrationalia override’ 
(2009: 1024–1025). 
3.2.3.2 Critique 
There seem to me to be three main limitations of Croskerry’s model, adapted as it is from dual process 
theory. Firstly, it is limited in its scope. It is an approach to decision-making that intends to solve a problem 
and, specifically, a diagnostic problem. Secondly, it is limited in its professional perspective. Within the 
cognitivist paradigm there is comparatively little attention given to the decision-making process of other 
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healthcare professionals, patients or relatives. Thirdly, it is limited by the shortcomings of the computation 
metaphor presupposed by the cognitivist paradigm. Dual process theory can be firmly located within the 
empirico-analytical tradition, as evidenced by its emphasis on the rational processing of accurate 
information. However, decision-making in a clinical setting does not deal simply with informational ‘brute 
facts’ that need processing; it deals with personal problems, interpreted as meaningful by persons and 
reliant on persons for their amelioration. 
Empirico-analytical approaches ‘work best when the context is defined, limited and perpetual’ (Holman, 
1993: 30) but arguably lack appreciation for the ill-defined, relationally extended, unique context of clinical 
decision-making. For such a ‘complex, multidimensional, integrated, task- and context- dependent process’ 
as clinical decision-making (Loftus and Smith, 2008: 209) an expanded model which abandons the 
reductionist and individualist computation metaphor of cognitivism may prove insightful. 
Croskerry considers his clinical adaptation of cognitivist dual process theory to be of use to healthcare 
professionals. His ‘comprehensive approach’ allows clinicians to ‘gain insight and understanding into their 
own decision making’ (2009: 1026). What spurs Croskerry on to promote this model is more than the 
appeasement of clinicians’ intellectual curiosity, however. As he puts it, ‘it is difficult to imagine anything of 
greater importance or relevance to patient outcomes and to patient safety’ (2009: 1026, emphasis added). 
Ultimately, Croskerry urges clinicians to engage with his decision-making model on ethical grounds: ‘For the 
safety of patients, the imperative to think critically, reason, decide, and diagnose well always remains’ (2009: 
1026, emphasis added). In terms of values, Croskerry is concerned for patient welfare and views the need 
for clinicians to gain decision-making insight as a means to that end. A strength of this clinical adaptation of 
cognitivist dual process theory, then, is its positive impact on clinical practice according to the value of 
welfare.  
However, a weakness may be its construal of positive impact only according to the value of welfare. What if 
there were other values according to which impact could be appraised, such as choice? The individualist 
reduction inherent in cognitivism renders Croskerry’s model located exclusively within a single cranium, 
namely, the clinician’s. However, clinical problems look different from different perspectives (Higgs and 
Jones, 2008). There is minimal appreciation within Croskerry’s model of clinical reasoning for the meaning 
of an illness in the life-world of a particular patient and, in this way, it could be said to lack respect for 
autonomy. By adopting a cognitivist paradigm, Croskerry’s model is blinkered from the outset; it only sees 
people as individual information-processors. However, as feminist bioethicist Jackie Leach Scully puts it, the 
‘model of the moral self as a disembodied, rational decision maker functioning independently at the 
bargaining table overlooks important aspects of moral life’ (2008: 24).  
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Furthermore, it may be that producing the correct diagnosis is not the only problem (or even the main 
problem) with which the clinician ought to be concerned. Likewise, it may be that the doctor is not the only 
(or even the main) problem-solver around. 
Croskerry refers to some limited quantitative research to provide empirical warrant for his appropriation of 
dual process theory (Landrigan et al, 2004; Berner and Graber, 2007). However, in order to show whether 
clinical reasoning does indeed proceed according to this model, qualitative research is required into the 
experience of decision-makers within their social context. In short, cognitivism here needs interpretivism; 
the ethnographic study of an AMS, which I am soon to present, may serve to address this scientific shortfall. 
It remains to be seen how well Croskerry’s cognitivist model maps onto decision-making in clinical practice, 
such as within an AMS. In particular, it remains to be seen whether welfare considerations alone are 
sufficient to characterise what deciding well is. 
3.3 Values-conscious decision-making 
Clinical decision-making models which have been considered thus far involve values implicitly. However, 
some decision-making models are more explicit about the role of values in making a decision in healthcare. 
I will explore two prominent examples of such values-conscious decision-making models: values based 
practice (VBP) and values-based medicine (VBM). 
3.3.1 Values-based practice 
3.3.1.1 Summary 
KWM Fulford is the main proponent of VBP, having provided theoretical grounding for it in Moral Theory 
and Medical Practice (1989). Drawing on the insights of ordinary language philosophy, Fulford establishes 
that person-centred care is synonymous with personal-values-centred care (Fulford et al, 2012) and argues 
that good clinical care equates to good handling of the various values which are in play. He considers VBP to 
be a timely complement to the evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement, which is well-established in UK 
healthcare. David Sackett, an early proponent of EBM, describes it as an integration of best research 
evidence, clinical expertise and patients’ values (Sackett et al., 2000: 1). Fulford sees VBP as supplementing 
EBM in its values-conscious task and thus enabling clinical decisions to stand on ‘two feet: evidence plus 
values’ (2014: 11). 
How does VBP lead to a decision? Fulford et al draw an analogy with democracy, in which decisions can be 
made and accepted without first requiring unanimity (2012). A similar process of balancing of values can 




To characterise the process by which decisions should be made, Fulford proceeds to articulate ten principles, 
five theoretical and five practical, as a framework for values-conscious decision-making. These include the 
‘squeaky wheel principle’, that values tend to be noticed in times of value conflict, and the ‘patient-first 
principle’, that the preferences and wishes of the patient are the clinician’s first port of call (2004: 206). Once 
all stakeholders have expressed their preferences, the responsible clinician is enabled to proceed with a 
decision according to a ‘balance of legitimately different value perspectives’ (2004: 216). 
3.3.1.2 Critique 
The model of VBP is endorsed across a wide range of healthcare professionals, as reflected in its Oxford-
based network of individual and organisational partners (The Collaborating Centre for Values-Based Practice 
in Health and Social Care, 2020). Furthermore, VBP is self-consciously aligned with legal and professional 
guidance, such as the Mental Health Act 2007 and the ‘National Framework of Values’ (2004)  of the National 
Institute for Mental Health  in England (Fulford, 2014: 12). Its reception amongst scholars, however, has 
been a little more mixed. I will present three problems of VBP: one ontological, one epistemological and one 
evaluative. 
3.3.1.2.1 Ontological problem 
Many critics of VBP level their complaint at the basic unit of the model: values. According to VBP, what 
actually is a value? In Fulford’s own words, values extend to ‘needs, wishes, preferences, indeed to any and 
all of the many and diverse ways in which people express, directly or indirectly, negative or positive 
evaluations and value judgments’ (2011: 976)28. 
One of VBP’s fiercest critics, Bob Brecher, notes both the tautologous nature of this definition as well as its 
impractical vagueness: 
‘What I do call for, and what I do not find anywhere in Fulford’s account of what he takes “value” to 
mean, is some minimal characterisation of what he has in mind’ (2014: 63).  
Likewise, Kingma and Banner note that, across his writings on VBP, Fulford considers values to be ‘anything 
that people take to be important to illness tout court’ (2014: 41), rendering the concept of values ‘so broad 
as to become useless’ (2014: 43). 
Whilst the individual patient is the ‘first call’ for information (Fulford, 2004: 213), Fulford suggests that the 
expressed values of all stakeholders need to be taken into account. Given the democratic process that 
ensues, it makes a great deal of difference who counts as a stakeholder and is thereby entitled to a vote in 
this decision-making process. Surprisingly, Fulford fails to articulate how the group of stakeholders is to be 
 
28 KWM Fulford’s sense of ‘values’ is thus much broader than the sense I use in this thesis (see: Chapter 2 What are values?). 
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determined, other than hinting it involves at least the patient and an ‘extended’ multidisciplinary team 
(2014: 8). 
VBP’s ontological problem is that it is unrealistic about what values are and who stakeholders are. To 
continue his own metaphor, the clarity of Fulford’s democratic process is undermined by striking ambiguity 
about what counts as a vote and who counts as an electorate. 
3.3.1.2.2 Epistemological problem 
Whilst Fulford preserves deliberative space for the ‘clinical judgment’ that Sackett identified as an 
accompaniment to evidence and values, he nowhere characterises the nature of this judgment. For example, 
Fulford recognises that not all persons involved in a clinical decision are equal; hence the so-called ‘patient 
perspective principle’ (2004: 206). However, this principle merely prescribes the order of communication, 
not the relative weighting of different people’s evaluations. 
In order to come to a decision, value-expressions must be more than listened to; there needs to be reason 
for action, a justification for a course of action. Appeal to a vague notion of balancing does not help the 
practitioner know how to do balancing well. Critic Tim Thornton sees this omission as transforming VBP from 
liberal-in-theory to authoritarian-in-practice; as he puts it: 
‘Surely not just any balance would do? For example, a “balance” imposed through undue force or 
influence by powerful parties to a clinical decision would not be a good outcome. So “balance” is to 
be understood as something like the right or a good balance, which seems to presuppose the kind of 
innocent authoritarianism in question’ (2014: 60–61). 
The development of VBP seems to be epistemologically stunted29, leaving it an insufficient guide for a clinical 
decision-maker, especially during times of dissensus. 
3.3.1.2.3 Evaluative problem 
The ontological and epistemological problems of VBP could also be described as normative problems: VBP 
does not adequately present what ought to be considered a value, whose values ought to be considered, 
nor how clinical judgment ought to be performed. The latter could be expressed in terms of values: Is a good 
balance to be measured by the evaluative standard of patient welfare? Or perhaps a good balance is one 
which best reflects the perspectives of the stakeholders, according to the evaluative standard of choice? Or 
perhaps another evaluative standard altogether? 
 
29 KWM Fulford conceded that VBP’s epistemological notion of balancing remains a work-in-progress in personal dialogue with 
me on 11/04/19. 
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I raise one final limitation of VBP. VBP, inspired by the procedural justice of a liberal democracy, involves a 
balancing of value-perspectives. Not any perspectives, however: only ‘legitimately different perspectives’ 
(2004: 206). Fulford deems values to be legitimate so long as they do not contravene the fundamental 
‘values-based premise of mutual respect’; disrespectful, discriminatory values such as racism are thus 
excluded from the VBP decision-making process (2004: 12). 
Despite Fulford’s construal of VBP as a pluralist framework of ten principles, it turns out that the ten are 
based on one. The foundational premise, respect for persons, acts as a meta-value by which all other value 
expressions gain their legitimacy. In philosophical terms, VBP is thus a value monist ethical system. In political 
terms, it is an ideology, espousing a liberal conception of the good society (Brecher, 2014: 65). In theological 
terms, it is a creed: there is no value but respect for persons, and VBP is its prophet. 
Whilst ‘respect for persons’ has an intuitive resonance to it, it affords a vast array of interpretations. Firstly, 
what counts as  a person? Secondly, what does it mean to ‘respect’ persons? Does respecting a person entail 
doing what promotes objective flourishing (welfare), or does it entail doing what appreciates subjective 
wishes and preferences (choice)? Or perhaps something else altogether? 
The structure of VBP is only as strong as its foundation. The foundation of VBP is a meta-value which is 
arbitrary and ambiguous, leaving it unclear what the role of values ought to be in clinical decision-making. 
3.3.2 Values-based medicine 
3.3.2.1 Summary 
Values based medicine (VBM) is a model proposed by Miles Little that has a lot in common with VBP. Both 
share a ‘V’; they seek to address the value-laden aspect of clinical work. Both share a ‘B’; they presuppose a 
values foundation as a basis for ethical justification. They are thus both forms of foundationalism about 
values. Whilst both abbreviations differ in their final letter, they nevertheless share a focus on ‘medicine’ 
and ‘practice’: the models are intended to be incorporated into day-to-day clinical decision-making. 
However, they differ in their philosophical underpinnings; where Fulford depends on ordinary language 
philosophy to elucidate the nature of values, Little leans on a David Hume’s account of ultimate ends beyond 
which ‘it is an absurdity to ask for a reason’ (2004 (1777): 293). Little rejects Fulford’s loose definition of 
values which includes preferences, drawing a contrast as follows: 
‘[Values] are not the same as preferences. Preferences may express values, but preferences are not 
values per se. Values for me are the end-points of iterative enquiry, a series of questions that keep 
asking for justifications until there is no answer except something like ‘Because that is the way 
humans are’, or ‘Because societies cannot function any other way’ (2014b: 172). 
71 
 
Little’s account of values is thus reminiscent of the phrasing of the Warnock report, which noted that 
‘matters of ultimate value are not susceptible of proof’ (Department of Health and Social Security, 1984: 2). 
Little’s depiction of values is unashamedly foundationalist: ‘A society without foundational values is an 
incoherent concept’ (2014b: 174). Despite this foundationalist conception, Little only considers some values 
to be truly fundamental: 
‘It is quite possible to talk about values anywhere along a continuum. At one end, we have the set of 
foundational values… at the other, we have the systems that give practical expression to these values 
in culturally appropriate ways’ (2014b: 174). 
Foundational ‘F’ values, according to Little, are universal across human cultures and ‘pre-normative’; they 
form the basis of justifying normative claims, whether generalised axioms (‘A’ values) or specific practical 
expressions (‘P’ values) (2014b: 174). 
Little identifies three foundational values: survival, security and flourishing. He holds these to be ‘descriptive 
categories’ and ‘a priori necessities for a culture or society to continue and to evolve – but [this] does not 
say how they must play out in each culture or society’ (2014b: 173). As with Fulford’s VBP, it could be argued 
that VBM is then also a disguised form of monism. An implied meta-value here is ‘culture or society 
continuing and evolving (is good)’; or rather ‘enabling culture or society to continue and evolve (is the 
standard of goodness)’. However, I think this would be a hasty inference; Little does not suggest that 
humanity’s evolutionary propagation renders these values good but rather it renders these values existent 
(and vice versa). 
In Values, Foundations and Being Human, Little illustrates how his F-A-P system of values could usefully 
operate as a framework for clinical decision-making. He narrates a scenario in which patients with a 
haematological disorder could be treated with a medication known as recombinant Factor VII. However, the 
benefit of this medication has not been conclusively shown and it is extremely expensive. Physicians can 
prescribe it off-licence but risk litigation by doing so (2014b: 179–180). 
Little shows how decision-making could start with the three foundational values and work its way upwards. 
‘From the doctor’s point of view, the patient’s survival is paramount… From society’s point of view as well, 
every possible step should be taken, because life is precious, and the use of Factor VII is still within the means 
of most Western societies’ (2014b: 180). Little goes on to describe how the doctor would wish to protect her 
own security and flourishing by being able to ‘say with conviction “I did everything I could”’ (2014b: 180). 
Similarly, society at large expresses concerns related to security and flourishing:  
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‘Faith in our own security implies that all reasonable means will be used by medicine when death 
threatens. Death is the end of flourishing. We want to feel secure that medicine does what it can to 
rescue us from vulnerability’ (2014b: 180).  
Little then turns to draw attention to the more superficial A and P values in play, noting that there is no 
conflict on the level of foundational values; ‘substantive disagreement begins at the A level’ (2014b: 180). 
He concludes this chapter by alluding to one of Immanuel Kant’s more poetic moments: 
‘”…out of wood so crooked and perverse as that which man is made of, nothing absolutely straight 
can ever be wrought”(Kant, 1824) The wonder is that the species, warlike, spiteful, inconstant and 
capricious, has survived at all’ (2014b: 181). 
In view of such capricious inconstancy, it is also remarkable that Little deems humanity to be so unshakeably 
constant in its tenancy of foundational values. I now turn to consider in what ways Little’s presentation of 
foundational values is problematic. 
3.3.2.2 Critique 
3.3.2.2.1 Pre-normativity 
According to Little, ‘survival’, ‘security’ and ‘flourishing’ are descriptive categories that provide a basis for 
normative content without containing such normativity themselves. Is this a coherent thing to say?  
Upshur does not find this notion of pre-normativity persuasive, seeing the three foundational values instead 
to be ‘regulative ideals that we strive, collectively, to ensure’ (2014: 216). He notes that Little’s account of 
foundational values is lacking an anthropology: 
‘Do the values of survival, security and flourishing apply to all humans and societies equally? That is, 
ought persons, qua persons, qualify for or share these values? If so, then they must be regarded as 
normative in some sense, otherwise they can be countered as non-necessary and therefore non-
foundational’ (2014: 217). 
In Little’s defence, he seeks to present F values as foundational to humanity’s way of propagating and 
evolving. As such, foundational values are a basis for a structure of society rather than a structure of 
knowledge (2014a: 256). Little arrived at these three foundational values through empirical qualitative 
investigations and notes he could have named them ‘primordial factors’ in order to emphasise their 
descriptive, pre-normativity (2014a: 257). He adds: ‘consider the F-values as something essentially human 
like opposable thumbs. They are a given. We are stuck with them’ (2014a: 257).  
Whilst Little’s F-values are evaluative in the sense that they function as standards by which persons evaluate 
a situation, they are merely descriptive in that ‘they offer partial understanding of the ways in which humans 
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respond to all kinds of experience… they are clearly stated to underpin evolutionary social processes, not 
knowledge’ (2014a: 256). Thus Little does not claim that it is by these F-values that humans should respond 
to experience, ideally; he claims that it is by these F-values that humans do respond, in fact. As such, VBM 
does not tell us what the role of values in clinical decision-making ought to be but what it tends to be.  
3.3.2.2.2 Universality 
It could be argued, however, that VBM is not justified in claiming to be even a descriptive model, for two 
reasons.  
Firstly, Little’s account is caught on the horns of a dilemma. Whether or not Little’s F-values are conceived 
within a form of social life, either conception leads to an intolerable conclusion. Within a form of social life, 
F-values would be meaningful but not universal; divested from a form of social life, F-values would be 
universal but not meaningful30. To assert that such values are both meaningful (to be applied) and universal 
(applied by everyone) is for Little to have his theoretical cake and eat it. 
Secondly, Little’s attempt to justify the existence of F-values, by appeal to evolutionary necessity, is purely 
theoretical31. Whilst alluding in passing to qualitative data in support of VBM (2014a: 257), he sooner reaches 
for (the empiricist) David Hume’s moral epistemology than any contemporary empirical data in support of 
his foundationalist claims. It remains to be seen whether survival, security and flourishing really are values 
involved in decision-making within healthcare generally and an AMS in particular. 
3.4 Conclusion: values and decisions 
In this survey, I have endeavoured to present a critical account of major decision-making models. The 
limitations of each model can be portrayed as an inadequate account of the role of values in healthcare 
decision-making, on the grounds of arbitrariness, incompleteness or ambiguity. 
Some models exhibit arbitrariness, such as paternalist and anti-paternalist decision-making. These 
approaches take it as given that the fundamental value of healthcare decision-making is welfare or choice, 
respectively. Arbitrariness is also evident in shared decision-making’s conjunction of paternalist and anti-
paternalist phases, which lacks  a third value by which to justify any delineation between the two phases.  
 
30 In contrast, the model of the role of values in decision-making that I present in this thesis is derived from an interpretive analysis 
of rich qualitative data. As a result, the applicability of this model to other settings relies on a context-dependent ‘fusing of 
horizons’ (Gadamer, 2013) rather than a context-free universalising of terms (See Chapter 5: Trustworthiness). 
31 Arguably, research in social psychology provides some empirical support for Little’s claims, given the similarity between F-values 
and the hierarchy of needs described by Abraham Maslow (1943). However, where Little’s values are necessary for propagation 
for the human species, Maslow’s needs are necessary for self-actualisation; where Little posits a foundation, Maslow posits the 
opposite: a hierarchy. 
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Some models exhibit incompleteness, such as the Croskerry’s universal model of clinical reasoning, which 
combines a cognitivist-only construal of decision-making with a welfare-only ethical justification. 
Incompleteness is also exhibited in Little’s VBM, which provides some theoretical warrant for three 
foundational values without adequate empirical justification.  
Some models exhibit ambiguity, such as the ambiguity of the value ‘patient-centredness’, which could be 
interpreted in terms of welfare or choice. Likewise, it is profoundly unclear what ‘respect for persons’ means 
and how (good) balancing is done in Fulford’s VBP. It is also ambiguous what the meaning is, or could possibly 
be, of the decontextualized, asocial F-values of Little’s VBM. 
In summary, all of the models that I have explored fall short of providing an adequate characterisation of the 
role of values in decision-making in healthcare. In chapter 4, I contextualise this knowledge gap within an 










Chapter 4. An Acute Medicine Service 
This chapter provides context for the issues identified in the previous two chapters in three steps. Firstly, I 
summarise the short history of an Acute Medicine Service (AMS) in order to highlight its multifaceted nature. 
Secondly, I identify the priorities of the work of an AMS that are evident in current literature. Thirdly, I 
connect these insights to the knowledge gap identified in Chapters 2 and 3; namely, an AMS is a context in 
which the inadequate understanding of the role of values in decision-making is particularly problematic. 
4.1 A brief history of the AMS 
An AMS32 has only been a feature of UK healthcare since the turn of the 21st century. It has evolved through 
the changing environment of the National Health Service (NHS). This environment features survival pressures 
not just for patients but also for general hospitals, which are required to manage increased workload with 
limited resources. 
4.1.1 An AMS is a medical specialty and an organisational unit 
In the words of the Secretary of the Society for Acute Medicine, ‘there was a time when all physicians were 
expected to be competent in both the immediate and subsequent management of all common medical 
disorders, and thus were general physicians’ (Dowdle, 2004: 652). In such times, the term ‘Acute Medicine 
Service’ was not used to refer to any distinct feature of, or physical location within, hospital medicine. 
However, doctors increasingly committed themselves to focus attention on particular organ systems. This 
process of specialisation accelerated during the 1970s, with the consequence that ‘many physicians became 
more committed to their specialties than to the generalities of the acute intake’ (Dowdle, 2004: 652).  
Previously, a medically unwell patient who required hospital stay would be admitted to hospital via their 
General Practitioner (GP) or the Accident and Emergency department (A&E) onto the ward of the ‘physician 
on call’. However, ‘with the inexorable rise in the numbers of emergency admissions, ward-based admissions 
were lost, with patients being admitted initially to any available medical bed, and later to virtually any bed 
in the hospital’, leaving the admitting team to spend as much time travelling to their patients as attending 
them (Dowdle, 2004: 652). This tortuous and time-consuming routine was colloquially termed a “safari ward 
round”. Such a scattering of newly admitted patients throughout the hospital was deemed ineffective and 
untenable by a report in 1998 from the Scottish Royal Colleges of Physicians, who instead endorsed a single 
geographical area for the assessment of acutely unwell medical patients (Scottish Intercollegiate Working 
Party, 1998). This geographical area came to be known as the Acute Medicine Unit (AMU).  
 
32 ‘AMS’ is not itself a commonly used term. An AMS is more frequently referred to in terms of its medical specialty, Acute Internal 
Medicine (AIM), or in terms of its organisational department, the Acute Medical Unit (AMU). 
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This concern of the Scottish Royal Colleges of Physicians was qualified and established by a report in 2000 
by the Federation of Medical Royal Colleges (Federation of Royal College of Physicians of the United 
Kingdom, 2000), which endorsed the introduction of AMUs as an organisational unit but not yet Acute 
Internal Medicine (AIM) as a distinct medical specialty. On the heels of this, the Royal College of Physicians 
of London (RCP) formed an Acute Medicine Group which soon established the Society for Acute Medicine 
(SAM) (Dowdle, 2004). Facilitated by SAM and the RCP’s recommendations and negotiations, AIM was 
recognised as a medical sub-specialty in 2003, and a specialty of its own in 2009 (Dowdle, 2004). It was 
claimed that the new specialty of AIM was needed in addition to the establishment of AMUs for four reasons, 
the first of which was ‘the increasing demand for emergency care, much of which falls within the medical 
specialties’ (Royal College of Physicians of London, 2004: 1). 
The president of the RCP summarised the need for change in her own words: 
‘the unpredictability and intensity of caring for the acutely ill calls for the undivided attention of the 
teams dealing with them… Junior doctors faced with acute problems must be confident that they can 
call on a senior colleague who is skilled in acute medicine and receive unreserved support’ (Royal 
College of Physicians of London, 2004: vii). 
The proposal of the new specialty of AIM together with the new department of an AMU rapidly gained 
traction. As a result, there came a pressing need to clarify what these entities actually are. A report of a 
working party from the RCP was released for this purpose, entitled Acute Medicine: Organisation and 
Training for the Next Decade (2004). It defines the specialty of AIM as ‘that part of general (internal) medicine 
concerned with the immediate and early specialist management of adult patients with a wide range of 
medical conditions who present in hospital as emergencies’ (2004: ix). This definition was revised in 2007 to 
clarify that patients may present ‘to, or from within, hospitals’ and that their care needs may be either 
‘urgent or emergency’ (RCP Acute Medicine Task Force, 2007: xxi). The urgency of care needs has elsewhere 
been enumerated to suggest that the specialty of AIM is primarily concerned with the first 72 hours of clinical 
management (Joint Royal Colleges of Physicians Training Board, no date; takeAIM Campaign, no date).  
Alongside the birth of the specialty, the RCP  endorsed the arrival of its accompanying organisational unit, 
the AMU, which they define as ‘a specialised area of an acute hospital where patients suffering from acute 
medical illness can be assessed and initially admitted’ (RCP Acute Medicine Task Force, 2007). The success 
of one depends on the success of the other. 
The impact of the RCP’s suggestions is evident from the subsequent rapid implementation of AMUs 
throughout the UK. By 2009, it was estimated that 75% of hospital patients were being admitted to AMUs 
(McNeill et al., 2009). AMUs are now ‘uniformly present in acute hospitals in the UK and… increasingly 
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relevant internationally’ (Reid et al. 2018: 522). The AMU model has begun to be installed in Ireland, New 
Zealand, Australia, Italy, the Netherlands and Scandinavia (McNeill et al., 2011; Realdi et al., 2011; Vork et 
al., 2011; Watts et al., 2011; Providence, Gommans and Burns, 2012). Whilst professional bodies have been 
quick to express expert opinion in support of this new model of acute medical care, it must be conceded that 
the AMS model has largely emerged ‘as a result of local service innovations and there is limited evidence in 
relation to the effectiveness of this model of care’ (Reid et al. 2016: 434). 
The specialty of AIM and the department of AMU, then, are twins which grew up together. Their adoption 
has been justified in view of two needs: the need of patients to receive expert acute care and the need of 
hospitals to deliver a service on limited resources with greater efficiency and co-ordination (Health Careers, 
no date). AIM and an AMU can be considered two closely related aspects of an AMS; an AMU refers to the 
department within a hospital and AIM refers to the specialty within medicine that primarily operates there.  
So far, I have presented a portrait of an AMS that emerges from a particular kind of literature: reports, 
guidance and evidence from within the medical tradition. I now turn to alternative portrayals of an AMS that 
arise from other literature sources. 
4.1.2 An AMS is a place for healing 
Jocelyn Cornwell trained as a medical sociologist and ethnographer prior to working in NHS management 
and becoming chief executive of The Point of Care Foundation (Kings Fund, 2017). She rejects the 
characterisation of an AMS purely in medical and organisational terms. Instead, Cornwell proposes that an 
AMS ‘would be better defined as a place for healing, where pain and distress can be eased by caring 
professionals’ (Kings Fund, 2017: 73, emphasis added). The goal and value of an AMS is something that needs 
to be balanced by other viewpoints. As she puts it, ‘when value is defined from the supply side alone, it tends 
to ignore the relational and non-clinical aspects of care that are critical to patients' mental and emotional 
wellbeing and recovery’ (Kings Fund, 2017: 73). 
Cornwell is concerned that if an AMS is construed only as a medical specialty and organisational unit, then 
the psychosocial elements of acute illness may be overlooked. Such elements include illness’ impact on 
embodied relationality: 
‘Illness changes everything. It changes not only my internal organs, but my relationship to my body, 
my relationship to others, their relation to me and to my body... In short, illness changes how one is 
in the world' (Carel, 2007). 




'Every patient that comes through a hospital is apprehensive. It's a strange place, you have strange 
sheets, you have odd tea in a plastic cup. The whole thing is vibrantly different' (2009). 
The aspect of illness that Cornwell, Carel and Sweeney are emphasising has a lot in common with the 
biographical disruption model of sickness (see: Chapter 2 Biographical disruption). In view of this, to fail to 
acknowledge the psychological and relational dimensions of an AMS is to fail to treat all the kinds of suffering 
that are present. As Cornwell concludes: 
‘If wards were re-defined as places for healing, recovery and care, staff would aim to reduce and 
eliminate all avoidable suffering. The quality of relational care would have equal priority to clinical 
quality and patient safety, and changes in the physical environment, the conduct of staff and the 
organisation of care would follow’ (Kings Fund, 2017: 75). 
Thus, Cornwell identifies a third aspect of an AMS, which is largely overlooked in medical and organisational 
literature. As well as being a medical specialty and an organisational unit, an AMS is a place of healing. As 
well as being a place where sickness is met with treatment and triage, an AMS is a place where sickness is 
met with relational care.  
Cornwell’s account is supported by clinical researcher Sam Pannick, who notes that, like all medical wards, 
an AMS is not just a place of treatment but ‘a temporary home… a resting place’ (Kings Fund, 2017: 68). It 
cannot be reduced to its location on the map of medical specialties or hospital departments. Pannick et al 
note that there is a lack of clarity regarding the goals of medical ward care that shape the ward’s structures, 
processes and outcomes (2015). This is problematic because ‘without this clarity, we’re putting the cart 
before the horse, introducing changes without really knowing what we’re hoping to improve’ (2015: 69). He 
notes that ‘there isn’t a consensus about the measurements that reflect good ward care in the United 
Kingdom’ (2015: 68, emphasis added). 
The introduction of an AMS is a change which is aimed at improvement. Like Pannick et al’s verdict on 
medical wards in general, is it a case of putting the cart before the horse? In what ways does an AMS do 
good? To shed light on this question, I turn to describe the priorities of an AMS.  
4.2 Priorities of an AMS 
4.2.1 Urgency 
The priority of acting urgently is implicit in the definitions, empirical justification and guidance documents 




The priority of acting with urgency is entailed in the very title of an AMS as an Acute Medical Service. I now 
survey the definitions of an AMU and AIM, highlighting in italics allusions to the priority of urgency. 
AMU: 
 ‘Acute medical unit: a specialised area of an acute hospital where patients suffering from acute 
medical illness can be assessed and initially admitted’ (RCP Acute Medicine Task Force, 2007)  
 ‘An acute medical unit… is an area of an acute hospital where people with undifferentiated medical 
emergencies who need hospital admission receive rapid assessment, investigation, initial treatment 
and definitive management’ (NICE 2018: 10) 
AIM: 
 ‘Acute medicine is that part of general (internal) medicine concerned with the immediate and early 
specialist management of adult patients suffering from a wide range of medical conditions who 
present to, or from within, hospitals requiring urgent or emergency care’ (RCP Acute Medicine Task 
Force 2007: xxi)  
 ‘Acute Internal Medicine provides the initial assessment, investigation, diagnosis and management 
of patients who have an acute medical illness within the first 72 hours of their hospital stay’ (takeAIM 
Campaign, no date) 
The healthcare that an AMS offers an individual patient is to be enacted early, quickly and not for long. This 
is perhaps because an AMS is not simply dealing with individual patients; rather, there is a continuous, 
variable and unpredictable cohort of patients being admitted to hospital as medical emergencies, with which 
the work of an AMS must rapidly keep pace.  
Besides mere definitions, is the priority of urgency reflected in other literature about an AMS?  
4.2.1.2 Empirical justification 
The evidence used to justify and promote the implementation of an AMU may reveal the priorities of those 
who wish to implement it. According to the limited evidence base, the primary benefit of an AMU is that it 
‘is associated with reduced hospital LOS [length of stay] compared to alternative models of care. The 
evidence that AMUs are associated with a decrease in mortality is weaker’ (Reid et al., 2016: 444). ‘Length 
of stay’ is a marker of how quickly patients are assessed, treated and discharged from hospital. One study 
reports a ‘mean 1.34-day reduction (95% CI 0.01–2.67)’ (McNeill et al., 2009, in: Reid et al., 2016: 444).  
Whilst this finding is not consistently confirmed in other studies (Bell et al., 2013), the reduction in length of 
stay is nevertheless used to justify the need for urgent review by senior decision-maker, daily review by 
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consultant physician and the establishment of AMUs generally (NHS England, 2015: 10). Implicit in this 
empirical justification is the priority of urgency; getting patients assessed, treated and discharged quickly is 
seen as good. 
4.2.1.3 Guidance 
In 2018, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) published 4 quality standards relating 
to areas of the work of an AMS, with suggested outcomes to measure (2018a). One such outcome to 
measure is the ‘length of hospital stay for adults admitted with undifferentiated medical emergencies’, in 
order to show that the AMS is meeting its requirement of providing ‘rapid assessment, investigation and 
treatment for medical emergencies’ (2018a: 8-9). 
SAM has also released ‘clinical quality indicators’ for an AMS to aim for, in order to improve the standard of 
care. SAM suggests 3 targets, in addition to the NICE recommendations. Upon arrival, the patient is to have 
bedside measurements (called an Early Warning Score) recorded; within 4 hours, ‘all patients should be seen 
by a competent clinical decision maker’; within 8 hours, all patients admitted during the daytime should be 
reviewed by a consultant physician; within 14 hours, all patients admitted during the night should be 
reviewed by a consultant physician (2014). The time-bound nature of each target reinforces the urgency with 
which each task is to be carried out. 
The priority of urgency is also captured in broader guidance documents. For example, the title of the Report 
of the Acute Medicine Task Force accentuates the need to get things right quickly: Acute Medical Care: the 
right person, in the right setting – first time (2007). Similarly, the NHS England publication Transforming 
Urgent and Emergency Care Services in England reflects this emphasis on urgency in its subtitle: ‘safer, faster, 
better’ (NHS England 2015b, emphasis added). 
Some guidance is directed at patients, which also highlights the priority of urgency. Recognising that the 
bustling environment of an AMS may be one to which members of the public are not accustomed, one AMS 
released a leaflet describing the department as follows: ‘AMU is a busy environment and we receive roughly 
30 to 50 admissions every day. It is not normally a long-term stay area for patients and we expect to send 
you home or move you to a speciality ward within 24 to 48 hours’ hours’ (University Hospital Southampton 
NHS Foundation Trust, 2013, emphasis added). 
As I have shown, the priority of urgency is reflected in the definitions of an AMS, in evidence justifying the 
establishment of an AMS, and in guidance documents about the work of an AMS. 
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4.2.2 Other priorities of an AMS 
4.2.2.1 Medical perspective 
Whilst the urgency of care delivery may be described as the raison d’être of an AMS according to definitions, 
evidence and professional guidance, there are indications that the work of an AMS is also shaped by 
additional priorities. For example, for all of its emphasis on urgency and the need to maintain good patient 
flow through hospital, NHS England’s guidance to urgent and emergency care services also values cost-
effectiveness, patient outcomes and patient safety (2015: 10). It is not mere urgency that is prioritised, but 
care which is simultaneously ‘safer, faster, better’ (2015: 1, emphasis added). 
With regard to the medical specialty of AIM, ‘prompt practical management’ is considered a key competency 
of a specialising physician (Joint Royal Colleges of Physicians Training Board, no date). However, in addition, 
the clinical decision-maker is required to develop a ‘rational differential diagnosis’ to ensure ‘safe and 
effective treatment of the patient’ : ‘getting it right, first time’ (RCP Acute Medicine Task Force, 2007: 7, 
emphasis added). There are clear indications here that speed is not the only measure of good acute care. 
Other priorities of the work of an AMS seem to include accuracy, safety, effectiveness, and cost-
effectiveness. 
4.2.2.2 Other perspectives 
The role of an AIM physician includes ‘the development of multi-professional systems to promote optimal 
patient care’ (Joint Royal Colleges of Physicians Training Board, no date). Accordingly, an AMU typically 
involves ‘a number of professional teams… including the medical, nursing, therapies, pharmacy and 
administrative teams’ (University Hospital Southampton NHS Foundation Trust, 2013). It is striking, 
therefore, to note that the rise of AMS has been supported by expert opinion from the medical profession, 
such as the medical royal colleges and SAM, with relatively little contribution from other healthcare 
professions. As such, the priorities of an AMS as stated in literature may successfully reflect the emphases 
of the medical profession within the NHS but leave the priorities of other healthcare professions – or patients 
- relatively unattended.  
Michael Wise was formerly a specialist in oral surgery and restorative dentistry before being admitted to an 
AMS acutely unwell with near-fatal sepsis. His reflections and experience reached publication in his book On 
the Toss of a Coin (2017). Wise’s clinically-informed analysis offers a caution over the unrestrained priority 
of urgency: ‘further “efficiencies” are likely to result in degradation of acute services, not improvement’ 
(Kings Fund, 2017: 35). 
Wise notes the importance of developing trust in the clinical team. The fact that ‘it can take time for trust to 
be established, but it can be very easily and rapidly lost’ (Kings Fund, 2017: 32-33) presents a particular 
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challenge for the time-pressured environment of an AMS. During his admission, he noticed that the priority 
of urgency and pursuit of efficiency resulted in a compromise in communication. To make matters worse, 
‘being busy can be used as an excuse for not being human, and there is a danger of this occurring among all 
frontline staff due to pressures’ (Kings Fund, 2017: 34). Wise expresses fear that the priority of urgency in 
an environment where staff are constantly pressurised can result in desensitisation to the perspective of 
patients, resulting in harm to patients’ psychological well-being and a compromise in the quality of care. 
Rather than pushing staff to go faster and faster, Wise calls for the priority of urgency to be counterbalanced 
by concern for the smaller gestures of healthcare, which alleviate the distress and anxiety that accompany 
acute illness (Kings Fund, 2017). 
The wisdom of these words is echoed by Cornwell, who notes that an AMS can actually aggravate 
psychological suffering during episodes of acute illness: 
 ‘patients are inadvertently exposed to shame and humiliation; to distress, when their requests are 
ignored or overridden; to anxiety, about being kept in the dark, and about discontinuities and 
contradictory information; and to fear, when they are unable to trust caregivers’ (Kings Fund, 2017: 
75). 
According to Wise and Cornwell, then, one priority of the work of an AMS should also be to alleviate the 
psychological struggles of acutely ill patients. 
In summary, as well as delivering care urgently, some literature suggests that the work of an AMS should 
also meet other requirements, such as being safe, accurate, effective, cost-effective and caring.  
4.3 Conclusion 
In Chapter 2, I identified a lack of clarity with regard to what values are involved in healthcare decision-
making.  
A review of literature relating to the concept of sickness identified welfare and choice as two values to which 
objectivist and subjectivist epistemologies tend to appeal, respectively. However, the situation is 
complicated. For example, it is not self-evident that welfare-based and choice-based conceptualisations of 
sickness are mutually exclusive. Furthermore, welfare and choice do not exhaust the range of possible 
evaluative standards; for instance, it remains unclear what fundamental value a genealogical conception of 
sickness might appeal to. This ambiguity in values was shown to be problematic through a review of 
literature relating to the concept of futility. Value-monist and value-pluralist theoretical frameworks both 
failed to provide clarity as to what values are involved in decisions in clinical practice. 
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In Chapter 3, I identified a lack of clarity with regard to how values are involved in healthcare decision-
making. I reviewed well-established decision-making models in contemporary healthcare literature and 
explored their evaluative content. Each model of decision-making displays an inadequate account of the role 
of values on the grounds of arbitrariness, incompleteness or ambiguity. 
In this chapter, the lack of clarity regarding the what and how of values in healthcare decision-making was 
contextualised within an AMS and found to be particularly problematic for two reasons. 
Firstly, an AMS is pressured. Healthcare delivery, including decision-making, must be done quickly within an 
AMS. Patients are rapidly deteriorating and rapidly admitted, and thus must be rapidly treated and rapidly 
discharged or transferred. Putting it bluntly, an AMS is pressured to get patients out. A lack of clarity 
regarding what good decision-making is potentially impedes the efficiency of making decisions, worsening 
the pressure.  
Secondly, an AMS is stretched. The priorities of the work within an AMS are multiple, reflecting its 
multifaceted nature. As a result, the work of an AMS is pulled in multiple directions: it must be fast, safe, 
accurate, effective, cost-effective and caring, for example. An AMS is thus stretched to meet various 
demands. A lack of clarity regarding what good decision-making is potentially impedes the balance of 
decision-making. For example, it potentially leaves an AMS vulnerable to the unbridled pursuit of efficiency, 
which could bring about the inhumane degradation that Cornwell and Wise caution against. 
In conclusion, an AMS is a context in which the current lack of clarity regarding the role of values in 







Chapter 5. Methodology 
In the preceding literature review chapters (2–4), I described the theoretical landscape within which this 
thesis is situated. This landscape features three terrains: the philosophy of medicine, clinical decision-making 
and an Acute Medicine Service (AMS). I identified a knowledge gap at the interface between these three 
areas: the role of values in decision-making within an AMS. In chapters 6-8, I will present empirical data 
which address this knowledge gap. 
In this chapter I respond to the following methodological questions: 
1. Does this study, in theory, address the knowledge gap?  
2. Is the way this study was implemented, in practice, consistent with its theoretical aim?  
I address these questions in four steps. Firstly, I articulate the research question and subordinate questions 
with which this thesis is concerned. 
Secondly, I describe this study’s empirical methodology. I have carried out a ward ethnography as a 
participant observer, supplemented with semi-structured interviews. I focus on key features of this 
approach, including its theoretical, practical and experiential aspects. 
Thirdly, I describe this study’s analytic methodology33. I did a thematic analysis, borrowing from the tradition 
of philosophical hermeneutics. As with the empirical methodology, I present theoretical, practical and 
experiential aspects of this analytic approach. 
Fourthly, I argue that what follows in subsequent chapters is a trustworthy interpretive account of the role 
of values in decision-making within an AMS. After sketching the notion of validity in social science, I show its 
implications and underpinnings to be in keeping with the empirical and analytic methodology of this research 
study.  
5.1 Aim and objectives 
The question I intend to address in this thesis is as follows: 
What is the role of values in decision-making within an Acute Medicine Service (AMS)?  
This question entails three major topics: values, decision-making and an AMS. The content, context and 
significance of these topics was explored in literature review chapters 2, 3 and 4. This research question is 
 
33 I recognise that the categories of ‘empirical’ and ‘analytic’ are not neatly divisible. As with the Cartesian subject-object dualism, 
the empirical-analytic dualism is a dialectic relation. Observation and interviewing shape analysis, and analysis shapes observation 




the broad aim of this thesis, which can be broken down into more specific knowledge objectives, which I 
articulate here as subordinate questions: 
1 What is the purpose of decision-making within an AMS? 
2 How do people experience decision-making within an AMS? 
3 What values are involved in decision-making within an AMS? 
4 What role do these values play in decision-making within an AMS? 
5 What are the implications of these findings for the philosophy of medicine?  
6 What are the implications of these findings for clinical decision-making? 
Objective 1 relates to the telos of the work of an AMS and decision-making in particular. This will be primarily 
addressed in chapter 6, Restoring order. Objective 2 relates to the phenomenology of decision-making within 
an AMS. This will be primarily addressed in chapter 7, Working together. Objectives 3 and 4 focus on the 
norms that are evident in decision-making within an AMS. This will be primarily addressed in chapter 8, 
What’s best. Objectives 5 and 6 connect empirical findings with theoretical issues raised in literature review 
and will be primarily addressed in chapters 9-10, Discussion and Conclusions.  
5.2 Empirical methodology 
My empirical methodology consists of a ward-based ethnography as participant observer, supplemented by 
semi-structured interviews. 
5.2.1 Ward ethnography 
5.2.1.1 Theory  
Ethnography can be characterised as a ‘qualitative design in which the researcher describes and interprets 
the shared and learned patterns of values, behaviours, beliefs, and language of a culture-sharing group’ 
(Harris in Cresswell & Poth, 2018: 90). In this instance, the selected culture-sharing group is an AMS. This 
approximates to a hospital ward: the Acute Medical Unit (AMU). However, even a ward ethnography cannot 
be precisely confined to a ‘ward’ in a spatial sense; this is because the values, behaviours, beliefs and 
language of people within an AMS may well be shaped by actions and interactions beyond the walls of the 
hospital ward. As such, the AMU represents the centre of this study’s social field but not its boundary. 
The aim of an ethnography is to present an ‘overall picture of how a system works’ (Fetterman, 2010, in: 
Cresswell & Poth 2018: 94) by gaining an ‘empathic understanding of a social scene’ (May 2001: 150). The 
understanding of a social scene can be described as empathic because ethnographers typically endeavour 
to unveil a view of cultural life ‘from within’ (Gobo 2011: 18).  
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This pursuit of an insider-perspective of social life is reflective of the heritage of ethnographic theorists, from 
the early English anthropologists (such as Bronislaw Malinowski and Alfred Radcliffe-Brown) to the 
influential sociology department of the University of Chicago. A director of the latter was Robert Park, who 
shared the English anthropologists’ distaste for ‘desk anthropology’ (Radcliffe-Brown, 1948), which relied on 
secondary sources to understand a society from a distance; instead he famously told his students to ‘go get 
the seat of your pants dirty in real research’ (personal note by student reported in Bulmer 1984: 97). A real 
sociological researcher, according to Park, sought not merely to sit at a desk but ‘to stroll in order to 
understand the flux of social life in which the individual self is also subject to change’ (May 2001: 149). The 
data chapters that follow, then, seek to present an empathic understanding of decision-making by 
presenting some of the insights of my strolling34 within an AMS. 
In order to gain an empathic understanding, an ethnographer is typically immersed within a social group for 
a prolonged period of time. For example, Malinowski lived for two years amongst the Kula people of the 
Trobriand Islands (Gobo, 2011: 18). This extended immersion enables the researcher to get to know the 
group as well as the group to get to know the researcher. In this way, the ethnographer is ‘to some degree 
connected to, or part of, the object of their research’ (Aull Davies 2008: 3). Subject and object cannot be 
easily distilled from one another because ethnographic fieldwork is inherently ‘personal, emotional and 
identity work’ (Coffey 1999: 1). 
The ‘overall picture’ (Fetterman, 2010, in: Cresswell & Poth 2018: 94) that an ethnographer presents, then, 
is unavoidably personal and interpretive. To extend the metaphor, the picture is not so much a mirror or a 
photograph; rather, it is an impression or ‘portrait’ (Cresswell & Poth 2018: 94). An ethnographic account is 
concerned less with measurement than with meaning; less with objectivity than with trustworthiness (see: 
Trustworthiness).  
It is difficult to characterise ethnographic theory beyond these broad brush strokes, as there remain a variety 
of different emphases within ethnographic methodologies. For instance, Herbert Blumer emphasised the 
need to appreciate symbolism within human interaction, in order to ‘see reality from [participants’] point of 
view’ (2011: 20-21). Anselm Strauss and Barney Glaser emphasised the need to exclude researcher 
preconceptions in theory construction (1967). Erving Goffman’s structural analysis emphasised the influence 
of social context on behaviour: ‘Not, then, men and their moments. Rather moments and their men’ (1967: 
3, in: Gobo 2011: 21). Additionally, some authors locate ethnographies along a spectrum from realist to 
critical ethnographies. The former emphasise the need for an account to be ‘uncontaminated by personal 
 
34 Characterising social research with ‘strolling’ is not unique to Robert Park. For example, a fellow sociologist writes that ‘it 
becomes a philosopher and an analyst of his time to use his feet now and again. Strolling still has its uses’ (Bauman, 1992: 155). 
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bias, political goals, and judgment’ (Cresswell & Poth 2018: 92); the latter ‘advocate for the emancipation of 
groups marginalized in society’ (Thomas, 1993, in: Cresswell & Poth 2018: 92). It is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to explore each of these theoretical commitments in detail. Suffice it to say that, being differences of 
emphasis, these theoretical variations need not be mutually exclusive. In this thesis I incorporate insights of 
each35. 
Before turning to the implementation of this ethnography on a hospital ward, I summarise the background 
to ward ethnography in current literature.  
The literature on ward ethnographies dates back to the 1960s, which featured a flurry of interest in the 
hospital as a relatively unexplored social field (Coser 1962; Glaser & Strauss 1965; Sudnow 1967; Glaser & 
Strauss 1968) and was followed by the first medical anthropology textbook to dedicate a full chapter to 
hospital-based ethnography (Foster & Anderson 1978: 163-174). Nevertheless, van der Geest et al note a 
relative paucity of hospital-based studies in anthropological collections (2004: 1995). They attribute this, 
firstly, to a perceived familiarity with the hospital environment, whose deceptive cross-cultural uniformity 
seemingly adds little couleure locale, a point affirmed by Long et al: ‘It was not until postcolonialism moved 
the anthropological focus from the exotic of the Other to shine a light on the exotic of the Self that hospitals 
became of interest to anthropologists’ (2008: 71). Secondly, the exclusionary nature of the hospital as 
institution (Foucault, 1975) has purportedly correlated with a lack of ethnographic research access due to 
defensiveness of hospital authorities (Van Der Geest & Finkler 2004; Long et al. 2008). 
Van der Geest et al describe a challenge that faces the ethnographer on a hospital ward: fieldworkers who 
wish to appear ‘natural’ on a hospital ward must choose to adopt one of three basic roles: staff, patients or 
visitors, and they tend to select the former (2004). There are some notable exceptions, however. For 
example, Caudhill et al (1952) and Rosenhan (1973) represent two instances when researchers pretended 
to be mentally ill in order to describe a so-called patient perspective in a psychiatric hospital. Similarly, an 
experiment by van der Geest and Sarkodie (1998) featured the latter posing as a ‘fake patient’ on a medical 
ward in a Ghanaian hospital. Unsurprisingly, it ‘stands virtually alone using this research technique’ (Van Der 
Geest & Finkler 2004: 1999). This highlights one of the first challenges I faced in this study when putting 
ethnographic theory into practice: when I set foot within an AMS and am surrounded by staff, patients and 
visitors, what is my role within this social group?  
 
35 An exception to this is Barney Glaser’s version of grounded theory, which proposes a systematic construction of  theory from 
the ‘ground’ of mere empirical data, without prior commitment to theory or engagement with literature (Charmaz, 2006: 4-9; 
Charmaz and Bryant, 2011: 295). I find this impossible to do with integrity because empirical data is already theory-laden. Edmund 
Husserl’s concept of époché is arguably a more workable alternative, which does not require the neutralisation of judgment but 
rather the ‘suspension of judgment regarding the true nature of reality beyond perception’ (Rehmann-Sutter et al, 2012: 442). 
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The role which approximates to what I am used to is the role of staff member. I am a qualified doctor and 
hospital physician, and have previously worked on AMUs in this region and others (although not in Middleton 
Hospital, the site of this ethnography.) From this starting point, I had to consider my fieldwork role in the 
context of an AMS. 
Gold (1969) identifies a spectrum of four main fieldwork roles that are available for a researcher to adopt:  
1 Complete participant 
2 Participant as observer 
3 Observer as participant 
4 Complete observer 
An advantage of the complete participant end of the spectrum is that it is easier to gain trust of social actors 
and to relate to their experience. An advantage of the complete observer end of the spectrum is that it 
maintains a critical outlook, which can be lost if an ethnographer were to ‘go native’ (Wind, 2008: 80). 
5.2.1.2 Practice 
In this study, I adopted the role of participant as observer, which is also referred to as participant 
observation. I carried out ethnographic fieldwork over a period of 16 months, commencing in June 2017. 
This involved 36 fieldwork shifts, where a shift’s duration varied from 2 hours to 12 hours. This period of 
participant observation was spread across 3 phases: an initial phase, a developmental phase and a 
consolidation phase, which I will describe later in this chapter (see: Semi-structured interviews). First, I 
characterise what participant observation involves within an AMS. 
Gobo (2011: 17) summarises the key characteristics of participant observation as follows: 
 ‘The researcher establishes a direct relationship with the social actors 
 Staying in their natural environment 
 With the purpose of observing and describing their social actions 
 By interacting with them and participating in their everyday ceremonies and rituals 
 Learning their code (or at least parts of it) in order to understand the meaning of their actions.’ 
What the role of participant observer actually involves depends on the social field which is being studied. I 
now describe three features of my role as participant observer that are specifically shaped by the 
environment of an AMS. 
5.2.1.2.1 Self-introduction and access 
To participate in the social field of an AMS requires authorisation. Nobody simply happens to be there. Entry 
to the ward is controlled by a card reader and monitored by CCTV. There are two windows of time in which 
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friends and family are authorised to visit patients: 2:30pm to 4pm and 6:30pm to 7:30pm. Patients are 
referred to the AMS by the Emergency Department. In short, patients and visitors are authorised by staff 
and  staff are authorised by the organisation. 
Aware of the need for authorisation to participate within an AMS, my first contact with participants was to 
gain permission from gatekeepers: the senior nurse (“ward manager”) and the senior doctor (“clinical lead”). 
The ward manager is responsible for the everyday running of the ward. In my experience, ward managers 
often represent the ward in interactions with senior hospital management and have a significant influence 
on the culture of a ward. An initial email was followed by a one-to-one meeting, in which I introduced myself, 
summarising my clinical and research background. I gave an outline of the study and what, in practice, it 
might involve. I showed her some of the materials that I had prepared in order to gain ethics approval. This 
included an information sheet and poster. To my relief, she agreed to post these in a clearly visible space on 
the ward. In addition, she agreed to forward information by email to all of the ward staff (see: Appendix A 
and Appendix B). 
The clinical lead is a consultant who is responsible for the clinical decisions made within the AMS. I had briefly 
worked with him in 2015 in another healthcare setting within this trust and we got on well. Following email 
contact and a one-to-one meeting, he endorsed this research study and agreed to forward information by 
email to all current medical staff within the AMS (see: Appendix A and Appendix B). I was thankful for this, 
aware that some trainee doctors rotate across sites every 3-6 months and may be missed off the senior 
nurse’s mailing list. 
Once the empirical phase of this ethnographic study was underway, it was extremely useful to have 
established rapport with, and gained permission from, these gatekeepers. Sometimes ward staff seemed 
nervous to be talking with me and, in particular, they were unsure if they were authorised to leave their 
usual site of work on the ward to speak with me privately. It seemed a comfort and reassurance to them 
when I would indicate that my research has been endorsed by the authority figures about whose opinion 
they were concerned. 
On this ward, all members of staff have an 8 o’clock meeting called a “morning huddle”. After some notices 
from the senior nurse, each staff member in turn gives a short self-introduction. This consists of saying their 
name, role and finish time. In order to be a participant among staff, I frequently joined in with this huddle 
and complied with the style of communicating. In order to not be a complete participant, I would take pains 
to emphasise that “I’m not here in a clinical capacity; here as a researcher”. 
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As well as accompanying staff, I was also a participant observer among patients and visitors. Patients in a 
multi-bedded bay would often talk to one another. Patients who were alone in a cubicle would often be 
speaking on a mobile phone or be keen to chat when I entered their cubicle. When visitors arrived, social 
activity became all the more prominent. One way I was able to participate with patients and visitors was by 
spending time chatting at the bedside. 
5.2.1.2.2 Dress and appearance 
Most people within an AMS are dressed in uniform. However, the uniform is specific to the person’s role 
within an AMS. For example, the uniforms of senior nurses, staff nurses, healthcare assistants, pharmacy 
technicians and physiotherapists are each of a different colour. Patients are given a uniform gown of white 
and green. Some people do not wear uniform, however. These people are visitors, trainee doctors, some 
consultants, the psychiatry liaison team and the hospital-to-home assisted discharge team.  
How I dressed would thus influence my social identity. Wearing my own clothes is not a socially neutral act 
but rather one which would most likely associate me with doctors. Some of my personal attributes may also 
give the impression of me being a doctor. These include being male, not speaking with an accent of the local 
region and some unconscious features of my demeanour. In addition, a small number of nurses and doctors 
recalled working with me in previous healthcare settings within this NHS trust. Thus, it seemed to me that 
this is likely to be how I am perceived unless I make conscious effort to appear otherwise. 
After reflection, it seemed to me that the benefits of distancing myself from doctors in appearance were 
outweighed by the cost of inauthenticity. To many, especially those who know that I am medically trained, 
dressing in any other way might seem like I was pretending. I suspected that a perceived lack of sincerity is 
more detrimental to the study than a perceived medical air about me. 
I chose to dress in a collared shirt with smart trousers and work shoes. Whilst this is not a neutral impression 
to make, at least it is predictable. The advantage of this predictability was that I could then try to counter 
this affiliation by other means.  
5.2.1.2.3 Timing and posture 
For most staff within this AMS, a shift begins with a handover. For example, the night nurse hands over to 
the day nurse at 7:30am; the night doctor hands over to the day doctors at 8:10am. To enter the ward in 
time for the nurses’ 7:30am handover showed dedication to accompany them in their work, rather than 
simply joining them as second choice to the doctors. In this way, the timing of my shifts itself was of relational 
importance; it influenced the kinds of participation that were available to me. 
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On fieldwork shift 17, I stayed into the night shift. I primarily did this because I wondered whether decisions 
about different issues were made at night. I also wondered whether decision-making was done in a different 
way by the different staff in the different circumstances of night shift. What surprised me, however, was not 
what I saw but how I was seen. I noticed that staff were particularly welcoming towards me during this shift, 
and these staff members continued to be warm towards me subsequently. After some initial joking about 
whether or not I had “better things to do than be here on a night”, I found it much easier to develop rapport 
with members of staff on this night shift.  
On reflection, I think there are two reasons why it was easier to establish rapport with staff at night. Firstly, 
my being there at night-time showed my dedication to this project. Secondly, there are relatively few senior 
nursing and senior management staff around during a night shift. As a result, ward staff are less monitored 
and may feel freer to interact with me and speak their mind. 
I varied the timing of my shifts. Encompassing early morning or late at night helped connect with nursing 
staff; encompassing visiting time helped me to connect with patients and visitors. This is not to imply that 
the timings of my shifts were rigorously calculated; I was not merely pursuing diversity for diversity’s sake; 
nor was I simply avoiding doctors. Rather, I was being mindful of the relational dynamics that are inevitably 
involved in ethnographic research and the contributory factors over which I exercise a degree of control. 
Beyond timings, I became acutely aware that my identity in this social field was also shaped by subtle 
features like my posture.  Doctors tend to assess a patient from the patient’s right hand side with an analytic 
facial expression; junior doctors on a ward round typically stand back on the far side of the bed, keeping 
quiet, writing notes. Nurses tend to move quickly, wearing trainers, and do their writing at a notes trolley, 
not in front of patients. Patient visitors tend to sit down, speak quietly, and not write at all.  
Initially, my posture resembled the doctors, out of habit. However, as time went on, I learnt to adjust my 
manner to look less analytical, and to reduce the time spent writing in field notes during a ward round. 
During ward rounds, I would endeavour to stand separate to the team of doctors and not to mirror their 
posturing, which required conscious effort at times. 
As van der Geest et al suggested, a ward ethnographer usually has to adopt the role of staff, patient or visitor 
(2004). In this study, I endeavoured to be participant observer across these three roles. Rather than trying 
to be all at once, which seems to me to be a psychological impossibility, I varied the nature of my 
ethnographic participant observation. This was made possible by paying attention by such features as I have 
described above: self-introduction, access, dress, appearance, timing and posture. I sought to emphasise my 
participant status more towards those sub-groups with which I did not naturally belong (non-doctors) and I 
sought to emphasise my observer status more toward the sub-group with which I did naturally belong 
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(doctors). In summary, my role as participant observer was continuously negotiated in response to 
circumstantial and relational factors. 
5.2.1.3 Experience 
Prior to stepping foot on this Acute Medical Unit (AMU), I expected some resistance from staff and patients. 
I expected to have to be very thick-skinned, pressing ahead with the project despite being excluded from 
involvement at various moments along the way. To my surprise, I experienced extremely little resistance to 
my research. The vast majority of patients and staff were interested and welcoming. Ironically, it was the 
researcher himself who presented the most resistance to his own research! This was perhaps related to 
three desires. 
5.2.1.3.1 Desire to help 
I informed participants that I did not intend to take part in the clinical work of this AMS. This was stated and 
illustrated for research ethics approval (see: Appendix A and Appendix C), described in a ward poster (see: 
Appendix B), described in participant information sheets (see: Appendix A), declared during staff huddles, 
and reinforced during informal interaction with staff and patients.  
There was a part of me, however, that did wish to take part in clinical work. I missed being useful in a clinical 
sense, especially when there was evident need expressed by patients or staff. For example, a nurse needed 
a doctor to “look at this ECG [electro-cardiogram] for me”; a consultant asked me for “any ideas?” when the 
team were struggling to diagnose the cause of persistent coma; a patient asked me “so what will they do, 
then, if they find a mass on the scan?” As per my research ethics approved plan, I would decline to offer 
clinical contributions. I did, however, find this difficult. In particular, I felt like I had let the person down when 
they responded to me with apparent disappointment. This discomfort was worsened at times when staff 
were overburdened with the clinical workload; loitering seemed out of place. 
Over time this anxiety settled as I gained more acceptance among the group within this AMS. I found ways 
of looking less conspicuous whilst loitering: I would take my pen out, I would write more in my notepad (even 
simply writing more slowly), I would echo the postures of those around me as I stood near a work station. In 
addition, I would take short breaks to provide enough discontinuity to alleviate my anxiety about being 
conspicuously useless, whilst providing enough continuity to return and carry on.  
5.2.1.3.2 Desire not to get in the way 
From previous experience in clinical work, I was aware of the pressure to get through work quickly within an 
AMS. I imagined that this pressure is likely to be intensified in the context of a hospital specialising in 
emergency care. If I were the doctor, I surmised that my response to having a researcher join me would 
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initially be one of concern: “will they slow me down?” Besides doctors, other staff members are also under 
pressure to work efficiently. 
For example, a staff nurse was rushing around to find treatment for a patient of hers with a worryingly low 
glucose. I did not want to interrupt her with questions, when she was clearly needing to focus. Additionally, 
I did not want her to feel the burden of giving me commentary, a burden which was brought about simply 
by me being present. However, if I were to go away to let her ‘get on with it’, this would impede my data 
collection; I might fail to gain deep understanding of decision-making in emphatically time-pressured 
circumstances. 
Clarificatory, concrete questions seemed to be easier and more quickly answered by participants than 
questions which were exploratory and abstract. For example, to a consultant who had just discussed 
resuscitation with a patient during a ward round: “what makes you lean toward a DNAR [Do-not-attempt-
resuscitation order] with him?” is an easier question to answer than “what is it, in general, that makes CPR 
[cardio-pulmonary resuscitation] not worth doing?” The latter may seem like a change in mode of thinking 
that takes more effort and time. As a result, when I was aware of the perceived pressure and I was 
particularly keen not to get in the way, I would tend to pose clarificatory, concrete questions and leave more 
exploratory, abstract ones for a subsequent interview. 
During busy ward rounds, I found myself almost apologising for my existence: “I don’t want to slow you 
down at all; happy to be ignored!” I found this light-hearted comment would often help to gain the trust of 
a busy clinician by demonstrating an appreciation for the priority of efficiency and the primacy of the delivery 
of clinical care. Ironically, perhaps this gained trust so as to increase the amount of interaction with me; 
requesting to be ignored may have reduced any desire to ignore me. 
5.2.1.3.3 Desire not to seem a fool 
In the past, I have worked with some of the staff in this AMS. In the future, I am likely to work with many of 
these staff in this AMS in a clinical capacity. If so, I am likely to work as a registrar (a grade of trainee doctor) 
under the authority of the consultants, who would have a part to play in my career progression. As such, it 
may come at personal cost if my role as participant observer in this study erodes my reputation as a 
competent clinician. 
On a psychological level, I felt very unsettled being back on a hospital ward with relatively little sense of 
belonging. I was accustomed to being embedded in a clinical team and had not felt out-of-place since being 
a medical student on placement. I therefore found this research role uncomfortable to embrace, a sentiment 
which was exacerbated when I was once asked “so you’re… medical student?” 
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To understand decision-making, to see decision-making through new eyes, and to bring the role of values to 
the fore, involved asking questions. Many times, these questions would be seen as obvious: questions to 
which any sensible doctor would know the answer. These were the questions which could most undermine 
my image as a reliable medical colleague. As such, ‘easy’ questions were the hardest to ask! However, this 
discomfort eased over time as participants became more familiar with my role, and as I became more fluent 
in signposting that have to ask some “daft questions”. 
5.2.2 Semi-structured interviews 
5.2.2.1 Theory 
Observation, especially participant observation, is regarded as the primary data collection technique for an 
ethnographer (Toren, 1996). Within qualitative research more broadly, interviews are the most common 
method of data collection, often categorized along a spectrum from structured to unstructured: structured, 
semi-structured, in-depth, unstructured (Taylor, 2005).  
The two extremes are contentious. A typical example of structured interviewing is the completion of a 
multiple-choice survey. Arguably, the well-circumscribed nature of this data renders it a form of quantitative 
research (Taylor, 2005: 39). A typical example of unstructured interviewing is casual conversation. However, 
this is arguably not truly unstructured, as even the most informal interaction is shaped by habits, traditions 
and culturally conditioned expectations. Thus, from an ethnographer’s perspective, structured interviewing 
is possible but not qualitative, and unstructured interviewing is qualitative but not possible. 
Interviewing entails a mixture of multiple agendas: the interviewer and the interviewee36. Semi-structured 
interviewing enables sufficient structure for the interviewer to set some direction, in keeping with the 
research agenda. However, it also enables sufficient flexibility for the interviewee to take conversation in 
another direction, in keeping with the participant’s agenda. This balance enables interview data to be both 
relevant and exploratory. 
In-depth interviewing focusses on a particular issue within a participant’s account and provides a rich 
characterisation of it (Taylor and Bogdan, 1984). Rather than mapping out the broader relations of such an 
issue in general terms, in-depth interviewing tries to articulate a thick, contextualised description of the issue 
in particular terms. This emphasis on the contextualised particular over the abstracted universal is an 
essential feature of ethnography. Where a positivist pursues the naked truth, laid bare in perfect abstraction, 
the ethnographer respects the contextually-clad nature of social reality; the ethnographer seeks truth with 
its clothes on. 
 
36 In less formal interactions it may be unclear who is playing which role. 
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Both semi-structured interviewing and in-depth interviewing, then, are well-suited to an ethnographic 
enterprise. In this ethnography, my interviewing was primarily semi-structured. This enabled sufficient 
structure to address the research question of values in decision-making within an AMS, whilst also providing 
sufficient flexibility to explore participants’ accounts in their own words.  
However, semi-structured interviewing need not be exclusive of depth. When a particular event or topic was 
of particular interest and particular relevance to the research question, interviews would momentarily 
become in-depth interviews in order to explore this area in more detail. For example, my interview with 
Kylie, a palliative care nurse, was semi-structured. I had some pre-formed topics and broad questions to ask, 
which she took in new directions; our interview became in-depth when she described her discussion with 
Mr Whitehead about his discharge home to die, which became a focal point to explore in detail. 
5.2.2.2 Practice 
5.2.2.2.1 Overview 
In total, I carried out 27 interviews across the 16 months of fieldwork. As I mentioned above, this fieldwork 
was divided chronologically into 3 phases: an initial phase, a developmental phase and a consolidatory phase. 
The initial phase consisted of the first 3 months within this AMS. The priorities of this phase were to gain the 
trust of participants in this field, to negotiate the most effective ways of gaining appropriate data, and to 
learn to see the AMS through new eyes (as ethnographer). This phase was as much about de-constructing 
my preconceptions as constructing new conceptions. Field notes, memos and reflections were shared and 
discussed with my supervisory team.  
The developmental phase consisted of the following 9 months. The priorities of this phase were to improve 
the quality of data gathered and identify key themes in empirical data which may serve as a basis for an 
explanatory narrative. The quality of the data gathered was improved with input from my supervisory team, 
who read all transcripts of field notes and interviews. Two ways in which data-gathering was improved during 
this phase are: 
 Increased richness of description 
 Increased triangulation by multi-perspectival accounts 
These improvement measures required me to pay more attention to contextual, non-verbal factors of social 
interaction, and to seek opportunities for multiple accounts of the same encounter – which I refer to as an 
‘experiential cluster’. 
During this time, I began to carry out interviews alongside participant observation. 24 interviews were 
carried out during this developmental phase. Initial availability sampling progressed to representative 
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sampling and then to theoretical sampling. Interviews were carried out with patients, relatives and different 
staff members, as summarised in table 5.1. The development phase also involved contemporaneous 
transcription of field notes and interviews, with early thematic analysis. 
Participant role within AMS Number of interviews 
Patient 11 
Relative 2 
Consultant doctor 4 
Trainee doctor 3 
Nurse 5 
Healthcare assistant 1 
Pharmacist 1 
Physiotherapist 1 
Psychiatry liaison 2 
Palliative care liaison 1 
Total 37 28 
Table 5.4: Research participants by role within AMS 
There was a deliberate interval of 2 months between development phase and the consolidatory phase. 
During this time, I did extensive transcription and thematic analysis in order that a provisional explanatory 
narrative might develop from my interpretation of data. A final consolidatory phase was required in order 
to challenge and check areas of this provisional narrative, with particular attention to exceptions and 
anomalies. 3 interviews were carried out during the 2 months of consolidation, arranged on the basis of 
theoretical sampling. 
5.2.2.2.2 Specific considerations 
5.2.2.2.2.1 Timing 
The workload within an AMS is unpredictable. I suspected this prior to my arrival, informed by clinical 
experience, and it was confirmed in my time as ethnographer. How many patients are admitted into the 
department, how sick they are, what tasks are required, which staff are responsible for these tasks, how 
patients progress: all of these aspects of the workload are difficult to anticipate in a given shift. Similarly, 
patients also experience a degree of unpredictability: how they are responding to treatment, how things are 
 
37 The 27 interviews feature 28 participants because one interview was carried out with 2 participants (Sheila and her mother). 
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going to happen next, what time discharge or transfer is going to be. Patients often find themselves waiting 
with uncertainty. This makes it difficult for interviews to be scheduled or for them to be long.  
In order to accommodate the unpredictability and busyness of the workload within an AMS, I adapted the 
timings of interviews. Instead of trying to book a participant for a certain time in the future, interviews were 
usually spontaneous. Instead of lengthy exchanges, they were as short as possible and interruptible at any 
point. The assurance that interviews could be interrupted and stopped at any point enabled participants to 
commit more easily. 
5.2.2.2.2.2 Location 
Many staff are closely monitored within an AMS. For example, some nursing staff expressed concerns that 
if they were speaking with me on the ward, their senior would reprimand them for not working. In addition, 
they were not free to leave the ward without permission from their senior.  
In order to be able to interview nursing staff, I took four steps to help this situation. Firstly, I provided 
assurance that the most senior ward nurse had given approval to this research project. Secondly, I would 
sometimes interview nursing staff in the evening or night-time, when they felt less policed by their senior. 
Thirdly, interviews could be done in short episodes of a few minutes at a time, enabling the nurse to tend to 
clinical duties as they arise. Fourthly, I identified some non-clinical spaces which were nevertheless still on 
the ward. By interviewing in these spaces, the nurse was still reachable by other staff but also gained the 
privacy to speak freely. Examples of these spaces are the quiet room and the ward kitchen. 
The location of an interview has an impact on the content of the interview. For example, the quiet room is 
more than a room which is quiet. As I reflected in field notes, the quiet room is a room where people go to 
speak about death. Likewise, the ward kitchen is more than a kitchen. It is a room which is out of sight of 
colleagues, where staff might go to make a cup of tea or to have a light-hearted conversation. Interviewing 
in the quiet room feels different to interviewing in the ward kitchen, and I needed to be mindful of this when 
interpreting interview data. 
Some patients are in their own cubicle. Other patients have a bed in a shared bay, individualised by curtain 
rails. Whether or not the curtain is drawn round, an interview can be easily overheard by other patients in a 
bay as well as staff walking in and out. Patients in their own cubicle were thus able to speak more freely, 
without worrying about who is overhearing the conversation. A difficulty would arise when I wished to 
interview a patient in a shared bay. To speak at the bedside may be limited by confidentiality rules and social 
inhibition. To remove the patient from their bedside into the quiet room, for example, may be limited by the 
patient no longer feeling relaxed in a familiar environment. In such situations, I would weigh up the benefits 
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of different interview locations according to the patient’s preferences, the specific circumstances and the 
anticipated interview content.  
5.2.2.3 Experience 
5.2.2.3.1 Evolution of interviewing style 
The manner in which I conducted interviews was constantly negotiated over the course of this ethnographic 
study. To begin with, I had little rapport with ward participants, little understanding of what topics and areas 
are likely to be theoretically fruitful, and little experience of what doing semi-structured research interviews 
is like.  
As a result of my limited interview experience, I tended to default to the interviewing style to which I am 
accustomed: the clinical consultation. Having worked as a doctor, I am used to interviewing patients 
according to an approach known as the Calgary-Cambridge framework. In this approach, interviews start 
with open questions and progress to more closed questions in order to focus on key details (Silverman et al, 
1996).  
One advantage of this approach is that it permits a degree of both structure and flexibility, which is essential 
for semi-structured interviewing. One disadvantage of this default approach is that it assumes that one 
conversation partner (the doctor) has the authority to shape the open-to-closed consultation and decide 
which areas are worth focussing on. The implicit authority asymmetry in this approach felt particularly 
problematic when, adopting a doctor role, I interviewed participants who are doctors. 
With greater rapport with participants, I was more able to pose more challenging questions and comments, 
to enable greater critical exploration of an account. At times this would be by way of clarifying what 
participants mean by certain phrases used. For example, I challenged consultant Tony to clarify what he 
meant by “quality of life” and “futility”, in a manner that was supported by our well-developed rapport over 
the course of ethnographic observation. At times I would challenge participants not by asking a question so 
much as by imagining the described scenario was different in a significant way. I did this with a patient called 
Heidi, for example. This had the effect of challenging Heidi to articulate her feelings on the matter in more 
detail and with renewed vitality. 
As I gained more experience of what doing semi-structured research interviewing is like, I became 
accustomed to the emotional aspect of interviewing. In many ways, conducting semi-structured interviews 
involved the same relational dynamics that I noted when conducting ward ethnography, which reflected my 
own desires: a desire to help, a desire to not get in the way, a desire to not seem overly critical, and a desire 
to not seem a fool. The anxiety that I experienced as a result of these desires was eased to some extent by 
providing an introduction prior to the interview. In this introduction, I would describe to participants that “I 
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have to ask some daft questions” and that I’m speaking “as Luke the researcher, not as a doctor, so some of 
the questions I ask might be a bit odd or surprising”. 
5.2.2.3.2 Tensions 
Despite my best efforts at a clarificatory and preparatory introduction, there were nevertheless some 
tensions I experienced whilst conducting semi-structured interviews that could not easily be ironed out.  
5.2.2.3.2.1 Eliciting and challenging 
Interviewing was intended to supplement ethnographic observation by way of triangulation (Taylor, 2005: 
42). Spoken accounts during formal interviews could provide a detailed impression of the participant’s 
perspective. Essential to this process is description: hearing the participant’s account of what happens within 
an AMS from their perspective. Thus one priority of my interviewing is eliciting and, specifically, eliciting the 
participant’s point of view.  
However, another element in interviewing participants was challenging. At times, challenging was a useful 
way to prompt participants to sharpen their description in some way, such as by adding a clarification, 
justification or example.  
This was a difficult balance to strike. To challenge the participant too early or too sharply might hinder the 
trusting relationship between us and thereby inhibit the participant from opening up for the rest of the 
interview. To challenge the participant too little or too late might reduce the clarity, richness or usefulness 
of the interview data they are providing. 
5.2.2.3.2.2 Directing and exploring 
A tension I experienced which is perhaps ubiquitous in semi-structured interviewing is the tension between 
directing and exploring. Given the rushed environment within an AMS and the possibility of being cut short 
at any moment, it was important that interviews had some structure and did not require excessive amounts 
of time. I needed to direct the participant to some extent: semi-structured interviewing. 
At the same time, however, this is qualitative interviewing which seeks to not simply check or enumerate 
but to explore a complex phenomenon. This requires giving the participant enough freedom to narrate their 
impressions and experiences in their own words, using their own categories and frames of reference. In this 
way, it was important that such exploration was not impeded by excessive direction on my part: semi-
structured interviewing. 
The balance between directing and exploring, I found, depended on the circumstances of each interview. An 
interview with consultant Tony, for example, was scheduled for a day when Tony was off the ward and not 
so time-pressured. He listened carefully to each question I posed and tended to answer precisely and 
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concisely. During this interview, then, the priority of exploring pressed on me more prominently than the 
priority of directing. 
In contrast, during my interview with a patient’s husband, Chris, I was more aware of the priority of directing. 
As a former college lecturer with an interest in NHS reform, he was ready to share his views on NHS structure 
and how to fix an array of problems. As a result, a merely exploratory interview style may have been very 
interesting but the data might rapidly depart from the particular observed interaction which prompted this 
interview. In order to serve its triangulatory purpose, this interview required me to enact a more directive 
interviewing style than I had implemented with Tony. 
So far in this chapter, I have described the two main aspects of this study’s empirical methodology: ward 
ethnography and semi-structured interviewing. I have presented each aspect of data-gathering in terms of 
theory, practice and experience. Next, I describe the process of analysing data38.  
5.3 Analytic methodology 
5.3.1 Philosophical hermeneutics 
5.3.1.1 Theory 
Hermeneutics is the science or art of interpretation (Grondin, 1994: 1). The term originates from the ancient 
Greek word hermeneuein, which meant to explain or translate (Zimmerman, 2015: 3). Hermeneutics, as a 
field of study, developed in the disciplines of jurisprudence and theology, where it related to the application 
of legal guidance and scriptural exegesis respectively (Zimmerman, 2015).  
The advent of philosophical hermeneutics, however, marks a shift in emphasis. No longer is hermeneutics 
merely the property of theologians and lawyers and no longer is it restricted to the study of authoritative 
texts. Philosophical hermeneutics is a tradition which portrays interpreting as a way of life; humans are 
interpreting animals (Heidegger, 1999; Zimmerman, 2015: 9). Beyond legal and scriptural text, interpretation 
is involved in all human interaction, including understanding actions, gestures, speech and writing; for this 
reason hermeneutics is described as universal (Grondin, 1994: 3).  
In what follows, I assume a degree of familiarity with the history of philosophical hermeneutics (see: 
Appendix E). For the purposes of this thesis, the pertinent insights of its history are two-fold. Firstly, 
interpreting is an essential feature of all human being-in-the-world; hermeneutics is universal. Secondly, 
there is a recursive connection between subject and object, whole and parts; this phenomenon is 
 
38 The relationship between data-gathering and data-analysis is dialectical; the one influences the other and the other influences 




conceptualised as the hermeneutic circle. Next, I apply these theoretical insights to the practicalities of data 
analysis in this study of decision-making within an AMS. 
5.3.1.2 Practice 
5.3.1.2.1 Universal hermeneutic 
According to the tradition of philosophical hermeneutics, all forms of human interaction involve 
interpretation. Whether ward ethnography or semi-structured interviewing, such forms of human 
interaction are in a sense textual, since they are a hermeneutic enterprise. Ethnographic observation was 
recorded as text in field notes. Semi-structured interviews were recorded as text in transcriptions. Such texts 
require interpretation. My task is to interpret text in two layers: I am to interpret the text of field notes and 
transcriptions as well as to interpret the ‘text’ of human interaction within an AMS. 
In a sense, all of my experiences and interactions within this AMS over the 16 months are data. As Barney 
Glaser put it, ‘all is data’ (in Charmaz, 2006: 16). Even interaction which I did not record in field notes or 
interview transcripts is nevertheless context which frames and shapes the interpretation of interaction on 
which I have focussed. It is therefore important to pay attention to this unrecorded data. I was assisted to 
be conscious of unrecorded data by discussion with my supervisory team, one of whom also attends this 
AMS regularly in a clinical capacity, is familiar with the environment and would frequently ask me “what is 
missing in your notes?”  
Seeing as all my experience and interaction within this AMS is data, it is impossible that an analysis of 
empirical data would ever be exhaustive. In this way, an approach that borrows from philosophical 
hermeneutics sits comfortably with the intention of a ward ethnography which is self-consciously situated 
and perspectival. I do not seek to provide a complete map of the role of values in decision-making within an 
AMS, covering every area from every angle. Instead, I seek to provide a plausible ‘portrait’ (Cresswell & Poth 
2018: 94) of the role of values in decision-making within an AMS: limited by circumstances and my pre-
understandings, yet acknowledging that such limitations make understanding possible. 
5.3.1.2.2 Hermeneutic circle 
5.3.1.2.2.1 Whole and parts 
A sentence of my field notes is part of a whole paragraph. A paragraph is a part of the notes of a whole shift. 
The notes of a whole shift are a part of a whole collection of field notes. The collection of field notes is a part 
of a whole series of personal interaction which I experienced within an AMS. Personal interaction that I 
experienced within an AMS is a part of a whole network of interactions of the hospital or a community. 
According to the tradition of philosophical hermeneutics, such parts can only be understood in relation to 
their wholes (and vice versa). In view of this, the interpretation of recorded data of field notes requires 
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contextualisation within the broader whole within which they are located. Understanding field notes, then, 
requires supplementation with ‘head notes’ (Okely, 2008): a recollection of how this event happened. I 
identify two specific implications of this.  
Firstly, it is imperative that I, as ethnographer, carry out the analysis of recorded data. This is not to say that 
others cannot usefully contribute to such analysis. It is to highlight that the analysis of recorded data without 
appreciation for the historical context of which it is a part is to divorce the part from its whole and 
compromise the validity of any subsequent interpretation. Experience and interpretation should not be 
subjected to a division of labour. 
Not only did I carry out the primary analysis of all recorded data, I also carried out all transcription of 
interviews. Whilst this ‘data-logging’ (Lofland and Lofland, 1995) was a time-consuming activity, it is also an 
interpretive one. How to transcribe the language and sounds made during interview involves addressing 
such questions as: shall I articulate that phrase in order to reflect this participant’s dialect and accent, or in 
order to reflect standard spelling and grammar (authenticity versus clarity)? What is the significance of non-
verbal expressions such as sounds and silences, and how should these be graphically represented? Interview 
transcripts include ‘coughs, pauses, laughs and so on… all of these have meanings and may influence 
interpretation of data’ (Bluff, 2005: 153). Despite its demand for time and resources, the process of 
transcribing I found to be a fruitful time, during which I might notice new details which I had not noticed 
during the interview itself. 
Secondly, the interdependence of part and whole implies that thick description in field notes is 
hermeneutically more useful than a thin description. A thick description is one which features a wealth of 
contextual information (Holloway, 2005: 296). This enables the reader to appreciate the whole of which this 
interaction was a part. It took time for me to recognise the importance of this. In the first three days of 
ethnographic observation, my field notes mostly consisted of bullet points containing quotes and short 
reflections. It was not that I did not experience contextual features but that I did not ‘see’ them. After critical 
input from my supervisory team, who read each day of field notes, I rapidly learned the importance of 
describing the social, emotional, clinical and temporal context of a recorded encounter: What time was it? 
What was the room like? What was their emotional state? What were they wearing? What was going on in 
the background? What struck me about this? This helped to expand and support the interpretive analysis of 
such data. 
5.3.1.2.2.2 Subject and object 
According to the tradition of philosophical hermeneutics, the subject is not separable from the object; the 
two are mixed. I am a part of the AMS that I studied. Indeed, it was not so much that I, as researcher, studied 
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it, the researched; rather, I participated in the social field of an AMS and developed understanding through 
this engagement. The ontology of this process cannot be neatly divided into subject and object, and the 
epistemology of this process cannot be reduced to rational principles (Gadamer, 2013). I identify two 
implications of this, which I gradually realised over the course of this study. 
Firstly, field notes are not intended to be a summary of all events. Instead, they are to be descriptions of 
interactions within an AMS that seem to bear significance for the research question with which I am 
concerned. This involves a process of selection that is inevitably interpretive; I am to provide a rich 
description of moments that seem to me to be significant. 
Secondly, field notes are not intended to be a detached summary of events. My early field notes featured 
what was said, what was done and what it looked like. However, there was relatively little description of my 
personal involvement: How was I positioned in this encounter? What did I expect? How did this make me 
feel? Over the course of this ethnographic study, my field notes expressed my own personality more openly. 
Given the subject is part of the object, being more present in the data ironically renders my ethnographic 
account simultaneously more subjective and more objective. 
5.3.1.3 Experience 
The way in which I recorded and analysed data evolved over the course of this study. Whilst I could render 
cognitive assent to the hermeneutic circle and the need for a dialectical relation between part and whole, 
and between subject and object, it took time for me to appreciate the ramifications of these dialectic 
relations in this research. I was helped to appreciate this by my supervisory team, further reading, and critical 
reflection during the initial phase of ethnography. 
Whilst I am encouraged that such adjustment is an ordinary feature of the iterative process of social 
research, it was nevertheless an uncomfortable process to go through. With a background in hospital 
medicine, which intellectually leans towards positivist science (Higgs and Loftus 2008: 215), my journey 
towards a fully-fledged hermeneutic approach to this qualitative study was at times one of discovery, self-
discovery, discomfort and self-discomfort.  
This reflection is in keeping with social research fieldwork generally. Hammersley and Atkinson note that 
field researchers ‘do not always leave the field… emotionally unscathed, and they rarely leave unaffected’ 
(1995: 120). Lofland and Lofland (1995) go further to give a typology of different kinds of emotional stress 
involved in social research fieldwork. Coffey summarises these as: ‘deception and fear of disclosure, loathing 
and the desire to withdraw, sympathy and the impulse to help, marginality and the temptation to convert’ 
(1999: 5). I can identify with each of these stresses, and with loathing and sympathy in particular. 
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5.3.2 Thematic analysis 
As I stated earlier in this chapter, the aim of this thesis is to address the question: What is the role of values 
in decision-making within an Acute Medicine Service (AMS)? The purpose of my engagement with an AMS is 
to provide an explanatory theory which responds to this question. Such an explanatory theory is not 
intended to take the form of generalisable formulae, as in the natural sciences. Rather, in the social sciences, 
an explanatory narrative is considered a better tool for explaining the complexity and particularity of social 
life.  
In this section, I describe some theoretical considerations that support my thematic analysis of empirical 
data in order to construct an explanatory narrative. I then describe how I did this (practice) and how I found 
this (experience) before moving on to discuss issues relating to validity. 
5.3.2.1 Theory 
5.3.2.1.1 Data to narrative 
The use of stories as explanatory theory in the social sciences has become increasingly evident since the 
1980s (Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach and Zilber, 1998: 1), and is reflected in social research in the healthcare 
setting (Horrocks et al., 2003). This has been described as the ‘narrative turn’ of the social sciences, as Denzin 
describes: 
‘The narrative turn in the social sciences has been taken… Everything we study is contained within a 
storied, or narrative representation. Indeed, as scholars we are storytellers, telling stories about 
other people’s stories. We call our stories theories’ (2003: xi). 
Somers (1994) considers narrative to be an ontological condition of social life, such that to fail to describe it 
in storied terms is to inadequately characterise social life. 
Unlike the universal formulae of the natural sciences, research in the social sciences typically seeks to 
describe the situated-ness of human activity. Polkinghorne deems narrative to be well suited to this anti-
abstractionist purpose, describing narrative as the ‘linguistic form uniquely suited for displaying human 
existence as situated action’ (1995: 5). In his eyes, this is because narrative portrays human activity as 
‘purposeful action in the world’ (1995: 5). Narrative has the capacity to explore the subjectivities of both 
individual and group (Sparkes, 2005: 192). As Cortazzi pictures it, an explanatory narrative is a way of 
‘opening a window on the mind, or… opening a window on [a group’s] culture’ (1993: 2). 
Thus, in order to describe the complexity of social life within an AMS, which includes purposeful action in 
the world as well as individual and group subjectivities, an explanatory narrative is an effective means of 
doing so. However, in the words of Coffey and Atkinson, ‘there are no formulae or recipes for the “best” way 
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to analyse the stories we elicit and collect’ (1996: 80). (I would add that stories, in an ethnography, are not 
only elicited and collected but also constructed.) In order to construct an explanatory narrative of the role of 
values in decision-making within an AMS, the approach I take in this thesis is a thematic analysis. 
In a thematic analysis, themes provide the interpretive building blocks for putting an overarching narrative 
together. Themes must reflect the directionality of narrative; that is, they must ‘structure events in such a 
way that they move over time in an orderly way toward a given end’ (Gergen and Gergen, 1983: 257). At the 
same time, themes must be rooted in the data. That is to say, themes must be demonstrably derived from 
empirical findings. To ensure themes are connected to the interpretation of observational and interview 
data, I constructed themes from lower-level interpretive categories: codes. 
The process of coding empirical data has been largely developed by proponents of grounded theory 
(Charmaz, 2006). ‘Level 1 coding’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) consists of giving a name to small sections of 
data (e.g. a line of text or a sentence) and sticks closely to participants’ own words (Bluff, 2005: 154). Similar 
codes can be accommodated into a broader category. During this process, the researcher generates 
questions and seeks answers in the data (Bluff, 2005: 154). These questions include the overall question of 
‘what is actually happening in the data?’ (Glaser, 1992: 51) as well as who, what, where, how, when and what 
if (Stern, 1980; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
This process of interrogation is followed by ‘level 2 coding’39 (Hutchinson and Wilson, 2001), the purpose of 
which is ‘to make connections between categories and sub-categories and [allow] a conceptual scheme to 
emerge’ (Bluff, 2005: 154). Level 2 codes need not align so closely with participants’ own wording; they are 
intended to be transformational, integrating the level 1 codes (parts) within the emerging themes (whole).  
In summary, the explanatory narrative is constructed from themes, which are constructed from level 2 codes, 
which are constructed from level 1 codes. Such a process of construction is necessarily interpretive but not 
necessarily linear. I employed a non-linear interpretive approach, the constant comparative method, which 
I will describe below. 
5.3.2.1.2 Data sufficiency 
‘Theoretical saturation’ is commonly used in social research to refer to a phase of fieldwork when the 
researcher keeps finding the same patterns, which yield no new theoretical insights (May, 2001: 113). The 
term was originally used by grounded theorists Glaser and Strauss (1967). Compared to its common usage, 
Glaser offers a more sophisticated view of saturation: 
 
39 Level 2 codes are also called ‘axial’ codes (Bluff, 2005; Charmaz, 2006). 
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‘Saturation is not seeing the same pattern over and over again. It is the conceptualization of 
comparisons of these incidents which yield different properties of the pattern, until no new 
properties of the pattern emerge’ (2001: 191, emphasis added). 
Whether defined in terms of patterns or properties of patterns, theoretical saturation is characterised by 
same-ness, by the absence of new discovery. As one contemporary author describes it, theoretical saturation 
is ‘the time when observations no longer serve to question or modify the theories generated from earlier 
observations, thus rendering the theory “saturated” with data’ (May, 2001: 160). 
However, the metaphor of saturation is arguably problematic when used in this way. As Dey points out, 
‘saturation’ implies that all the data have been coded, and all the codes have been theoretically exhausted; 
this is too bold a claim for an interpretive process that inevitably leaves some data uncoded and some codes 
only partially explored. Theories, themes and codes are not saturated by data, they are suggested by data 
and hence Dey prefers the term ‘theoretical sufficiency’ (1999: 257).  
5.3.2.2 Practice 
Theoretical sufficiency recognises the situatedness of any research study; the theory is sufficient for 
something, namely, its research aim. This seems to reflect more accurately the nature of this study; I do not 
seek to answer all questions relating to decision-making within an AMS. Rather, I seek to construct an 
explanatory narrative which is sufficient to address the specific aim of this qualitative study. This does not 
require an exhaustive depiction of the data but a plausible one, a ‘portrait’ (Cresswell & Poth 2018: 94). A 
portrait is inevitably limited and perspectival; it is ‘a view of something by someone from somewhere’ 
(Poythress, 2018) (see: Reflexivity). I construct a narrative which is sufficient to provide a plausible account 
of the role of values in decision-making within an AMS. 
5.3.2.2.1 Codes, themes and theory 
Each day of field notes and each interview transcription was coded by level 1 codes, as line-by-line coding. 
This would typically be done after reading through the text multiple times. In this way, coding exemplifies 
the dialectic relation between the whole and its parts (see: Appendix E). 
All field notes and interview transcripts would then be coded with more interpretive level 2 codes. Where 
interviews related closely to a particular day of field notes, these would be coded together because the one 
would provide useful context for the other, which enables deeper understanding. This again is an example 
of the circular hermeneutic relation between part and whole (see: Appendix E). 
In addition, I created a mind map for each interview transcript. This was a diagrammatic representation of 
level 2 codes, which facilitated drawing connections and contrasts between codes. This ‘dimensionalization’ 
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(Bluff, 2005: 154) was a creative means of interrogating my interpretation of the data in such a way that 
would facilitate the recognition of themes. 
All four supervisors read samples of the empirical data, both in the form of field notes and interview 
transcripts. One supervisor, who has a background in qualitative research and clinical practice, read all field 
notes and interview transcripts. She coded large portions of this data, reviewed all of my coding, and met 
with me on a monthly basis to discuss the emerging themes and theory. This served as a means of ‘peer 
debriefing’ (Noble and Smith, 2015), to scrutinise the interpretation of data and enhance trustworthiness 
(see: Trustworthiness). 
The process of data-logging, transcribing, level-1 coding, level-2 coding, recognising themes and constructing 
theory was not a neatly linear process, however. These activities would usually be going on simultaneously 
during the empirical period (developmental phase, consolidatory phase) as well as during the post-empirical 
period, according to a constant comparative method. 
5.3.2.2.2 Constant comparative method 
The constant comparative method is defined as ‘a method of analysis that generates successively more 
abstract concepts and theories through inductive processes’ (Charmaz, 2006: 187). It is thus a method of 
going through data to theory. Such progress is made through interpretive comparison: the researcher 
compares ‘data with data, data with category, category with category, and category with concept’ (2006: 
187). Thus, the social researcher repeatedly scrutinises any analytical steps towards the construction of 
theory.  
These steps are not always forward. For instance, once analysis of a set of data has produced  codes, themes 
and a portion of theory, this would then be compared with subsequent analysis of other data. Sometimes 
subsequent data analysis would show the provisional interpretation to be inadequate. This would prompt a 
return to the original dataset and a search for an interpretation which is able to integrate both contrasting 
datasets. 
This process requires not just familiarity with the data of the interpreter, but the interpreter of the data. The 
reliability of my proposed explanatory theory, in the form of narrative, depends upon the validity of the 
interpretation I propose. Next, I present three elements that enhance the validity of the narrative I present 





The notion of reflexivity ‘refers to the ways in which the products of research are affected by the personnel 
and process of doing research’ (Aull Davies, 2008: 4). To be aware of this effect is thus a means of ‘turning 
back on oneself, a process of self-reference’ (Aull Davies, 2008: 4). Reflexivity entails ‘exploring the dynamics 
of the researcher-researched relationship and how the research is co-constituted’ (Finlay, 2002: 536). 
As participant observer in this ethnography who is “here as a researcher”, I exert some influence over the 
behaviour of others in the field. One such influence is a possible change in participant behaviour upon 
recognition that they are being observed, a phenomenon known as the Hawthorne effect (Lexico, 2019). 
However, even covert participation and objective attempts at social research exhibit reflexivity, albeit in a 
less visible way (Aull Davies, 2008: 4). 
For example, a doctor may adapt their style of communicating with a patient when being watched by a 
researcher. A healthcare assistant may be reluctant to share any opinions if they might be recorded in my 
field notes or by my Dictaphone in interview. The process of speaking with a patient about their experience 
of hospital may itself impact their experience of being in hospital. Furthermore, my preconceptions of a 
participant and my relationship with them influences how I perceive and understand their behaviour and 
communication. As these examples illustrate, I am a part of the social field which I study. Consideration of 
reflexivity thus entails a consideration of subjectivity and objectivity (Aull Davies, 2008: 4) and a return to 
the hermeneutic circle (see: Appendix E). 
As with the hermeneutic circle, there is no means of eliminating reflexivity entirely from the social research 
process. What maintains the validity of an ethnographic account is not the illusory avoidance of reflexivity 
but rather an appreciation of its effects. This requires the ethnographic researcher to be both involved and 
detached, ‘stepping in and out of society’ (Powdermaker, 1966: 19). I endeavoured to achieve this in various 
ways, such as the following four examples.  
Firstly, I deliberately took frequent short breaks during a shift of observation, when I would leave the ward 
for a few minutes before returning – literally ‘stepping in and out’ of the ward’s society. Secondly, I would 
keep a reflective log of how I have experienced being on the ward, including what I found difficult and what 
had surprised me. Thirdly, I wrote an extensive reflection on my first impressions of the hospital and this 
AMS during the first week of participant observation. This ‘arrival story’ (Aull Davies, 2008: 11) enabled 
identification of my initial expectations, assumptions and relationships. Fourthly, I would discuss data 
interpretation with my supervisors, who have varied backgrounds in general medicine, palliative medicine, 
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philosophy and bioethics and all have an interest in qualitative research. This peer debrief was an 
opportunity for my assumptions about the field and influence upon it to be scrutinised. 
The recognition of my influence on the social field and the data I gathered improves the validity of my 
interpretive analysis. In this way, reflexivity is closely related to trustworthiness. 
5.4.2 Trustworthiness 
The question of how much a qualitative account such as an ethnography can be trusted remains a live issue; 
there is still no consensus on the criteria for good qualitative research (Sparkes, 2001; Rolfe, 2006). Yet 
without any such criteria, qualitative research findings could be deemed ‘merely a collection of personal 
opinions subject to researcher bias’ (Noble and Smith, 2015: 34). 
Reliability, generalisability and validity are criteria frequently used in quantitative research (Long and 
Johnson, 2000). When applied to ethnographic research, generally such research is judged ‘deficient as 
regards its reliability as well as the generalizability of its findings, while given high marks for validity’ (Aull 
Davies, 2008: 95–96). However, social research theorists have argued that criteria for demonstrating rigour 
in the natural sciences are not appropriate for the social sciences. Such criteria need translating within the 
qualitative research context into alternative terminology, involving truth value, consistency and 
applicability40 (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The best-known set of criteria for establishing whether qualitative 
findings can be trusted is that of Lincoln and Guba (Korstjens and Moser, 2018: 121), who proposed a four-
part framework consisting of credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability (1985). I consider 
each criterion in turn and apply it to this study. 
Credibility is the qualitative equivalent of internal validity in quantitative research (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
It relates to the degree of confidence that can be held in the researcher’s interpretation of participants’ 
original communication (Avis, 2005: 13), and can be supported by such strategies as prolonged engagement, 
triangulation and member check (Korstjens and Moser, 2018: 121). With regard to prolonged engagement, 
I was a participant observer across 16 months and included a 3-month initial phase, during which to build 
trust and become familiar with the research setting. With regard to triangulation, I used a diverse range of 
approaches to data collection. This includes data triangulation, by gathering data at different times of day 
and times of year, gathering data in different situations and gathering data with different groups of people. 
It includes investigator triangulation, by having regular input into coding and analysis from my supervisory 
team. It also includes method triangulation, by gathering data not just through participant observation but 
also through semi-structured interviewing. With regard to member check, this was done informally in 
 
40 These are intended to be qualitative equivalents to the quantitative criteria of validity, reliability and generalisability respectively 
(Noble and Smith, 2015). 
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conversation with participants who asked “how’s it all going then?”. A more formal member check was 
performed when I presented my provisional findings at a national conference for acute medicine staff and 
responded to questions41. 
Transferability is the qualitative equivalent to generalisability in quantitative research (Noble and Smith, 
2015: 34) and describes the extent to which research findings can be applied to other contexts. It is facilitated 
by providing a ‘thick description’ (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Tracy, 2010; Korstjens and Moser, 2018). This is 
progressively evident in my field notes, which were thin in the opening few shifts but rapidly became rich in 
contextual detail, as is evident throughout the development phase and consolidatory phase. Whilst there is 
no calculable threshold of transferability, ‘the more illustrative, explanatory and sophisticated [a] portrayal 
is, the more extended or applicable the acquired knowledge becomes’ (Mantzoukas, 2004: 994). 
Dependability and confirmability are the qualitative counterparts to the quantitative criterion of reliability 
(Noble and Smith, 2015; Korstjens and Moser, 2018). The former relates to the stability and accountability 
of the research process across time. The latter relates to degree to which the findings are evident in the data 
and not merely figments of the researcher’s imagination (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Both dependability and 
confirmability are supported by procedural transparency, which I maintained in this study by keeping records 
of research decisions, research diary entries and supervision meetings so as to ensure an auditable trail of 
research decision-making alongside the data. 
The purpose of this attention to reflexivity and trustworthiness is to be able to answer affirmatively to the 
question ‘can the findings be trusted?’ (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) and thus assure the reader that what follows 
in this thesis is a plausible account of the role of values in decision-making within an AMS. 
5.4.3 Research ethics approval 
Methodological issues in healthcare research are closely related to ethical issues (Seymour et al., 2005). For 
this reason, my proposal for this research study required consideration from an ethical perspective. As well 
as gaining approval from the research and development department of the relevant NHS trust, which also 
acted as sponsor of the research, I required approval from the Health Research Authority (HRA). After 
discussing my proposal with a regional ethics committee (REC) (reference: 17/NE/0106), HRA approval was 
granted on 22/05/17. My application form, protocols, supporting documentation and clarifications 
anticipated ethical aspects of this study such as the consent of participants, the involvement of patients 
lacking capacity, data retention and any influence on the delivery of clinical care. Members of the REC were 
 
41 Values and decision-making in an Acute Medicine service. Society for Acute Medicine conference, Bournemouth International 




satisfied that the plan for this study satisfied the ethical demands of good research practice as well as the 
legal demands of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (England & Wales). 
5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have surveyed the empirical methodology, analytic methodology and validity of this study. 
Theoretical considerations describe how this study is designed to address the knowledge gap that was 
identified in literature review, in terms of methodology. Practical and experiential considerations describe 
how this study was implemented in such a way that does indeed address this knowledge gap. However, it is 
only useful for research to address a gap in contemporary knowledge if a scientific community can have 
confidence in its findings. Such confidence is supported by the validity of this study, which is described in 
terms of reflexivity, trustworthiness and institutional ethics approval. In conclusion, then, what follows is a 







Chapter 6. Restoring Order 
This is the first of three chapters in which I present my interpretive analysis of ethnographic and interview 
data. In this chapter, I present the aim of an Acute Medicine Service (AMS): to restore order. Restoring order 
is not simple, however. It involves patients and problems. I start by characterising what patients are and 
what problems are within this AMS. This will lead to a consideration of what the point is of all of this work: 
what does restoring order require? 
6.1 What is the patient? 
6.1.1 Journey 
A white canopy stretches over the paving in front of the glass door of the hospital. In its shade, members of 
the public are deciphering the instructions on the screen of the car park ticket machine. There are two types 
of car park here: ‘staff’, who have permits, and ‘public’, who buy tickets. A CCTV camera looks out across the 
paving. A couple of young women looking deprived of sleep are stood at the edge of the paving. One is 
wearing a purple dressing gown, the other a white-and-green hospital gown. They must be patients. Each is 
holding a smoking cigarette.  
Crossing the shade of the canopy, I am offered an automated welcome by the glass doors of the main 
entrance, which open as I approach. There is a reception area to my right and a spacious atrium ahead of 
me. In the words of a patient I would later encounter, “this place looks like what you see when you finally 
step off the coach for your hotel break in Alicante!” Yet, further ahead, I notice rows of people seated, 
waiting. They must be patients. This hotel atrium is in fact the Accident and Emergency (A&E) waiting room. 
The whiteboard ahead displays an estimated waiting time in rushed handwriting: “2 hours”. Heads turn as I 
enter to see if I am one of the sick that wait here or the healthy that work here. Self-conscious, I become 
aware of the click-clacking of my shoes. I walk across the margin of the atrium with my head down. As I do 
so, I notice the cartoon illustration printed on the floor. It pictures a tree and fresh air, with the caption “we 
are smoke free”.  
Upon setting foot in Middleton Hospital, then, I make two observations. Firstly, there are clear categories 
here: some people are staff and other people are patients. Secondly, there is something complex, even 
paradoxical, about the categories here: this is both a smokey and a smoke-free place. A complex relation 
between categories is a feature of what I would encounter downstairs in the AMS. 
6.1.1.1 From doors to doors 
The AMS is a part of the hospital whose entrance is marked by another set of automatic doors. Unlike the 
main entrance doors, however, these doors automatically close rather than automatically open. To enter 
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the AMS requires action and authorisation, and marks a milestone in my journey into the field. Having parked 
in the ‘public’ car park, I became ‘staff’ as I was watched walking through the atrium. Then, having taken the 
‘public’ staircase, I employed a ‘staff’ privilege in order to enter the ward. As I noted at the time: 
To enter the AMS I had to tap my ID badge against an electronic card reader… On entering the ward, 
there is a long corridor straight ahead. There was a lady in uniform… seated at a desk 15m ahead. 
Beyond that, I could see nurses in blue uniforms at another desk about 25m ahead, who looked 
towards me as the doors opened. [1a]42 
This time, the heads turning to watch me were those of nursing staff. The illustrations are not on the floor, 
which was plain, but on the walls. The collective ‘we’ of the “smoke-free” cartoon now features implicitly in 
a poster of a nurse looking caringly towards a patient: “if it matters to you, it matters to us”. 
The automatic double-doors are the single entrance and exit of this AMS, which are at one end of a long 
corridor: 
The shape of the ward is of three corridors, which are connected to a central area like three spokes in 
a wheel. Along each corridor there is a circular bulge. Patient’s cubicles and bays are around this 
circular bulge which sometimes I have heard referred to as a ‘pod’. The entrance corridor, unlike the 
other two, extends beyond this pod a further 15m to the entrance of the ward. [1a] 
The passage through these automatic double-doors marks the moment a patient becomes a part of the AMS. 
Patients who come through the doors are allocated a place in a pod of the ward, and eventually exit the 
ward through the same doors. The doors are therefore symbolic of the start and end of the care journey of 
a patient.  
Tony43 is a consultant in Acute Medicine who was reflecting on what the unique features are of Acute 
Medicine. He refers to the doors of the department symbolically in his wording: 
We’re all, I think, coming with fairly wide open eyes to what might be coming through the doors.
 [Tony, 61]44 
 
42 I divided my transcripts of 36 shifts of fieldwork into 9 groups of 4. Each group shares a number, and each shift within a group 
is assigned a letter (a-d) at random. The reader can thus gain a sense of where a data excerpt occurs in a series of 1-9 but not with 
sufficient accuracy to identify the actual day an event occurred. 
43 Some consultants within this AMS were called by their first name, and others by their title and surname. This is reflected in the 
pseudonym I have assigned each consultant. 
44 Interview excerpts feature the interviewee’s name, followed by its location within the interview by line numbering. 
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What comes through the doors, according to Tony, is a “case mix” [Tony, 47] of patients. A patient is 
someone who comes through the doors. More than that, a patient is someone who also has a medical 
condition. That is what qualifies them to enter the AMS: 
Acute Medicine, to me, means whatever that undifferentiated take is, the collection of physical, 
physiological, and actually quite a significant amount of psychological or mental health problems that 
people experience. That leads them to a point where there’s a tipping point of some kind and either 
a GP is called or 111 or 999 is called. And then they end up filtering through the system and ending 
up in the system as an Acute Medicine patient. [Tony, 23-27] 
This AMS is a part of the hospital system. A&E is the preceding step in a patient’s journey; it is the part of 
the system a patient ‘filters through’ in order to make it into this AMS. 
Dr Williams is a consultant in this AMS who was speaking to me towards the end of his shift. He seemed 
exhausted and was rubbing his forehead wearily as we spoke. After recounting the challenges of the day, 
which included dealing with the “weird and wonderful that falls in the cracks that no one else wants” [9a], 
he also spoke of the process of ‘filtering’ through A&E into the AMS: 
The point of triage is the junior doc in A&E. They’re the one that makes the decision. [9a] 
As is common practice nationwide, sick people are triaged in Middleton Hospital on the basis of medical 
conditions. Other medical wards correlate with a body system, such as cardiology and gastroenterology45. 
An AMS, however, is not so physiologically demarcated. As a result, patients with a medical condition that 
“falls in the cracks” [9a] also qualify, according to the judgment of the doctor in A&E. 
There is nevertheless a degree of selection as to which sick people are entitled to enter the AMS doors as a 
patient. Some are specifically excluded from this AMS: 
In our service we no longer see what are clearly acute new strokes, acute new heart attacks… in 
general, acute new jaundice and very specifically abdominal problems, for example. [Tony, 30-
33] 
Likewise, some sick people are specifically included in this AMS: 
We specifically take a cohort of patients who have overdoses or self-harm. Okay? So that poses some 
challenges for the nursing staff and for ourselves because of the patient cohort. Many of them who 
 




very definitely not only don’t want to be in hospital, some of them don’t want to be alive. 
 [Tony, 38-41] 
Whilst the journey of a patient through the hospital system may begin in the A&E waiting room, the journey 
through the AMS is one that starts and ends with these automatic double-doors. So long as the sick person 
is sick with a medical condition that satisfies the judgment of the doctor in A&E, the sick person becomes a 
patient within an AMS. This ‘filtering’ process of triage qualifies a patient to start their AMS journey, which 
is a circular journey from doors to doors. 
6.1.1.2 The pressure and the pace 
Such itinerant circularity is common to all medical wards within Middleton Hospital, which share the same 
layout. What makes the AMS special is the pressure and pace of this journey. 
Fergus is a senior pharmacist who has been working within this AMS for many years. I notice his cheerful 
demeanour on the ward as he checks ward prescriptions, clarifies community medication lists with patients 
and responds to queries from colleagues. As well as cheerful, his manner seems rushed; he speaks in rapid 
bursts, which are separated by momentary pauses, as if to let the listener catch up. Fergus describes his 
impression of this AMS, why he enjoys it and how it compares to other wards: 
I love the insanity of [the AMS]… I’m not easily bored but I like being constantly engaged and things? 
And Acute Medicine, with the variety of patients, and the absolute insanity of it, feeds into that 
[laughs]. [Fergus, 6-9] 
Even in interview away from the ward, Fergus maintains his quick-fire style of communicating. He expands 
on what he means by the “absolute insanity” that distinguishes an AMS from other wards: 
It’s the pace. You’ve seen [the AMS]. It is non-stop. The turnover is huge.  [Fergus, 6-11] 
This ‘huge turnover’ is characterised by its speed:   
Well [within the AMS] it’s slash and burn, it’s in and out!… they want a quick sort, they want to sort 
the initial problem and get rid of them [smiles].  [Fergus, 457-459] 
Within an AMS, according to Fergus, problems are sorted and patients are got rid of. What is a unique feature 
of this ward, an AMS, is not so much the shape of this journey as its “slash and burn”, “in and out” pace. 
Fergus expands on where this pressure to maintain this pace comes from. Besides the training and 
experience of doctors and nurses, he identifies an additional factor: 
It’s bed management going “we want the bed 5 minutes ago”, or the patient! Or get rid of them or 
get them somewhere. And that fight! Bed management or the OSMs [Operational Services Managers] 
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are on the ward every day going “we need beds.” And no other ward gets the same pressure.
 [Fergus, 457-468] 
Bed management and OSMs, agents of the hospital at large, reportedly apply particular pressure to the AMS 
staff to discharge patients. As hospital staff who exert pressure on AMS staff whilst not belonging to the 
AMS, bed management and OSMs are frequently referred to by ward staff simply as “they” [3c]. 
I join Sarah and Sandra on their morning coffee break in the canteen, as they start speaking of the “they”. It 
is the first time either of them has sat down this morning. As we pull out plastic chairs, there is a sigh of relief 
before conversation begins. Both Sarah and Sandra have worked here for many years and also note the fast 
pace of the AMS as its distinguishing feature: 
Sarah: It is tough. But that’s also why we like it. We like the busy-ness. The people that we are, we 
like getting things done. 
Sandra: Sometimes when you have a slow shift we’re all like “what’s going on, it’s boring”; we 
complain even then. 
Sarah: We’re a bit crackers. [3c] 
The pressure to sustain the pace of turnover within an AMS, whether spoken of as “absolute insanity”, 
“tough” or “crackers”, is also understood by Sarah and Sandra to be maintained by management. As Sandra 
says: 
“Ah, [the pressure is] all the time. They’re always getting you to do more.” [3c] 
The pressure from management to maintain the pace of turnover is recognised by consultant Dr Taylor. Dr 
Taylor is an energetic consultant who wears scrubs and trainers during her ward rounds. Sometimes walking 
swiftly, sometimes crouching at the bedside, Dr Taylor only sits still briefly to check clinical information on a 
computer screen before moving on. Looking back on the previous two days of busy ward rounds, Dr Taylor 
describes her sense of pressure within this AMS: 
I think there’s a push, clearly this hospital won’t function if people don’t move through wards pretty 
quickly, so there’s clearly quite a big push of getting people home… when I go to see a patient the 
question in the forefront of my mind is “can they go home? Do they need to be here?” [Dr Taylor, 
23-27] 
Thus the pressure on discharge, referred to as “turnover” (Fergus), the pressure to “do more” (Sandra) and 
the pressure to “[get] people home” (Dr Taylor), is a widespread phenomenon reported amongst AMS staff. 
It involves factors which are external to the AMS such as the “they” of management; however, it is also 
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internalised in the mindset of staff who “like the busy-ness” (Sarah) and hold patient discharge in the 
“forefront of [their] mind” (Dr Taylor). What is more, this sense of urgency is not limited to staff. 
Gary is not staff. He is a patient, sat upright in the armchair in the corner of his cubicle. His room, called “bed 
5” by nursing staff, is unusually spacious. It is the so-called bariatric room, which is designed to be able to 
manage extremely heavy patients. Gary himself is slim and looks very fit. He is well-tanned and wearing a T-
shirt and football shorts as he reads the newspaper beside the sunlit window [3c].  
Gary is then joined by another patient in his cubicle. The hospital is short of beds and so this extra patient, 
Arthur, has been put in with Gary for the time being. Nurse Sarah explains to me that this decision comes 
from “management”. With a despondent tone, she adds that there is no point in disputing it “because if I 
say the patient in there isn’t suitable to share the room, they’ll just say ‘find a patient who is and swap them’” 
[3c]. 
Arthur is wheeled into room 5 by two porters as he lies on a bed. Arthur is extremely hard of hearing and 
shouts “I can’t hear you!” to any nurse who approaches. Arthur appears elderly, agitated, thin and frail. He 
breathes heavily into an oxygen mask which hisses loudly. His bed is parked opposite Gary as a healthcare 
assistant positions a thin fold-out screen between the two patients. The whole scene feels a little chaotic 
and clumsy; Arthur’s bed is blocking the toilet entrance and his oxygen supply tube stretches across the room 
to attach above Gary’s bed. There is no opportunity for the two patients to greet one another. The nursing 
staff appear embarrassed and frustrated as the porters walk away [3c]. 
Five minutes later, I return to speak with Gary, who smiles warmly and comments: 
“I’m very impressed with the staff here. Can’t fault them. Some of them I’ve seen on their feet for 13 
hours and then, once they’ve finished, they go round offering teas and coffees! Very impressive. Call 
you by your first name and everything. The doctors are very nice too. Like the one with the beard, he’s 
very good.” [3c] 
Gary’s facial expression drops for a moment, after this string of compliments. He folds his newspaper and 
adds: 
“Mind, I’ve overstayed my welcome… I’m well now. Better give the bed to somebody else. Arthur has 
come in; may as well have my bed!” [3c] 
Gary goes on to give a light-hearted illustration of how fast things are done on this ward: 
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“I tell you what is impressive: In the morning I have a shower. Problem is, the whole bathroom gets 
very wet. Within 5 minutes, the lady comes in and mops it up! I didn’t even know they were watching 
us! I don’t know even how they knew.” [3c] 
Gary chuckles with amusement at how rapidly his shower room is tended to. Yet, despite this impressive 
service, he wishes to leave. Despite the welcoming main entrance, complete with a decorative canopy, 
automatic glass doors, atrium and reception desk, Gary recognises that this is not a hotel. Witnessing the 
hard-working staff, the sickness of his room-mate and the shortage of space, Gary feels an obligation to 
vacate his bed. It is not because staff have indicated he ought to leave now but because of his sense of the 
urgency with which this place operates. Sensing the pressure and pace of the ward, Gary feels he has 
“overstayed [his] welcome” [3c]. 
The circular journey of patients from doors to doors is thus not a gentle meandering; it is an active, consistent 
process of ‘turnover’. To work in AMS is to work under pressure; there is a ‘push’. This is a push with 
direction: a push to get patients home, working to a pace described as “absolute insanity” (Fergus). Within 
the world of an AMS, to be a patient is to be on a journey: a journey from doors to doors as fast as possible. 
6.1.2 Whiteboard 
The patients who are currently journeying through the AMS are recorded and tracked on a whiteboard. The 
ward whiteboard stands prominently beside the central work station. Before a patient arrives in the AMS 
from A&E, their name is written on the whiteboard; the patient’s reputation precedes them. This reputation 
consists of a summary of the patient given by a phone call to a nurse within the AMS, which enables the 
nurse to know which bed the patient is due to occupy on the ward. After this phone-call is received, the 
patient’s name is written on a row of the whiteboard next to the central work station, with a box drawn next 
to it to indicate the patient needs to be seen by a doctor. Each row of the whiteboard relates to each bed of 
the ward, to which names are then added as patients come and go. 
The columns feature the patient name, and then information which is mostly written in abbreviations 
relating to tasks of clinical relevance (e.g. “Flexi-sig”) or logistical (e.g. “W15, SSH” [going to ward 15 
at South Side Hospital]). [1a] 
This whiteboard is a pivotal point, which staff of all kinds stop to interact with at some point during their 
shift. For instance, staff survey the whiteboard to gain an impression of  how busy the ward is as a whole: 
I arrived on the ward at 18:45 and approached nurse Ryan, who was standing back and looking over 
the whiteboard beside the central work station. He had a serious look on his face, had his hands on 
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his hips and was looking up and down the board, as if he were more concerned by the overview of the 
whiteboard rather than any particular patient’s row. [4b] 
Ryan’s eyes would skirt vertically, pause, and then glide horizontally to see what tasks remained outstanding 
for that particular patient. I ask him how today is going. Ryan glances back over the whiteboard as he replies: 
“busy!” [4b]. 
During my time on the ward, management attempted to have the whiteboard removed and replaced with 
an electronic alternative. This prompted a response from staff, who made their cherishing of the whiteboard 
more explicit. 
Laura is a trainee doctor who is seated at the central work station with her back to the newly-mounted 
electronic screen. She is rapidly typing and clicking at a computer, gathering the relevant information about 
a patient before the consultant Dr Morrison asks her. I notice she glances intermittently at the ward 
whiteboard but does not turn to look at the new electronic screen behind her [3a]. I ask Laura about this as 
she gets up: 
“[The electronic screen] is nice for just having a quick look. But looking at it, it doesn’t say to me how 
many patients I’ve got to see and the little jobs that need doing. The whiteboard is really good for 
that… it’s better for a quick overview.” [3a] 
Laura’s preference for the whiteboard is shared by Dr Morrison, who specifies that “it’s all about flow” [4b]. 
‘Flow’ is a term used to describe the movement of patients through the hospital, as they are transferred and 
discharged.  
She continued to describe to me how there is pressure to “do everything on [electronic software for 
tracking clinical tasks]” but that the electronic handsets and electronic board are not as good at giving 
a feel for the overall state of the ward; in particular, what tasks are outstanding before transfer or 
discharge.  [4b] 
The whiteboard is a visual representation of how the work of the ward is divided into beds, and beds are in 
turn divided into tasks. Surveying the whiteboard thus gives a ‘feel’ for the ward. Not all tasks make it onto 
the whiteboard; only those which are required in order for the patient to be discharged and for the bed to 
become available again. “It’s all about flow” (Dr Morrison). 
The following month, I notice that the ward whiteboard has disappeared. The electronic screen seems to 




She has a very friendly demeanour and tells me about the “dramas” concerning the ward whiteboard. 
Having previously been positioned beside the central work station, it has disappeared: “taken down 
by management. I don’t have a problem with them taking the whiteboard, but not until we’ve had 
our questions answered.” Harriet continues to describe to me how useful the whiteboard is for how 
the ward runs, and especially for getting the big picture overview of who’s going where, and who 
needs what done.  
With a relieved expression, she says that she has got permission to put it back up. As I walk across the 
ward, I notice that the whiteboard is still on the ward, without its legs, tucked in a corner of the 
procedure room.  [4a] 
Harriet speaks with fondness about the ward whiteboard, and this is reflected in the relief she expresses at 
the victorious efforts to have it restored. 
Within the AMS, a patient is someone whose name makes it onto the whiteboard. A patient’s name makes 
it onto the whiteboard when it is assigned a bed and whilst there are outstanding tasks before discharge. In 
order to become a patient on the whiteboard, a sick person undergoes four translations. Firstly, they are 
translated to individuals; family members do not accompany them onto the whiteboard row. Secondly, they 
are translated to a first name and surname; titles and descriptors are not required. Thirdly, they are 
translated to tasks; the 30 rows of the whiteboard represent 30 journeys towards discharge. The columns of 
tasks are the logistical steps in this journey. Fourthly, they are translated to parts of a new whole. Outside 
of the whiteboard, the patient may be understood as a member of a family or community. Inside the 
whiteboard, however, they become a member of a new 30-bedded society, defined by a logistical map which 
provides the “big picture overview” (Harriet) . 
As well as being a sick person in a bed on a journey from doors to doors, a patient is a name in a row on a 
journey from left to right. As well as being a sick person who is some distance away from going home, a 
patient is someone who makes it onto the ward whiteboard, who is some tasks away from discharge. 
6.1.3 Anatomy 
In the world of the ward, what people do can be seen from what people wear. Patients come in white and 
green: a unisex gown which they put on until the day of discharge. Nurses come in blue: light blue for junior 
nurses, dark blue for senior nurses. Healthcare assistants come in brown, discharge co-ordinators in grey, 
and so on. There is a poster on the ward which is a diagram, identifying the role to which each coloured 
uniform relates. Those who enter the ward in their own clothes are visitors, doctors, psychiatry liaison, and 
the ‘hospital to home’ team (who facilitate complex discharges into the community).  
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This dividing up of the workforce simultaneously indicates a colour-coded dividing up of each patient. That 
is to say, each role is concerned for a particular part of the patient’s journey from through the doors to out 
the doors. Each part of the professional workforce concentrates on a part of the patient. In a sense, the 
division of labour is the division of the patient. 
For example, Rahul is a physiotherapist who has just been assessing Mrs Beatrice Jones for discharge. 
Wearing blue and white, he had come to see her, in her white and green gown. Mr Chris Jones, in his own 
clothes, was seated on a plastic chair in the corner. Beatrice is recovering from an asthma attack. She pushes 
her oxygen mask to the side to speak with Rahul, as they discuss the layout of her home and how she feels 
about walking on her own. Following this, Rahul and Beatrice leave Chris behind as they go in search of a 
nearby staircase to test her ability to go up and down stairs.  
Immediately afterwards, Rahul summarises his general approach to assessing patients: 
From a physio point of view, like what mobility aid they need. If they need further community physio, 
or if they need out-patient physio. Just sometimes you give basic, generic exercises, depending on the 
patient, just help improve them like a little bit more. More from physiotherapy point of view, it’s more 
looking at the functionality so, getting in and out of bed, get up out the chair. [Rahul, 23-27] 
Rahul clarifies how he assesses ‘functionality’: 
If it’s quite a competent patient we would do it on and off the toilet, because toilets here are normally 
the average height, for toilet normally. Doing the stairs if they’ve got stairs. If they have a bungalow, 
if they’ve got steps outside, so then we’ll take them to stairs and do a couple of steps. If they have no 
grab rail, we’ll do them without any handrails. Or if they have a handrail, obviously one handrail…
 [Rahul, 27-32] 
Beatrice was off her oxygen whilst Rahul tested her mobility on the staircase. She needed to pause and catch 
her breath, complaining that her chest feels tight. Rahul describes how he felt at this moment: 
In the middle of the stairs you start panicking. That could have led to her falling, essentially.
 [Rahul, 187-188] 
After walking Beatrice gently back to her bed to be reunited with Chris, Rahul immediately went to inform a 
doctor of her ongoing difficulty breathing. 
The main concern for her quality of life to be improved, from my point of view, is making sure that the 
doctors had everything in place for her chest.  [Rahul, 190-192] 
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Whilst Beatrice’s breathing was a concern from his point of view, Rahul recognised it was the responsibility 
of the doctors to deal with this. As a ward physiotherapist, he is more interested in the mobility side of things 
than the respiratory side of things. 
Beatrice herself adopted a similar division to Rahul. As she sees it, there is a medical side of her, which 
concerns her breathing, and a physical side of her, which concerns her mobility: 
I’m still wheezy, and it’s scary when you can’t breathe. It’s terrifying actually. So from my point of 
view, not so much the physical side as the medical side. I have to know what I do to help me, because 
I certainly don’t want to come back into hospital. [Beatrice, 22-25]  
Whilst the “medical side” of her is worrying, Beatrice contrasts this with the “physical side”, which she sees 
as reassuring: 
I have my husband. I can go up and down. We have three bathrooms in the house, we have a 
downstairs toilet. I have a walk-in shower. And these facilities work well. And once I’m upstairs I’m 
upstairs, once I’m downstairs and I do have toilet facilities and bathing facilities. I have my husband, 
which is good because not everybody has that.  [Beatrice, 22-34] 
The categories of ‘mobility’ and ‘chest’, or ‘physical’ and ‘medical’ represent different aspects of Beatrice’s 
healthcare needs along her journey through the AMS. Different categories may be used for different patient 
journeys.  
Another way a patient journey may be categorised is drawn by Brian. He spoke to me from the armchair in 
cubicle 5, the so-called bariatric bed. Brian was an obese man, wearing the white and green hospital gown. 
As he put away his mobile phone, I noticed extensive bruising along his arms. He summarised the situation 
to me: 
Without hesitation, he started telling me “the staff here have been great. The nurses: nothing’s a 
bother. Especially as, with me, the things they’ve got to do are not exactly pleasant, ya na? I had 
pretty bad diarrhoea when I come [sic] in.” He continued to describe his injured spleen which resulted 
in a large bleed into his abdomen and “downstairs”. The doctors, he continued, are having to make a 
difficult decision because he’s in a “difficult balance: having to get the blood clotted, but also having 
to get me on tinzaparin [an injected medication which thins the blood to prevent stable clot 
formation].” [8b] 




“They know what they’re doing. I know my body, but they know the medications ‘n that, ya na?” 
 [8b] 
He expanded a little on the distinction between the doctors’ knowledge and his own: 
If it’s a medical thing you wanna trust the doctors. Because they know the facts ‘n figures. They’ve 
got all the data, all the experience. If it’s a medical issue, it’s acceptable. If it’s a lifestyle issue, then 
it’s about choices… Medical things they’ll tell us to take certain medicine, so you behave in a certain 
way. And a lifestyle thing is the choice that I make to do it. If I choose not to do it, after being given 
sound medical advice, well then, ya na, it’s me fault isn’t it? That’s the way I look at it. [Brian, 74-
81] 
Going home on regular tinzaparin injections crosses both the “medical” and “lifestyle” categories, in Brian’s 
opinion: 
It’s a temporary measure, it’s a bit of both, yes. ‘Cause medically it has to be done, lifestyle it has to 
be done as well, ya na?   [Brian, 84-85] 
Where Beatrice had a medical side and a physical side, Brian has a medical side and a lifestyle side. Even 
though these categories can become mixed, they show that an individual patient is not necessarily an 
indivisible patient. Patients and their journeys can be divided into different components.  
Another way of dividing a patient is alluded to during consultant Harriet’s interaction with a patient called 
Alan. Alan is in his fifties and has been admitted to the AMS after taking an overdose with the intention of 
ending his life. I pull round the curtain as Harriet greets him cheerfully: 
Alan was wearing a football shirt and was seated looking straight ahead. The consultant Harriet sat 
to his right, on his bed, at eye level. He made occasional eye contact with her but mostly looked ahead 
and showed minimal emotional change. His answers were mostly “right. Right”. [3d] 
Harriet’s voice softens and quietens as she realises that Alan is not in the mood for talking. He mostly avoids 
her gaze and looks fed up of being here. When Harriet asks “how are you feeling?”, Alan replies straight 
away: “No feelings. I want to go home” [3d]. At this, Harriet stands up and says: 
“Well I’m the doctor who looks after the physical side of things. You’re on this antidote to protect your 
liver, and you’ll need to be in until it finishes. We’re looking at a little while, most likely tomorrow 
from the looks of things.” [3d] 
Harriet points to the ‘time remaining’ digital display on Alan’s infusion pump, as he nods and then looks 
away. Harriet’s focus on the “physical side of things” suggests there is another side of things which she is 
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less concerned to address. Perhaps it is the mental side of things? Consideration of two similar interactions 
may shed light on this. 
Trainee doctor Laura is speaking with a patient called Charlotte, supervised by consultant Charles, during the 
morning ward round: 
As Charlotte relayed the timing of events and the details of the overdose she had taken, Laura 
crouched down at the bedside on one knee, leaning forward with a caring and concerned posture. I 
noticed that the conversation related to what had been taken, any bodily impact of this, and then a 
plan for her going home. Charlotte and Laura had not talked about the psychological reasons for 
choosing to take an overdose.  [8b] 
As Laura emerged from the cubicle, followed by Charles, I ask her “how much detail do you tend to go into 
in terms of the intention behind taking an overdose, or relational issues?” 
Laura looked at me, wide-eyed, as if I’ve put her on the spot by asking her in front of the consultant. 
“Well, it depends. I don’t really know how it works here because I’m new. I’m assuming that everyone 
gets seen by psych [psychiatry liaison team], or were seen in A&E”. She glanced towards Charles, who 
nodded and added “I don’t at all. I have to say, I never really do ‘cause it doesn’t change my 
management. In terms of all that, A&E have already done it, psych are coming after; so if I go into it 
to, it doesn’t really add anything.” [8b] 
Laura and Charles hint at a division of labour that warrants their focus on merely the physical side of patients 
who have taken an overdose; if the psychiatry team are coming afterwards anyway, then there is no need 
to tend to the mental side of things as well. 
This division of the physical and the mental is made explicit by another trainee doctor, Ken. Ken was bent 
down on one knee before a young woman as he proposed. What he proposed was a series of questions for 
a young woman called Suzie, who had taken a paracetamol overdose. Her face was red and puffy, as if from 
crying a few moments ago. She seemed visibly upset during their short conversation, curled up in the 
armchair beside her bed as if she didn’t want to be there.  
Ken posed short, closed questions in a thick Chinese accent, which generally demanded a “yes” or “no” 
answer: “you know taking paracetamol overdose is bad for you, yeah? You know it can cause the liver failure, 
yeah?” Suzie would often sigh before answering, as if to indicate that this conversation is a waste of time. I 
found it remarkable that, despite Suzie being clearly upset and having tried to kill herself, Ken’s questions 
related purely to the physical details of what had happened without any attention given to why she wanted 
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to harm or kill herself [7a]. Ken confirmed this intentional division, explaining it to me immediately 
afterwards: 
I see it as my job’s to treat them medically and the psychiatry team to try treat in terms of her mental 
health issue… The paracetamol overdose is a medical - in my mind – issue, in my mind. The depression 
and the trigger that makes her wants to take the paracetamol overdose would be from the psychiatry 
point of view, in my mind. [Ken, 107-118] 
Like Charles and Laura, Ken’s focus on the physical side of Suzie is in view of his place in the professional 
sequence. He is the episode before the psychiatry team; tending to “the depression and the trigger” of this 
overdose would thus be an unnecessary duplication of labour. When speaking with a patient who has taken 
an overdose, Harriet, Laura, Charles and Ken all concentrate on the physical side as opposed to the mental 
side of the patient. 
The anatomy of a patient within the AMS is therefore not simple. A patient has many sides. Patients are 
divisible. The component parts into which they are divided may be a reflection of the division of labour of 
the professionals sequentially reviewing patients. As a result, patients can have as many component parts 
as there are uniforms visiting them. Patients can have a medical side, a mobility side, a lifestyle side, a 
physical side, a mental side. And perhaps many other sides.  
Within the AMS, a patient can be figuratively understood in terms of anatomy, whiteboard or journey. 
Insofar as a patient’s component parts relate to different tasks, their anatomy is equivalent to the 
whiteboard. Insofar as the whiteboard charts a patient’s progress from admission to discharge, the 
whiteboard is equivalent to their journey. And insofar as their journey from doors to doors features a 
multidisciplinary series of consultations, their journey is equivalent to their anatomy. 
Patients do not arrive in the AMS out of habit or curiosity; they have problems that need to be addressed. 
In what follows, I present three different kinds of problem that I encountered within an AMS, which help to 
characterise the overall aim of the work of an AMS. 
6.2 What is the problem? 
6.2.1 Deviation 
In order to enter the doors, a patient must have a problem. Without a problem, a patient would not make it 
past the triage point of the junior doctor in A&E. As a result, patients arrive in the AMS with an already-




Well, I was getting on grand after my operation, my breathing was a lot better until Friday morning 
and as I got out of bed my husband just caught us as I was going to the bathroom. That’s was more 
or less… I would have collapsed. And I was sweating. Clammy, you know. I thought “oh dear me!”, 
and of course I phoned my daughter.  [Brigitte, 7-10] 
Brigitte recognised that her near-collapse, sweatiness and clamminess meant that there was a problem. This 
disturbance in ordinary home life was recognised immediately, seemingly without any need for deliberation 
or measurement. 
Mike describes, in contrast, how he knows he does not have a problem. In hospital with a chest infection, 
we speak about his past. Mike lies on his side as we talk, with his head propped up on his hand. He 
acknowledges that he used to have a problem with alcohol but feels clear that it is not a problem anymore: 
I divin’t get like I used to get. I used to get intoxicated and wake me up and it’s like “what have I been 
doing now?” I’m not like that anymore, you na?... For it to become a total problem when you cannot 
pull yoursel’ out of it at five o’clock tea-time, d’you na what I mean? And you’re not eating proper and 
stuff like that. Where now, I’m eating again and I’m getting up at like seven eight o’clock and gan 
deeing things.  [Mike, 62-69] 
For Mike, whether or not his alcohol consumption is an alcohol ‘problem’ is determined by whether there is 
impairment of his ability to lead a normal life. A normal life for Mike features regular meals and daytime 
activities and, without deviation in these, his alcohol intake is not deemed problematic. 
Like Mike, consultant Charles uses a template of a normal life in order to assess how problematic a condition 
of breathlessness is: 
It’s a bit about the impact on the patient. You know, how’s it actually affecting the patient? Generally, 
if a patient has come to you, if you’re in heart failure for example, if 3 months ago they were able to, 
you know, walk to the shop and now they have to stop 5 times… then it would be reasonable to treat. 
 [Charles, 356-360]  
According to Charles, whether or not a patient should be treated for a problem with breathlessness requires 
contextualising the symptom within that particular patient’s life and considering whether their normal life is 
impeded. Sometimes this reference point of a patient’s normal function is referred to as their ‘baseline’. 
Consultant Harriet refers to a patient called Harold’s baseline in considering whether to let him go home. 
Harold is a frail-looking, disorientated man who is wearing the standard white and green hospital gown but 
it remains untied at the back, exposing his lack of underwear. Consultant Harriet is speaking with nurses 
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nearby when they observe Harold walking assisted across a section of the ward and defaecating in the 
process. 
Harriet: “If that’s baseline then I’m happy for him to go home. Would you [nurse] give a call to the 
[care] home and see if that’s baseline function?” [3d] 
Comparison with “baseline function” strikes me as an unusual way to respond to this event. It refers to what 
normal living is for this patient. If there is deterioration in Harold’s continence, then there may be a problem 
that the AMS staff need to address. In the absence of deviation, however, such behaviour is not deemed 
medically problematic. 
A fellow consultant, Dr Morrison, also emphasises the importance of comparing the patient’s current state 
to their baseline function. She stands reading through a new patient’s medical notes before attending them. 
In the hospital’s ‘clerking proforma’ (the paperwork on which a patient’s first full clinical assessment is 
recorded, typically in A&E) features a section entitled ‘social history’. Dr Morrison turns to me and her 
accompanying doctor in order to express her frustration with this clerking, and emphasise the importance 
of a thorough social history: 
She has noticed that the social history in the clerking often fails to document the patient’s “baseline”. 
This was important because, as Dr Morrison put it, “how do you get someone home if you don’t have 
a baseline?”  [4b] 
Like Harriet, Dr Morrison considers baseline function to be an essential reference point by which to evaluate 
a patient’s clinical need and readiness for discharge. A patient’s impairment in function is not seen as a 
problem, in terms of requiring in-patient medical care, if it is their baseline. As such, the recognition of a 
problem seems intimately related to the patient’s ability to lead their normal life. 
However, there are also times when a patient is recognised to have a problem in the absence of any obvious 
interruption in their ability to live a normal life. Audrey is a lady who has no family nearby and dislikes coming 
to hospital. She speaks with me at her bedside about how she ended up being admitted, starting with routine 
health-check blood tests: 
Yesterday morning, the nurse came, took another blood sample. And then last night, half past nine at 
night, I had a phone-call from the people who check the blood. Some hospital or whatever it is, and 
she said “are you on your own?” She said “it’s very serious.” [laughs] She said “can you get 
somebody?” I said “no!” [laughs]. So she said “you mustn’t be on your own”, she said. I said “look, if 
I feel ill I’ll call 999.” She said “well we’re going to speak to a kidney specialist, and we’ll come back 
to you.”  [Audrey, 12-17] 
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Audrey resisted coming to hospital, saying to the doctor who called later:  
“But I’m alright. I don’t feel ill or anything!”  [Audrey, 23] 
When she was told that, according to the blood tests, her kidneys were failing and that it was serious, Audrey 
was worried and conceded to come to hospital: 
 You panic, you know, which I did more or less. [Audrey, 65] 
Here, the recognition of a problem occurred without any impairment in Audrey’s ability to live a normal life. 
Purely as a result of measurement of blood tests, a problem was recognised by health professionals and, to 
some degree, by Audrey herself. Whilst this was not an impairment of her day-to-day behaviour, it was 
arguably still a case of deviation from her normal functioning: the baseline function of her kidneys. 
Deviation from normal kidney function is also the reason another patient, Maureen, is on the ward. Fergus 
emerges from Maureen’s cubicle having restarted many of her medications, which were suspended in light 
of her kidney failure. Fergus has reserved a nearby computer by leaving her paperwork beside the keyboard. 
He explains to me why he checks kidney function blood tests on the computer before seeing the patient: 
I was able to kind of piece together more of the story and actually go “actually, yes it is this result, 
which is bad in most people but actually it’s her normal”. There’s this obsession with numbers- I find 
numbers very interesting because especially with numbers we don’t think about normal. Everyone’s 
normal’s different. We should be working with whatever their normal is.  [Fergus, 76-81] 
The story that the blood results tell Fergus is what Maureen’s normal is; specifically, her kidney baseline 
function. This enables Fergus to evaluate to what extent Maureen’s current state is a deviation from normal 
and thereby problematic. 
Whether speaking of breathlessness, activity levels, mobility, continence, social dependence or kidney 
function, then, such things are evaluated within an AMS by reference to baseline function. A patient has a 
problem when their function has deviated from what is normal for them. 
6.2.2 Distress 
However, it is not quite so simple. There is another kind of problem that is evident within the AMS, such as 
in the following light-hearted interaction between Heidi and Charles. 
Heidi has been a patient in the AMS for 3 days now. She looks up eagerly at consultant Charles, who stands 
beside her cubicle bed. They have been speaking about the headache she has been experiencing and the 
results of the MRI scan. Previous doctors have mentioned the possible need for Heidi to have a lumbar 
puncture, which is a procedure that obtains a sample of cerebro-spinal fluid, for diagnostic purposes. Over 
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the past 3 days, Heidi has received mixed messages regarding how much longer she will need to be in 
hospital:  
I was still none the wiser… I was just being tossed between one and the other and the other.
 [Heidi, 22-26] 
As a result of a doctor mentioning a possible diagnosis of ‘meningitis’, Heidi has told her family not to visit, 
in case she infects them [Heidi, 85-86]. 
After a brief clinical examination of Heidi, Charles takes a step backwards, as if to indicate a change of tack 
from receiving information to now providing it. Charles explains that Heidi has not had infective meningitis. 
She continues to look up at him, waiting for something more. Charles adds that it is now perfectly safe for 
Heidi to re-join her family: “I think we can send you home” [8b]. 
The mention of home seemed to light up Heidi’s face: “Today?! Eeh, you’re my favourite – you’re a 
very good doctor, you know! What a lovely doctor!” she joked. Charles laughed as he turned to walk 
out. As we left the cubicle, he joked that perhaps the ward should direct Patient Experience (who take 
a survey of patients to assess how well the ward is doing) to speak with her. [8b] 
Heidi’s humorous response is filled with relief and delight. Charles’s joke, in return, shows that he recognises 
that being home-bound is a relief for Heidi. What is striking is that her relief was not so much prompted by 
Charles’ assurance that she does not have infective meningitis as by Charles’ assurance that she can re-join 
her family at home.  Heidi describes the pain of separation to me as follows: 
It just gets your heart because it’s like: I’ve got a granddaughter ‘cause me daughter’s had another 
baby so she’s got 2 now. But me granddaughter she’s 4 and she’s a nana’s girl. Everywhere I go she 
goes, you know? Well I’m Maui and she’s Moana [characters from a recent Disney production], 
because that’s what she calls me ‘cause it’s what we are. And she’s just rung me up this morning at 
t’ phone crying and saying “where are you, nana?” and “I need you, Maui” and it’s like [sighs] you 
know?  [Heidi, 78-83] 
Separation from her family, according to Heidi, “gets your heart”, and hearing how much her granddaughter 
misses her is a cause of distress. In her eyes, it is a problem. It is a problem that is not characterised by 
abnormal functional deviation but by relational dislocation. It is a problem that is relieved by the words “I 
think we can send you home”.  
Not all patients make it home, however. Deanne is sat in a dark room beside her partner, John, who remains 
in a coma from meningo-encephalitis. He occasionally rolls across the bed but does not respond to her 
presence. Deanne speaks to him but he does not respond. She tries to hold his hand but it does not grasp 
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her. Deanne looks into the lids of John’s eyes as she leans over the bed rails, intermittently stroking his head 
[9c]. 
After a brief introduction, consultant Nick sits down to speak with Deanne in the ward’s Quiet Room. Deanne 
sits awkwardly on a squeaky leather-bound sofa, leaning forward to hear what Nick has to say. There are 
three other empty seats in the room. After a summary of the course of events, Nick pauses before stating 
“it could go one of two ways” [9c]. Unable to reassure Deanne of the likelihood of recovery, she appreciates 
the frank conversation. As soon as Nick turns the corner to walk along the corridor, Deanne reaches for her 
mobile phone. 
Clearly upset by her partner’s illness, Deanne also describes another hurt at the moment: the empty seats. 
She calls John’s brother to give him an update and then turns to me with tear-glazed eyes: 
“The thing is, his family, right, they’re very nice, they are. They’re lovely. But if it were my brother, I’d 
be here! You know? That’s what matters now, ya know?” [9c] 
What matters is being together, being here, caring for John by being with John. The pain of her partner’s 
critical illness turns out to be a double-pain, multiplied by the absence of family. The problem of meningo-
encephalitis (an abnormal deviation) is coupled with the problem of relational distress. 
A patient’s relationships, and any relational distress, can be hard to see in a cubicle. This is significant within 
this AMS because the majority of patients are in their own cubicle. The large window of each room is 
positioned to the side of an armchair and the bed, with a blank wall opposite. As a result, a lot of time can 
be spent looking straight ahead, staring at a wall. 
Mr Whitehead was staring at the wall ahead as the palliative care nurse (Kylie) came to see him to speak 
about his “terminal metastatic disease and… difficult home set-up”  [6b]: 
Mr Whitehead was an elderly, frail-looking man who was extremely thin. He had long, wiry, white 
hair which was un-combed, which gave me the impression he did not care much what he looked like. 
Perhaps out of weakness, he was slumped to his right-hand side and seemed unable to hold his head 
up vertically. [6b] 
Kylie sat on a plastic chair close beside Mr Whitehead as he spoke about his circumstances at home. Since 
the death of his son, he has been living with his two teenage grandsons.  
After a long pause, he looked to the far wall and uttered “I think it was ‘cause his wife left him”. 
Hearing this news made me feel extremely heavy-hearted for this man, and his grandchildren, whose 
pain was far deeper than I realised initially.  [6b] 
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Mr Whitehead turned from the wall back to Kylie as the conversation continued: 
Kylie then clarified the frequency and timing of the visits from a carer that Mr Whitehead receives. He 
resumed eye contact with Kylie as he recalled this information. It seemed to me that, whilst this 
information was urgent to make a plan for Mr Whitehead’s discharge, it was not what was on his 
mind. [6b] 
The conversation between them alternated between logistical issues, such as the number of carer visits and 
how often the grandchildren are around, and psychological issues, such as the pain of losing his son and how 
Mr Whitehead feels about dying.  
Mr Whitehead maintained a concerned expression, with lowered eyebrows and a creased forehead, 
throughout the conversation… “I’ve been in 4 days. It’s like a lifetime.” [6b] 
Perhaps four days in the AMS feels like a lifetime because Mr Whitehead has been re-living a lifetime of 
memories as he stares at the wall. Perhaps four days is a lifetime because his awareness of dying is 
accompanied by contemplation of eternity. Perhaps it feels like a lifetime because of the pain of being so 
separated from home and his loved ones. It is not clear what Mr Whitehead means by this phrase. What is 
perhaps clearer is that his focus is alternating. Switching between the wall ahead and the palliative care 
nurse beside, Mr Whitehead is switching from considering the ‘there and then’ of life-related memories and 
the ‘here and now’ of dying-related tasks. 
Kylie had met Mr Whitehead before and seemed to have a very close rapport with him. She would listen for 
long stretches, allowing Mr Whitehead to pause and reflect as he looked ahead at the wall. She feels this 
gave her insight into what the biggest problem was: 
He was referred to me for some pain. control issues…. But when I went to see him, pain wasn’t his 
biggest problem, and then it was more about his social situation and his desire and want to be at 
home if he was dying.  [Kylie, 17-20] 
Kylie incorporated this conception of the problem into her role in looking after him: 
It felt like, based on the conversations that I’d had over the two days previous, that home was very 
important to him – to die at home… I felt that I should help to move things forward as quick as 
possible. [Kylie, 30-32] 




Three times a day care from a care agency, with two visits from a district nursing service, a telephone 
contact to rapid response from palliative care, and someone there all night every night. 
 [Kylie, 107-109] 
Thus whilst physical pain was associated with Mr Whitehead’s illness, what seemed to be the biggest 
problem was in fact existential.  
This problem was explored in two modes. In the first mode, Mr Whitehead would share his story whilst 
staring ahead at the wall, reflecting the ‘there and then’: “I think it was because his wife left him”. In the 
second mode, Mr Whitehead would make a plan whilst looking across to Kylie, reflecting the ‘here and now’: 
“his desire… to be at home”. Overall, his lifetime-in-four-days is translated from stories and desires into a 
list of tasks to be completed in order for Mr Whitehead’s existential concerns – the problem of distress - to 
be met. 
The problems that Heidi, Deanne and Mr Whitehead encounter are not of the same sort as a deviation in 
kidney function. Their experience also exhibits a relational, emotional, existential dimension. That is, they 
experience a problem of not being with loved ones and not being home, with its accompanying distress. 
6.2.3 Disruption 
Besides deviation and distress, Kylie alludes to a third kind of problem which she was conscious of in her 
dealings with Mr Whitehead: 
Sometimes it’s easier to move it forward before you start getting the bed pressures, which you do get 
from acute medicine unfortunately, which is “what are we doing? Do we need to be here in 
Middleton?”  [Kylie, 44-45] 
Kylie started preparing the practicalities of Mr Whitehead’s discharge early and swiftly, in anticipation of the 
mounting pressure to reclaim the ward bed. She hints that it would be problematic to do otherwise; this 
approach is “easier” in some way.  
Consultant Tony helps to shed light on this third kind of problem. As mentioned earlier, the pressure to 
discharge a patient is a major element in the ‘insanity’ feel of the AMS. There are times when this experience 
of pressure is more pronounced: 
[Wednesday] was one of the worst days in terms of patient flow through the emergency department 
that this Trust has ever had. And I know that - it felt like that at the time. But I know that subsequently 
having talked to people yesterday about how severely strained the system was on Wednesday. 
 [Tony, 112-115] 
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Tony was conscious of this system strain which contextualised the assessment of a new patient (Stuart) 
coming through the doors: 
And in the middle of that this patient arrived who is a cancer patient, on chemotherapy, who has a 
temperature.  [Tony, 116-118] 
Tony explains how the strain of the system affects the assessment of a patient: 
I think there’s a palpable sense sometimes, which there was on Wednesday, a palpable sense of ‘this 
place is really under strain’, and ‘if we don’t need to admit this man to a bed overnight then that 
would be a good thing for everybody’. [Tony, 136-139] 
Immediately after assessing Stuart, Tony returned to the whiteboard to update it with plans. He spoke with 
me as he wrote: 
“A&E is full, and it’s full of frail elderly, which puts a lot of pressure on us, as you can imagine, because 
a lot of them will need to come in. And that has an impact on decision-making. Just now I sent a cancer 
patient home. He was febrile, but not neutropenic. To be honest, if there were beds I probably would 
have kept him in and kept an eye. But as it is, I had to send him home”. [6d] 
Thus the pressure that is felt when the system is “under strain” is pressure with a direction: out the doors.  
Sophie is a trainee doctor who is working alongside Tony that same day. I greeted her near the central work 
station as she walked past energetically in order to prepare the medical notes for Tony’s next patient. She 
sighed and smiled with resignation, saying: 
 “The hospital’s in crisis. No beds!”  [6d] 
A lack of available beds causes disruption across the hospital as an organisation. Here is consultant Dr Taylor 
speaking of a man who was in the AMS with brain injury after taking an insulin overdose: 
He was very complicated socially and I kept him at Middleton purely because I think if he goes to a 
base site [general hospital within the Trust] he will just get stuck forever. [Dr Taylor, 529-530] 
“Getting stuck forever” is not only a problem for the patient; it is a problem for the hospital trust. A lack of 
beds is a “crisis” (Sophie) because it impedes “flow through the emergency department” and puts the system 
“under strain” (Tony). Specifically, it impacts decision-making in such a way as to raise the bar required to 
justify admission. This results in mounting pressure on Kylie to discharge Mr Whitehead on whatever social 
care plan is available soonest, and pressure on Tony to deny admission to a cancer patient because it might 
be “a good thing for everybody”. In order to prevent the problem of a hospital in a bed crisis, staff strive to 
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maintain the flow of patients back out the doors. In addition to the problems of deviation and distress, there 
is thus a third kind of problem: organisational disruption. 
6.3 What is the point? 
6.3.1 Problems and pathways 
It’s eight o’clock in the morning and two trainee doctors, Faisal and Laura, are gathered at computers around 
the central work station, discussing whether a patient called Tina needs any more treatment. They have a 
rushed demeanour, as if eager to discover this before the morning handover with the consultant. Tina is in 
the AMS because she took an overdose of paracetamol and was admitted overnight. While Faisal looks up 
Tina’s liver tests, Laura looks up some guidance online. 
Having eventually found the King’s College Transplant Score online, Laura seems amused and 
frustrated that the score leaves it indeterminate whether Tina would be eligible for transplant 
because she has not had a phosphate blood test done. [8b] 
Faisal and Laura are joined by a more senior trainee doctor, Jackie. Jackie is specialising in Acute Medicine 
and arrives looking serious, clutching a flask of coffee. 
Jackie opens the ‘Toxbase guidelines’ on a computer. As she does so, she surmises that Tina probably 
needs another 16-hour bag of intravenous treatment. Toxbase guidelines appear to be an algorithm 
which guides what treatment to give, and when a patient who has overdosed is safe for discharge. 
Reading through the text, Jackie declares loudly: “ALT [a liver test] still high but INR [a clotting test] 
1.1, so she’s not for more NAC [an intravenous treatment]; medically fit for discharge!” [8b]  
In order to progress from blood results to this conclusion, the doctors were in search of a pathway, which 
Jackie was first to find. 
As she said this, she sat back in the office chair and crossed her arms, in a confident and satisfied 
manner. To me this moment was quite striking; it was as if a significant milestone had been reached 
by arriving at the conclusion ‘medically fit for discharge’. The loud declaration and accompanying 
satisfied posture change was reminiscent of somebody playing ‘bingo’, whose numbers had come up. 
“So she’s not for more NAC?”, checks Laura. “Nope, she’s medically fit, medically fit for discharge!”, 
repeats Jackie. [8b] 
This episode of algorithm bingo was reminiscent of a quick-fire game in which the winner is the first one to 
say the slogan “medically fit for discharge.” 
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Laura turns to me and remarks how many pathways there are. “There’s one for everything!”
 [8b]  
Just adjacent to Laura as she speaks, there is a cabinet of approximately 30 drawers, in which staff can find 
printouts of pathways in the form of algorithms, “bundles”, protocols and proformas. Each relates to a 
particular situation, such as ‘Acute Kidney Injury’ or the completion of a clinical procedure [8b]. In addition, 
there are clinical guidelines on the hospital intranet, such as for management of Giant Cell Arteritis headache 
[3d], and many more available on the worldwide web. 
Laura remarks that there are more pathways in this hospital than she has ever seen in previous 
hospitals. “In a way it makes it easy but I don’t know how good it is in the long run. What do we do 
when the computer breaks?” She shrugs her shoulders as if to suggest that doctors may be stumped 
without computer access to pathway guidance. [8b] 
At first glance, there seemed to be an enthusiastic uptake of pathways by these three trainee doctors, all of 
whom were participating in the algorithmic rush to declare Tina “medically fit for discharge”. The problem 
was protocolised; in the absence of significant physiological deviation (on blood tests), Tina is to be 
discharged. However, the enthusiasm for pathways is a qualified one. Laura expresses concerns that the 
plethora of computer-based pathways, which is particularly pronounced here in Middleton hospital, may not 
be good “in the long run”. Such mixed feelings about pathways is shared by Laura’s consultant colleague, Dr 
Taylor. 
6.3.2 Pathways and cul-de-sacs 
Consultant Dr Taylor describes when knowing what to do for a patient is obvious: 
I think things are obvious when they fit that guideline or protocol, aren’t they? So that SHO-level 
[senior house officer, a rank of trainee doctor such as Laura] of: take history, you have a diagnosis, 
there is a test to confirm it, there is a treatment that I know, it’s the right treatment, and there is a 
known, understood way of following you up or discharging you. And that’s easy, isn’t it?      [Dr 
Taylor, 558-561] 
She contrasts “easy, pathway-driven things” [Dr Taylor, 566-567] with situations in which knowing what to 
do is more complicated: 
And I think increasingly, what comes into hospital is not single organ, single disease, single diagnosis 
driven. I think it’s multifactorial and complex. In terms of its medical disease origin but also in terms 
of its social context… It’s “Mmmm, you’ve got a bit of COPD [chronic obstructive pulmonary disease] 
and a bit of heart failure, and you’re struggling on the stairs and you daughter’s really worried about 
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your breathlessness, and she’s going away to Australia for a month”… There’s no pathway that says 
“this is how you fix this”.  [Dr Taylor, 567-579] 
On Dr Taylor’s ward round, she prepares to meet the next patient, Albert Jenkins,  by reading through 
medical notes in a red folder and looking up previous clinical notes on the computer system. Albert Jenkins 
is a man in his 70s with frequent journeys through this AMS with the same problem: more breathless than 
normal. Dr Taylor noted the same course of events each time: oxygen, CTPA [computed tomography 
pulmonary angiogram] scan, discharged. Dr Taylor crouched down at the bedside to hear his story. 
Mr Jenkins narrated the run of events prior to his admission. He started by describing his routine every 
Tuesday afternoon, when he visits his wife’s grave site “without fail”. On this occasion, he began to 
feel breathless and thought “something was up”. [6c] 
On this occasion, Dr Taylor explained that oxygen and a CTPA scan were not required, to Mr Jenkins’ relief. 
Reflecting with me as she walked away, Dr Taylor said: 
“I sometimes think we’ve got to break this cycle that patients have in their heads: ‘I go to hospital, I 
get a CTPA, I feel better, I go home’. And similarly with us as doctors, we work by algorithm in acute 
medicine. We just tend to think: ‘it’s a PE, we fix it, then they go home’”. [6c] 
She describes the trigger for needing to change tack: 
She pointed out that it’s when she stepped back and saw in the correspondence that Mr Jenkins keeps 
coming in and having this cycle reinforced, that she realised the medical team need to think differently 
about his care. “We’re so busy excluding a PE [pulmonary embolus], but after all a PE might not be a 
bad thing for him. You’ve got to die of something”. [6c] 
Dr Taylor thus portrays the mindset of both the patient and the doctor as pathway-like. However, in view of 
the broader picture of Mr Jenkins’ life (and mortality), she recognised that such scanning and PE-excluding 
might be a pointless way to go. Sometimes, these pathways become a pointless cycle which needs to be 
broken because what is being pursued, such as the exclusion of a PE, is futile: “you’ve got to die of 
something” [6c]. 
Dr Taylor’s colleague, Harriet, is having a conversation with some family members in the ward sister’s office 
which also involved a change of direction. 
Gloria is an elderly, frail lady with dementia whose son (Bill) and his wife (Jenny) have been asked to come 
in “for a chat” with Harriet, the consultant. Once they are each seated, Harriet describes the “difficult 
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situation” [3d]: Gloria needs blood-thinning medication to prevent further clots, but also needs to avoid 
blood-thinning medication to prevent harm from falls. Jenny appears too tearful for words, but Bill responds: 
“Can I be blunt with you? I do – that’s what I’m like, I like to just say things, don’t I? [glancing across 
to Jenny]. Me mam’s got no quality of life. If it was our dog, I would have no hesitation in putting it 
down, and that’s what I’d do. I don’t mean to be heartless, because I’m not – I’m like this when I’m 
with her but when I leave I cry me eyes out – I think you should do nothing. [3d] 
At this, Jenny looks to the floor as tears start to roll down her cheeks and Bill rests a hand on her to comfort 
her. Harriet explores the specifics of this suggestion: 
Harriet: …as I say, I’ll do what causes her least distress and illness. It might be that the best thing for 
her is a blood clot 
Bill: …or a massive heart attack 
Harriet: Hearing what you’re saying, it sounds like we should… 
Bill: …let nature take its course 
Harriet: …exactly; you could put it like that. 
Bill: Thank you for speaking with us. We feel a lot better [wife nodding]. 
Harriet: Nee bother.  [3d] 
The daughter-in-law remains tearful as the couple leave the room and hug each other, distressed at coming 
to terms with the dying phase of Gloria’s life.  
Following Bill’s statement “if it was our dog…”, there seemed to be consensus between him and Harriet that 
blood-thinning medication for Gloria would be futile: she’s “got no quality of life”. This encounter could also 
be described as veering off a pointless pathway. The standard pathway for treating a blood clot would be 
with blood-thinning medication. However, in this case the prevention of a blood clot is considered pointless 
or futile (in view of Gloria’s perceived poor quality of life). 
However, there are times when such agreement on where to draw the line and break from a pathway is not 
forthcoming. These decisions can feel more complicated. As consultant Tony says: 
An example of a more complex decision would be, for example, a patient with what is perceived to be 
end-stage organ failure, such as end-stage heart failure, in a discussion regarding resuscitation for 
the patient who has capacity and in clear consciousness asks us to do everything that we can do, 
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including making sure we do CPR [cardio-pulmonary resuscitation] and put them on a life-support 
machine if it comes to that.  [Tony, 324-328] 
Tony expands on what makes this situation difficult: 
Because we would be potentially be subjecting that patient to treatment, to CPR, ventilation, 
whatever it comes to, that a reasonable body of medical opinion would say is inappropriate, 
unnecessarily aggressive and futile. [Tony, 329-331] 
I ask for clarification on what futile means in this context, which Tony illustrates:  
If there isn’t a plan for the next stage… if it’s a cul-de-sac you’re going to, basically, with this. If the 
heart rhythm comes back to normal and the heart starts pumping again, but the patient is likely to 
have a similar problem arise imminently again, then you kind of need a way out. And if the road is 
blocked because we’re not able to offer that patient inotropes or organ support, then what is the 
value in putting that patient and their family through another episode of that if it’s predictably gonna 
end in a similar or even worse condition for the patient to be in at the end of that? 
 [Tony, 355-361] 
Thus if a treatment is not offering a way out, it ceases to be a pathway and becomes a “cul-de-sac”. Rather 
than simply continuing down a blocked road, Tony suggests a change of direction.  
Laura’s mixed feelings about pathways have been supported by Dr Taylor, Harriet, Tony and Gloria’s family. 
Whilst able to guide Jackie to a declaration of “medically fit for discharge”, pathways have been less 
satisfactory at other times. Sometimes the situation is complicated and multifactorial and there is no 
pathway that can say “this is how you fix this” (Dr Taylor). Sometimes the pathway46 assumes that lethal 
conditions should be prevented as much as possible but in reality “you’ve got to die of something” (Dr 
Taylor). Sometimes the pathway assumes that life should be extended wherever possible whereas in reality 
a patient’s life may not be considered worth extending if they’ve “got no quality of life” (Bill). In such 
instances, when following a pathway is seen as futile, the pathway is deemed to be a “cul-de-sac”; the “road 
is blocked” and “you need a way out” (Tony), prompting a change of approach. 
6.3.3 Cul-de-sacs and futility 
However, futility is not simply one thing. In what follows, I try to show that futility comes in three forms 
within this AMS. Futility is, in fact, a set of three futilities. 
 
46 By ‘pathway’ here I mean to include the pathway-mindset that Dr Taylor attributes to doctors and patients. 
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One person’s futile is not the same as another’s; one person’s pathway may be another person’s cul-de-sac. 
This is illustrated by Tony, in his description of a patient “who asks us to do everything” despite the fact that 
such treatment, in the eyes of medical professionals, would be “inappropriate, unnecessarily aggressive and 
futile” [Tony, 331]. Unanimity at times can be hard to come by, resulting in three kinds of situation. In some 
situations, a pathway can be followed until the patient be declared “medically fit for discharge” (Jackie). In 
other situations, a pathway can be rejected because the clinical scenario is too complicated or because the 
pathway is deemed a cul-de-sac. In yet other situations, however, the clinical scenario may prompt both the 
following and the rejection of a treatment pathway; what is futile to one party may not be futile in the eyes 
of another.  
This chapter began by considering what a patient is and what a problem is, within this AMS. This laid some 
of the groundwork for considering what the point is of work within this AMS: to restore order by addressing 
problems. This is enacted by sometimes following pathways and sometimes changing direction when 
following the pathway is deemed futile. In what follows, I explore the notion of futility a little further, 
connecting it explicitly with the three kinds of problem described above (deviation, distress and disruption). 
6.3.3.1 Distress futility 
First, I turn attention back to the conversation between Harriet and Gloria’s family: Bill and Jenny. A turning 
point in the discussion (“if it was our dog…”) was recognising the futility of life-extending treatment. This 
futility was not because of any indication that the treatment would be ineffective in re-establishing baseline 
function and extending life. Rather, this treatment was considered futile because Gloria’s experience of life 
would not be helped: “she’s got no quality of life” (Bill). Whilst possibly addressing deviation, in physiological 
terms, giving life-extending medication would fail to alleviate Gloria’s distress, in existential terms. 
Let us consider a nurse’s perspective on this kind of scenario. Nurse Ryan was speaking with me about when 
withdrawing treatment might actually be good for someone: 
They’ve got cancer and they’re in so much pain. And they are, like, the best thing possibly is for them 
to die because, if that’s what they want. And there’s no way they’re gonna come back from it. There’s 
no way they’re gonna improve. There’s no way they’re gonna get better. You know, if they’re in that 
much pain then sometimes it is in best interests, yeah.  [Ryan, 127-132] 
“If they’re in that much pain”, then extending life may be futile; even if successful at stabilising functional 
deviation, such action would fail to address the problem of distress.  
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Whilst Ryan described dying as possibly “the best thing” for a hypothetical cancer patient, he takes a 
different approach with regard to a young, suicidal patient called Emily47. Ryan had found Emily in the 
hospital canteen. She had left the ward without permission and was escorted back under the assistance of 
security personnel. Emily is a teenage girl who has tried repeatedly to end her life and, when admitted, the 
AMU is her usual ward. In contrast to letting the hypothetical cancer patient die, Ryan is not so approving of 
letting Emily die. He speaks of what might happen if staff did not intervene: 
…then she would end up, yeah, probably dying. It’s not what you want, especially for just a young girl 
as well. [Ryan, 124-125] 
Looking after Emily is a team effort; all ward staff seem to be aware of her and the need to keep an eye out 
for her likely attempt to leave the ward. For example, Sharon is a healthcare assistant who knows Emily well 
from previous admissions, and has spent hours with her to “make sure she’s not self-harming and that kind 
of thing” [Sharon, 20]. Sharon is likely a similar age to Emily’s mother. She describes how Emily used to live 
a different life before a traumatic relationship breakdown: 
Before that she was normal. Going to work, going out with her friends, driving her car. [Sharon, 
79-80] 
Sharon describes the reason for wanting to intervene to treat Emily: 
Well just to protect her really, isn’t it? She is a young girl. I think that if she got the support that she 
needs… maybe she could turn her life back around. [Sharon, 97-99] 
Emily is a “young girl” with the potential to “turn life back around” and enjoy it again, so treatment is not 
futile; it is to protect her. The treatment pathway is not seen as a blocked road. Treating Emily, even if against 
her wishes, has the potential to improve Emily’s deviation (from the normal life she used to lead) and possibly 
her distress (so that she could turn her life around and enjoy socialising with others again). 
In contrast, the patient with cancer is in pain and “there’s no way they’re gonna improve” (Ryan). “The best 
thing probably is for them to die” (Ryan). Their road map is different. Their life-extending treatment, like 
Gloria’s , is futile because they’ve “got no quality of life” (Bill). Thus one kind of futility is an irredeemably 
poor quality of life, when the problem of distress is not going to improve. 
6.3.3.2 Deviation futility 
I return to the case of Albert Jenkins, (who visits his wife’s grave without fail). Dr Taylor reflects with me 
afterwards: 
 
47 Emily’s stay in hospital will be explored in more detail in Chapter 8 What’s best. 
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My aim for [Mr Jenkins] would be to start to explain to him and the team treating him that this needs 
a much more holistic, realistic approach and that should be led by him. And that he should be at the 
centre of it, and not just do what doctors tell him is the ‘right’ thing. [Dr Taylor, 159-161] 
Dr Taylor had crouched low down at Mr Jenkins’ bedside, submissively sitting on her heels, as she listened 
to him tell his story  [6c]. In contrast, she shares her approach to deciding about to cardio-pulmonary 
resuscitation (CPR): 
It sounds awful but I’m not sure I go to seek agreement, I go to seek understanding. You know, it’s the 
clinician’s, it’s a consultant’s choice. I can’t put people on critical care if it’s the wrong thing to do… 
It’s a treatment that we’re offering and it’s not right to offer a treatment if it’s not the right thing to 
do to somebody… I think responsibly, ethically, morally, that’s the right thing. So I don’t go to say 
“let’s all sit down and agree this together”. I go to say “this is what’s happening and this is why, and 
let’s understand the why”.  [Dr Taylor, 345-352] 
Whilst adopting a submissive posture whilst listening to Mr Jenkins tell his story, Dr Taylor adopts a more 
assertive posture towards making CPR decisions: “it’s a consultant’s choice”. She expands on this with an 
illustration: 
If you are a frail, older person with a downward trajectory of your functional status with lots of co-
morbidities, who are deteriorating in hospital with a rising NEWS score [a measure of systemic 
physiological instability] because of your pneumonia, your COPD [chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease], your heart attack, pulmonary oedema, whatever it is, then we know that resuscitation is not 
going to be a successful exercise, that it’s futile and that most of those people are going to die of 
physiological problems. And the rest we may withdraw because of brain damage. And the few that 
survive the brief intubation are not gonna make it out of that acute hospital stay.  [Dr Taylor, 
389-395] 
Dr Taylor unpacks what futile means with regard to CPR by asking herself two questions: 
It’s a treatment where you say “what am I trying to achieve here? Am I just prolonging death?” [Dr 
Taylor, 414-415] 
As Dr Taylor describes, a treatment can be deemed futile even it is wanted by the patient, on the grounds 
that it will not restore biological function. The problem of baseline deviation cannot be fixed; the therapeutic 
road is blocked and thus the CPR pathway is deemed a cul-de-sac. Rather than existential distress, here the 
futility is of a second kind: CPR would fail to improve functional deviation. 
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6.3.3.3 Disruption futility 
To identify a third kind of futility, I return now to the situation in which consultant Tony is assessing whether 
a patient with cancer (Stuart) needs to stay in hospital at a time when “this place is really under strain” [Tony, 
137-138] for lack of beds. Tony describes his approach like this: 
My decision-making was to decide whether or not to offer the patient the opportunity of going home, 
essentially. And then I left that decision to him. [Tony, 129-130] 
The process of deciding whether to offer the opportunity of going home involved clinical data: 
I knew that he wasn’t neutropenic. I also knew he felt well in himself. And that his physiological early 
warning score, (so there’s national early warning score calculated on his blood pressure, heart rate, 
temperature et cetera) was not ringing any alarm bells. It was near normal. [Tony, 124-127] 
In addition, this decision-making process involved consideration of other, non-clinical factors: 
[Stuart] was very happy to be at home... And he happened to live around the corner from Northside 
Hospital, and his mum happened to live next-door to him, and he had good social support. So he’s a 
great example of someone who’s in the right place if things go wrong. So if he became unwell 
overnight, you know, he’s right next to where he needs to be. And he can ring for help. And he’s a 
sensible chap who’s got capacity and coherent and stuff. [Tony, 143-149] 
Putting the clinical and other factors together, a decision was reached with the patient in the driving seat: 
And he made that decision, I suppose with me and his mum, about going home. [Tony, 149-150] 
During interview, I asked Tony to describe how he would have responded if Stuart had desired, even insisted, 
to be in hospital. 
On Wednesday, the way things were, I think I would have gently challenged him about that.
 [Tony, 156-157] 
This challenging involved ascertaining the reason for wanting to stay in hospital: 
If the reasons for him wanting to stay in hospital were perhaps less objective and more along the lines 
of “well, to be honest, erm I’ve got a relative staying with me who I really dislike and I need to be out 
the house tonight” or something less kind of clinically relevant, I suppose. Then I would be tempted to 
say “I’m afraid that is not, you know, it’s not a reasonable use of the NHS. For us to keep you in a bed 
overnight and be your hotel overnight”. Because [pause] the infrastructure of this place is a hugely 
complex business, and is a hugely costly business. [Tony, 164-171] 
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Tony expands on this in terms of resource allocation: 
If he doesn’t like his aunty and they fall out, well, that’s not really society’s problem. And we don’t 
really need to be ploughing the very finite and stretched resources of the healthcare system into that 
personal issue that he has.  [Tony, 194-196] 
To Tony, keeping Stuart in hospital is not an acceptable pathway because it would cause disruption to the 
healthcare organisation. Sensing the futility of this, Tony describes a psychological gear shift from ‘leaving 
the decision to Stuart’ to “gently challenging him”. 
Dr Taylor also encountered a patient who was reluctant to go home during her ward round: 
Dr Taylor crouched beside the next patient, Brandon, who was a man with grey hair, sat on his bed in 
his own clothes with his arms crossed. They spoke about his reason for admission, and how much 
better he feels now. Dr Taylor mentioned that, following pneumonia, it takes many weeks to recover 
strength, emphasising the need for rest. At this moment he became tearful and said he’s been having 
a lot of “trouble with the neighbours”. He described it as escalating recently, and now the “police are 
involved”.  [6c]  
Brandon raised this issue with a troubled, downcast expression once the plan for discharge was mentioned. 
As it happened, he did not put up resistance to going home other than describing this reluctance to be near 
to his neighbours. I explored this further with Dr Taylor, supposing Brandon had insisted on staying in 
hospital: 
“Before, I would have just sent him home. But now I wouldn’t. He’d only re-present to A&E, which 
creates a load more work. So I tend to just let them stay another night.” [6c] 
Where Tony would have challenged Stuart to persuade him to go home, Dr Taylor describes conceding. Both, 
however, share a similar motivation: to avoid overloading the hospital. Dr Taylor describes how it feels to 
negotiate this: 
I think this is really hard, isn’t it?... And I think it’s a real balance between how much you force 
somebody out and say “no, you are going.”  [Dr Taylor, 480-486] 
Dr Taylor gives a pragmatic justification for prolonging admission: 
I suspect you’d have bed manager and management of the Trust saying “he just has to go”. But I 
suppose the counter-argument to that is “well if he comes back later, he gets another X-ray, another 
set of bloods, another A&E clerk, another 8-hour trolley wait, then he comes in, another post-take 
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ward round. And actually, if we keep him at Middleton Hospital, he’ll go home tomorrow. [Dr 
Taylor, 511-515] 
To Tony, keeping a patient in to be their “hotel overnight” is futile because it is expending finite resources 
on something which is not “society’s problem”, so a change of approach48 to “challenging” is seen as 
appropriate. To Dr Taylor, forcing someone to go home is futile because it “creates a load more work”, so a 
change of approach to conceding is appropriate. To both, the indication that the pathway is in fact a cul-de-
sac is futility of a third kind: the futility of a course of action which does not ease the workload of the hospital; 
it fails to address the problem of organisational disruption. 
6.4 Conclusion: goals and futility 
In this chapter, I presented my ethnographic and interview findings in relation to the theme of restoring 
order. This theme has featured three variations: the patient, the problem and the point. Each of the three 
variations has not been as simple as it first seemed. 
An AMS is a place where patients are admitted, 30-at-a-time. However, the category of ‘patient’ is not 
simple. A patient can be construed in a variety of ways. For instance, a patient can be construed experientially 
as someone on a journey from doors to doors. A patient can be construed organisationally as a named row 
on the whiteboard which is a few tasks away from discharge. A patient can be construed professionally as a 
series of component parts with which different uniformed people are concerned. These different construals 
also reflect the environment of an AMS, which is characterised by pressure and pace. 
An AMS is a workplace where problems are addressed and these problems are acute medical problems. 
Addressing these problems could be described as restoring order. However, like ‘patient’, ‘problem’ is not a 
simple category. I encountered and presented three kinds of problem. The single aim of restoring order can 
thus be described as a set of three goals: to address the problems of deviation, distress and disruption. 
The point of an AMS, to restore order, is achieved by a range of courses of action. Sometimes these courses 
of action take the form of following a pathway; at other times a pathway is seen as a cul-de-sac because the 
course of action it endorses is futile. However, the category of ‘futility’ is complex. A course of action is 
deemed futile insofar as it fails to address a problem (and thereby fails to restore order). Given there are 
three kinds of problem to be addressed within the AMS, there are thus three kinds of futility: deviation 
futility, distress futility and disruption futility. 
In a sense, then, my first impressions of Middleton Hospital were an adumbration of what I would encounter 
within the world of the AMS. The hospital was a place where there are clear, simple categories: staff and 
 
48 This change of approach is similar to what I describe as a psychological gear change in Chapter 8. 
145 
 
public, healthy and sick. However, the relation between these categories was complex, even paradoxical: 
people are smoking outside yet the hospital is purportedly smoke-free. This relation of simple and complex 
would prove a persistent feature of my time in the field. This will also become evident in the next chapter, 






Chapter 7. Working Together 
In the previous chapter, I described the aim of the work of an AMS as to restore order. Order is restored by 
addressing three kinds of problem: deviation, distress and disruption. A course of action is deemed futile 
when it fails to address one of these problems. In Chapter 8, I will present an account of how people within 
an AMS figure out what course of action is best and the values that are involved in this process.  
In this chapter, I focus on the relationships between people within an AMS as they work together to alleviate 
needs49. I present this in four steps. Firstly, I illustrate the contrasting kinds of interaction within the AMS. 
Secondly, I describe different ways in which people interact in harmony within the AMS. Thirdly, I describe 
the opposite: different ways in which people interact in cacophony within the AMS. The fourth and final step 
is a metaphorical one. I portray the way people interact within the AMS as a peculiar kind of dance. 
7.1 Culture of contrasts 
7.1.1 Morning huddle 
“Huddle!” shouts Emma, the nurse in charge for today, projecting her voice through the doorway. “Huddle!”, 
she repeats into the next doorway. She has a stern, frowning expression, and is walking briskly with a sense 
of urgency about her, before coming to a standstill near the central work station. Her standstill is not a case 
of standing still, however. She agitatedly stands on the spot, changing weight between feet, looking around 
and glancing up at the wall clock intermittently, which is positioned prominently at the centre of the central 
wall beside the central work station. Emma stands opposite the clock and seems to become more anxious 
with each look at it [1a, 4d]. 
The team emerges out of various sections of the ward to form a circle. Apart from the nervous gap either 
side of Emma, staff stand side by side and evenly spaced. The heavy, sound-proof double doors to the patient 
areas are closed so that the announcements can begin. This is staff time now.  
“We’re understaffed today; can we please be strict on visiting hours. I don’t want anyone staying over 
visiting hours today.”  [4d] 
After a couple of notices, staff introduce themselves to the rest of the staff in the huddle circle, proceeding 
clockwise. There is a uniform structure to it: state your name, role and shift duration. This is usually done 
without verbs in shorthand: “Mark, staff nurse, long day” [1a]. 
The huddle circle is large, featuring 16 people, and for some it is the only time in their shift that they will be 
standing upright and still. The strict formality of this interaction, the uniformity of staff members in the circle 
 
49 I describe the relation between needs and problems in the next chapter (see: Chapter 8 Problems and needs). 
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and the exclusion of patients give a sense of togetherness. As such, ‘huddle’, with its connotations of a sports 
manager gathering, organising and uniting his or her team, seems a fitting term. 
7.1.2 Afternoon visiting 
After lunch, senior nurse Victoria is standing at the notes trolley. Like Emma during the huddle, she also 
stands agitatedly, shifting weight between her feet.  
Victoria was tall and stocky, and had trainers for footwear… She stood centrally along the side of the 
trolley where notes would be drawn out, with her back to the central work station. This way, she could 
look along the main corridor to the ward entrance as well as easily look sideways into a patient’s 
cubicle, all of which were visible from her standpoint.  [6b] 
Where Emma had had her back to the main entrance in order to face the main work station, Victoria has her 
back to the main work station in order to face the main entrance. Where Emma was agitatedly waiting to 
speak to staff, Victoria is agitatedly waiting to be spoken to by relatives: 
I’m checking through the plans from the doctors and making sure all me notes are here”, tapping on 
a red folder of patient notes which was resting under her left hand on the trolley as if she was guarding 
it in some way. “It’s almost visiting time, see, and that’s when all the relatives will be askin’.” [6b] 
Visiting hours officially start in ten minutes’ time, at 2:30pm. In the meantime, straight ahead of Victoria can 
be seen the visitors to the ward, who are also standing still, preparing for action: 
Outside the ward entrance doors could be seen a small crowd of visitors, who lined up along the wall, 
either side of the doors. At 2:30pm, a member of staff left the ward. Before the door closed, one visitor 
held the door and entered, and then the rest quickly followed. The visitors walked one- or two-at-a-
time down the corridor. [6b] 
The main entrance double doors have a glass inset, through which the visitors can be seen gathering and 
intermittently peering through. As the clock strikes 2:30pm, their quiet standstill becomes a linear march; 
exclusion converts to inclusion, inaction converts to action: 
Having previously found this unremarkable when I worked as a clinician, I now found this slightly 
amusing: such obedience to the ‘visiting hours’ rule, such an orderly march down the corridor, 
prompted by the clock striking such a precise time; this reminded me of a military march, which felt 
like an absurd comparison, given that we are talking about family members who are coming to 




Now it is the nursing staff and ward clerk who become quiet and motionless. The visitors walk onto the ward 
briskly, hands still wet from the alcohol handwash dispensed at the entrance. Visitors are friends and 
relatives of patients, wearing their own clothes, talking informally and without introducing themselves first. 
Victoria stands with her hand still resting on the pile of red files of medical notes, as if expecting a question 
from any visitor about any patient at any moment [6b]. 
The opening of the “floodgates” strikes me as a stark contrast to the calling of the huddle. Where the huddle 
separated patients and staff in different places (and visitors in no place), visiting time brings patients, staff 
and visitors together in the same place. Where the huddle was formalised by hierarchy, ritual and codified 
language, visiting time is relatively unstructured, unpredictable and conversational. 
In the AMS, there is a time for huddling and a time for visiting. Whilst both these moments bring people 
together, the manner in which they do so are remarkably different. As such, the culture of the AMS is one 
which involves contrasting forms of interaction. I will explore some of these varieties within two categories: 
harmony and cacophony.  
7.2 Harmony 
I categorise an interaction as harmonious if the relationship does not overtly frustrate the needs of an 
involved party. This loose definition  will become clearer after a consideration of a range of different 
harmonious interactions within the AMS. 
7.2.1 Relying 
Fergus the pharmacist steps out of a patient’s cubicle clutching a file to his chest, followed by a trainee 
pharmacist. As they search for an available computer to use, Fergus greets me and says they have “just done 
a medication review with bed 3” which was complicated because “she’s an ITU step-down, renal patient”, 
he says with a smile. 
In cubicle 3 is woman in her 70s called Maureen, who is seated on her armchair beside the window, where 
she had been sat whilst the pharmacist was with her. The room feels quiet because her bedside TV is off, 
probably turned off during her conversation with Fergus. She also describes her medication issues as 
complicated because of her kidney problems (including a kidney transplant). I ask her how the medication 
changes happened: 
Basically “we’re not giving you this, we’re not giving you this, we’re not giving you this, and you will 
take that.” And I just do it. Because they’ve been in touch with the Lighthouse [regional specialist 
hospital] so I know that the renal team are the ones that are sorta like leading the way. So and I mean 
149 
 
they’re the ones I rely on to keep me fit and well. So I was quite happy to go along with things.
 [Maureen, 88-91] 
During our conversation, she spoke fondly of the renal medicine team at Lighthouse. She continued: 
I trust the Lighthouse and I trust that- I mean, they are the specialists in the kidney unit. So, if I can’t 
trust them to tell me the right drugs to take, is there any point in me going to the doctor’s at all? 
You’ve gotta put your faith in someone. [Maureen, 116-118] 
Maureen’s trust in the Lighthouse is related to knowledge: 
Well I can’t tell how my rejection tablets are doing. And the Lighthouse only know because I get the 
blood tests. And they can tell from that what they need to up and down. [Maureen, 127-128] 
Maureen is content to do as she is told by Fergus and others here in the AMS because she knows they are 
being led by the renal team at Lighthouse, whom she trusts because they have the expertise to know what 
she needs. Her trust in expertise yields reliance on medical advice. 
Brian is another patient who spoke to me about trust, and is also sat in his armchair beside the window. 
Compared to the drilling, moving and hammering sounds of the construction work outside, his cubicle felt 
peaceful and he seemed pleased as he finished giving an update to his wife over his mobile phone. Brian 
describes the doctors as facing a “difficult balance” [8b]: Brian has an injured, bleeding spleen as well as a 
recent blood clot on the lungs. The former needs the avoidance of blood-thinning medication; the latter 
needs the administration of blood-thinning medication. I asked how he is going to approach this difficult 
situation: 
“I trust the doctors. They know what they’re doing. I know my body, but they know the medications 
‘n that, ya na?”  [8b] 
An hour later, the consultant, Charles, returned with his junior doctor colleague, Laura, to see Brian: 
By this stage, Brian was lying on his bed. After a brief greeting and introduction, Charles then 
summarised the situation: “so your wife’s going to administer the tinzaparin. Your chest’s better; 
kidneys are better; diarrhoea’s better. I think we can send you home today.” The structure of this 
summary sounded to me like it matched the ‘problem list’ of a medical notes entry, and what Laura 
is likely to write down. Brian appeared delighted to hear this and thanked them both, as they promised 
to sort out the final “paperwork”, which presumably meant the discharge letter and prescription for 
take-out medications.  [8b] 
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Like Maureen, Brian trusts the doctors to make a plan for him to follow. He expands on this trust during 
interview: 
I trust them ‘cause, you na, past experiences. And the fact that, ya na, they’re the experts and I’m not, 
ya na? So… yeah, not a problem there like… Well obviously there’s a training structure thing where 
they have to go through, ya know, it’s not just any Tom Dick or Harry that becomes a doctor. It’s a 
profession and I think it’s not just a profession, it’s a – what’s the word- a vocation, ya na? And I think 
they’re all interested in their job and I know they work long hours and all this ‘n that ‘n the other but 
you know, the better the thing for them is to get the patient better, ya na? That’s their focus. So it’s 
in their interests to be as, ya na, up to date with all the procedures and things, ya na? So… ya na, you 
don’t become a hospital doctor without being, ya na, clever. [Brian, 49-59] 
This perceived cleverness of doctors translates to trust: 
If it’s a medical thing you wanna trust the doctors. Because they know the facts ‘n figures. They’ve 
got all the data, all the experience. [Brian, 74-75] 
Brian’s trust in doctors cannot be reduced to mere cleverness, however: 
They ooze confidence, ya na? And that gives me confidence, ya na… it’s the whole lifestyle isn’t it? It’s 
dedicating, that’s what it is. It’s dedication to their job, ya na? And it’s not gonna be what a life you 
get, ya na? In the hours I do in my job, I do it the best of me ability ‘n I’m dedicated when I’m there. 
But when I go home I switch off, ya na? These people are working away after, ya na, daft shifts… So 
they have to be dedicated to do that. [Brian, 61-68] 
To Brian, the difficult balance between avoiding blood-thinning medication and administering blood-
thinning medication is best managed by doctors, whose cleverness, confidence and dedication has 
established his trust. His respect for them and his trust in them yields his reliance on them. 
7.2.2 Complying 
Finlay is a tall, thin Scotsman who has been admitted to the AMS after taking an overdose of paracetamol 
which left him in pain. Like Brian, Finlay displayed, and spoke of, a level of trust in professional expertise. 
Having been seen by the doctors on the morning ward round, he is considered ‘medically fit for discharge’ 
on the condition that the psychiatry liaison team agree with this [7c]. Today the psychiatry liaison team 
consists of a doctor and a psychiatric nurse who are currently speaking with Finlay in the quiet room: 
Finlay was sat in the 2-person chair in the corner of the room, whilst the two women from the psych 
liaison team sat opposite him. One of them, Meghan, sat confidently with her legs crossed and back 
upright, and asked the majority of questions, which Finlay was answering. The other of psych liaison, 
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Amber, sat cross-legged on her chair but was hunched over her notes; she was making minimal eye 
contact but instead was making notes to each of Finlay’s answers. [7c] 
On questioning, Finlay reluctantly recounted the order of events before his overdose: after an argument 
with his mother and brother, he left his dog with his brother, went home, left the door unlocked, overdosed 
on paracetamol, jumped in the car and drove away. Having responded to these initial questions, Meghan 
continued to probe further: 
Does he often argue with his family? Has he ever overdosed before? Was this planned? Are his family 
searching for a ‘missing person’? …Meghan continued, asking questions about Finlay’s living 
circumstances, his dog, his relationship with his brother, his work as a street sweeper. She then asked 
about any “mental health history”. [7c] 
Finlay felt embarrassed talking about his overdose, describing his reason for being here as “’cause I done 
somethin’ stupid” [Finlay, 69]. This was reflected in the way his conversation with the psychiatry liaison team 
proceeded: 
Meghan directed the conversation. Finlay seemed content to answer the questions she asked, but did 
not seem to be particularly concerned, as if he was really just doing this for her. He answered in a 
matter-of-fact way, without expanding. At times he seemed surprised that she was asking so many 
questions and tried to wrap things up by phrases such as “that’s it really. Simple as that.” [7c] 
It occurred to me that Finlay may not have wanted to have this interview to begin with. He recounted how 
this interview was arranged: 
Just one of the doctors decided… just said “somebody’s coming in t’ assess you” [Finlay, 73-77] 
I asked Finlay if he had been involved in any decisions during his hospital stay: 
Aye, whether you drink tea or coffee [laughs]! I think the doctors and nurses ken what they’re doin’… 
they ken what they’re doin’, so leave it to th’ experts I say… You might know or think you’ve got a clue 
but, at th’ end of the day, they ken what they’re- they’ve done it for long enough to know what they’re 
doin’.  [Finlay, 83-93] 
This deferential attitude perhaps contributed to the tone of the interaction between Finlay and the 
psychiatry liaison team: 
Then Meghan asserted “so you’re to going contact your family, contact your work, contact the GP if 
you need to or the Crisis Team if it’s urgent. Okay?” She counted these points out on her fingers, and 
raised her eyes and voice as she asked “okay?” I noticed the tone that she used reminded me of a 
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teacher at school towards a naughty pupil, who was to promise good behaviour in response to her 
correction. Finlay responded with a nod and “Right.” [7c] 
Like Maureen and Brian, Finlay also trusts the expertise of medical staff. This results in his “leave it to th’ 
experts” attitude, reflected in a passive, deferential role in his interaction with the psychiatry liaison team.  
This whole interaction struck me as both tragic and comic. Tragic, in that this man has had an awful 
time and feels a fool. But nevertheless there was something comic about the conversation, which I 
found hard to pin down. Perhaps it was the reduction of a complex, messy situation into a simple 
process, a bit like a proforma. Perhaps it was that the doctor acted like she was doing this for the 
patient’s sake, and the patient acted like he was really just doing this for the doctor’s sake! 
 [7c] 
Given Finlay’s trust in the expertise of healthcare staff, it was unclear whether he was relying on them to 
meet his needs or whether he was complying with them to meet other needs, such as the needs of the 
psychiatry liaison team to complete their enquiry. When a patient speaks with the psychiatry team, are other 
needs involved besides the patient’s health needs? 
I spoke with the psychiatric nurse, Amber, immediately after this interaction with Finlay in the quiet room. 
Amber had documented a summary of the conversation and spoke with me about the reason the psychiatry 
liaison team ask Finlay so many questions: 
A lot of kind of the questions what we ask about sort of family- personal history and family history do 
bear some sort of significance into sort of current risk. It does kind of feed into current risk. Which is 
why that we ask the questions. It’s not just that we’re trying to be nosey and find out more about 
what’s going on [smiles]. [Amber, 12-16] 
She unpacks what kind of “risk” they are trying to assess: 
Risk of further acts of suicide and self-harm. Risks of further deterioration in mental state… So that’s 
kind of the picture we try and get. And sort of the information we sift out is to kinda sort of look mostly 
around risk and capture. Is this person at risk of harming themselves, harming others? [Amber, 
34-45]  
The language used here is reminiscent of the legal framework within which the psychiatry liaison team 
operates. Sections 2 and 3 of the Mental Health Act (2007) permit the involuntary admission of a patient for 
assessment and treatment, on the condition that a deterioration in mental state leaves the patient at risk of 




The gentleman that we were seeing was unknown to our service. So, when somebody is unknown, we 
have to do a, you know, a full history of somebody? And that includes just finding out a bit more 
about, you know, where we’re going, where they grew up… what kind of childhood they had, what 
kind of family dynamics is there going on. Is there any family history of psychiatric, sort of, mental 
illness or physical illness. And again a lot of that is because that kind of informs some of the risk, 
current risk and things, in families.  [Amber, 5-10] 
A “full history” here is performed by the psychiatry liaison team in order to gain information about risk. There 
is a hint here that it is not only Finlay’s needs that are in play, given that it is “we”, the psychiatry liaison 
service, who “have to do” it. This sense of obligation may be a professional obligation, in order to have done 
a good job; it may also be a legal obligation, in order to have abided by the guidance of the Mental Health 
Act to which she alluded earlier. 
Alison is another member of the psychiatry liaison team. She is an experienced psychiatric nurse who has 
been doing the job for many years. Having been speaking with a young woman who had also taken a 
paracetamol overdose, she described the reason for this conversation was to assess the “safety of getting 
her home” [Alison, 39]. 
Is she considering taking a further overdose? Has she got any imminent thoughts of self-harm or 
suicide? And she doesn’t. So those would indicate that at the moment it’s safe to send her home…
 [Alison, 46-48] 
Alison describes a situation in which the risks are suitably low for discharge from hospital: 
A lot of people still have ongoing suicidal thoughts and we send them home but that’s because often 
there’s evidence of some forward planning so they’re not imminently thinking about doing something 
it’s just that they live with chronic suicidal thoughts… if they’re willing to work with their regular care 
team about those issues then that would be something that we’d be happy then to send that person 
home if there’s evidence of some forward planning.  [Alison, 51-57] 
Forward planning [making arrangements for future activities] and co-operation with a regular care team 
render the risk low enough for discharge from hospital to be deemed safe. Notably, it is the psychiatry liaison 
team who must deem it safe and who have a need to be “happy” with the plan.  
If we felt that somebody was high risk and we didn’t feel happy to send them home and discharge 
them, we would make a referral to Crisis Team. [Alison, 126-128] 
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Sometimes a different assessment can bring out different things and there might be that the patient 
didn’t give us any sort of safety things that made us feel happy about letting them go… [Alison, 
139-140] 
Like Amber, the safety of the patient features prominently in Alison’s mind. In addition to the need of the 
patient to be safe at home, there is a hint of an additional need here: she needs to be happy with her decision 
to ‘let them go’ or else she would perform the less risky act of referring to Crisis Team. Thus there is ambiguity 
here as to whether it is the patient or the psychiatry liaison team whose need to be safe is being addressed. 
The stories that people have to tell are quite emotional and can be very upsetting. And there are some 
circumstances where, you know, we’ve all felt it was a really difficult assessment or that you’ve been 
a bit torn with what to do with somebody, unsure about what to do with somebody, whether you do 
feel okay sending somebody home or what’s the best place to signpost somebody to. [Alison, 
150-155] 
The visceral terms in which Alison describes her response to patients indicate that the concerns of the patient 
and the concerns of the psychiatry liaison team are not easily separated. Given a patient’s trust in the 
psychiatry team and their concern for the patient, the needs of both parties appear entangled. Patients rely 
on the professionals to be trustworthy and they comply with their questions and advice; the professionals 
rely on the patients to be truthful and they comply with relevant professional and legal standards. 
With regard to Maureen and Brian, the needs of the patient seem centre stage and professionals are 
entrusted with providing sound advice. With regard to Finlay, there is an indication that the needs of the 
professionals may also be involved in an unclear, entangled way. I now present some interactions with 
nursing staff in order to further characterise what the needs of members of staff might be. 
7.2.3 Resisting 
Sarah is a staff nurse who has spent the morning busily to-ing and fro-ing between patient cubicles and the 
lab room, where medications are prepared. She is barely 5 foot tall but manages to scurry across the ward 
rapidly with the help of her sporty black trainers. Around 4 hours into her shift, I find her standing still. Her 
section of the ward, “section one”, feels somehow quieter. There is no longer the sound of patient bedside 
buzzers, beeping infusion pumps, ward clerk telephone conversation or the squeaking of the cleaner’s oil-
deprived bucket. 
Sarah, an alcohol nurse and a healthcare assistant are gathered around the notes trolley, leaning in with 
their backs facing outward. Whilst looking down at their respective pieces of paper (and the healthcare 
assistant without a piece of paper but looking down anyway), they are chatting about baby names, nurseries 
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and child care. The ward clerk, Jane, is within ear shot and joins in intermittently as she piles up folders on 
the floor beside her desk. I find something amusing about this scene: it would be impossible to guess the 
topic of conversation if someone, such as the modern matron or Trust management, were to peer into the 
ward from the main entrance. 
Sarah explains to me that she is completing all of her “routine documentation”, which consists of “breakfasts, 
washes, toileting and any assistance required” [3c]. She states this with a tone that suggests it is 
uninteresting work and so I ask her why she does it. Whom is she writing for? 
“Management really. It’s just in case there are any problems. Covering my back basically” [3c] 
Shortly afterwards, a new patient is wheeled into a cubicle of Sarah’s section by porters. Sarah announces 
to herself “right, better do the admission”, as she picks up a proforma. Turning to me for a second, she points 
to the proforma and exclaims with a sigh “look, so many boxes!” [3c]. Detecting a note of reluctance to 
complete such a proforma, I ask Sarah why she is completing this form: 
“Covering my back again! …there’s more and more covering your back. So many forms now!” [3c] 
As Sarah’s black trainers are kicked into action again, I am left wondering in what way nurses feel the need 
to cover their back from “management… in case there are problems”. Sarah’s colleague, Rachel, is an 
experienced nurse who helps to shed light on this through her interaction with Nick. 
Nick is a new consultant who is about to return a phone call to bed management, who have asked to know 
how soon beds on the ward will become available for new admissions. Rachel is seated close by as Nick picks 
up a telephone handset at the central workstation. 
Picking up on his slightly nervous demeanour and extensive preparation before the phone call, Rachel 
sought to encourage him: “just smile when they ask you, but at the end of the day you’ve gotta do 
what you think is right.” [9c] 
She clarified the reason a defensive approach is needed: 
Bed management, right, what gets me about them is that all they care is about bums on beds. Or 
bums off beds more like!” She chuckled for a moment, as Nick affirmed this. Rachel continued: “if owt 
[anything] goes wrong it’s your registration, that’s what you’ve gotta remember. It’s your registration 
that’s on the line.” She seemed to grow in emotional intensity as she described this, as if she had had 
bad experiences of struggling with bed management in the past. [9c] 
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Rachel is aware of her vulnerability as a professional; she fears she may lose her licence to practise as a nurse 
“if owt goes wrong”. The organisation’s need for beds must, from Rachel’s point of view, be balanced against 
the professional’s need to practise safely. 
On one occasion Rachel had adopted a similar posture to how Sarah had appeared earlier: in the same 
section of the ward, Rachel was gathered with two other colleagues around the notes trolley, leaning 
forward, with their backs exposed outwards. They were discussing a trust policy which had recently been 
taped to the surface of the trolley. Rachel explained to me that this is a “falls policy” [3b], instructing what 
level of vigilance is required by the nurse for patients with different levels of falls risk. One level of vigilance 
was described as ‘within line of sight using cohorting’. She explained to me what that means: 
If you’ve got two patients who need watching, you put them both together so that you can watch 
them both, and that’s your cohort. But obviously if you go in to help one, you can’t keep an eye on the 
other one. So he could fall and it’s not your fault, but they’d say the patient weren’t line of sight. So 
it’s just ridiculous, it’s not practical, and I tell’d them that.”  [3b] 
Rachel thus identifies with Sarah’s felt need to ‘cover her back’, and she recognises unsafe discharges (which 
risk her professional registration) and impossible policies as two examples of situations in which she is aware 
of her vulnerability. Using paperwork to ‘cover her back’ is a means of Rachel ensuring her professional needs 
are recognised, despite the pressure of the situation. 
Besides management, Rachel identifies an additional source of her vulnerability. During night shift at 
11:30pm, Rachel and a colleague were again gathered around the notes trolley, leaning forward, in backs-
exposed position. They seemed anxious and Rachel explained why: 
“They’re coming thick and fast at the minute. Had 4 patients in 10 minutes! ...But we haven’t got any 
more beds.” [2a]  
She identifies an additional stressor: 
“Plus I’ve got a horrible patient in bed 8. He’s proper horrible… He’s withdrawing from alcohol, but 
he’s also really scary. He’s got the blind down now [points] and I’m like ‘I don’t want to go in there. 
He’s so intimidating’”. The healthcare assistant, still seated a few feet away, joined in: “he is very 
intimidating. And big. Aggressive. He’s already threatened us once.” [2a] 
Rachel highlighted that the physically intimidating patient is ex-military and as a result she feels extremely 
vulnerable: “I’m not going in; I’m terrified!” [2a]. 
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As Rachel said this, Rosemary approached to comfort her. Rosemary is an experienced staff nurse who works 
bank shifts on this ward and at other hospitals. She shared with me immediately afterwards that it is 
moments like this that make her want to leave nursing: 
I’m gonna have to leave nursing altogether. I don’t enjoy it at all. And it upsets us. It stresses us out… 
I could just come and sit in the toilet, and have a good cry. Because you just can’t do your job. And it’s 
people shouting for their tablets, shouting for- and you just can’t because your workload’s so heavy.
  [Rosemary, 24-30] 
Speaking in general about the vulnerability of nurses: 
Lots of violence. And relatives are also quite aggressive and violent with you sometimes as well. Rude. 
You know what I mean? I think we’re easy targets.  [Rosemary, 138-140] 
As Sarah, Rachel and Rosemary have shown, nurses also have needs. Their felt vulnerability reflects their risk 
of losing their professional licence, risk of reprimand from hospital management and risk of aggression from 
patients and relatives. The gathering of nursing staff around the notes trolley, exposing their backs as they 
complete documentation, could thus also be read figuratively; nurses complete pieces of paper in order to 
‘cover their backs’. As nurses with registrations to protect, documenting pertinent details of the situation is 
a means of self-defence; it ensures their professional needs are met.  
It could be argued that such defensiveness does not appear particularly harmonious. Nevertheless I have 
categorised these interactions as harmonious because, whilst ‘covering your back’ is a form of resistance, it 
is done to help protect a nurse’s registration. Whilst Rachel herself may be understandably and overtly 
frustrated, her professional needs are not overtly frustrated. There are some instances in which needs are 
more overtly frustrated, which will be discussed below (see: Cacophony). Before turning to consider 
cacophonous interactions within the AMS, I pause to reflect on the notion of needs and what kinds of need 
there are. Specifically, whose are the needs? 
7.2.4 Whose needs? 
As has been shown, many patients exhibit trust in the expertise of professionals. Maureen pointed out that 
“you’ve gotta put your faith in someone”. As Finlay said: “they ken what they’re doin’, so leave it to th’ 
experts I say” . This trust is based on cleverness and dedication, according to Brian. The deferential attitude 
that accompanies this trust at times can introduce ambiguity: it is unclear whether patients such as Finlay 




My interpretation of the psychiatry team identifies their need to be ‘happy’ with the degree of risk associated 
with a decision and a need to be acting in accordance with professional and legal guidance. This suggestion 
of a professional’s need is made more explicit by nurses such as Sarah, Rachel and Rosemary, who feel 
vulnerable to reprimand and patient aggression. Gathered around the notes trolley with backs exposed but 
pen in hand, nurses exhibit defensive behaviour as a means of resisting the threat to their professional 
registration. 
Within an AMS, then, whose needs are being met? As we have seen, this is not a straightforward question 
to answer; any answer is ambiguous because there appears to be a multiplicity of needs going on 
simultaneously between patients and healthcare professionals. This ambiguity is exemplified by a routine 
action during a doctor’s ward round in the AMS: the knock at the door. 
7.2.4.1 The knock at the door 
Dr Morrison, the consultant on this evening, has been building up to knocking on the next patient’s door for 
25 minutes: 
Dr Morrison was standing at a notes trolley, sifting through the preceding entries in the red folder of 
medical notes, and writing a bullet-point summary on the post-take ward round page, which has a box 
for the consultant to sign at the bottom. She stopped to check the patient’s “obs” [observations] on her 
handset. She mostly continued in silence until she came across something surprising: the patient is taking 
a tablet called ‘clopidogrel’. “Why are they on clopidogrel? There’s no mention of-” Her speech tailed off 
as she again sifted back through the previous notes entries to clarify previous medical diagnoses that this 
patient had received. [4b] 
She then suffered a series of urgent interruptions: a phone call from A&E about another patient, then 
documenting this telephone conversation, a phone call from psychiatry liaison team, then documenting that 
telephone conversation, followed by a series of alert notifications on her hospital handset. After this:  
As Dr Morrison walked along the corridor to resume documenting, the ward clerk approached and asked 
loudly: “have you had anything to do with the patient in 26?”, to which Dr Morrison replied: “ask one of 
the juniors.” Before getting to the central work station, she noticed an elderly patient losing her balance 
as she walked. Dr Morrison came to her side quickly and just caught her to break the patient’s fall. With 
a sigh, she finally sat down at the central work station, where the red folder of medical notes remained 
open, and said aloud “Right, better carry on or I’ll never get this done.” [4b] 
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Dr Morrison was then interrupted by the ward sister who was asking about another patient. She wrote a few 
words before having to leave to attend the on-call handover meeting down the corridor. Upon her return, 
with a tone of rushed exasperation, she vocalised a mental list of the issues to assess during this consultation: 
“AKI [acute kidney injury], sepsis, vomiting, ketosis, from critical care” [4b] 
Dr Morrison knocked on the door with her right hand whilst opening it with her left, describing her reason 
for visiting as “to see how you’re getting on” [4b]. 
Whereas in a General Practice surgery or an out-patient clinic the patient walks to the doctor’s room and 
knocks, in the AMS these roles are reversed; the consultant knocks on the door of the patient’s room. I am 
used to a knock on the door signifying a request for permission to enter, which is granted or denied by the 
person on the interior. However, here there is no pause for permission to be ascertained. A knock on the 
door is justified by the vocalised list of clinical needs to address, but also enacted briskly according to the 
needs of Dr Morrison to get on with seeing the next patient without further delay. As such, the routine of 
knocking-on-entering captures something of the ambiguous multiplicity of needs interacting in the AMS: the 
patient needs to see the doctor in order to get on, and the doctor needs to get on with seeing the patient. 
Arguably, there is a third set of needs in play here that so far is only implicit: the needs of the hospital.  
Dr Morrison’s consultant colleague, Dr Williams, was walking quickly out of the door of a patient’s cubicle 
during his morning ward round. Still rubbing his hands with alcohol gel, he held the door open with his foot 
to confirm the plan with Sophie, his accompanying junior doctor. Dr Williams, like staff nurse Sarah, is 
wearing sporty trainers and puts them to good use as he walks briskly from one place to the next, clearly 
eager to get on with the ward round quickly: 
If you can rattle through quickly then you allow time for those patients where you need to stop and 
spend 20 even 30 minutes with them. You know, a standard COPD [chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease] exacerbation you can see in 2-3 minutes… You can’t spend 20-30 minutes on each one or 
you’re talking about 10-hour ward rounds! [leaning over trolley where Sophie has opened another red 
folder of medical notes] Right, who’s next? [4d] 
The disruption that would be caused by “ten-hour ward rounds” is something that evidently could not be 
entertained in an AMS. As such, there is a need to “rattle through”. Whose need is this? It is a need which 
considers ‘time’ a limited resource which needs to be allocated effectively, appreciating the patients 
collectively and the ward round as a whole. The need is thus a collective need: the hospital needs the ward 
round to be quick to prevent organisational disruption. 
As fellow consultant, Nick, puts it: 
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“being really thorough and going into depth with one patient might reduce risk for that one patient, 
but then there’s a knock-on risk for the patient load, the rest of the department. You’re not just 
managing one patient; you’re managing a department… It’s a real source of stress that I think you 
feel most when you’re a consultant.” [8a] 
Thus perhaps Dr Morrison’s sense of frustrated urgency, which warrants the hasty entrance to finally see 
the next patient, is as a result of her duty to not just manage the patient but manage the department. Like 
Dr Williams and Nick, she embodies the need of the hospital to maintain procedural efficiency. 
7.2.4.2 The transfer of needs 
During another busy ward round, a phlebotomist (Brenda) arrives with her trolley of equipment in order to 
take some blood tests from a series of patients: a ‘ward round’ of her own. She is wearing white, like 
laboratory staff. Brenda picks up a pile of printed requests beside the ward printer and sets to work. 
Evidently, she is not well acquainted with the patients she sees, as she consults the whiteboard in order to 
locate them. Like Dr Morrison, she knocks on entering: 
“I’ve just come to get a blood sample from you…” [1b] 
It strikes me that the phlebotomist’s introduction is purely functional, without exchanging names or 
conversation regarding the patient’s illness. The patient puts down her magazine. There is quiet for 2-3 
minutes whilst the blood samples are collected. With the ‘ping’ of a released tourniquet and the clunk of 
blood sample vials placed on her plastic trolley, Brenda’s work is done. As she reverses out her trolley, she 
smiles to the patient and says “Thank you!”, to which the patient replies “alright” and returns to her 
magazine.  
This mundane, routine interaction immediately struck me as surprising. As I reflected at the time: 
Who is doing whom a service? [1b] 
According to the doctor’s printed request, the patient is the one who needs a blood test. The phlebotomist 
arrives to provide help to meet that need. However, this interaction sounded as though the phlebotomist 
was doing the needing and the patient was doing the helping, by allowing the Brenda in, suspending her 
leisure activity and donating a blood sample. 
7.2.4.3 The plurality of needs 
Let us retrace our steps briefly. Patients arrive at the A&E Department in need of healthcare. Patients arrive 
in the AMS having had their need affirmed by the doctor in A&E. Once in the AMS, however, who it is that is 
in need becomes less clear. The plurality of needs can make it ambiguous whose needs are being met in a 
given encounter. In some encounters, the needs of staff are more prominent, such as nurse Rachel who is 
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afraid of her intimidating patient and phlebotomist Brenda who apologises for interrupting her patient’s 
leisure time. 
Thus patients have needs and professionals have needs. A third source of needs is also evident in the data, 
however. Dr Morrison’s knock on the door was rushed because she had a whole ward of patients to get 
through. As consultant Nick comments, “You’re not just managing one patient; you’re managing a 
department” [8a]. The hospital needs the department to maintain effective patient flow in order to prevent 
a bed crisis. This need of the organisation is also evident in the vulnerability expressed by Rachel. The “thick 
and fast” patient admission rate as well as the policies which are “just ridiculous” and “not practical” (Rachel) 
are a reflection of the hospital’s need to maximise patient flow through the AMS and to function on a 
stretched workforce. Patients have needs. Professionals have needs. Even  hospitals have needs. 
However, such needs are not easily separable. Indeed, the very fact that participants find managing multiple 
needs to be such a source of “stress” (Nick) is an indication that the needs are not independent but 
entangled, pulling a person in multiple directions at once. A single person can embody a plurality of needs. 
For instance, Rachel (as a person) feels intimidated by an aggressive patient, whilst (as a professional) feeling 
her professional registration is under threat unless she covers her back, whilst (as an employee of the 
organisation) feeling obliged to admit and discharge patients rapidly. It is perhaps more accurate to speak 
not of sources or locations of need (patient, professional, hospital) but rather to speak of different kinds of 
need: personal need, professional need and organisational need. 
In what follows, I present an account of how these three kinds of need can contrast in ways that are not 
harmonious; one kind of need clashes with another and so the interaction could be described as 
cacophonous. 
7.3 Cacophony 
7.3.1 Organisational vs. professional 
Nick is a new consultant who, above, described the tension between managing an individual patient and 
managing the department as “a real source of stress that I think you feel most when you’re a consultant” 
[8a]. I notice a pattern in how he conducts his interaction with his trainee doctor colleague (Sophie): after a 
moment of cheerful talking with Sophie, Nick’s facial expression would return to one of frowning concern. 
With this silent cue, Sophie would start presenting the information relevant to the next patient, in a 
standardised order:  
Medical notes, blood results (on computer screen at central work station), imaging, observations (on 
mobile phone handset)… [8a] 
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Nick explained this habit to me: 
“I tend to have the same routine for each patient: notes – blood results – imaging – obs. 
[observations]. And actually, I think you kind of have to do that to be systematic. It’s really important 
to be systematic. To make sure you don’t miss things.”  [8a] 
Being thorough and systematic is not the only priority, however: 
“At some point you’ve gotta draw a line when you’ve read enough.” Nick illustrated this by describing 
a consultant colleague of his in a previous hospital, who was from an African country and gained most 
of his medical experience there. “He’s incredibly fast. He’ll see literally 30 patients in an hour! And 
yeah, he makes mistakes. But the department manages. I’m certainly not as fast as him, and I’m more 
risk averse, but I do think there’s something to be said for that.” [8a] 
Nick recognises the need to look after the individual patient well to “make sure you don’t miss things”. This 
could result in harm to the patient and professional repercussions. At the same time, he recognises the need 
of the organisation for the whole department to manage. He describes something of a spectrum of risk 
aversion along which a consultant is placed, which affects where the line is drawn to say “enough” attention 
has been given to one patient. I asked how much risk aversion is about right, or how to know where to draw 
this line: 
Good question! I dunno, it’s really difficult to know isn’t it?! I guess from looking at your outcomes. 
Right… [8a] 
And, with that, the frowning expression returned, kicking the trainee doctor into action. The tension 
between looking after the individual patient thoroughly, as a doctor in the profession, and looking after the 
department, as a consultant in the organisation, is arguably not eliminated by “looking at your outcomes”, 
however. This is because it remains unclear whether this is the outcome of the individual or the department, 
and how much weight to render to each. 
The dissonance that comes with looking after patients both individually and collectively is also described by 
Helen, who is an experienced staff nurse at the start of a 12-hour shift. Helen intermittently stands with her 
hands on her hips and vocalises to herself “right, what was I doing now then?” [6a] before walking hastily to 
the next task. It is the morning and she is busy doing her ‘drug round’. Each patient has a Kardex, which is a 
tabulated display of the prescriptions the doctors have authorised for each day. Some of her patients also 
have an infusion chart, which is a tabulated display of the intravenous drips that doctors have authorised for 
each day. She is rushing back and forth between her patients and the Lab Room, in which the Kardexes and 
infusion charts are laid out in a line on the counter [6a]. She reflects on this shift: 
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This shift today has been steady but busy; there’s been a great variation of different patients in. Quite 
heavy50 patients that need double attention. Quite a lot of infusions going, so it’s just trying to catch 
up and trying to chase everybody just to see what is needed. [Helen, 5-7] 
“Chasing everybody” consists of noticing something about the prescription which needs clarification, 
correction or collaboration. The next step is to locate the relevant colleague, which entails hunting the likely 
area of the ward to find them. Doctors could be at the notes trolley or behind a curtain or behind a cubicle 
door. Staff nurses and healthcare assistants could also be in the Lab Room, clean utility room or sluice (which 
is a room for the cleaning or disposal of dirty things). The pharmacist could be at the computer, with a 
patient, or off the ward. For anyone else, there is a telephone. 
For Helen, she usually performs this chase under pressure: 
It hasn’t been too bad today compared to other days where it’s really, really busy. Because I’ve been 
lucky I haven’t had a lot of discharges. Because when you’ve got your discharges on top of looking 
after really poorly patients, it adds a lot of pressure. [Helen, 9-12] 
The priority of discharging patients, as I described in the previous chapter, is to free up beds and maintain 
‘flow’ of patients through the AMS. “Poorly patients”, however, require Helen to spend more time on them 
individually; they are the “heavy patients” that need “double attention”. As such, Helen is caught between 
the organisational need to maintain flow, by arranging discharges of well patients, and the professional need 
to deliver good care, by spending time looking after sick patients 
Today, Helen is managing to progress through her line of Kardexes and infusion charts swiftly, despite all of 
the “chasing” she has to do. She recalls a shift recently when one of her patients needed painkillers. This 
resulted in a stressful kind of chasing: 
 [The patient] was a lady who was in a lot of pain. She had multiple things. Fibromyalgia. She was on 
so many medications but the doctor wanted to give more paracetamol, and it was over the dosage of 
the 4 milligrams in 24 hours? And I said I wasn’t very happy in doing that. And he said they do do it in 
resuss [resuscitation bay in A&E] and I was like “well I’m not in resuss”. And you’re not allowed to 
have that.  [Helen, 86-90]  
This confrontation led to further chasing: 
So I went and spoke to pharmacy because – I did go to a sister first but the sister didn’t do much so I 
went to pharmacy and asked them – and they said “no, they can’t”. So I went back and relayed and 
 
50 Helen uses “heavy” figuratively here, to refer to clinical demand rather than patient physique. 
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he said “no, well I think they should”. So I asked the pharmacist to go and speak to the doctor.
 [Helen, 90-93] 
Helen’s concerns were vindicated: 
And then the doctor did come back and apologise and said he was wrong …And sorry that he had put 
us in that situation. [Helen, 95-97] 
She identified what was threatened by the doctor’s prescription: 
Everybody can be under stress… but, as I had explained, it’s my registration. Even though it’s 
prescribed, if I give it, it’s my registration that’s on the line. So you’ve got to be able to stand up and 
say “no”, or when you see certain drugs that are written up you think “that doesn’t seem the right 
dose for that” so I will go and double check and I will ask another doctor just to make sure. 
 [Helen, 101-105] 
Whilst Helen senses the need to discharge patients and get through tasks rapidly, such as administering 
painkillers which have been prescribed, she also senses another need: to work according to professional 
standards. Helen needs to complete her tasks efficiently, for the hospital’s sake, but also appropriately, for 
her professional licence’s sake. The one is clashing with the other. The dissonant “stress” that she 
experienced was thus caused by an irreconcilable conflict in the plurality of needs: the organisational versus 
the professional. This is not the only kind of clash, however. 
7.3.2 Professional vs. personal 
A second way in which relationships can feature cacophony within the AMS is when there is a clash between 
professional need and personal need. To explore this, we return to Dr Taylor and her interaction with Mr 
Jenkins. 
Dr Taylor is the consultant on today, and she is in the middle of her morning ward round. She is preparing to 
see Mr Jenkins, and goes through the same preparatory routine as Nick, her consultant colleague: medical 
notes (including clinical correspondence), blood results, scan images, nursing observations. 
Mr Jenkins was a man in his 70s, who was wearing the standard white-with-green-pattern hospital 
gown. He had an oxygen mask over his face, which was making a quiet hissing noise, and was sat up 
against his bed, which was tilted up at the back. He smiled and looked across as Dr Taylor walked 
towards his bedside and crouched down, sitting on her heels. [6c] 
With an opening greeting, the conversation started: 
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Mr Jenkins narrated the run of events prior to his admission. He started by describing his routine every 
Tuesday afternoon, when he visits his wife’s grave site “without fail”. On this occasion, he began to 
feel breathless and thought “something was up”. [6c] 
Following more conversation about how Mr Jenkins has been feeling, Dr Taylor examined him, which 
included listening to his chest with her stethoscope.  
After this, Dr Taylor sat on the edge of Mr Jenkins’ bed and said “I think we need to be open and 
honest with you: I can’t fix your chest. I wish I had a better magic wand, but I don’t.” …Mr Jenkins 
nodded and listened as Dr Taylor continued: “it’s about your quality of life. It’s about how you feel 
about your breathing and getting you feeling better.” 
Dr Taylor said she doesn’t think that a CTPA [a scan of lung arteries looking for a blood clot] scan is 
going to be useful; like the previous ones on two recent similar admissions, it would probably “not 
show anything”. [6c] 
In interview, Dr Taylor recounted how reading the medical notes had helped to provide some direction for 
this ward round consultation: 
The interesting thing with him was to spend a bit of time looking at a computer before we saw him. 
Because that gave you a real flavour for this man who’s had multiple admissions, he’s getting multiple 
scans every time he comes in, we just go straight for a CT scanner. They never show anything. He’s 
gone onto oxygen. He’s hypoxic in clinic …And to me that is a really bad combination of factors. 
 [Dr Taylor, 89-94] 
Dr Taylor characterised the significance of this bad combination of factors: 
Because I just felt in a way, whatever our diagnosis and whatever our management, he is probably 
heading towards the end of his life. He was very anxious. It was anxiety a lot, I think, that was 
distressing him. And I think we just need to be a bit more holistic and a bit more realistic.  [Dr 
Taylor, 104-107] 
After Dr Taylor explained the plan for the physiotherapist and the palliative care nurse to see him, Mr Jenkins 
gave a smile and said “right-oh!” [6c]. As we walked back to the central work station, Dr Taylor describes 
how doctors habitually approach this kind of situation: 
“As doctors, we work by algorithm in acute medicine. We just tend to think: ‘it’s a PE [pulmonary 
embolus], we fix it, then they go home’”. She pointed out that it’s when she stepped back and saw in 
the correspondence that Mr Jenkins keeps coming in and having this cycle reinforced, that she realised 
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the medical team need to think differently about his care. “We’re so busy excluding a PE, but after all 
a PE might not be a bad thing for him. You’ve got to die of something”. [6c] 
Dr Taylor draws a link between this algorithmic approach, which responds to diagnostic categories such as 
‘PE’, and the way doctors are trained: 
We’re taught a very paternalistic, kind of protocol guideline-driven way, and every time there’s a new 
patient safety incident there’s a new guideline or protocol! And I think we have to understand that 
they’re really good, evidence-based guidelines but that patient in front of you is not the same as that 
10,000 patients that went into that trial. And so, you know, you and them have to have some wiggle 
room on what’s right.  [Dr Taylor, 228-233] 
Dr Taylor recognises a limit to the usefulness of clinical evidence: this patient is a unique individual. She 
expands on this with an illustration of how doctors customarily approach the treatment of DVT [deep vein 
thrombosis]: 
You’re in your own little pathway “oh DVT, must treat. Here, have tinz [blood thinning medication]”. 
But you’re not actually saying to the patient “in the last part of your life remaining, how do you want 
to live? Do you want the district nurse to come in every day? Do you want to go to Costa Rica next 
week as your last thing before you die of your breast cancer or whatever? Do you want to try and get 
sharps through customs or would you prefer to take the risk and die of PE and you don’t have medical 
insurance anyway?”  [Dr Taylor, 200-206] 
Dr Taylor summarises the connection between these illustrative examples: 
I just think we’re very paternalistic to assume that we know the answer to this. So I think we have to 
explain the pros and the cons, the risks and benefits, and then I think patients have to try and have 
some input into that decision. And a lot of people probably aren’t able to wholly make that decision 
because they maybe can’t quite understand or – a lot of people would still say “what would you do?” 
But I think it’s important that we at least show people that it’s not black and white. [Dr Taylor, 
206-211] 
With regard to Mr Jenkins, Dr Taylor says: 
My aim for him would be to start to explain to him and the team treating him that this needs a much 
more holistic, realistic approach and that should be led by him. And that he should be at the centre of 
it, and not just do what doctors tell him is the ‘right’ thing.  [Dr Taylor, 159-161] 
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Whilst doctors may feel a professional need to follow evidence-based guidelines, treat diagnoses and to have 
“ticked the box” [Dr Taylor, 164], Dr Taylor recognises an additional need here. This additional need involves 
patient input and shades of grey. She continues: 
As human beings we’re not stupid. We can all feel that we’re getting weaker, or we’re getting tired-
er, or that we’re struggling more or that we’re coming in more, and I don’t think we allow patients to 
tell us that story. Or to accept that, or to say “well okay, that is getting more difficult. Doing all these 
tests isn’t going to change that. What’s important to you?”  [Dr Taylor, 257-261] 
As well as assessing need in terms of professional diagnostic categories, Dr Taylor urges the assessment of 
need in terms of a patient’s life story: 
You can sit there and you can take a history and do some tests and prescribe some- but if it doesn’t 
really fit with what the patient wants to get out of that consultation then actually what have you 
achieved? [Dr Taylor, 223-225] 
Dr Taylor’s frustration with what she sees as the traditional medical approach is expressed in terms of neglect 
of the additional need to cater for the patient as a unique person with a life story. The professional 
(perceived) need to medicate a diagnosis clashes with the personal need for individual self-expression and 
avoidance of over-medicalisation. 
The juxtaposition of Dr Taylor’s approach with the expectations of her traditionalist colleagues could be 
described as cacophony, due to the conflict in these instances between a multiplicity of needs: the 
professional versus the personal. 
However, as well as conflict between her approach and that of her more paternalist colleagues 
(interpersonal conflict), there appears to be a conflict within Dr Taylor herself (intrapersonal conflict).  
Each patient in the AMS is expected to have a ‘Treatment escalation plan’ (TEP). This is a proforma, which is 
usually completed by the consultant, which describes what limits to healthcare are relevant to this particular 
patient. In addition to a TEP, many patients in the AMS also have a ‘Do not attempt resuscitation’ (DNAR) 
form. This is also usually completed by the consultant, and the presence of the form in a patient’s medical 
notes prevents the initiation of cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on that particular patient in the event 
of a cardiac arrest. 
Consultant Tony summarises the process: 
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In theory it’s black and white… for the nursing staff and other clinicians looking after the patient 
because they either have a valid DNAR form in which case you don’t start CPR, or they don’t in which 
case you do. [Tony, 334-337] 
However, Tony recognises the situation as less black and white once the practical details are considered: 
An example of a more complex decision would be, for example, a patient with what is perceived to be 
end-stage organ failure, such as end-stage heart failure, in a discussion regarding resuscitation for 
the patient who has capacity and in clear consciousness asks us to do everything that we can do, 
including making sure we do CPR and put them on a life-support machine if it comes to that. …the 
way things are legally, that can be quite a tricky business. [Tony, 324-329] 
Returning to Dr Taylor, she describes how she approaches such conversations: 
I think a lot of the times that’s about listening – sitting down with the family – and listening to their 
concerns and their… and getting them to tell you the story.  [Dr Taylor, 285-287] 
Dr Taylor sheds light on her intention in such moments: 
…you get them to tell you the story first, and then try and explore the frailty and the downward 
trajectory and the fact maybe they are getting a bit weaker and “you said they used to go to the 
supermarket; you said the last time was six weeks ago” and, you know, picking out bits. So that before 
you say “as the doctor I think this, and this is black and white, and this is my decision and that’s it; 
hard luck”, you’ve actually got them to start to come to terms with some of that.  [Dr Taylor, 
287-292] 
Both Tony and Dr Taylor recognise that the situation, in reality, is not black and white. Dr Taylor suggests 
that the problem with a black-and-white construal is primarily rhetorical; it is an ineffective way of “getting 
them to start to come to terms” with it. As Dr Taylor continues: 
Sometimes getting people to acknowledge that it has been at the back of their minds but they’ve just 
not wanted to come to terms with it, is quite helpful. What isn’t helpful, certainly, is to be really busy 
and to blast in and say “I’m the critical care consultant. No. Goodbye!”  [Dr Taylor, 299-
302] 
Compared to chemotherapy or surgical laparotomy, Dr Taylor observes that CPR and subsequent intensive 
care is relatively misunderstood: 
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I think people don’t understand what resuscitation is. “Is it CPR?” And actually when, you know, you 
have to spell it out in black and white what it is, families are like “I never knew. I never realised”. 
 [Dr Taylor, 330-332] 
This difference in understanding is addressed in conversation: 
And I think sometimes it’s just about exploring their vision of what you’re talking about because it can 
be very different to your black and white knowledge, factual knowledge. And what they’ve seen on 
Casualty or ER or something. [Dr Taylor, 338-341] 
Dr Taylor summarises her approach to CPR discussions: 
It sounds awful but I’m not sure I go to seek agreement, I go to seek understanding. You know, it’s the 
clinician’s- it’s a consultant’s choice. I can’t put people on critical care if it’s the wrong thing to do… 
It’s a treatment that we’re offering and it’s not right to offer a treatment if it’s not the right thing to 
do to somebody. And I think as a clinician I think we’re legally, that’s our position. I think responsibly, 
ethically, morally, that’s the right thing. So I don’t go to say “let’s all sit down and agree this together”. 
I go to say “this is what’s happening and this is why, and let’s understand the why”. [Dr Taylor, 
345-352] 
In her interaction with Mr Jenkins, Dr Taylor emphasised being “open and honest”, “holistic and realistic” in 
a way which prioritises his personal needs. In her depiction of CPR discussions, however, she seems to take 
a different approach. Regarding Mr Jenkins, care should be led by him with his input and him at the centre; 
regarding CPR, it’s a consultant’s choice. Regarding Mr Jenkins, a doctor should avoid protocolised black-
and-white knowledge; regarding CPR, the public’s television-induced misconceptions contrast with a 
doctor’s black-and-white factual knowledge. Regarding Mr Jenkins, there needs to be “some wiggle room on 
what’s right” and he should not merely go along with what the doctors say is the right thing to do; regarding 
CPR, there is a morally right thing to do which provides the basis for a doctor saying “this is what’s happening 
and this is why.”  
Perhaps this is can be interpreted in terms of a clash between personal and professional need. With regard 
to Mr Jenkins, the need to respect his personal autonomy and unique life-story trumps the professional need 
to medicate a diagnosis. With regard to CPR, the professional need to avoid administering putatively futile 
treatment trumps the personal preferences and wishes an individual or family may express. Thus Dr Taylor 
enacts two conflicting approaches to weighing up needs in these two different sets of circumstances. 
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7.3.3 Personal vs. organisational 
A third way in which there can be cacophony within the AMS is when organisational need clashes with 
personal need. We return to Tony and continue the topic of DNAR decisions and escalation plans. 
Tony, wearing his consultant uniform of grey scrubs, has just begun his morning ward round. Accompanied 
by a trainee doctor, Ling, they are preparing to see “the gentleman in room 3” [6d]. A more junior doctor, 
who had introduced herself as “the F1” [6d] is seated beside them, writing down salient points in the medical 
notes on a proforma entitled ‘Post-take ward round’. Tony highlights these salient points by announcing 
them in a higher pitch and volume, with a subtle turn of the head towards her.  
Tony sits down beside the F1 doctor, who has laid out the notes for patient 3 and X-ray images on 
computer. “Lung cancer patient” he reads aloud. “But no cancer clinic letters. We find this a lot 
[turning to LM], that cancer patients arrive and we have no clinic letters, which would really be quite 
helpful, to know what the overall picture is. They might say something like ‘radiotherapy, if doesn’t 
work then palliate only’. But we don’t know that for sure – until acute cancer nurse comes tomorrow”.
  [6d] 
After viewing clinical information on the computer and in the medical notes, Tony reflects to Ling that there 
are “still a few pieces of the puzzle missing” which would be useful to know in order to figure out the “ceiling 
of care”. Patient 3 is Mr Johnson, who is sat in the bedside armchair in the far corner of the room. Mr Johnson 
is wearing the standard green-and-white hospital gown, with his own slippers over his feet. A few feet away 
from him are his son and daughter-in-law, seated in the corner on standard plastic chairs for visitors.  
Tony knocks and enters the room, which is dimly lit by the glow of sunlight through the blind. He stands in 
front of Mr Johnson, with intermittent looks towards Mr Johnson’s family. Ling and the F1 doctor stand on 
the far side of the bed, nodding and writing respectively. After an initial greeting, Mr Johnson describes to 
Tony his usual day-to-day activities and then cuts to the chase: 
Mr Johnson: I’m ten times worse, breathing-wise 
Tony: It’s not clear what’s made it worse, so we’ll give you antibiotics. We’re treating you in case 
you’ve got an infection. My guess is that we’re not gonna be able to cure this problem. 
After a brief discussion about the home environment, Tony then changes the focus of conversation: 
Tony: If and when things take a turn for the worse, I think we shouldn’t be trying to restart your heart. 
Mr Johnson: “Shouldn’t?” 
Tony: It wouldn’t work. 
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Mr Johnson: That’s nice to know. [smiles – unclear if being sarcastic or relieved] 
Tony [turning to son and daughter-in-law]: I’ve only just met you. I’m just trying to piece together the 
puzzle, the picture. 
Daughter-in-law: So are we just keeping him comfortable then, sort of thing? 
Tony: We are still actively treating him with antibiotics for an infection. We’ve just got to be realistic 
as well that we might not be able to cure everything here. [Turning to son] Is your brother coming in 
later? 
Son: Aye. 
Tony: We can have a word with him too [looking at Ling], when he comes in [Ling nods] 
Mr Johnson: I hope you win! 
Tony: [amused] me too! 
Closing the cubicle door, the medical team stand around the notes trolley, as Tony documents in 
addition to what F1 has written: “poor exercise tolerance even on a good day”. Tony turns to Ling: 
“We should expect the other son might disagree with that DNAR” 
Ling: I’ll have a word with him. When he comes in, I’ll talk with him. 
Both consultant and Ling complete DNAR form for Mr Johnson, stating he is not for resuscitation.
  [6d] 
Tony described what was going through his mind as he entered the room to meet Mr Johnson: 
Walking into that room, I know that the man has had a diagnosis of quite advanced squamous cell 
lung cancer. And he hasn’t had surgery. And he hasn’t had chemotherapy. And he was judged not fit 
for chemotherapy at the time of his diagnosis. So immediately I am thinking the trajectory for this 
gentleman, no matter what we find when we walk in the room, unfortunately the trajectory for this 
gentleman is not going to be that he is cured from lung cancer. And probably all the treatment he’s 
had is aiming to keep it at bay, and reduce the symptom burden, and give him the best quality of life.
 [Tony, 225-232] 
This downward trajectory has implications for resuscitation: 
In my view it would not be appropriate to put him on a life support machine to try and get him through 
that. And that’s based on my experience that patients with significant symptom burden from their 
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lung disease, which he had, because he’s breathless walking a couple of yards. That if he became so 
poorly that he needed organ support on a high dependency or intensive care unit. If it got to that 
point, the chance of him recovering to have what most patients would consider a meaningful 
existence – quality of life at home – the chance of him recovering would be pretty slim. [Tony, 269-
276] 
With regard to what a “meaningful existence” for Mr Johnson would be, Tony said: 
I guess many patients, you have that conversation with them and they would say: “being in 24 hour 
care and unable to… communicate, or unable to feed myself or toilet myself would be unacceptable 
to me. Many patients you have that discussion with them and that’s the type of level at which they 
think that’s not really an acceptable quality of life for them. And if he had a cardiopulmonary arrest, 
given that background and given that his right lung was essentially gone with his cancer, then the 
chance of him surviving and not ending up in 24 hour care of some kind would be next to zero.
 [Tony, 286-292] 
However, Tony recognised a limitation to this assessment of Mr Johnson specifically: 
For him I don’t know because I didn’t ask him. I didn’t ask him “what to you, Mr Johnson, is an 
acceptable quality of life?” [Tony, 280-281] 
Tony expands on this: 
Some patients have – some people have – massively different priorities to others. So for example, I’ve 
met patients who leave, take off their oxygen in a clear state of mind, clear consciousness, walk out 
the hospital, get a bus home to make sure their dog is fed. You know, with what to us, we perceive to 
be terrible pneumonia and respiratory failure. But for that particular person the priority is making 
sure the pet they love is not being neglected, and that they see them every day. So that’s their priority. 
I don’t know if I really gave that particular patient that we’re talking about, I don’t know if I really 
gave him the opportunity to voice what his main priorities are.  [Tony, 296-304] 
Giving Mr Johnson this opportunity, to describe what a “meaningful existence” is for him, is something Tony 
could have done “if we had a lot more time” [Tony, 281]. In Tony’s view, the way the workload is divided 
addresses this to some extent: 
But I’m almost certain that he had that discussion the following day with the palliative care nurses. 
…That is typically the type of thing they would choose to spend some of their time discussing with 
patients: what their priorities are.  [Tony, 304-309] 
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Due to time pressures, Tony is unable to give Mr Johnson the opportunity to “voice what his main priorities 
are”. As a result, Tony must make an assessment of whether resuscitation is worthwhile based on what 
“many patients” in similar circumstances would consider a “meaningful existence”. Although he recognises 
that people have “massively different priorities”, he is unable to appreciate Mr Johnson’s uniqueness in this 
regard; in the interests of time, Tony must consider Mr Johnson as a category of ‘patients with incurable lung 
cancer and significant symptom burden’. The difference between seeing Mr Johnson as a category and 
seeing Mr Johnson as an individual is captured in the juxtaposition of Mr Johnson’s standard hospital gown 
with his unique homely slippers. This difference could be described as a clash between organisational need 
and personal need. 
One more instance of a clash between the organisational and the personal will bring our exploration of 
cacophony to a close: visiting hours. 
Maureen, the lady in her 70s who trusts expert professionals with her kidney tablets (“you’ve gotta put your 
faith in someone”), feels strongly about visiting hours: 
Obviously you’ve got to limit as to how many people come in at a time ‘cause it can be disruptive. And 
I think when you’re in a cubicle on your own, does it matter if you’ve got a visitor or not? Because it’s 
different if you’re on a ward and there’s lots and lots a people with visitors, it can be mayhem. So, you 
know, I think you should- a bit of discretion if you don’t actually live local. [Maureen, 15-19] 
With a deflated sadness in her tone of voice, she describes her partner’s struggle with visiting hours. He lives 
in a town many miles away and his journey requires two bus journeys. Maureen says: 
He doesn’t drive, so it’s horrendous for him to get here. And the first time he came to visit he sat down 
here waiting for us, I was still in intensive care but he didn’t know that. And he was sat here and 
missed quite a bit of the visiting time. And he had said, you know, “I’ve only got one hour in that 
visiting time between buses.” … But he just- he’s a little puppy really. He doesn’t complain about 
anything! You know? He just gets on with it.  [Maureen, 31-45] 
When her family members were asked to leave by nursing staff on two occasions, Maureen explains why 
they were compliant: 
‘Cause they don’t like confrontation. You just go. ‘Cause you think, you know, what’s the knock-on 
effects if you upset the nurse? Is the nurse then gonna be in a bit of a strop because your family were 
like that? And then they would maybe treat you that little bit different. [Maureen, 52-56] 
Lamenting the rigidity of impersonal rule-following, Maureen comments: 
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Everybody’s different. We all have different reasons for needing other people outside of being in here.
 [Maureen, 76-77] 
As Maureen describes it, everybody is different and everybody’s need for visitors is different. This matters 
very much to Maureen and her partner. Yet, on the ward whose welcoming poster reads “if it matters to 
you, it matters to us” [2a], visiting hours are standardised. The tension between these two facts is 
experienced by the nursing staff, who are responsible for enforcing visiting hours restrictions: 
At the section 1 work station, I was standing chatting with two nurses. Amanda was at the computer 
and Rachel was writing in notes on top of the notes trolley. The topic of conversation was visiting 
hours, and when to “stretch” them. Amanda said she would stretch visiting hours sometimes “if they 
were really sick”. When I asked how sick, she replied “you just use your judgment. Definitely if they’re 
palliative.” I was aware that ‘they’re palliative’ is a shorthand way of describing a patient on the ward 
who is terminally ill and often likely to die within a few days.  [9c] 
Perhaps the “discretion” that Maureen wished for is in fact exercised by Amanda’s “judgment”. However, 
where Maureen had in mind the degree of travel inconvenience for her partner, Amanda has in mind the 
degree of sickness of the patient. Rachel pauses her writing and lifts her head to join in: 
Rachel overheard this response and mostly agreed, but added a little extra: “plus, I dunno if I should 
say this, but you’re definitely more lenient if the family are nice! And like if they’re elderly or they’ve 
come from far or whatever. Not if it’s just like their 17 year-old boyfriend!” She went on to describe 
an occasion when a teenage boyfriend of a patient had wanted to stay overnight with the patient, 
even sharing her bed. “No way! I wouldn’t let that; my dad would never have let my boyfriend stay 
over when I was 17 like. That’s not happening!” [9c] 
The clinical emphasis of Amanda’s judgment is complemented by the lenience of Rachel, who incorporates 
the kind of concerns that Maureen expressed. In addition, Rachel is prepared to interpret the relational 
significance of particular requests, such as the impropriety of a 17 year-old boyfriend staying overnight.  
In stark contrast to this, Amanda and Rachel’s colleague, Emma, sees visiting hours differently. Behind the 
sound-proof doors of the Lab Room, Emma is preparing an infusion before the morning huddle. She has a 
jittery, impatient demeanour, to which the other nurse in the room (Mark) responds with silence. 
“Look, we’ve got to put an end to this. It’s getting ridiculous. [turning to me] It’s impossible to get 
anything done when you’ve got relatives there thinking they can stay as long as they like asking idiotic 
questions. …They expect you to drop everything, whatever you’re doing. …Especially when we’re 
understaffed, we’ve got to get on.” [leaves room hurriedly with medications to give] [4d] 
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Mark looks embarrassed at the way Emma spoke and adds: 
“Emma gets quite stressed about it. It’s so variable but she takes it really seriously. I sometimes think 
it’s okay as long as the relatives aren’t getting in your way. It’s only the ones that get in the way that 
are a problem.” [4d] 
Within the nursing team, there are evidently different interpretations of visiting hours policy. Some are 
lenient and emphasise the uniqueness of patients, clinically, relationally and circumstantially. This leniency 
is from a personal perspective, recognising that patients each have “different reasons for needing people” 
(Maureen). Some instead emphasise standardisation, considering patients as a single category. The push 
towards standardisation is from an organisational perspective: the department needs to run efficiently and 
this is impeded by relatives who “get in the way” (Mark). The simultaneous different interpretations clash 
with one another; they are a cacophony because there is an irreconcilable clash between personal need and 
organisational need. 
“Huddle!” shouts Emma, the nurse in charge for today, projecting her voice through the doorway. “Huddle!”, 
she repeats into the next doorway. She has a stern, frowning expression, and is walking briskly with a sense 
of urgency about her, before coming to a standstill near the central work station. As ward staff complete 
their introductions in a clockwise fashion, we too have come full circle [1a, 4d]. 
7.4 Conclusion: contrast and cacophony 
7.4.1 An AMS is a dance 
What follows is an allegorical ethnographic account of how people in the AMS work together: the AMS is a 
dance51. It is an unusual dance because, as we shall see, people are dancing to two sources of music.  
At one end of the dancefloor, there is a small stage with a piano on it. The piano is strikingly colourful. As I 
approach it to make out the unique pattern, it becomes clear that what gives this striking appearance is that 
it is autographed all over. Names have been painted on it, each in a different colour. As I walk round it, I can 
make out only those which have been painted on recently:  Maureen, Finlay, Brian, Mr Jenkins, Mr Johnson. 
The closer I look, the more names I see, each painted on in their own style. Each name contrasts with the 
others; no two are quite the same. I start to wonder what colour the piano was to begin with. Was it black, 
originally? Or perhaps white? Or is it colours all the way down? 
Seated at this piano is a pianist who is dressed in a formal grey suit. She is seated with a straight, motionless 
back, as is expected of pianists within the classical tradition. Her straight back contrasts with the elegance 
and rapidity of her fingers as they traverse the keyboard. She is wearing a name badge on her lapel, which I 
 
51 I unpack this allegorical account in Chapter 9 (see: Back to the dancefloor) 
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struggle to read due to the number of awards which she has pinned beside it. As I peer in to get a closer look 
at her name, she glances across to me as if to indicate that looking there is not appropriate. She caresses the 
keys expressively and sensitively, yet her facial expression is intermittently stern as she keeps looking across 
to something.  
As I trace the pianist’s gaze, I notice that something to be an electronic metronome, beeping with insistent 
regularity. The metronome is only small, almost invisible. In fact, were it not for its effect on the pianist I 
might have never discovered it. As I reach to touch it, I find it to be cemented onto the piano, rotated away 
so that the pianist cannot change the settings. The metronome is white. Nobody’s name is written on it but 
is does feature a plain blue logo on the front. I wonder who made it? Who cemented it that way around? 
Who set the tempo? Isn’t this a bit fast? 
The dancefloor is a circle. In fact, it is a white circle, with that same blue logo in the middle of it. An alarm is 
set off when too many people step on it. People round the edges are wearing white and green and move 
cautiously. Curiously, they have paint on their hands and a look of anxiety on their faces. People in the middle 
wear grey, pyjama-like outfits whether it is day or night. All pyjamas have the same blue-and-white 
embroidery. They dance energetically and always have clean hands. This must be a ballroom dance, as 
people pair up for a few moments, holding hands, and then move on to a new partner. People in green and 
white only dance when the pyjama people arrive and initiate. The dancers in pyjamas seem concerned for 
dancing to be done properly; they are quick to spot when someone’s dancing is out of step. Once dancing 
together, though, it becomes unclear who is the ‘lead’ and who is keeping in step. 
At the other side of the dancefloor, people are dancing in a very different fashion. Rather than holding onto 
each other’s hands, they are facing opposite each other. Rather than dancing to the pianist’s music, each 
dancer is wearing a headset. This must be a silent disco, in which each dancer is tuned in to one of three 
music channels playing through their headset. What music is best to dance to? Each channel is selected by 
pressing a button of a different colour: blue-and-white, grey or multicoloured. However, each channel’s 
music is playing to a different beat! As a result, the dancing on this side is chaotic and unpleasant.  
On the piano side of the dancefloor, the contrasts were co-ordinated and reconcilable. On the headphone 
side, though, the contrasts are clashing and irreconcilable. The way people dance together on this dancefloor 
is either in noisy harmony or silent cacophony. 
7.4.2 Working together to alleviate need 
In the previous chapter, I described the aim of an AMS as to restore order. In this chapter, I have described 
how people relate to one another in the pursuit of this aim: people work together to alleviate need. Just as 
the aim of an AMS turned out to be a complex of three goals, so the notion of ‘need’ has turned out to be a 
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complex of three kinds of need: professional, personal and organisational. Sometimes these needs are 
contrasting but harmonious; they can be reconciled. At other times these needs are contrasting but 
cacophonous; they clash and a need is overtly frustrated. It is within this context that people within an AMS 











Chapter 8. What’s Best 
In the previous two chapters, I presented data organised around two themes. In Restoring order, I portrayed 
the aim of an AMS as to restore order by addressing three kinds of problem (deviation, distress, disruption). 
A course of action is sensed to be futile if it fails to address one of these kinds of problem.  
In Working together, I described the relational aspect of the work of an AMS. Specifically, people within an 
AMS work together to alleviate need. Three kinds of need were identified (professional, personal, 
organisational). The contrasting forms of interaction are usually harmonious but can be experienced as 
cacophonous when a course of action overtly frustrates one of these kinds of need. 
The findings of these two chapters provide the background for the focus of this present chapter: how do 
people figure out what course of action is best? In this chapter I present data organised around the theme 
what’s best. It is in this chapter that values become more apparent and, specifically, what their role is in 
decision-making within this AMS. I progress towards this point in four steps.  
Firstly, I consider the connections between the key concepts in the previous two chapters: problems, futility, 
need and cacophony. Secondly, I describe moments of conflict in decision-making and characterise this as a 
conflict between two values. Thirdly, I identify a third value which is also in play albeit less conspicuously. 
Fourthly, I use these three values as a model to explain the difference between obvious and negotiated 
decisions. 
8.1 From problems and needs to values 
8.1.1 Problems and needs 
Problems and needs have come in threes. In Restoring order, I presented three kinds of problem: deviation, 
distress and disruption. These three formed a triad of problems which ought to be put back in order to avoid 
futility. In other words, problems are things that need to be corrected. More precisely, perhaps, problems 
are things that people need to correct. 
In Working together, I presented three kinds of need: professional, personal and organisational. These three 
formed a triad of needs that ought to be alleviated in order to avoid cacophony. In other words, a need is 
something which poses a problem. More precisely, needs are things that people experience as problems. Just 
as a problem without correction is in need; a need without correction is problematic. Problems are needs 
and needs are problems; both are things that ought to be corrected. 
Before claiming absolute synonymy, I concede that the two terms nevertheless may have a difference in 
emphasis. Chapter 5’s ‘problem’ emphasises the circumstantial aspect of an uncorrected need: a situation 
which is disordered. Chapter 6’s ‘need’ emphasises the phenomenological aspect of an uncorrected 
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problem: an experience which people work together to alleviate. Perhaps it is most accurate to consider the 
two terms to be relatively synonymous in that they are two perspectives on a very similar thing: something 
that ought to be corrected. 
If this is so, then it comes as no surprise that both problems and needs have come in threes. With two 
different emphases, the themes of restoring order and working together have overlapped by both describing 
things-that-ought-to-be-corrected within this AMS. 
8.1.2 Futility and cacophony 
In similar fashion, it comes as no surprise that ‘futility’ and ‘cacophony’ have come in threes. Futility is sensed 
when there is unavoidable conflict between problems. Cacophony is sensed when there is irreconcilable 
clash between needs. If problems and needs are perspectives on things-that-ought-to-be-corrected, then 
the three kinds of futility are relatively synonymous with the three kinds of cacophony, albeit with a 
difference of emphasis. Just as needs are problematic, so cacophony is futile.  
8.1.3 Things-that-ought-to-be-corrected and values 
As things-that-ought-to-be-corrected, problems and needs are therefore value judgments in the negative 
tone of voice. The thematic exploration of restoring order and working together has thus been an exploration 
of negatively valued things, made more prominent in conflicting moments of futility and cacophony. But how 
do people know what to do about these negatively valued things, such as problems and needs? Building on 
the previous two chapters, we can pose the question as follows: how do people figure out what course of 
action is the best way of working together to restore order? 
This question is a question about values. It concerns how people judge what is good (and even best). In such 
a goal-oriented environment as the AMS, these judgments may relate to problems: perhaps what is best is 
what restores order? In such an interactive, collaborative environment as the AMS, these judgments may 
relate to needs: perhaps what is best is what alleviates need? However, both these questions presuppose 
some kind of evaluative standard or criterion: a means of discerning whether a course of action restores 
order or alleviates need the best. This search for evaluative criteria, or values, will be the ultimate focus of 
this chapter. What is the role of values in how people figure out what course of action is the best way of 
working together to restore order? 
8.2 Tension in decision-making 
Moments of tension in decision-making can bring values to the fore52. In the following section, I describe five 
types of tension in decision-making which can be characterised as a conflict between two recurring values.  
 
52 This phenomenon has come to be known as the ‘squeaky wheel principle’ (Fulford, 2004: 206). 
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8.2.1 Paternalism vs. advocacy 
Kylie is a very experienced palliative care nurse, who visits the AMS to offer a liaison palliative care service. 
Whilst any patients she sees remain under the responsibility of the acute medical team, she is there “to liaise 
and there to advise” [Kylie, 222]. Kylie walks briskly onto the ward with a cheerful demeanour and places 
her notepad on top of the notes trolley [6b]. Turning to me, she explains that she’s here “to see the 
gentleman in room 3, Mr Whitehead53, who’s a man with terminal metastatic disease and a difficult home 
set-up”  [6b]. In interview, Kylie described the events leading up to her coming to see Mr Whitehead: 
He’d been known to the palliative care team back in November, when he was initially diagnosed with 
a radiological diagnosis of a likely lung cancer with mets [metastases]… he’d come in with increased 
shortness of breath and looked very frail and cachectic. Acute medicine team had given him antibiotics 
and some oxygen and he was feeling a little bit better on the first day when I met him. He was referred 
to me for some pain control issues. [Kylie, 6-18] 
Before entering Mr Whitehead’s room, however, Kylie indicated to me that there might be other issues going 
on. There was not yet a plan for where Mr Whitehead would go after hospital “and I’m just a bit worried; he 
looks like he’s dying” [6b]. She sensed that going home might be a complicated arrangement: 
Unfortunately his son, who had moved in with him, he had died at Christmas… He didn’t die at home; 
he died at hospital. But that had been a very rapid deterioration. And there were still two teenage 
grandchildren living at home with their grandad. [Kylie, 21-26] 
“Now Mr Whitehead lives with his grandsons, two of them, with a package of care that maybe isn’t 
that suitable”. [6b] 
We walk into Mr Whitehead’s room, where the sunrise is glowing through the long vertical blinds. Mr 
Whitehead himself is sitting on his bed: one foot in, one foot out.  
Mr Whitehead was an elderly, frail-looking man who was extremely thin. He had long, wiry, white 
hair which was un-combed, which gave me the impression he did not care much what he looked like. 
Perhaps out of weakness, he was slumped to his right-hand side and seemed unable to hold his head 
up vertically. He wore a white vest, clearly visible as his gown was undone at the front. [6b] 
As she placed her plastic chair beside Mr Whitehead’s bed, Kylie opened the conversation with a friendly 
tone: 
“I’ve come to have a bit more of a chat with you” [6b] 
 
53 Kylie and Mr Whitehead’s interaction was presented previously (see: Chapter 6 Distress and Disruption). 
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As Kylie had left the topic of conversation fairly open, Mr Whitehead started talking about his family 
circumstances, and his sadness at losing his son. Mr Whitehead had a fentanyl patch in place, to treat his 
severe and chronic pain. Despite being asked to tend to pain control, Kylie described a shift in priorities: 
When I went to see him, pain wasn’t his biggest problem, and then it was more about his social 
situation and his desire and want to be at home if he was dying.  [Kylie, 18-20] 
Kylie continues: 
The patient himself wanted to be at home… The day that we went to see him, he looked just like he 
was not improving. He was in bed, he was frail… It felt like, based on the conversations that I’d had… 
that home was very important to him – to die at home. He had capacity and we felt that – I felt that 
I should help to move things forward as quick as possible… It was more based on the fact that he was 
clearly not improving and we knew what his expressed wish to die at home – and looking at him 
looked like things could deteriorate quite quickly. [Kylie, 27-38] 
As Kylie recounts, Mr Whitehead expressed a wish to be at home when he dies. From this moment on, Kylie 
felt that she should “move things forward” to arrange this. This involved expressing her concerns to the AMS 
ward team: 
My concern was that he would run out of time… what are we keeping him in hospital for if home is 
where he wants to be? That’s when it was our priority.  [Kylie, 69-71] 
Towards the end of their conversation, the priority of discharge destination over further acute care was 
clarified: 
“Are you the kind of person who wants us to just be open and honest with you?”, Kylie asked. Mr 
Whitehead replied “Sometimes.” Kylie followed this by describing the outlook of his metastatic cancer, 
closing with “it’s unlikely that we’re gonna get you any better.” This seemed to trigger a moment of 
energy from Mr Whitehead, who immediately replied “I don’t want to get better; I want to die!”
 [6b] 
Rather than continuing intravenous therapy and other acute care in hospital, Kylie considered the priority in 
this situation to be to ensure Mr Whitehead is discharged quickly so that he is at home when he dies. This is 
an urgent priority because Mr Whitehead’s health is deteriorating rapidly and he wants to die; he is one foot 
in, one foot out. The reason for this being so important is because it was “very important to him to die at 




However, when it came to arranging a package of care for Mr Whitehead, Kylie’s approach was slightly 
different. 
 I negotiated with him what would be appropriate. [Kylie, 98] 
Kylie sat on the plastic chair, leaning forward with interest as Mr Whitehead described the circumstances 
and rhythm of his household. 
He said night times were very important because he felt that that’s what had led to this admission to 
hospital, because he didn’t have a carer overnight, he’d got more breathless and he couldn’t summons 
help from the family members who were in the house. So that’s what he felt. So to him, that’s what 
was important to him. So he wanted overnight help. [Kylie, 99-103] 
Kylie, however, felt that daytime was more of a concern than night-time; Mr Whitehead’s grandsons were 
around at night. She knew the logistical restrictions that would accompany Mr Whitehead’s wishes, thanks 
to having “twenty-something years of experience and [knowing] the systems”  [Kylie, 95]: 
I said “well, if you have overnight help we probably won’t be able to get you care all day through the 
day. We could probably put in three times a day care, with some gaps in-between that.” [Kylie, 103-
105] 
After some further discussion, they came to an agreement. As Kylie says: 
So I negotiated with him: three times a day care from a care agency, with two visits from a district 
nursing service, a telephone contact to rapid response from palliative care, and someone there all 
night every night. He was happy with that. He felt that was maybes a bit too much, when I asked him. 
He said “well [sigh]”. I said “well let’s go with that, and we can reduce it if need be.” [Kylie, 107-
111] 
Here was an instance of Mr Whitehead’s wishes being both directive and subject to negotiation: directive 
with regard to location, and negotiable with regard to the package of care. Kylie describes some occasions 
when location of death is also open to negotiation: 
We often… try to guide people. If we think that home is gonna be difficult, whether that’s because of 
their uncontrolled symptoms or the lack of resources to be able to give them 24 hour care or because 
their family aren’t gonna cope- are gonna find it really really difficult because there’s a high chance 
they’re gonna have an awful death based on what’s going on. We might really try to steer them 
towards home not being the right place, and offer them the other options up. And we do that quite 
creatively! [laughs].  [Kylie 142-150] 
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This ‘steering’ involves painting a mental picture for patients: 
By “home will be like this [gestures demonstratively with hands], and it might be – and at the minute 
you can ring a bell and someone’s with you within a couple of minutes. You would make a telephone 
call or ring a care call alarm and someone might get to you within two hours. Your family members 
might observe you in pain or distress, or die in the time waiting for somebody to come to see you. 
Would you want your family to see that?”... I talk about being open and transparent but, I don’t know, 
I think sometimes we use it to try and guide people as to what’s right for them.  [Kylie, 150-158] 
Kylie’s account of figuring out what’s best for patients involves both advocating for what’s important to them 
as well as guiding them towards “what’s right for them.” She explains: 
It comes down to your own beliefs about what you would want, what you would want for your loved 
ones, what you would want. I think you build up some of that. I’ve got staff in our team who are total 
patient advocates and no matter what the scenario is, they will be 100% patient advocate… So they 
will just: patient says they want to be at home, they’ll do anything possible to get them home.
 [Kylie, 168-175] 
The desire to ensure patients’ wishes are realised and the desire to do what’s right for them are two desires 
which can pose a dilemma: 
It does give you a dichotomy… advocacy is probably the first value that we try to instil in our palliative 
care team members, and then paternalism come in a bit later on! [laughs]  [Kylie, 181-183] 
Whilst Mr Whitehead’s interaction with Kylie teases out an important conflict in the decision-making 
process. As she puts it, it is a tension between “advocacy” and “paternalism”. On the one hand, the advocacy 
approach seeks to respect Mr Whitehead’s wishes; if it is important to him to die at home, then it is 
important to the team that Mr Whitehead dies at home. “If it matters to you, it matters to us”, as the poster 
puts it [1a]. 
On the other hand, the paternalism approach seeks to do what is right and, where this conflicts with a 
patient’s wishes, it is the patient’s wishes that the paternalist tries to change: “to try and guide people as to 
what’s right for them” [Kylie, 158].  
In times when there is a conflict between what course of action the patient thinks is best and what course 
of action the clinician thinks is best, advocacy and paternalism bifurcate. According to an advocacy approach, 
the clinician’s opinion yields to the patient’s wishes, which are paramount. According to a paternalist 
approach, the patient’s wishes are to be negotiated towards the clinician’s knowledge of what is right.  
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The conflict between advocacy and paternalism, here, can be characterised as a conflict between bioethical 
principles. According to an advocacy approach, ‘respect for autonomy’ trumps ‘beneficence’ or ‘non-
maleficence’. According to a paternalist approach, however, the order is reversed. Likewise, the tension that 
Kylie exhibits and articulates can be characterised as a conflict between values. An advocacy approach 
cherishes the value of choice; getting what you want is a good thing. A paternalist approach cherishes the 
value of welfare; getting what helps you flourish is a good thing.  
How Kylie selects what the priority of treatment is and how she arranges carers for Mr Whitehead at home 
are two conflicting approaches. This conflict is similar to that between the decision-making of younger and 
more experienced palliative care team members. It is the conflict of advocacy versus paternalism. In terms 
of values, it is a conflict between choice and welfare. 
8.2.2 Wellness vs. wishes 
The tension between what is important to the patient and what the professional says is right is experienced, 
from a patient’s perspective, by Mike. Yesterday, Mike came to hospital short of breath and hypothermic, 
and is being treated for a chest infection. He is lying in bed attached to a drip for intravenous antibiotics. The 
consultant-led ward round has just passed. Despite having hopes of being back home today, Mike was told 
that he is not fit for discharge today. Immediately afterwards, he shared with me what he was thinking. He 
gazes down to the floor as we talk, looking bored and despondent. 
I’m not stopping in much longer like. I’ve had enough, oh aye. [Mike, 35-37] 
Mike describes a limit to how long he would wait in hospital under medical advice: 
Well it’s me birthday for a start on Saturday. I’m not sitting in here, you na what I mean, when it’s me 
birthday. [Mike, 39-40] 
I could gan yem [go home] now if I want. You na what I mean? They can’t stop us. I’ll discharge meself 
but I cannot see the point.  [Mike, 97-98] 
Mike summarises his plan: 
I’m gonna sit and listen to what their advice is… see what they’ve got to say… God knows when I’m 
gonna get yem like…   [Mike, 108-112] 
I’ve got a choice, ya na what I mean? They’re not forcing us or anything like that, you na what I mean? 
But I mean, even tomorrow, if it boils down to it, I’ll just have to walk yem. [Mike, 118-120] 
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On the other side of the ward, Heidi is also frustrated that her admission has lasted longer than expected. 
She fidgets as she speaks, anxiously awaiting the consultant-led ward round to tell her whether she can be 
discharged home today: 
Because I’m not a doctor ‘n that and even if I looked at the scan results I wouldn’t know what’s going 
on, so I have to have the faith and the trust in the doctors that are specialising in what they’re doing. 
So more they’re gonna you know tell me what’s best and what’s not best. Obviously I’ve got to tek 
that into consideration and listen because even if you showed me the scan results I wouldn’t be able 
to read it and know. So I just tek it as face value that what I’m being told is what’s being told. 
 [Heidi, 136-141] 
Whilst Heidi has faith in the doctors to tell her “what’s best and what’s not best”, she also takes what they 
say “into consideration” and exercises a degree of choice: 
Well I could [go home] because I’m an adult and I could discharge meself if I wanted to. But then if 
I’m at home with me daughter and owt goes wrong, that falls back on a 12 year-old and I can’t do 
that. [Heidi, 70-74] 
Both Mike and Heidi recognise their right as adults to self-discharge but are following medical advice for the 
moment instead. In considering whether to stay or go, they both are balancing their wishes with concerns 
for their wellness. This balance is not clear-cut, however. Whilst both Mike and Heidi desire to go home, they 
also desire to be well. Thus, it is not a simple balancing act of wishes-against-wellness. There is an indication 
in both accounts, however, that their autonomy, as adult patients, cannot be undone by medical authority: 
“They can’t stop us”, says Mike; “I’m an adult and I could discharge meself if I wanted to”, says Heidi. They 
can accommodate medical advice for the present time, taking it into consideration. However, if their 
patience is stretched too far, Mike and Heidi’s choice would trump medical concern for their welfare: “if it 
boils down to it, I’ll just have to walk yem [home]” (Mike). 
8.2.3 Safety vs. preference 
I have so far presented the conflict between choice and welfare in two manifestations: advocacy or 
paternalism, wishes or wellness. I now turn to a third way this conflict manifests: preference or safety. 
Maureen has been sitting in her cubicle since Fergus the pharmacist and his assistant left. She is waiting for 
visiting time, when she can finally spend time with her family and partner, who live far away. Although it is 
her preference for visiting hours to be extended for her family, her preference is not accommodated. She 
describes a similar pattern occurring with regard to her medications: 
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I do feel frustrated when I look in my pot [for medications] and I think well, I don’t even know what 
I’ve got anymore. Because I do like to know. But there has been times when I’ve thought “well I am 
not takin’ that!” [thumps table, laughs]. [Maureen, 95-98] 
Maureen describes how she wants to be in control of her laxative medications, and is frustrated if she cannot 
administer them according to her own judgment: 
[The tablet] softens things up a bit. And I had had enough, d’you know?! I was like “no, I don’t need 
it anymore!” But [the nurses] still give you it. They don’t ask if you want it. You still get given it. And I 
thought “well, I don’t want it, I don’t need it.” [Maureen, 103-105] 
However, there are other medications which Maureen is quite happy to be administered or denied without 
any accommodation of her preference. She describes what happened with regard to some kidney-related 
medications: 
Basically “we’re not giving you this, we’re not giving you this, we’re not giving you this, and you will 
take that.” And I just do it. Because they’ve been in touch with the Lighthouse so I know that the renal 
team are the ones that are sorta like leading the way. So and I mean they’re the ones I rely on to keep 
me fit and well. So I was quite happy to go along with things. [Maureen, 88-91] 
The Lighthouse Hospital is the specialist hospital which is responsible for the management of Maureen’s 
renal transplant. From Maureen’s point of view, there are two different types of tablets: laxative-type 
tablets, about which she “would like to know” and use her discretion, and renal-type tablets, about which 
she “is happy to go along with things”. 
Fergus the pharmacist spoke with me afterwards about his interaction with Maureen, in which medications 
were reviewed and changed. 
Laxatives patients refuse all t’ time. T’ nurses will tell “oh it’s a laxative” and they’ll go “well I don’t 
want to take that.” If you see refusals for drugs, if you ever look at drug charts and what patients 
refuse: painkillers ‘n laxatives! [Fergus, 351-353] 
Fergus goes on to describe how staff respond to this: 
So a nurse will usually encourage more heavily to take normal meds than they would laxatives or 
painkillers. So you do see that, I don’t know if that affects it. Also from a pharmacy perspective, 
laxatives aren’t [whispers] something you really care about! They’re something you buy over t’ 
counter. They’re not high-risk meds.  [Fergus, 355-358] 
Like Maureen, Fergus indicates two types of medications: 
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So from a nurse’s perspective, they don’t really care about “oh they’re not taking their laxatives, 
they’re not on any paracetamol but they do need their antibiotics.” And how you come about a 
patient, especially elderly patients, how you come to them and how you talk about medication is very 
different. So for example, a good example is tablet size. Patients hate- a lot of antibiotics are huge 
tablets. Patients hate them. So they’re very quick to go, if the nurse thinks they’re in any way 
struggling or would take a liquid easier, they’ll come to you and ask for liquid very quickly. Because 
in- because they’re part of a critical meds list, because they’re deemed important treatment, by 
nursing staff by everyone, you don’t want patients refusing antibiotics, so you want to encourage 
differently.  [Fergus, 372-380] 
Whereas laxatives are a type of drug which nurses reportedly “don’t really care about”, antibiotics are a type 
of drug which is “important treatment” on a “critical meds list”. Fergus goes on to describe the process of 
figuring out what is best for medicating patients: 
There’s a default for safety. So if your kidneys aren’t working, literally [pharmacists] will slash and 
burn. They will. Sorta like “no no no, that’s off limits”. And that’s never almost never discussed with a 
patient because they are just made. Look at t’ drugs, a decision is just made.  [Fergus, 
254-256] 
A decision is made immediately to cross off kidney-harming medications in circumstances of kidney failure. 
On the basis of safety, such drugs become “off limits.” Fergus describes what happens if a patient would like 
painkillers which are harmful to kidneys: 
So if you had… NSAIDs [non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs]. Because they’re ones that are very 
nasty for- very nephrotoxic [harmful to kidneys], but patients quite like it for the painkiller effect. And 
they are automatically default stopped because they’re so nephrotoxic.  [Fergus, 269-272] 
Despite a patient’s wishes or preference for a medication, if it is harmful then the medication is 
“automatically default stopped”. Fergus continues to describe how this is enacted in practice by pharmacists: 
I’ll be honest, if it’s me I’m usually having a conversation. I’m telling them “it’s because it’s damaging 
your kidneys. We will not be giving it.” Usually, from my perspective, I think pharmacy is very much 
so much more cut ‘n dry. Usually if we’re telling a patient, we’re telling them “it’s stopped for this 
reason.” And it’s usually a discussion of “there are other painkillers we can use and we’ll look at them.” 
So say for example, it will be “we’ll try ‘n give you other painkillers instead.” But if you’re kidneys are 
damaged, certain drugs are pretty cut ‘n dry. However much you like them! [Fergus, 275-281] 
Fergus summarises his approach to this conflict in terms of value judgments: 
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Patient safety always beats patient choice. However much they like their opiates [a class of 
painkillers], if your kidneys aren’t working you actually need to change your opiates and that’s it.
 [Fergus, 284-286] 
From Fergus’ perspective, a patient’s request for a painkiller or laxative medication is of secondary 
importance compared to protecting their kidney function. Their wish for laxative-type drugs is a matter of 
choice; the damage to their kidneys is a matter of safety. “Patient safety always beats patient choice.” 
With regard to communication, Maureen’s priorities are the inverse of Fergus’ priorities. The laxatives that 
he “[doesn’t] really care about” are precisely the drugs she wants to know about. With regard to values, 
however, it seems Maureen’s priorities match up with Fergus’s priorities. When it comes to drugs which are 
a matter of her welfare (described in terms of safety), she is willing to forgo her involvement; her preferences 
concede to the higher priority of needing to be kept “fit and well” by the Lighthouse hospital’s renal 
medication. Just as “patient safety always beats patient choice”, so the value of welfare in this instance beats 
the value of choice. 
8.2.4 Best interests vs. capacity 
So far, I have characterised three decision-making tensions as manifestations of a conflict between two 
values: choice and welfare. The next tension I describe is one which relates closely to the experience and 
management of patients who are classed as mentally ill within an AMS. 
At 4 o’clock in the afternoon, I walked onto the ward and observed an interaction which struck me as both 
comic and tragic. The door of cubicle 15 was open but guarded. The guard was the smallest person on the 
ward: a healthcare assistant called Kerry. Kerry is a short, thin, middle aged woman who is seated on a little 
plastic chair at the doorway. She is wearing the typical brown top and trousers of healthcare assistants and 
facing away from the cubicle. What is remarkable about her appearance, however, is her posture. One of 
her skinny legs is extended horizontally across cubicle 15’s door and resting on a plastic chair which is 
positioned at the other side of the doorway.  
As such, her little leg was functioning as a barrier. She was leaning against the back of her plastic 
chair in a relaxed posture, checking her hospital handset at the same time. [7d] 
Inside the cubicle, a teenage girl was pacing up and down agitatedly. She intermittently muttered something 
to the healthcare assistant which I couldn’t quite hear. But the little healthcare assistant’s voice boomed 
back, speaking over her shoulder: 
“Well you can’t. It’s for your own good.” [7d] 
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Whilst it seemed tragic that this teenage girl was trapped in the cubicle, the manner in which she was 
enclosed seemed to me to be a little amusing in its absurdity: 
This tiny healthcare assistant with her leg extended across two plastic chairs was a symbol of power: 
[the teenage girl] was not free to leave across this psychological barrier. It struck me as a surprising 
way to symbolise power. [7d] 
What events have led to this teenage girl entering this enclosure and not able to exit the barrier? 
Another healthcare assistant called Sharon is giving me a who’s-who of all the patients in her section of the 
ward, pointing at their door as she starts the patient summary. She pauses as she points to cubicle 15: 
Actually, we’ve got one of our annual attenders in. Sorry, I mean weekly. She’s a regular attender. 
Knows all the staff. We all know her. Comes in with overdose. Paracetamol. She even took more on 
the ward once. Nice girl. In all the time. She’s currently off the ward with Ryan I think, dunno why.
 [7d] 
Sharon is in her 50s and thickly built. She speaks with confidence, holding a nurse handover sheet in one 
hand. The short sentences with which she speaks reflect the punctuated pattern of speech during handover, 
as if she may be passing on the messages that launched the day into action. 
I soon accidentally discovered where “bed 15” was, as I left the ward for lunch: 
As I walked along the corridor, I saw nurse Ryan. He was walking along, smiled at me and said hello. 
Two steps behind him walked a young woman, who appeared around 18-20 in age. She was wearing 
her own clothes: a baggy green top over white pyjama bottoms with a dotted pattern. She was very 
thin and quite small; I would guess just over 5 foot. She walked along with her arms crossed, as if 
reluctant to be here, and resentful of the company. She seemed upset, with her head directed down 
towards the floor, eyes looking up and eyebrows lowered. I didn’t say hello to her although we made 
eye contact and I guessed immediately that she must be the patient from cubicle 15. 
 [7d] 
The procession continued: 
Two steps behind her walked two security staff. They were both men, tall and big-built. They were 
dressed mostly in black and wore thick vests, which looked a bit like bullet-proof vests. They walked 
in a very relaxed fashion, almost dawdling. I found the contrast between the physique and posture of 
the woman (“bed 15”) and the security staff quite dramatic, almost amusing, were it not for the 
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serious and tragic nature of what was going on. I supposed that she was being escorted back to the 
AMS from the canteen. [7d] 
Once “bed 15” was back on the ward, I learned her name was Emily and went to see her: 
Emily was sat cross-legged on her bed, wearing her own pyjamas with a baggy green top… She sat 
upright with her back against the wall. Opposite her was a blank green wall, at which she was staring 
when I entered. In the corner of the room was an intravenous drip stand, with a partially used bag of 
fluid at the top. The drip was not attached, as if it had been started and then stopped. [7d] 
As Emily spoke with me in her cubicle, I viewed the ward from the other side of the door: 
The door was closed, and every few minutes the face of a staff member could be seen looking through 
the window and then walking on: healthcare assistant Sharon, nurse Ryan, consultant Dr Taylor. This 
I found distracting at first and looked out each time someone looked in, and then I found I just got 
used to it. I noticed that Emily would not find it as distracting as me, and would continue talking, 
seemingly familiar with being monitored in this way. [7d] 
As we started talking, Emily quickly cut to the chase: 
On Wednesday night I took an overdose of paracetamol and I live in supported living, so I was found 
by the staff. The staff then rang an ambulance. Didn’t want to come to hospital because then I’d have 
to have treatment, so then the police were called and they brought me here. And now that I’m here I 
can’t leave. The doctors have decided that I don’t have the capacity to make my own decisions 
anymore. Because I would like to leave and I don’t want the treatment. So it isn’t up to me anymore. 
I don’t really have a choice, which isn’t very nice.  [Emily, 6-11] 
She describes her understanding of “capacity” and how she has responded: 
The doctor said my mental health is affecting my ability to make decisions so therefore I don’t have 
the capacity… I think that’s what it is. They have told me a few times. I can’t remember… [I’m] upset, 
because I know that I can’t leave here. I’ve tried to leave and the security bring me back, which isn’t 
nice. Like last night, when I was forced to have treatment, I was sedated. That wasn’t very nice. But 
they say that they’re doing it in my best interest.  [Emily, 14-21] 
Over the course of the afternoon, nurse Ryan has been busily going back and forth between patient bedsides, 
the notes trolley and the Lab room where medications are stored and prepared. Even during his lunchbreak, 
Ryan spotted Emily “absconding” [7d], called security and escorted her back to the AMS. He describes his 
involvement with Emily also in terms of capacity and bests interests: 
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Well, for capacity as well. Because, I mean… we get quite a lot of patients who come in with overdoses. 
We get one regular attender who comes in with the same kind of paracetamol overdose every other 
week she comes in. And she’ll go through the same thing. She’ll come in, she’ll refuse treatment. And 
then her bloods get taken and her bloods are getting worse and worse and worse and it’s obviously 
affecting her kidneys and things like that. And her liver. And for her best interests, I speak to the doctor 
and we try and, as best as we can, to try and guide her to getting her to try have the treatment.
 [Ryan, 27-33] 
“Guiding” Emily to try treatment is often not an easy process: 
She has a lot of mental health issues going on. So it’s quite hard to engage with her sometimes 
because one minute she’ll be fine and she’ll be willing to accept the help. And the next she’ll be pulling 
her cannula out, and then that’s the treatment gone. And then she’ll be absconding off the ward, and 
you have to go and, like, try and find her. And then she’s also been found in the toilets to be slitting 
her wrists and things like that with a tiny little blade that she’s got. It looks like a pencil sharpener 
blade? Slitting her wrists in the toilet, trying to hang herself in the bathroom and things like that. 
 [Ryan, 35-43] 
Ryan describes how the clinical team work together: 
So we have to just make the decision to- as a team, as a multidisciplinary team, to kind of put best for 
patient interest in. So she can’t maybe refuse the treatment because it’s in her best interests. So we’ve 
got the psych team in, we’ve got the doctors on board. And basically it’s, it’s “you’re having your 
treatment, otherwise you’ll be in critical care.” So, yeah. [Ryan, 43-47] 
Ryan explains the justification for this approach: 
So to let her to walk off the ward would be unsafe because we know the damage that would come. 
And it’ll probably end up killing her. So, to let her walk off the ward without treatment, it’s not in her 
best interests. So yeah, you’ve always got the patient’s best interests first thing to do. So to let her to 
walk off without treatment would be, yeah, just wouldn’t be right.  [Ryan, 115-119] 
Thus, from Ryan’s point of view, letting Emily walk off the ward would not be right nor in her best interests 
because it risks damage and death. 
So if we didn’t do best interests, then she would end up, yeah, probably dying. It’s not what you want, 
especially for just a young girl as well.  [Ryan, 124-125] 
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Sharon, like Ryan, recognises that Emily is just a young girl and justifies the clinical team’s actions in reference 
to this: 
Well just to protect her really, isn’t it? She is a young girl. I think that if she got the support that she 
needs, which is – I don’t know what it is; I’m not a mental health specialist – maybe she could turn 
her life back around. She’s just young. Far too young for his. ‘cause she does seem like a nice girl.
  [Sharon, 97-100] 
Like Ryan, Sharon sees Emily as a young girl who needs support; the clinical team, amongst others, work 
together to restore order, which she conceives as follows: 
So before that [traumatic incident] she was normal. Going to work, going out with her friends, driving 
her car. This is all from that. Since she came back she just feels the support’s not there. 
 [Sharon, 79-80] 
Staff on the AMS work together to restore order to Emily’s life. This involves protecting her by not permitting 
her to leave, which is conceived as in her best interests. Emily’s choice is not directive in this situation 
because her mental health is interfering with her ability to make decisions properly. Plus, her walking off the 
ward and risking death simply “wouldn’t’ be right.” 
From the interior side of Emily’s cubicle door, many things are the other way around. Firstly, security is scary: 
I don’t have a choice. And it’s that, not having the control over yourself, that’s scary. Like security 
coming in and holding you down. That’s scary.  [Emily, 148-149] 
Secondly, living is worse than dying: 
I was once asked “are you scared of dying?” I was like “no. I’m actually scared of living!” I’m afraid of 
trying to survive. It’s hard. It’s really hard. [Emily, 259-260] 
Thirdly, help is an impediment: 
Now I’m at the point where I don’t want them to help me anymore. I hope [my liver] does fail… I hope 
it – yeah, because I’ll die. I think I’ll die. If it fails, I think I will die. I don’t know too much about it but 
I’m pretty sure you need your liver… And then if I die, I die. If I don’t then I’ll just keep taking stuff. 
 [Emily, 59-67] 
Fourthly, to care is to let go: 
At the time I was like “you aren’t listening. If yous [sic] cared about us, you wouldn’t give us that drip”. 
And they’re like “no, we’re giving you it because we do care about you”. That’s kind of how it’s been 
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the last few days. I was like “you mustn’t care about us because you’re forcing us to have that”. And 
they’re like “no, we do care about you. We’re trying to help you”… It’s nice. It’s nice that people care. 
But I just get upset because I don’t want them to care. I don’t want them to care. I want them to just 
let me go.  [Emily, 324-337] 
What is the best course of action: to let Emily go without treatment, in keeping with her choice, or to retain 
Emily for treatment, in a manner in keeping with her welfare? From Emily’s perspective, people ought to 
work together in order to restore her to a less-scared state by letting her go or letting her die. This is because 
what is important is being nice to her by letting her have a choice. Emily would like her choice to be respected 
– if only she were deemed to have capacity. 
From the perspective of staff like Ryan and Sharon, people ought to work together in order to restore Emily 
back to a normal life. Whilst some of this may not be attainable until she gets “the support that she needs” 
(Sharon), the clinical team can at least keep her alive; letting her go and risking her dying “just wouldn’t be 
right” (Ryan). Ryan and Sharon would like Emily’s welfare to be protected – a sentiment which is captured 
in their use of the term ‘best interests’54. 
Emily and nursing staff thus figure out what is best according to different, and competing, priorities. Where 
Emily values choice, staff value welfare. On this occasion, welfare has triumphed over choice on the grounds 
that Emily has an impairment of her mind and is deemed to lack capacity to make decisions regarding 
treatment and discharge. With Emily’s choice invalidated on mental health grounds, the value of welfare 
takes pole position in decisions about her care. 
This characterisation of best interests requires a final note of clarification. ‘Best interests’ and welfare here 
relate to what is seen as good for Emily, what is seen as right; what is in her best interests is “the support 
she needs” (Sharon) even if she does not want it. Whilst in this instance the pursuit of Emily’s best interests 
is the pursuit of her survival, this is not always the case. Ryan reflects on occasions when dying can be in a 
patient’s best interests: 
It’s a hard one because you’ve got people who are end of life, who are in so much pain. They’ve got 
cancer and they’re in so much pain. And they are, like- the best thing possibly is for them to die 
because, if that’s what they want. And there’s no way they’re gonna come back from it. There’s no 
way they’re gonna improve. There’s no way they’re gonna get better. You know, if they’re in that 
much pain then sometimes it is in best interests, yeah. So that’s when you withdraw treatment and 
 
54 In keeping with ethnographic methodology, I interpret the term ‘best interests’ as it is used within this social context. I recognise 
that its usage here differs in some respects from the characterisation of ‘best interests’ in legal guidance in England & Wales (MCA, 
2005; Department of Health, 2007). 
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things like that. Yeah, so end of life when you stop doing- giving them medications… You stop doing 
blood pressure and things like that… It is a tricky one. Because it’s- the cancer patient’s not- it’s not a 
mental health issue… But with mental health, it’s, you know, you’re not in the right frame of mind to 
make the decisions that you want to take your own life. [Ryan, 127-142] 
Ryan here is keen to emphasise the irreversibility of the cancerous condition, such that survival is an 
increasingly limited aim. He is also keen to emphasise the painfulness of the patient’s present state, such 
that the quality of the patient’s life experience is increasingly compromised. Here Ryan’s estimation of best 
interests involves an interplay between the two notions of survival and quality of life. This leads to the fifth 
and final decision-making tension. 
8.2.5 Survival vs. quality of life 
Like Emily, Sheila is a young woman in a cubicle who is in the AMS after taking an overdose. She is wearing 
black and is sat cross-legged and cross-armed on her bed. The lights are turned off, as if she does not want 
to be seen. Sheila’s mother is sat in the armchair beside her, leaning forward anxiously and with her hands 
together in a prayer-like position [8d]. 
Sheila is quick to share her concerns with me. She is worried she is “going mad” because thoughts keep 
“zooming” through her head in a destructive way [8d]. This has blown up recently in an explosive relationship 
break-down with her girlfriend. She struggles to put it into words at first: 
I feel like my thoughts are just- like I run away with- like I get like a small idea and it just like blows 
into this massive- she’s married to- like, she’s not even going out with her and I’m already thinking 
they’re gonna be like together for a long time and whatever else.  [Sheila, 8-10] 
Sheila connects this with her mental health: 
I just feel I know what I’m thinking isn’t right. And I just can’t- I can’t like, dunno. Just very like paranoid 
and I get really anxious all the time and feel like I can’t breathe and just don’t feel right in my head. 
Like I’m just so- I just make everything worse all the time. [Sheila, 31-34] 
I just feel like there’s something wrong with me. Something about the way I go on isn’t normal.
 [Sheila, 52-53] 
Sheila and her mother are worried that a pattern is developing of difficult relationships in the family. Sheila’s 
mother, after sharing some of her own troubles, concludes: 
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I’m not very good in relationships, [to Sheila] am I not? And what Sheila’s seen me go through, I feel 
somehow it’s been linked to how she is. Yeah, it’s repeating. And it’s not healthy... But I don’t know 
what to do. [Sheila’s mother, 109-112] 
Both Sheila and her mother shed tears as they speak with me, their voices intermittently choking up with 
sadness. After a moment’s pause, Sheila describes what it would be like for her to be well: 
I just want to be happy… I just wanna be able to deal with certain situations- I can’t deal with things. 
I can’t cope very well. I’ve got no coping mechanisms. I’ve been like, sounds stupid, I’ve been on like 
YouTube looking at ways to cope in like bad situations. I try and like be really really strong but just 
something happens and I just- like I’m fine, I’m like laughing and listening to music and then 
something just like clicks and then I just like I get like really really warm, and like I get really really 
anxious and like shaky and I feel like I can’t breathe. And then I just start like thinking things in my 
head all the time. And then I have to try and stop myself because I know it’s gonna make me ill.  
LM: Okay. So to be well would be to be free of that pattern? 
Pt: Yeah. To be, like, at peace… I just want to be happy.  [Sheila, 61-73] 
Outside the door, two doctors are gathered at the notes trolley, preparing to see Sheila. After looking at the 
red notes folder, the computer screen and the nursing measurements, consultant Dr Morrison takes the red 
folder and pulls out a pen. “Why don’t you see this one and I’ll scribe?” [8d] she says to Zoe who looks 
surprised and a little nervous but agrees nonetheless. 
I watch from a corner of the room as the interaction progresses. After a brief introduction, Zoe mentions she 
understands that Sheila has taken some paracetamol tablets. She checks how many, what time, whether 
they were consumed all at once, and whether any alcohol had also been consumed at the time. After a 
moment’s pause, Zoe checks for any symptoms since the overdose “like pain or sickness”. Sheila and her 
mother watched in silence as Zoe proceeded to “have a little look at you”, which involved Zoe feeling Sheila’s 
pulse, listening to her chest and pressing on her abdomen [8d].  
As Zoe stood up straight again, a summary and plan was described: “okay, so from a physical side of things, 
things seem to be okay. Your bloods are normal and there doesn’t seem to be anything to worry about. We’ll 
just wait for the mental health team to come and check they’re happy from a mental health side of things 
and take it from there. Does that sound okay?” Dr Morrison finished writing, closed the red notes folder, 
nodded approvingly, and the pair left the room [8d]. 
On reflection, there seemed to be a conspicuous absence of engagement with Sheila’s psychological and 
relational concerns. After all, Sheila is seeking healthcare because she wants to be “at peace” and “happy”. 
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Why the silence in this regard? How does Zoe know there is nothing to worry about? Does she care only for 
Sheila’s physical recovery (survival) rather than Sheila’s experience (quality of life)? 
This apparent disproportionality is particularly poignant in light of Zoe’s professed “ideal”: 
I think we would all say that the ideal is that all care we provide should be patient-centred. But 
realistically it probably isn’t. So I think patient-centred to me would mean that rather than treating 
someone with their diabetes or whatever the condition might be, it’s about the individual and their 
set of circumstances, which includes physical, psychological, social.  [Zoe, 272-276] 
I guess every human is an individual and has their own passions and interests and priorities, so it’s 
taking those into account rather than treating people as a condition. And therefore providing 
individual care.  [Zoe, 282-284] 
In interview, Zoe describes the importance of psychological and relational social considerations as part of 
providing individualised care. However, in consultation, this seems to be decidedly not the case. There is 
more going on here than first meets the eye, however. For this reason, I will present Zoe’s account of how 
she figures out what is best in other scenarios before returning to this interaction with Sheila. 
I saw someone else in the AMS the other week who had sepsis of some sort. And then acute kidney 
injury and they weren’t passing much urine. And they were quite elderly. And the prognosis didn’t 
look good. So they might have pulled through with treatment but we weren’t sure. And I sat down 
with his son and daughter and actually they made it very clear that he didn’t want to be here since 
his wife had died. He didn’t enjoy his quality of life as it was at the moment and actually they thought 
he was ready to die. So, yes, we should treat what we could, but actually if this was the end of his life, 
then their priority was comfort but they kind of felt like he was at a place when actually he was ready 
for that.  [Zoe, 161-169] 
Zoe recognises that life-extending treatments can be unpleasant for patients to experience: 
I was sitting there trying to decide: do I cannulate them or not? Because these things, they’re not nice. 
Cannulating people isn’t nice. Doing ABGs [arterial blood gases] isn’t nice. The things I had to offer 
are things that aren’t nice and I didn’t know whether they’d work. And I wished a decision had already 
been made about that. So it would have been easier to know how far to go. [Zoe, 184-190] 
Zoe describes having to weigh things in a balance: 
I knew that the things that I could offer would cause some distress. The patient was confused and 
drowsy and therefore doing things to them that they don’t understand what you’re doing, it’s 
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unpleasant, it’s scary. And they will be painful. They were very shut down [low blood flow to the 
peripheries] so I thought it’s unlikely that we’re going to get a cannula in easily, so we’re probably 
going to end up doing several attempts. And all these things aren’t nice. So although we could still 
treat some of his symptoms… doing things was going to cause some level of distress or harm, even if 
it was also to benefit them.  [Zoe, 193-201] 
Zoe was able to identify competing priorities by comparing this case to another case she managed recently: 
[He] was only 21 but had very severe cerebral palsy. And you do want to have that discussion with the 
family of “what is your priority?” and “is your priority surviving?” whereas with a fit 21-year-old you 
wouldn’t have thought to have that discussion. [Zoe, 219-222] 
In summary, Zoe says: 
Unless they’ve got a life-limiting condition I think we always prioritise survival. [Zoe, 226-227] 
Zoe has intimated that, where “surviving” is one priority, “comfort” or “quality of life” is another. She 
expands on what she means by ‘quality of life’: 
I think it’s what it is that is important to a person for them to get joy out of their life and enjoy- yeah, 
enjoy their life and feel like it is either worth- I guess either worthwhile or getting some kind of joy 
from it and whatever that might be to them? So that might be being pain-free, or that could be getting 
to see your granddaughter be born, or it could be living at home and not being in a care home. Like 
whatever that might be that means that you have some joy in your life and feel like you can fulfil what 
you want to in your life but I guess there’s something about it that’s a here-and-now thing rather than 
a longevity thing, I guess? [Zoe, 256-262] 
Zoe manages to summarise the conflict between priorities: 
Quality rather than quantity, I guess. So it’s different to ‘how long have you got?’ It’s more about 
‘what’s important to you?’ Now, with the life that you have now. Rather than in the future.
 [Zoe, 263-265] 
There is thus a potential conflict between extending the quantity of life and improving the quality of life, 
particularly when life-extending measures are unpleasant. According to Zoe, survival is usually the priority 
unless the patient is approaching the end of their life, at which point it is a more difficult balance. This 
balance requires acknowledging the patient as an individual person in a community and what “place” they 
are in psychologically.  
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To draw too sharp a contrast between ‘survival’ and ‘quality of life’ risks a false dichotomy. After all, if 
someone does not survive then he or she has no quality of life. Likewise, to hastily translate ‘survival’ to the 
prioritisation of welfare and ‘quality of life’ to the prioritisation of choice risks is profoundly simplistic. After 
all, a holistic conception of welfare would ensure the whole person, complete with psychologically and 
socially situated choices, fares well. Nevertheless, Zoe’s depiction of “quality rather than quantity” does 
permit the characterisation of a tension which results from choice and welfare in competition with one 
another. 
I return now to Zoe’s interaction with Sheila. In the world of an AMS, to prioritise survival is to promote 
someone’s good in the material world, the world made up of breathing lungs and beating hearts. In this 
world, it does not matter much that Sheila “gets really anxious all the time and feel[s] like [she] can’t 
breathe” because “from a physical side of things, things seem to be okay” (Zoe). If the priority is ensuring 
Sheila survives this overdose, it is more important to “have a little look at [her]” than to have a long listen to 
her. Why she took the tablets is not as important as what, when and how. What matters more than whether 
Sheila is an “individual with passions and interests and priorities”, is that her “bloods are normal and there 
doesn’t seem to be anything to worry about” [8d]. 
Survival requires the proper functioning of bodies and body parts, which can be supported to do so by 
medical interventions. In a patient with sepsis, for Zoe to prioritise survival involves the painful of inserting 
cannulas because intravenous fluids and antibiotics may be required to restore proper functioning to his 
body. It’s not pleasant for him, it’s not nice for him, it may not even have been chosen by him; but it is good 
for him. To prioritise survival is to prioritise the patient’s welfare. 
In contrast, to prioritise quality of life is to promote someone’s good in the life-world, the world made up of 
memories, experiences and hopes. Quality of life is not restricted to the currency of physiology. People have 
a good quality of life when they “get joy out of their life and enjoy their life and feel like it is… worthwhile” 
(Zoe).  
To prioritise Sheila’s quality of life is to pay attention to her desire to be “happy” and “at peace” and her 
wish to be able to “cope” and not “make everything worse all the time” [Sheila, 34]. It is to consider reasons 
and choices, not just symptoms “like pain or sickness”. It is to put a finger on her anxiety rather than a hand 
on her abdomen. In a patient with sepsis, for Zoe to prioritise quality of life may avoid intravenous fluids and 
antibiotics because the pain of inserting a cannula may compromise the patient’s joy and experience of life. 
Such measures may be ‘good’ for the physiological normalisation of human organ function but they are not 
necessarily ‘good’ for the life of the person and may not be reflective of his wishes. To prioritise quality of 
life is to prioritise the patient’s choice.  
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In interview, Zoe describes her ideal to appreciate a patient’s quality of life and thus to offer individualised, 
patient-centred care. In practice, however, she exhibits a concern for Sheila’s survival with relative neglect 
of Sheila’s quality of life. This may be a result of the division of labour and Zoe’s awareness that the mental 
health team will attend the patient after her. Nevertheless, she experiences a tension which is exacerbated 
in the pressured situation of treating the elderly man with sepsis and the 21 year-old with cerebral palsy. In 
such situations, Zoe is left unsure how to adjudicate between the competing priorities of survival and quality 
of life and their associated primary values of welfare and choice. In Zoe’s words, she “wished a decision had 
already been made about that. So it would have been easier to know how far to go” [Zoe, 184-190]. 
8.2.6 Conflict and values 
I have presented five kinds of decision-making tensions, in which decision-makers are pulled in different 
directions: paternalism versus advocacy, wellness versus wishes, safety versus preference, best interests 
versus capacity, survival versus quality of life. In each of these tensions, I have sought to demonstrate that 
one side of the dualism prioritises the value of welfare and the other prioritises the value of choice.  
This is not to claim that either ‘welfare’ or ‘choice’ fully capture the meaning of any of these terms. Such a 
reductionism would merge the five tensions into one, neglecting their subtle differences. It is to claim, 
however, that each side of a tension appeals to an evaluative standard for its justification. The ways that 
such justifications are enacted within this AMS can be broadly grouped into two: those which assess how 
good a course of action is by whether it promotes flourishing according to what is best (objectively), and 
those which assess how good a course of action is by whether it respects autonomy according to what is 
wanted. In shorthand, the former prioritises the value of welfare; the latter prioritises the value of choice. 
It could be tempting, at this point, to conclude that tensions in decision-making are simply due to a conflict 
between two values: welfare and choice. However, that would be not just simple but simplistic. Further 
interpretation of the data suggests that there is, in fact, a third value involved in decision-making tensions 
within the AMS. When it comes to figuring out what course of action is best, this third value is perhaps less 
conspicuous but equally influential. 
8.3 A third value 
I return now to the discrepancy between Zoe’s ideal of individualised care, which attends to psychological 
and relational concerns, and Zoe’s enacted care which tended only to “the physical side of things” [8d] when 
she met Sheila and her mother. A second interpretive look at this will disclose a third value which is involved 
in figuring out what is best: not just welfare and choice, but also effectiveness. 
8.3.1 ‘Half an eye on them’ 
Zoe reflects on the encounter with Sheila: 
200 
 
It was a bit of a different day. So when you turn up on the AMU, often how a day is is quite dependent 
on what consultant you have on with you because different consultants like to work differently… Dr 
Morrison wasn’t keen for me to see patients on my own… that was really unusual. So I virtually never 
go with a consultant on a ward round unless we’re going to review new patient later in the day. ‘Cause 
usually it’s more efficient for me to just go and see patients on my own. So I think actually that was 
more off-putting and kind of out of my comfort zone because I’m not used to having a consultant 
watch me see a patient unless it’s for an assessment. [Zoe, 10-17] 
The presence of Dr Morrison affects Zoe’s manner: 
I’m better when I’m not being watched. Because then I can just be more normal and myself. 
 [Zoe, 28-29] 
Zoe unpacks what the effect of having a consultant present is like: 
I find it quite difficult when you’ve got consultants because ultimately the patient is theirs and if they 
disagree with the decision you’re making, they can change that and say “I don’t want to do that.” But 
you don’t want to undermine- you don’t want the patient to lose trust in you, I guess. And you don’t 
know whether the consultant is gonna interrupt halfway through and say “actually that’s not what I 
think we should do”, or whether they’re gonna wait till you get outside, or whether they’re not gonna 
do that at all.  [Zoe, 30-35] 
The presence of a consultant particularly influences the clinical plan that is made: 
And you feel like you’re saying “this is what we’re going to do” but with half an eye on them, in case 
they say “actually that’s not what we’re going to do” and I’ve certainly been in consultations or 
assessments before when the consultant’s been like “oh actually maybe they could go home.” Or have 
interjected at that moment.  [Zoe, 38-41] 
As Zoe summarises: 
In this [encounter], at any moment [the consultant] could choose to intervene… So you’re not in 
control- I don’t feel like I’m as in control of the consultation. And I don’t feel like I’m as in control of 
the decisions. [Zoe, 45-49] 
Zoe describes the presence of a consultant, who has the authority to over-rule her at any moment, as a 
presence which leaves her cross-eyed; as she looks at the patient, she also has “half an eye” on the 
consultant, who effectively controls the decisions. 
Zoe applies her ideal to Sheila’s situation: 
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The overdose is the physical effect that you can see, but in order to provide best patient care you need 
to understand what’s underlying that in order to improve patients’ quality of life and stop them taking 
more overdoses. [Zoe, 455-457] 
The division of labour has an influence on Zoe’s approach: 
I always feel uncomfortable… because I know that they’re about to go through it in more depth with 
the mental health team who are more trained in being able to answer those questions and help with 
those symptoms and provide appropriate support, whereas often at the end of it I don’t have anything 
to offer and I know they’re about to see someone that does. [Zoe, 465-469] 
This pragmatic approach is not entirely satisfying for Zoe, however: 
But I also feel it feels superficial and odd to not mention the fact that they’ve taken an overdose, or 
just to say “are you feeling well this morning? Okay, great, we’ll get the mental health team to see 
you” feels very false. So I’m not sure what the answer is and I don’t think I’ve really found a good 
middle ground.  [Zoe, 475-478] 
Thus, in Zoe’s eyes, “go[ing] through it” may be ineffective; she is not well-trained for the conversation, has 
little to offer at the end, and Sheila will only end up going through psychological and relational issues again 
with the mental health team anyway. At the same time, Zoe recognises that this pragmatic approach, which 
reflects how the workload is divided up in the AMS, feels “superficial and odd”. Whilst this structuring of the 
workload is influential, it is Zoe’s perception of the consultant’s wishes that is ultimately determinative: 
It’s difficult when you’re being watched by a consultant because you don’t know what they expect of 
you. [Zoe, 462-463] 
I didn’t know what that consultant, who was watching me, was expecting. Some consultants are like 
“why are you bothering going into it?” and some would come out and say “you didn’t go into at all 
why they took the overdose.” So I guess probably I was also trying to do somewhere in-between.
 [Zoe, 479-482] 
Positioned beside the authoritative figure of the consultant, Zoe feels she is not “as in control of the 
decisions”. There is no point in her doing something that goes against the consultant’s wishes because she 
may be over-ruled, which may cause the patient to “lose trust” in the clinical team. Thus, the most effective 
approach is to speak to the patient with “half an eye” on Dr Morrison, echoing what she expects. 
Despite Zoe’s ideal of patient-centred, individualised care which tends to psychological and relational 
concerns, she has not spoken with Sheila about her distressing circumstances on the grounds of 
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effectiveness: it is not effective for her to duplicate the work that the mental health team will manage more 
effectively, and it is not effective for her to diverge from her consultant’s expectations. 
8.3.2 Being realistic 
Zoe identifies an additional reason why individualised care can be ineffective within the AMS: 
I guess every human is an individual and has their own passions and interests and priorities, so it’s 
taking those into account rather than treating people as a condition. And therefore providing 
individual care. The problem with that is that is more time consuming than providing standard care. 
So it’s easier to be like “you three people have paracetamol overdoses so we’re going to give you a 
NAC [infusion treatment for paracetamol overdose], and you three people are on the DKA [diabetic 
keto-acidosis] protocol and you’re at this stage of it.” That’s much quicker. Providing individualised 
care for people is more time-consuming. [Zoe, 282-288] 
Time-consuming care can be ineffective: 
We are very busy and stretched and often have multiple demands on us at work. So anything that 
takes more time tends to have a knock-on effect on other things. So it affects the speed you can get 
to the next patient on the ward round, or how many- how long it takes before you get through the 
ward round and therefore before you can go to A&E or before you can start discharging patients.
  [Zoe, 290-294] 
The value of exploring psychological and relational concerns and individual circumstances is that it enables 
the clinician to anticipate or understand a patient’s choice. After all, “you don’t want to be doing something 
that the patient doesn’t  want” [Zoe, 395-396]. However, the value of choice needs to be balanced against 
the value of effectiveness, acknowledging that the AMU is a place where staff are “very busy and stretched 
and often have multiple demands”. How about the other side of the  welfare versus choice dualism: does 
the value of welfare also need to be balanced against the value of effectiveness? To explore this, I return to 
some encounters that I have presented in earlier sections. 
Nick is the new consultant who I introduced in the previous chapter. As I presented then, he describes the 
importance of being methodical, which was reflected in his practice: 
As he opened one red folder to read the medical notes of the next patient, Nick turned to me and said 
“I tend to have the same routine for each patient: notes – blood results – imaging – obs. 
[observations]. And actually, I think you kind of have to do that to be systematic. It’s really important 
to be systematic. To make sure you don’t miss things.”  [8a] 
Nick’s opinion is echoed by his experienced consultant colleague, Charles: 
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I think my routine’s fairly standard for whatever- for whichever patient. I think that’s a safety a patient 
safety thing? … in fact if I don’t do that, I don’t feel I’ve got a good grasp of that patient. …when the 
hospital is busy clearly there’s pressure on discharge and things like that. But I think they’re the times 
when, you know, it’s almost imperative that you do stick to your routine.  [Charles, 72-76] 
Being methodical minimises the risk of missing important information and is therefore a safer approach. 
Being methodical thus is in the interests of a patient’s welfare. Returning to Nick’s account: 
“It’s all about judgment and taking risk. Managing risk is an inevitable part of it.” [8a] 
“[In this hospital] there’s lots of letters and you can go through them all one by one. But at some point 
you’ve gotta draw a line when you’ve read enough.” [8a] 
I wondered, then, why not minimise the risk as much as possible, maximising patient welfare by reading all 
the available information? Why draw a line at all? Nick responds: 
“Again it comes back to risk. There’s risk either way.” He expanded on this: “being really thorough 
and going into depth with one patient might reduce risk for that one patient, but then there’s a knock-
on risk for the patient load, the rest of the department. You’re not just managing one patient; you’re 
managing a department.” [8a] 
The point at which Nick “draw[s] a line” is a negotiated risk assessment. This negotiation is between the 
welfare of the individual patient and the functioning of the department; Nick ultimately has to do what 
works; the value of welfare needs to be balanced against the value of effectiveness. 
From a patient’s perspective, the tension between these competing priorities (welfare, choice, effectiveness) 
can also be sensed. Next, I present two instances of this. 
Maureen is a lady in her 70s (see: Safety vs. preference) whose sons and her partner find it difficult to travel 
to Middleton hospital and, as a result, the strict visiting hours on the AMU seem to her to be an impediment: 
And [in other hospitals] I’ve found that if you can have visiting times that just that guard doctors’ 
rounds and they guard meal times, but otherwise it’s quite flexible. But obviously you’ve got to limit 
as to how many people come in at a time ‘cause it can be disruptive. And I think when you’re in a 
cubicle on your own, does it matter if you’ve got a visitor or not? Because it’s different if you’re on a 
ward and there’s lots and lots a people with visitors, it can be mayhem. So, you know, I think you 
should- a bit of discretion if you don’t actually live local.  [Maureen, 13-19] 
The priority to maintain the effectiveness of the ward was expressed in powerful terms by nurse Emma in 
the previous chapter, who insisted that visiting hours be adhered to and that family members are not 
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permitted to get in the way by “asking idiotic questions” [4d]. Here, Maureen senses that the value of 
effectiveness needs to be tempered by the value of choice; she wishes staff would use a little more 
“discretion” to appreciate the validity of patient preferences, particularly for those with unusual 
circumstances such as those who “don’t actually live local.” 
I now turn to a second instance of value conflict being sensed from a patient perspective.  
Sarah the nurse is standing alongside a healthcare assistant, alcohol support worker and the ward clerk in a 
ring around the notes trolley. Their informal conversation ceases when Sarah suddenly springs into action 
whist the others stand in stunned silence. The cause for such change is the arrival of two porters who are 
wheeling a patient to be placed in cubicle 5. However, there already is a patient in cubicle 5: Gary (see: 
Chapter 6 The pressure and the pace). 
Sarah’s healthcare assistant hastily pulls across a 5-foot tall screen between the two patients. The new 
patient is on a mobile bed. He is a frail-looking, elderly man called Arthur, in his 80s, who is extremely deaf. 
With a frowning expression of concern and an agitated demeanour, he shouts “I can’t hear you!” when Sarah 
approaches his bedside [3c].  
The current patient in cubicle 5 is a middle-aged man called Gary. He is sat up in his armchair beside the 
window, looking comfortable and reading a magazine. His T-shirt, shorts and sporty watch give him an 
appearance of youthfulness. There is no opportunity for the two patients to interact, as the screen is quickly 
erected and Sarah rushes back with a proforma called “the admission” to start Arthur’s clinical journey, now 
that he is through the doors [3c]. 
A few minutes later, once the activity has settled down, I go to speak with Gary. 
“I’m very impressed with the staff here. Can’t fault them. Some of them I’ve seen on their feet for 13 
hours and then, once they’ve finished, they go round offering teas and coffees! Very impressive. Call 
you by your first name and everything.” [3c] 
Gary continues: 
I tell you what is impressive: In the morning I have a shower. Problem is, the whole bathroom gets 
very wet. Within 5 minutes, the lady comes in and mops it up! I didn’t even know they were watching 
us! I don’t know even how they knew. You don’t think they’re listening and then the next minute 
someone comes along with painkillers for you, so they were listening. [3c] 
Evidently, Gary has observed the efficiency with which tasks are carried out, in addition to the personable 
and dedicated nature of the clinical staff. He changes his tone as he points his index finger to make a point: 
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“Mind, I’ve overstayed my welcome… I’m well now. Better give the bed to somebody else. Arthur has 
come in; may as well have my bed!” [3c] 
Despite only watching in silence from the armchair by the window, Gary has picked up both the name of his 
room-mate and the pressure upon the ward as a department to make effective use of beds. From Gary’s 
point of view, his welfare is now catered for: “I’m well now”. Now it is time to be realistic; the priority of 
welfare is seemingly outweighed by another: effectiveness. 
8.3.3 Decision-making involves a triad of three values 
After drawing a conceptual connection between problems, needs, futility and cacophony, the mainstay of 
this chapter has been describing tensions in decision-making, and teasing out the value conflict which 
accompanies these moments. Decision-making tensions initially appeared to be manifestations of a conflict 
between two values: welfare and choice. However, after further consideration of Zoe, Sheila, Nick, Maureen, 
Sarah and Gary, I have identified a third value which is in play: effectiveness. Rather than simply being a 
battle between two competing evaluative standards, the conflict in values within the AMS is triadic55: people 
work together to restore order by figuring out what is best according to three main values: welfare, choice 
and effectiveness. 
8.4 Obvious and negotiated decisions 
I have described an array of situations in which people are figuring out what course of action is best, by a 
thematically organised interpretive integration of field notes with interview data. These accounts of figuring 
out “what’s best” [Alison, 15; Heidi 138] have led to the identification of three main values, the triad of which 
provides a diverse range of potential decision-making conflicts. Decision-making within the AMS involves 
responding to things-that-ought-to-be-corrected according to the dynamic interplay of three main values: 
welfare, choice and effectiveness. Having identified a triad of values, I end this chapter by taking a closer look 
at how these three values conflict: when values conflict, what happens? What does it look like? What does 
it feel like? 
8.4.1 Welfare vs. effectiveness 
Many staff in the AMS find it difficult to give examples of ‘decisions’ that they make. For example, nurse 
Victoria says: 
I can’t - because you just do them don’t you? That you don’t actually register that you’re making the 
decision… The decisions you make can be quite minor… Just how someone would transfer, or them 
 




kind of littler decisions… But even that’s still like just following a protocol. It’s not particularly, like 
what you would do off the cuff sort of thing.  [Victoria, 49-60] 
What I, as researcher, might perceive as a decision may not be experienced or categorised by participants 
as a decision. Courses of action may not be reached by a deliberative process; “you just do them”. Victoria’s 
description of this reflex, unconscious approach to decision-making resonates with the account of a 
consultant called Kiran.  
I struggle to keep pace with Kiran as he walks along the corridor. He has quickly seen the new patients 
admitted through the doors. As we go, he mentioned that the reason he is so fast in assessing patients is 
because “it’s all automatic” [7a]. I explore this idea with him as he reflects with me in the office, clicking his 
pen energetically as we speak: 
[I do things automatically] almost every day at the moment. I think sometimes ward rounds you just 
go, you just plough through. It’s difficult. It’s difficult to deconstruct it… it’s been building up a bit. 
And I’ve been a consultant for three and half years now. So you do this day-in, day-out and you get- 
you just- you don’t- I can’t- I don’t think I can deconstruct how I think. [Kiran, 79-84] 
Kiran goes on to describe two kinds of case. Firstly: 
There was someone who came in with three days’ worth of vertigo and GP and one of the other acute 
physicians had done a Dix-Hallpike manoeuvre because they thought she had Benign Positional 
Paroxysmal Vertigo. And just reading the notes, I said “you’ve had a posterior circulation stroke.” And 
the house officer was like “how on earth do you know that?” I was like “I just do because, you know, 
her vertigo’s not getting better.” And we did an MRI and it confirmed a posterior circulation stroke 
and she went off to a stroke unit. And I didn’t even examine her or whatever… You know, it just comes. 
It just comes, I think. Just over time.  [Kiran, 87-98] 
Secondly: 
If you get a complicated case, that’s when you have to think about things a lot more. [Kiran, 98-
99] 
I tend to finish my ward round quite fast when I’m on call anywhere. And I keep in the back of my 
mind the patients that I need to go back to and think over more. [Kiran, 106-108] 
In contrast to the case where he ‘just knows’ what is going on and what to do, Kiran recognises a second 
type of case: the complicated case. He gives an example of what he means by a complicated case: 
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This man here who’s got worsening of his kidney function. And the simple things would just be to 
make sure he’s got fluids written up, make sure he’s got an ultrasound booked, make sure he’s got a 
catheter. And then… afterwards you can go back and check “is his calcium normal? Does he have 
myeloma? Is his urine dip normal? Is that- has he had other bits?” You know, you can go back to it.
 [Kiran, 114-118] 
Kiran gives a justification for his approach: 
Because you’re running a unit. You need to make sure the ward round is done by eleven, half eleven, 
so that you know the ward runs rather than being stuck with a patient for an hour, and then you can 
go back and take your time with that particular patient. [Kiran, 108-111] 
In order to make sure the ward runs, Kiran manages patients in two ways. Firstly, he works quickly in 
autopilot, “plough[ing] through” in a manner that is fast but “difficult to deconstruct”. Secondly, he makes a 
mental note of cases which are complicated. These patients he will go back to “to think about things a lot 
more”, such as checking he has not missed something serious.  
The way Kiran figures out what is best for complicated cases is thus a negotiation. The time and consideration 
required for complicated cases is not set in advance, nor is it independent of other ward factors; instead, the 
time and consideration required for complicated cases is contingent upon other ward factors such as the 
needs of other patients and the time left at the end of the ‘first lap’ of the ward round. The time to “go back 
and check” on complicated cases is a negotiation between how complicated these individual patients are 
and the collective burden of other ward patients.  
This process can be described in terms of values. The simple cases are ones whose welfare can be managed 
effectively on auto-pilot; their safety is not compromised by Kiran’s efficiency because it does not take long 
for Kiran to figure out what is going on and what needs to be done. The complicated cases are ones whose 
safety is in fact compromised by his efficiency. Instead of functioning in auto-pilot, Kiran needs to go back 
and think about them. This requires a trade-off between welfare and effectiveness. 
This distinction between what is figured out automatically and what is figured out deliberatively is also drawn 
by Kiran’s consultant colleague, Dr Taylor. She also describes two kinds of case. Firstly: 
I think things are obvious when they fit that guideline or protocol, aren’t they? So that SHO-level of: 
take history, you have a diagnosis, there is a test to confirm it, there is a treatment that I know, it’s 
the right treatment, and there is a known, understood way of following you up or discharging you. 
And that’s easy, isn’t it? So you have flu, test positive. You have PE [pulmonary embolism], test 
positive. You have, you know, whatever it is. And then- and that’s great, and that’s why I did Acute 
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Medicine because the [AMS] was that. It was make a diagnosis and off you go.  [Dr Taylor, 
558-565] 
And secondly: 
I think increasingly, what comes into hospital is not single organ, single disease, single diagnosis 
driven. I think it’s multifactorial and complex. In terms of its medical disease origin but also in terms 
of its social context. And I think those decisions are much harder to make because they involve time 
to understand all of that, which we don’t have. They involve an MDT [multidisciplinary team] that 
includes patient and family, which we don’t have time to have. And there’s no right or wrong. [Dr 
Taylor, 567-573] 
Dr Taylor illustrates this contrast: 
 You know, it’s not “P.E., have NOAC [new oral anti-coagulant medication]. Evidence-based, ten 
thousand patients so it’s the right thing. Off you go”. It’s “Mmmm, you’ve got a bit of COPD [chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease] and a bit of heart failure, and you’re struggling on the stairs and you 
daughter’s really worried about your breathlessness, and she’s going away to Australia for a month…” 
There’s no pathway that says “this is how you fix this”.  [Dr Taylor, 567-579] 
This can also be summarised in terms of values. “Obvious” [Dr Taylor, 558] cases, which can be managed 
according to a ready-made pathway, are quick and simple. The best course of action, in terms of welfare, 
typically coincides with the best course of action in terms of effectiveness. However, “complex” [Dr Taylor, 
568] cases cannot be managed according to a ready-made pathway; they take time and are multifactorial. 
The best course of action, in terms of welfare, typically contrasts with the best course of action in terms of 
effectiveness; their optimal management requires “time… which we don’t have” [Dr Taylor, 571-572]. How 
Dr Taylor figures out what is best for complex cases is thus a negotiation between maximising individual 
patients’ welfare and maximising the collective ward’s effectiveness. 
According to the accounts of Kiran and Dr Taylor, the difference between what is obvious and what is difficult 
can be articulated in terms of values. Obvious decisions, which can be performed on “automatic”, exhibit 
value coincidence; the course of action which is the best according to the evaluative standard of welfare is 
compatible with the course of action which is the best according to the evaluative standard of effectiveness. 
Difficult, complex decisions require a psychological change of gear; instead of being obvious and dealt with 
in auto-pilot, they are difficult and require deliberation and negotiation. Negotiated decisions, which require 
further thought and time, exhibit value conflict; the course of action which is the best according to the 
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evaluative standard of welfare is incompatible with the course of action which is the best according to the 
evaluative standard of effectiveness. 
However, the above examples only consider conflict between two of the triad of values, namely: welfare and 
effectiveness. Does the value of choice also contribute to a psychological gear change in decision-making? 
This becomes apparent as I accompany trainee doctor Sophie. 
8.4.2 Choice vs. welfare 
During her busy shift assessing patients, answering phone calls, checking results and performing tasks, I 
notice there are some treatments which Sophie simply initiates and others which she discusses with patients. 
She sits at the central work station with her “jobs list” [5c]. Her jobs list is a miniature version of the ward 
whiteboard: a table with a row for each bed, and buzzwords of outstanding tasks which are needed during 
admission. These tasks include “D/C” [discharge documentation], “IV” [change medication to intravenous] 
and “anticoag” [anticoagulation medication]. 
Sophie battles with the interruptions of her alert-ridden hospital handset to progress through her jobs list. 
She completes a discharge letter rapidly on the computer, fills an empty box on her jobs list and moves onto 
the next task. She jumps to her feet to collect a Kardex, prescribes an intravenous antibiotic and places it 
back. That’s two boxes filled in within the space of 5 minutes. However, as she considers the “anticoag” task, 
Sophie lets out a quiet sigh as she goes to collect a red folder, checks the patient is available and then goes 
to discuss the matter with her [5c]. 
As I watched this ordinary behaviour of the completion of ward tasks, it struck me that there are some tasks 
which are work station tasks, and others which are bedside tasks; the former are generally quick and silent, 
the latter are generally slow and involve talking. Later in this shift, Sophie reflects with me on when to discuss 
decisions with patients: 
The thing is, we would never say to a patient “oh do you think I should start you on IV antibiotics?” 
You kind of just- you just would. And I think it’s sort of blurred when we have to discuss these things 
[gestures with one hand] but we don’t discuss these things [gestures with other hand], because 
obviously we’ll do that. I think it’s difficult.  [Sophie, 115-118] 
Thus, according to Sophie, there are two kinds of things. On the one hand, there are things which have to be 
negotiated with patients; on the other hand, there are things which are obvious and do not require 
discussion: “you just would”. 
In order to further explore this distinction between what is obvious and what is negotiated, consider 
consultant Tony. Like Kiran, Dr Taylor and Sophie, Tony describes two kinds of decisions. Firstly: 
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[An] easy decision, for example, would be a patient who has had an unintentional paracetamol 
overdose. So for example, someone who’s taken way too much paracetamol for their dental abscess 
and who are admitted to hospital, treated with an antidote to paracetamol, and at the point we have 
their blood tests back, if they are completely normal, it’s a very straightforward decision to say “this 
patient no longer needs to be in hospital. They need advice and we can discharge them safely”. That’s 
dead easy. Once we’ve seen those blood results, we know there’s no problem any more. That’s dead 
easy, straightforward. [Tony, 315-323] 
This decision to discharge, in the scenario which Tony describes, is considered straightforward. During his 
ward rounds, Tony adopts a similar preparatory routine to his other consultant colleagues: view the medical 
notes, the previous clinical correspondence, the laboratory results, the imaging tests, the nursing 
measurements, then the patient. In this kind of “straightforward” scenario, by the time Tony goes in to see 
the patient, he has already viewed enough; the decision to discharge is already in view from “the point we 
have their blood tests back”. 
However, it is noteworthy that paracetamol overdoses are sometimes considered difficult cases and not 
obvious. Emily, the “regular attender” (Sharon) I presented above, seems to be extremely demanding for 
staff. As well as necessitating intervention from security staff, and converting a healthcare assistant’s leg 
into a horizontal instrument of restraint, decisions about Emily’s treatment can be experienced by staff as 
not straightforward but difficult, at least on an emotional level. Ryan says: 
All you want to do is help her. And then you feel powerless. And, like, it makes you more upset when 
you can’t help her; when she’s refusing. And then you’re kinda stuck… trying and trying and trying 
and trying. You could try all day and it’ll still be the same. [Ryan 101-104] 
A key difference between Emily’s situation and the scenario that Tony is describing is that his conception of 
a straightforward case is not simply any paracetamol overdose but an “unintentional” one. Someone who 
has accidentally over-medicated their dental pain and voluntarily presents to hospital can be expected to 
want to live. The patient typically would want the medical team to minimise harm, prevent death, and aim 
to restore them back home as soon as it is safe to do so; the healthcare team and the patient are all seeking 
to restore order and conceive of ‘order’ similarly.  
In contrast, what is best for Emily was construed the other way around in her eyes compared to staff eyes, 
on the interior of the door compared to the exterior; Emily’s construal of restoring order and the staff’s 
construal of restoring order are two very different orders. One key difference between this “straightforward” 
case and Emily’s case is that in the easy case, people are working together towards the same goalposts. 
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Tony contrasts this easy, straightforward discharge decision with a second kind of decision-making scenario: 
An example of a more complex decision would be: so for example, a patient with what is perceived to 
be end-stage organ failure, such as end-stage heart failure, in a discussion regarding resuscitation for 
the patient who has capacity and in clear consciousness asks us to do everything that we can do, 
including making sure we do CPR [cardio-pulmonary resuscitation] and put them on a life-support 
machine if it comes to that.  [Tony, 324-328] 
Tony expands on why this is difficult: 
The way things are legally, that can be quite a tricky business. Because we would be potentially be 
subjecting that patient to treatment, to CPR, ventilation, whatever it comes to, that a reasonable 
body of medical opinion would say is inappropriate, unnecessarily aggressive and futile, for example. 
But if the patient has capacity to, sort of, effectively request or demand that we give them that 
opportunity. That doesn’t happen very often but it does happen sometimes. [Tony, 328-333] 
The friction that this situation can pose between people was anticipated in the exchange between Tony, Mr 
Johnson and Mr Johnson’s family, which I presented earlier (see: Chapter 7 Professional vs. organisational). 
Having sensed that Mr Johnson’s other son is likely to be keen for more resuscitative treatment, the 
conversation closed as follows:  
Tony: [To daughter-in-law] We are still actively treating [Mr Johnson] with antibiotics for an infection. 
We’ve just got to be realistic as well that we might not be able to cure everything here. [Turning to 
son] Is your brother coming in later? 
Son: Aye. 
Tony: We can have a word with him too [looking at Ling], when he comes in [Ling nods] 
Mr Johnson: I hope you win! 
Tony: [amused] me too! [6d] 
In both the scenario which Tony proposes and the scenario which I observed, there is a conflict between 
what Tony considers to be the best course of action and what the patient or family consider to be the best 
course of action. The course of action that Tony assesses to be best in terms of the patient’s welfare is not 
consistent with the course of action deemed best in terms of the patient or family’s choice. The resuscitative 
measures that they see as appropriate, helpful and worthwhile, Tony’s professional perspective sees as 
“inappropriate, unnecessarily aggressive and futile”. CPR, in Tony’ eyes, does not contribute towards the 
patient’s welfare, given their “end-stage organ failure”. However, he experiences this scenario as difficult 
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because he must balance this with the value of choice: the choice of a patient with capacity “in clear 
consciousness” or the choice of a close relative.  
The values of welfare and choice can therefore commend incompatible courses of action; this value conflict 
contributes to a psychological gear change: the decision is no longer obvious but negotiated. 
I have so far presented two examples of value conflict which contribute towards a psychological gear change: 
welfare versus effectiveness, and choice versus welfare. I now turn our attention to the final combination of 
the triad of values: effectiveness versus choice. 
8.4.3 Effectiveness vs. choice 
Heidi is the mother and grandmother whom I presented in the previous chapter (see: Chapter 7 Distress). 
She has been in the AMU for longer than she expected and there has been a lot of deliberation between 
doctors about whether she needs to have a lumbar puncture to exclude meningitis. Meanwhile, she is 
longing to be back with her family but does not want to risk any knock-on effects for her children if she could 
have infective meningitis. She feels heavily dependent on the doctors: 
I have to have the faith and the trust in the doctors that are specialising in what they’re doing. So 
more they’re gonna you know tell me what’s best and what’s not best. [Heidi, 137-139] 
After a long period of anxious waiting, consultant Charles confirms to Heidi that she is safe to go home and 
does not have meningitis. Accordingly, there is no health concern to warrant a lumbar puncture. Instead, 
Charles proposes Heidi is discharged home later today. This disclosure is met with delight:  
The mention of home seemed to light up Heidi’s face: “Today?! Eeh, you’re my favourite – you’re a 
very good doctor, you know! What a lovely doctor!” she joked. Charles laughed as he turned to walk 
out. [8b] 
In conversation with Heidi afterwards, we reflected on this moment. I asked Heidi how it would have changed 
things if Charles had said that there is no health concern to warrant a lumbar puncture but nevertheless the 
hospital has policies which enable it to run effectively, and hospital policy says that she should have a lumbar 
puncture. Heidi responded:  
Well then no I would say “no”! I would, definitely, because if there was no reason to have it that didn’t 
affect anything that was going to happen in later on then I would definitely not have it. Hospital policy 
is hospital policy. It’s not the doctor’s policy. [Heidi, 160-164] 
Heidi explained why she respects the doctor’s advice but not the organisation’s advice in this scenario:  
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Because I think the doctors are like you look up to ‘em, you respect ‘em. Because of all the medical 
knowledge that they’ve got, the years of training that they’ve had to go through. Whereas someone 
if it’s just an hospital policy someone just sat behind a desk just saying “yeah we can afford this or 
you’ve got to have this done”- so I think it’s like the trust and the respect that you have for someone 
that’s like that.  [Heidi, 167-171] 
In this somewhat artificial scenario, two incompatible courses of action are in competition. Heidi could follow 
the advice of the organisation and have a lumbar puncture or she could leave hospital without one. In this 
scenario, the former is supported by appeal to the value of effectiveness: these policies enable the hospital 
to run effectively; the latter is justified by appeal to the value of patient choice: Heidi would say “no” to a 
procedure which does not seemingly benefit her. In this imagined scenario, choice beats effectiveness.  
Interestingly, I did not observe any real instances of personal choice trumping departmental effectiveness. 
In such instances, a course of action which preserved departmental effectiveness usually triumphed. 
However, there were instances of relative equipoise, such as nurse Rachel bending the rules on visiting hours 
in the interests of patient preferences (see: Chapter 7 Personal vs. organisational): 
You’re definitely more lenient if the family are nice! And like if they’re elderly or they’ve come from 
far or whatever. [9c] 
When there is conflict between the wishes of patients and the policies of the department, it is not obvious 
what is the best course of action. Instead, the course of action is negotiated. I now explore other accounts 
of how the effectiveness-versus-choice conflict contributes to a gear change in decision-making. 
In Chapter 6, I presented an interaction between Dr Taylor and Brandon, who was reluctant to go home 
because of “trouble with the neighbours” [6c] (see: Chapter 6 Disruption futility). In the event, he accepted 
Dr Taylor’s advice to go home because he no longer had a clinical need to remain in hospital. If he had 
persisted, Dr Taylor indicated that she would likely concede to his wishes: 
He’d only re-present to A&E, which creates a load more work. So I tend to just let them stay another 
night. [6c] 
Thus, as Dr Taylor sees it, complying with the patient’s wishes would in fact be most effective for the hospital 
as a whole. 
However, there are perhaps times when conceding to a patient’s wishes to remain hospitalised without 
clinical need is in fact ineffective for the hospital as an organisation. In Chapter 6, I presented Tony’s account 
of how the “strain” of the organisation has an influence on how he figured out whether to admit Stuart 
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overnight (see: Chapter 6 Disruption futility). As Tony described, during a bed shortage the importance of 
preventing unnecessary admissions is greater. In view of the reality of this, Tony says: 
Sometimes I wonder whether this Trust should literally have a block booking of a local- a motel… a 
couple of miles away. [Tony, 181-183] 
Tony describes to me how he would figure out what is the best course of action with regard to a patient who 
does not need to be hospitalised for clinical reasons but who requests extended admission nonetheless: 
If the reasons for him wanting to stay in hospital were perhaps less objective and more along the lines 
of “well, to be honest, I’ve got a relative staying with me who I really dislike and I need to be out the 
house tonight” or something less kind of clinically relevant, I suppose. Then I would be tempted to say 
“I’m afraid that is not, you know, it’s not a reasonable use of the NHS. For us to keep you in a bed 
overnight and be your hotel overnight”. [Tony, 164-168] 
Tony justifies his over-ruling of a patient’s request: 
Because the infrastructure of this place is a hugely complex business, and is a hugely costly business. 
For every extra patient in a bed overnight in this hospital that involves probably more agency or locum 
healthcare assistance or healthcare workers, it involves more complex admin for everybody, a burden 
of things that can go wrong.   [Tony, 170-173] 
Tony is careful to qualify this principle: 
If he’s worried about falling going up the stairs, then it’s clinically relevant and an appropriate use of 
the healthcare resources, in my mind. Because if he does fall overnight and fractures his hip or tibial 
plateau or whatever it is, then that’s bad for him and it’s bad for the system and society as a whole.
 [Tony, 191-194] 
However, if there is no concern regarding his medical welfare, things are different: 
If he doesn’t like his aunty and they fall out, well, that’s not really society’s problem. And we don’t 
really need to be ploughing the very finite and stretched resources of the healthcare system into that 
personal issue that he has. [Tony, 194-196] 
This patient’s request to stay in hospital on the grounds of a “personal issue” with his aunty is out-weighed 
by the need of “the system and society as a whole” to make good use of the “very finite and stretched 
resources of the healthcare system”.  
Had the cancer patient insisted on admission overnight during the hospital’s bed crisis, Tony says: 
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On Wednesday, the way things were, I think I would have gently challenged him about that.
 [Tony, 156-157] 
In this scenario, which features a fictional embellishment of the cancer patient insisting on admission, two 
incompatible courses of action are in competition. Firstly, the cancer patient could be admitted into hospital 
overnight. This course of action may be appraised as what is best according to the value of choice; it is what 
the patient wants. Secondly, the cancer patient could be denied overnight stay and discharged. This course 
of action may be appraised as what is best according to the value of effectiveness; the hospital cannot afford 
to plough resources into all of society’s problems. This scenario thus features a value conflict. As a result, 
what course of action is best is not obvious, it is figured out by the deliberating and ‘gentle challenging’ of 
negotiation. 
8.5 Conclusion: Conflict and negotiation 
This chapter has proceeded in four steps. The first step was to draw connections between key concepts of 
previous chapters and values. Problems and needs are aspects of things-that-ought-to-be-corrected within 
the AMS. Things-that-ought-to-be-corrected are things which are evaluated negatively. But by what 
evaluative standards are such things negatively appraised? The second step identified two of these 
evaluative standards (or values): welfare and choice. The conflict between these two values was evidenced 
in various decision-making tensions. There is more to the story, however. The third step identified a third 
value which is also involved in figuring out what course of action is best: effectiveness. 
The fourth step took a psychological turn: some decisions are so obvious to participants that at times they 
are not even seen as ‘decisions’. At other times, decisions are experienced as difficult and enacted by way 
of negotiation. Difficult, negotiated decisions can be manifestations of conflict between the values welfare, 
choice and effectiveness. 
In conclusion, three values are involved in the way people figure out what course of action is the best way 
of working together in order to restore order. These values are welfare, choice and effectiveness. The same 
course of action56 can be commended as what is best according to multiple values. These instances I have 
termed value coincidence. In such moments, making a decision is experienced by participants as easy and 
obvious. However, there are also instances of value conflict in decision-making within the AMS; this occurs 
when different values commend incompatible courses of action as what is best. In such moments, making a 
decision is experienced by participants as difficult and requires negotiation. 
 
56 Or two compatible courses of action, whose amalgamation functions as a single course of action. 
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As is implied by ‘coincidence’ and ‘conflict’, values interact with one another. That is to say, the three values 
of welfare, choice and effectiveness are not independent criteria; they are operationalised simultaneously 
as a dynamic ensemble. This conceptual model of the role of values in decision-making within an AMS is 









Chapter 9. Discussion 
In the preceding three chapters I presented ethnographic and interview data that were organised around 
three themes. In Restoring order, I described three kinds of problem within an AMS, which can result in three 
kinds of futility. In Working together, I described three kinds of need within an AMS, which can result in three 
kinds of cacophony. In What’s best, I described three main values involved in decision-making within an AMS, 
which can result in three kinds of value conflict. 
This chapter progresses in four steps. Firstly, I summarise my empirically-informed interpretation of the role 
of values in decision-making within this AMS and refer to it as a trivalent approach or framework. Secondly, 
I use this trivalent framework as a means of critically engaging with clinical decision-making models that 
were explored in Chapter 3. Thirdly, I consider how this trivalent framework relates to conceptual and 
epistemological issues in the philosophy of medicine that were raised in Chapter 2. Finally, I identify ways in 
which the ‘dance’ of decision-making within an AMS can be misunderstood. 
9.1 A trivalent approach summarised 
In this interpretive account of the role of values in decision-making within an AMS, I have referred to a series 
of sets of three. I have also described each of these sets of three as a triad rather than a mere group. I start 
this chapter by summarising this model, with the intention of demonstrating that these triads are distinct 
from a group of one (monism) and distinct from a group of three (pluralism). 
9.1.1 Three problems 
As I described in Restoring order, people respond to different kinds of problem within an AMS. Firstly, there 
is the problem of deviation, which is sensed when patients (or their body parts) are not functioning as 
normal. This can take such forms as Mike’s previous alcoholism57:  
For it to become a total problem when you cannot pull yoursel’ out of it at five o’clock tea-time, d’you 
na what I mean? [Mike, 63-68] 
And Harold’s bowel incontinence: 
 Harriet: “If that’s baseline then I’m happy for him to go home.” [3d] 
 And Audrey’s abnormal kidney tests: 
 “But I’m alright. I don’t feel ill or anything!”  [Audrey, 23] 
 
57 Data excerpts in 9.1 are intended to be illustrative fragments of previously explored material. 
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In each of these situations, a problem was defined as a deviation from a perceived baseline of proper 
function. 
Secondly, there is the problem of distress, when patients (and their relatives) struggle with the psychological 
and relational impact of sickness. This was evident in Heidi’s separation from her grand-daughter : 
It just gets your heart… [Heidi, 78] 
And Deanne’s confusion at the absence of her sick partner’s family: 
“If it were my brother, I’d be here! That’s what matters now”  [9c] 
And Mr Whitehead’s reflections as he stared at the wall: 
“I’ve been in 4 days. It’s like a lifetime.”  [6b] 
In each of these situations, people experienced the psychological pain of not being with loved ones and the 
distress of not feeling at-home. 
Thirdly, there is the problem of disruption, which is sensed when the flow of patients through the hospital is 
not working. In this situation, not only are patients sick but the hospital is also sick, suffering a “bed crisis” 
[6d]. Tony described his awareness of the problem of disruption when, in considering whether to admit a 
patient with cancer: 
There’s a palpable sense sometimes of… ‘this place is really under strain’, and ‘if we don’t need to 
admit this man to a bed overnight then that would be a good thing for everybody’. 
 [Tony, 137-139] 
When staff anticipate the problem of disruption, they sense a pressure to discharge patients quickly. For 
instance, Fergus knows bed management “want the bed 5 minutes ago” [Fergus, 457], Dr Taylor reports “a 
big push of getting people home” [Dr Taylor, 24]. Even patients, such as Gary, sense the problem of 
disruption and the push to get home: “I’ve overstayed my welcome” [3c]. 
At first glance, then, this is inconsistent with goal-monism but seems quite consistent with goal-pluralism. 
An AMS addresses three goals; deviation, distress and disruption make three problems, not one. However, 
the three problems are simultaneously addressed in such a way that they are not three independent parts 
of a complicated aim; they are three interdependent aspects of a complex aim: to restore order. 
9.1.2 Triad of problems 
If deviation, distress and disruption were three independent problems, the definition of one need not rely 
on another; the successful remedy of one need not affect another; a deterioration in one need not disturb 
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another. However, this is empirically not the case within the AMS. I demonstrate the interdependence of the 
three kinds of problem with a summary of distress futility, deviation futility and disruption futility. 
The problem of distress affects the problem of deviation. As Gloria’s family discuss her treatment options 
with consultant Harriet, a turning point in the conversation comes when Bill comments that Gloria’s “got no 
quality of life” [3d]. As a result of her seemingly irreversible distress, Gloria’s abnormal physiology is seen as 
not worth correcting; extending Gloria’s quantity of life is not seen as worthwhile in view of her persistently 
poor quality of life. How problematic Gloria’s functional deviation is depends on how problematic her 
distress is; the two are not independent. 
The problem of deviation affects the problem of disruption. Following her interaction with Albert Jenkins, 
the elderly man who visits his wife’s grave without fail, Dr Taylor reflected with me about cardio-pulmonary 
resuscitation (CPR): 
It’s a treatment where you say “what am I trying to achieve here? Am I just prolonging death?” [Dr 
Taylor, 414-415] 
If a patient’s biological deviation is irreversible, this influences how much they may contribute to the 
problem of disruption. Admitting and treating patients whose deviation cannot be fixed, such as a frail 
patient who will not recover mental function following CPR, risks them getting “stuck forever” [Dr Taylor, 
530]. How problematic the ensuing disruption is depends on how problematic a patient’s deviation is; the 
two are not independent. 
Finally, the problem of disruption affects the problems of distress and deviation. Consultant Tony was 
exquisitely aware of the hospital’s bed crisis as he considered whether or not to admit Stuart, who was a 
cancer patient with fever: 
“To be honest, if there were beds I probably would have kept him in and kept an eye. But as it is, I had 
to send him home”.  [6d] 
From Tony’s point of view, the problem of organisational disruption raised the threshold required to justify 
Stuart’s hospital admission. On further assessment, Stuart’s degree of deviation did not meet this 
heightened threshold: 
I knew that he wasn’t neutropenic. I also knew he felt well in himself. And that his physiological early 
warning score… was not ringing any alarm bells. It was near normal. [Tony, 124-127] 




In interview, Tony and I explored a hypothetical variation on this scenario, in which Stuart insisted on hospital 
admission because being at home was a source of distress for him. The reason for rejecting Stuart’s request 
incorporated the strain of the hospital on this stressful Wednesday: 
On Wednesday, the way things were, I think I would have gently challenged him about that.
 [Tony, 156-157] 
Putting it more explicitly, Tony said: 
And we don’t really need to be ploughing the very finite and stretched resources of the healthcare 
system into that personal issue that he has.  [Tony, 194-196] 
Stuart (in this imaginary scenario) reported a degree of distress at going home. How problematic Stuart’s 
distress is, in Tony’s eyes, is influenced by the problem of organisational disruption; the two are not 
independent. 
Deviation, distress and disruption are three distinct kinds of problem. However, they are not three 
independent kinds of problem. Instead, they are interdependent. How problematic one of them is influences 
how problematic the others are. If the three were independent, such dynamic interaction would not occur. 
In this way, deviation, distress and disruption are not a group of three (pluralism), they are a triad. 
The three kinds of problem are analogous to three bulbs which are connected in a series circuit. Each bulb 
has a distinct place in the circuit. However, the voltage across one bulb depends upon the voltage across the 
others. Indeed, if one bulb were to blow a fuse and go out, the other bulbs may go out as well58. Thus, whilst 
distinct, they are interdependent as three-in-one: three bulbs in one circuit. 
9.1.3 Triad of needs 
In similar fashion, professional need, personal need and organisational need are not three in a group of 
independent needs; they form a triad of interdependent needs that can clash in a way that I previously 
described as cacophonous (see: Chapter 7 Cacophony). 
If these kinds of need were independent needs, they could nevertheless compete for resources. This could 
be a source of stress for staff on the AMU, who are tasked with alleviating both one need and another; this 
need and then that need. However, my interpretation of empirical data is that this does not accurately 
capture the stress of staff in situations of competing needs. Rather than simply a quantitative difficulty of 
this-need-on-top-of-that-need, there is also a qualitative difficulty of this-need-despite-that-need, as the 
following review of cacophonous moments illustrates. 
 
58 The same cannot be said of bulbs in a parallel circuit (AllAboutCircuits.com, 2020). 
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Nurse Helen was striving to meet her professional need despite her organisational need. She was in the 
middle of a busy shift: 
Quite heavy59 patients that need double attention. Quite a lot of infusions going, so it’s just trying to 
catch up and trying to chase everybody just to see what is needed.  [Helen, 5-7] 
As a result, she experiences the organisational need to ensure patients are managed efficiently and 
discharged quickly. A doctor has prescribed a dose of paracetamol that she sees as a breach of professional 
standards and a threat to her professional registration: 
Everybody can be under stress… but, as I had explained, it’s my registration. Even though it’s 
prescribed, if I give it, it’s my registration that’s on the line. So you’ve got to be able to stand up and 
say “no”… [Helen, 101-103] 
It is not simply that Helen needs to administer painkillers quickly and, in addition, maintain professional 
standards. It is that these two needs antagonise one another. The organisational need for quick delivery of 
care threatens her professional need to practise according to recognised standards; her need to practise 
according to recognised standards entails the delay of collaborating with colleagues to ensure the doctor 
prescribes an alternative.  
The quantitative stress of tending to multiple needs is exacerbated by a qualitative stress: there is a clashing 
antagonism, a cacophony, between these needs that exacerbates the stress that Helen experiences. The 
stress of alleviating organisational need depends on professional need; the two are not independent. 
Likewise, the stress of meeting personal needs can be exacerbated by simultaneously meeting professional 
needs. For example, Dr Taylor reflected on some of the difficulty in Do-Not-Attempt-Resuscitation (DNAR) 
decisions. 
On the one hand, her decision-making approach to Mr Jenkins recognised the diversity of personal need:  
[Mr Jenkins] should be at the centre of it, and not just do what doctors tell him is the ‘right’ thing.
  [Dr Taylor, 159-161] 
On the other hand, her decision-making approach to DNAR plans recognises the standardisation of 
professional need: 
It’s the clinician’s- it’s a consultant’s choice. I can’t put people on critical care if it’s the wrong thing 
to do… It’s a treatment that we’re offering and it’s not right to offer a treatment if it’s not the right 
 
59 Helen uses “heavy” figuratively here, to refer to clinical demand rather than patient physique. 
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thing to do to somebody. And I think as a clinician I think we’re legally, that’s our position. I think 
responsibly, ethically, morally, that’s the right thing.  [Dr Taylor 346-350] 
It is not accurate to simply say that Dr Taylor is tending to personal needs and also professional need; rather, 
tending to personal needs and professional needs are pulling her in different directions simultaneously, 
exacerbating the stress of this kind of decision-making. Dr Taylor does not simply deal with one in addition 
to the other; she deals with one despite the other. Personal need and professional need are not independent. 
Finally, the stress of meeting organisational need and the stress of meeting personal need are also influenced 
by each other. Due to the organisational need to complete his ward round swiftly, Tony recognises he had 
to cut out some more personal elements of his consultation with Mr Johnson: 
I don’t know if I really gave him the opportunity to voice what his main priorities are. 
 [Tony, 296-304] 
From Maureen’s point of view, the strictness of the AMS visiting hours represented a clash between 
organisational need and her personal need: 
Obviously you’ve got to limit as to how many people come in at a time ‘cause it can be disruptive. And 
I think when you’re in a cubicle on your own, does it matter if you’ve got a visitor or not?... So, you 
know, I think you should- a bit of discretion if you don’t actually live local.  [Maureen, 15-19] 
In such situations of cacophony, one kind of need is pursued not simply in addition to another but despite 
another. As with problems, the set of needs is like three bulbs in a series circuit; each has its place yet they 
form one circuit in which each influences the others. Professional need, personal need and organisational 
need are distinct yet interdependent; they are a triad. 
9.1.3 Triad of values 
Values are standards by which things-that-ought-to-be-corrected within an AMS are appraised. Problems 
and needs are also ways of portraying things-that-ought-to-be-corrected within an AMS, albeit with different 
emphases (see: Chapter 8 From problems and needs to values). It is unsurprising, then, that the relation 
between values is, like problems and like needs, triadic. In what way does the interdependence of welfare, 
choice and effectiveness distinguish them from a pluralist framework? 
In a straightforward pluralist framework, appraisal of a situation by one value can conflict with the appraisal 
of a situation by another value. Indeed, this was an essential feature of my argument for the inadequacy of 
value-pluralism (see: Chapter 2 Value pluralism). However, my interpretive analysis of empirical data from 
this AMS identifies a feature that distinguishes welfare, choice and effectiveness from a straightforward 




I return briefly to consultant Tony as he considers whether or not a DNAR form should be completed for Mr 
Johnson (see: Chapter 7 Personal vs. organisational and Chapter 8 Choice vs. welfare). In this situation, Tony 
made a decision to complete the form and decline CPR because, in his words, “we’ve just got to be realistic… 
that we might not be able to cure everything here” [6d]. Speaking in interview, this decision was justified in 
terms of welfare; the alternative would be: 
…subjecting that patient to treatment, to CPR, ventilation, whatever it comes to, that a reasonable 
body of medical opinion would say is inappropriate, unnecessarily aggressive and futile. 
 [Tony, 329-331] 
However, Tony’s welfare assessment entails an assessment according to the value of effectiveness. Recall 
the conversation with Mr Johnson: 
Tony: If and when things take a turn for the worse, I think we shouldn’t be trying to restart your heart. 
Mr Johnson: “Shouldn’t?” 
Tony: It wouldn’t work. 
Mr Johnson: That’s nice to know. [smiles – unclear if being sarcastic or relieved] [6d] 
 The concern that CPR “wouldn’t work” is a concern that CPR would not be effective; Mr Johnson may not 
make it off the ventilator or may not make it home. As Tony explained:  
In my view it would not be appropriate to put him on a life support machine to try and get him through 
that. And that’s based on my experience that patients with significant symptom burden from their 
lung disease, which he had, because he’s breathless walking a couple of yards. That if he became so 
poorly that he needed organ support on a high dependency or intensive care unit. If it got that point, 
the chance of him recovering to have what most patients would consider a meaningful existence – 
quality of life at home – the chance of him recovering would be pretty slim. [Tony, 269-276] 
It is noteworthy that Tony’s welfare assessment evidently also entails an assessment according to choice, 
namely, he anticipates “what most patients [in Mr Johnson’s circumstances] would consider a meaningful 
existence”. 
In short, Tony’s welfare assessment is considering whether CPR would restore Mr Johnson to a state of 
flourishing or whether it would be unnecessarily aggressive and futile. However, in order to complete this 
evaluation, Tony relies on a preconception of what would be good in terms of effectiveness – would 
resuscitation work? – as well as what would be good in terms of choice – would the outcome be desirable 
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for a patient like Mr Johnson? Welfare presupposes effectiveness and choice; the three evaluative standards 
are not independent but interdependent; one presupposes the others. 
9.1.3.2 Choice 
As a second illustration of the interdependence of values, I review a very different moment in this 
ethnography: Emily, the “regular attender” (Sharon) who is trying to leave the ward and wanting to end her 
life (see: Chapter 8 Best interests vs. capacity). As Emily said: 
Now I’m at the point where I don’t want them to help me anymore. I hope [my liver] does fail… I hope 
it – yeah, because I’ll die. I think I’ll die. If it fails, I think I will die. I don’t know too much about it but 
I’m pretty sure you need your liver… And then if I die, I die. If I don’t then I’ll just keep taking stuff. 
 [Emily, 59-67] 
Dying, in Emily’s eyes, is good thing according to her experience and wishes; it is a good course of action 
according to the value of choice: 
I was once asked “are you scared of dying?” I was like “no. I’m actually scared of living!” I’m afraid of 
trying to survive. It’s hard. It’s really hard. [Emily, 259-260] 
Emily and staff recognise what a state of flourishing for Emily might look like: 
So before that [traumatic incident] she was normal. Going to work, going out with her friends, driving 
her car. This is all from that. Since she came back she just feels the support’s not there. 
 [Sharon, 79-80] 
However, where Emily has given up hope that treatments will restore her back to a state of flourishing such 
that trying to survive is too hard, Sharon is more optimistic: 
She is a young girl. I think that if she got the support that she needs, which is – I don’t know what it 
is; I’m not a mental health specialist – maybe she could turn her life back around. She’s just young. 
Far too young for his. ‘cause she does seem like a nice girl.  [Sharon, 97-100] 
Whereas Sharon thinks treatments to restore Emily’s welfare could be effective, Emily is convinced they 
would not be. As a result, what is best according to Emily’s choice is dying because efforts to promote her 
welfare fail in terms of effectiveness. Emily’s experience and wishes are shaped by her preconceptions of 
flourishing and preconceptions of what would work. Her choice presupposes welfare and effectiveness; the 




As a third and final illustration of the interdependence of values, recall the moment Dr Taylor was speaking 
with Brandon during her ward round: 
They spoke about his reason for admission, and how much better he feels now. Dr Taylor mentioned 
that, following pneumonia, it takes many weeks to recover strength, emphasising the need for rest. 
At this moment he became tearful and said he’s been having a lot of “trouble with the neighbours”. 
He described it as escalating recently, and now the “police are involved”.   [6c]  
Dr Taylor summarised how she decided what course of action is best: 
“Before, I would have just sent him home. But now I wouldn’t. He’d only re-present to A&E, which 
creates a load more work. So I tend to just let them stay another night.” [6c] 
Dr Taylor’s decision to extend Brandon’s hospital stay was driven by a concern to do what is best in terms of 
effectiveness: avoid creating a “load more work”. However, in order to assess what course of action is most 
effective, Dr Taylor must incorporate evaluations of the situation in terms of Brandon’s state of health and 
Brandon’s wishes. Seeing as Brandon is recovering well, neither home nor hospital poses a threat to his 
flourishing; both are acceptable courses of action in terms of welfare. However, such is Brandon’s experience 
of anxiety at home at the moment that Dr Taylor anticipates he would choose to come back to hospital. 
Going home is not what is best according to the evaluative standard of choice. This would divert hospital 
resources to his clerking and re-admission. Thus, in order to weigh up what course of action is best in terms 
of effectiveness, Dr Taylor relies on a preconception of what is best for Brandon in terms of welfare and 
choice. The three values are not independent but interdependent; one presupposes the others. 
9.1.4 Neither monism nor pluralism 
Within this AMS, decision-making is a process in which people figure out what course of action is the best 
way of working together to restore order.  According to my interpretive analysis of ethnographic and 
interview data, the role of values in decision-making within an AMS is neither monist nor pluralist.  
Unlike monism, there are three values involved in this decision-making process. The distinction between 
these values is most evident during times of value conflict. 
Unlike pluralism, the appraisal of a course of action according to one evaluative standard involves an 
appraisal of the same course of action according to the other two evaluative standards; each value 
presupposes the others. In this way, welfare, choice and effectiveness do not constitute a group of three 
independent values but rather a triad of interdependent values.  
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Not quite one, not quite three, this model of values in decision-making within an AMS is neither monist nor 
pluralist. Instead, I refer to this three-in-one model in shorthand as a trivalent approach. 
9.2 A trivalent approach to clinical decision-making models 
In the literature review, I surveyed some current models of decision-making within healthcare. One way of 
categorising such models is along a relational axis, ranging from paternalism to anti-paternalism. 
9.2.1 Therapeutic relationship: paternalism and anti-paternalism 
As I described in literature review, conflict between paternalist and anti-paternalist decision-making models 
reflects a conflict in values; the former appeal to welfare as their fundamental value and the latter tend to 
appeal to choice. The most prominent model which seeks to transcend this dualism is shared decision-
making, which idealises an egalitarian relation between decision-making parties. However, shared decision-
making’s strength is also its weakness. Its biphasic model consists of a preparatory phase and an executive 
phase, which appeal to the values welfare and choice respectively. As to what the right or good balance is 
between these two phases, shared decision-making is silent. In this way, it is left open to the charge of 
arbitrariness. To try to address this conflict by appealing to either welfare or choice would collapse the 
debate onto one or other side. However, a triad of values could offer a third value by which to negotiate a 
way through this conflict. 
Within an AMS, there is not a pair of values but a triad. As such, there is a third evaluative standard by which 
to arbitrate between the other two values of welfare and choice. Effectiveness is the value which is primarily 
concerned with the organisational need to do what works in order to minimise the problem of disruption. I 
now consider how effectiveness, conceived within a trivalent framework, may contribute to the model of 
shared decision-making. 
Within a trivalent framework, the delineation between the paternalist preparatory phase and the anti-
paternalist executive phase of shared decision-making could be justified by appeal to a third value: what is 
most effective.  This need not actually change the structure of shared decision-making; rather, a third value 
may provide its biphasic structure with an evaluative foundation. 
Consider the preparatory phase of shared decision-making. It may be highly ineffective, within an AMS, to 
expect the patient to be extensively involved in what management options should be considered available 
to them. This requires a depth and breadth of clinical knowledge which the patient, not being medically 
trained, will understandably lack. It would be highly ineffective for the department as a whole if each patient 
were expected to be medically educated to such a degree as to work out for themselves what treatments 
should be available to them. Furthermore, it is extremely unrealistic to expect patients to be willing and able 
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to engage in such learning and discussion given they are hospitalised with acute illness. Thus, the welfare-
based preparatory phase may be justified in terms of effectiveness. 
Next, consider the executive phase of shared decision-making. It may be highly ineffective, within an AMS, 
to expect the clinician to bear sole responsibility for deciding which management option is best for the 
patient. Within a liberal democracy like the UK, to force treatment upon a capacitous patient without their 
prior consent constitutes assault (Herring, 2012: 149). Without being able to force treatment upon patients, 
the benefit of a course of action to a large extent depends upon a patient’s compliance. To gain consent and 
treatment compliance, a patient would typically need to be persuaded as to the benefit of the course of 
action. For a course of action to be, and be seen to be, of benefit would typically involve consideration of 
the patient’s unique situation and psyche; their world and their life-world. On such matters, the expertise of 
the patient (in conjunction with relatives) grossly outweighs that of the newly-acquainted clinician. As such, 
there is good reason to suppose that it would be ineffective to extend the paternalist approach of the 
preparatory phase into the executive phase of shared decision-making, over which patient choice is 
sovereign. Thus perhaps the choice-based executive phase of shared decision-making can also be justified 
by appeal to the third value of effectiveness. 
This cursory argument is intended to illustrate that a trivalent approach to the model of shared decision-
making enables it to be defended against the charge of arbitrariness. I have not, of course, given a fair 
hearing to counter-arguments to shared decision-making. These include concerns that shared decision-
making overlooks the reality of human dependency (Walker, 1998; van Heijst, 2011), relationality and factual 
inequality (Gilligan, 1982; Kittay, 1999; van Nistelrooij et al., 2017) as well as the hermeneutic and 
communitarian aspects of knowing (Nelson, 1990; Ricoeur, 1992; Goldenberg, 2015) . My point here is simply 
to show that, in order to make the case for shared decision-making’s delineation of paternalist and anti-
paternalist phases, appeal must be made to a third value. This is something which the empirically-derived 
trivalent approach provides.  
A trivalent approach promises to avoid the ‘tyranny of autonomy’ (Foster, 2009) whilst avoiding a tyrannical 
beneficence at the same time. The integration of a third evaluative standard, effectiveness, offers a 
conceptual means of avoiding the absolutisation of either choice or welfare, in keeping with Mol’s proposed 
movement of ‘patientism’ (2008: 36). In short, perhaps it is a ship with trivalent sails that can pass between 
the Scylla of paternalism and the Charybdis of anti-paternalism. 
9.2.2 Cognitive speed 
I now turn to consider how the empirically-derived trivalent framework critically interacts with cognitivist 
dual process theory.  
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9.2.2.1 Dual process theory 
As presented in my literature review, dual process theory developed out of research in cognitive psychology 
over the last 30 years and has recently been applied to the ‘processing’ done by clinicians. ‘Type 1’ processing 
is fast, intuitive pattern-recognition and is the predominant mode of reasoning by clinicians, particularly 
experts. ‘Type 2’ processing, in contrast, is slow, analytic hypothetico-deductivism (Croskerry, 2009).  
All three data chapters describe a contrast between two modes of decision-making, concerning problems, 
needs and values respectively; in Restoring order, between what is worthwhile and what is futile; in Working 
together, between what is harmonious and what is cacophonous; in What’s best, between what is obvious 
and what is negotiated. Each of these contrasts supports dual process theory.  
System 1 processing proceeds when there is no futility, cacophony or negotiation; problems are dealt with, 
needs are satisfied, and values interact without conflict. The decision-making process can thus proceed in a 
fast, intuitive manner. In contrast, when the pathway is sensed to be a cul-de-sac, when needs are not 
satisfied or when values are in conflict, a gear change is prompted: the decision-making process becomes 
the slow and deliberative approach of system 2. 
However, the dual process model does not adequately account for these contrasts. Even once expanded 
from a binary system to a ‘cognitive continuum’ (Hammond, 2000), it still remains a cognitive continuum. 
This falls short of accounting for reality within an AMS in the following two respects. 
Firstly, a schematization of cognitive processing does not attend to the architectural and genealogical 
dimension of decision-making in a social field. Much of decision-making, including diagnostic reasoning, is 
pre-cognitive. That is to say, it is shaped by factors such as the institution in which people are located, the 
tradition according to which they are defined and the concomitant power structures on which people 
depend (Foucault, 1975, 1989). Figuring out what is the best course of action is not merely a matter of 
information; it also concerns the habits of power and the power of habit. Hence many decisions are not even 
seen as decisions. As Victoria said: 
…You just do them don’t you? That you don’t actually register that you’re making the decision… The 
decisions you make can be quite minor… Just how someone would transfer, or them kind of littler 
decisions… But even that’s still like just following a protocol. [Victoria, 49-60] 
According to a trivalent framework, dual process theory underplays the need of the organisation to minimise 
disruption according to the value of effectiveness. 
With this in mind, type 1 processing is arguably long and slow. The final enactment of following a protocol 
or announcing a diagnosis may be rapid and require only a brief clinical exchange. However, the 
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development of the institution and tradition which legitimise such authoritative expressions has taken hold 
over many years and is itself constitutive of the decision-making process. A protocol could be described as 
an artefact of ‘sedimented valuations’ (Sayer, 2011: 25) which have solidified over the ‘the long baking 
process of history’ (Foucault in May, 1992: 144). In this sense, fast (type 1) decision-making is slow, and slow 
(type 2) decision-making is fast. To reduce decision-making to a protocolised momentary encounter is to 
confuse the race for the finishing line. 
Secondly, dual process theory, as appropriated by Croskerry, has informational coherence as a central 
concept: do the clinical data match the diagnosis? For example, it is informational incoherence that can 
prompt a ‘rational over-ride’ into type 2 decision-making (2009: 1024). However, dual process theory’s focus 
on diagnostic accuracy does not adequately characterise decision-making within an AMS. Decision-making 
within an AMS is not merely concerned with diagnoses; it is concerned with problems and needs. The 
evaluation of problems and needs requires the significance of distress and personal needs to be appreciated 
in the decision-making process. To fail to account for this, by presupposing a purely cognitive paradigm in 
which patients are mere information sources, is to neglect the meaning of an experience to the particular 
person; to neglect the meaning of personal experience is to overlook the value of choice. 
In summary, Croskerry’s appropriation of cognitivist decision-making theory fails to appreciate additional 
dimensions to the decision-making process; in so doing, it particularly overlooks the values of effectiveness 
and choice. 
In defence of Croskerry, his ‘universal model of diagnostic reasoning’ (2009: 1022) is not intended to be a 
framework for all kinds of decision-making in a healthcare environment. Specifically, it relates to diagnosis 
of an illness presentation. The above criticisms point out the limits (in scope) of such a model rather than its 
limitations (in quality). Before this discussion moves on from dual process theory, I propose a way in which 
the theory can be combined with my empirical findings of a trivalent framework to produce an expanded 
model. 
9.2.2.2 Trivalent continuum theory 
In What’s best, I identified two psychological gears in which decisions are made: obvious and negotiated.  As 
with dual process theory’s cousin, cognitive continuum theory, these categories need not be a clear-cut 
binary system. They could instead be conceived as a spectrum of varying degrees of negotiation. The reason 
for decision-making needing negotiation is a conflict between the values of welfare, choice and effectiveness. 
In this way, continuum theory can be reformulated to break free from merely cognitivist preconceptions, to 
give a continuum theory of values. 
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Type 1 decision-making remains intuitive and rapid, associated with the use of heuristics and pattern 
recognition. However, it is not merely diagnostic information that is being processed; it is values. If all three 
evaluative standards endorse the same course of action (value coincidence), the best course of action is 
sensed as obvious and “straightforward” (Tony); decisions in such instances may not even seem like decisions 
to participants: “you just would” (Sophie).  
Type 2 decision-making is towards the other end of the continuums. It is slow and involves deliberation and 
discussion. People tend to figure out what is the best course of action in this way when different values 
endorse a different course of action. In such instances, people may feel a sense of futility or cacophony; the 
best course of action is negotiated through value conflict. These are decisions which are experienced as 
“complex” (Tony), “difficult” (Dr Taylor) and “when you have to think about things a lot more” (Kiran). 
This is not to discard the cognitivist concern for information processing. Instead, it is to expand the model to 
not be limited to informational processing, in order to be consistent with ethnographic data and make better 
contact with reality within an AMS. By not being limited to mere information-processing by the minds of 
individual clinicians, trivalent continuum theory is a more holistic model of decision-making within an AMS 
than cognitive continuum theory. However, it is more holistic in an atypical sense. A trivalent framework 
offers a form of holism which is not ontological nor epistemological; it is normative holism. 
9.2.3 Values-based decision-making 
9.2.3.1 Values based practice 
In the literature review, I critically presented Fulford’s Values-Based Practice (VBP) as an example of values-
conscious decision-making. Whilst initially appearing to be value-pluralist, VBP turns out to be a value-monist 
framework, founded upon the meta-value of ‘respect for persons’. I identified ontological, epistemological 
and evaluative problems with VBP. I propose that the epistemological and normative shortcomings of VBP 
can, in part, be aided by adopting a trivalent ontology of values. This can be summarised in three statements, 
the first a priori and the other two a posteriori60: 
1. Values are the standards by which things are judged good or bad, which are in turn shaped and 
sustained by such judgments. (see: Chapter 2 What are values?) 
2. In decision-making within an AMS, three values are involved: welfare, choice and effectiveness.  
3. These three values are interdependent as a triad and relate closely to the goals and needs with which 
decision-making within an AMS is concerned. 
 
60 I recognise that these are only relative terms; no theoretical claim is ever empty of prior experience, nor is any empirical claim 
empty of prior theory. 
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The epistemological problem with VBP concerned how different value-perspectives are to be balanced in 
order for a decision to be made. A trivalent approach does not go all the way in answering this; no exhaustive 
formula has availed itself. Nevertheless, my empirical findings provide a framework to roughly characterise 
how different value-perspectives are balanced. 
Rather than defining value-perspectives as the viewpoints of all relevant stakeholders, a trivalent framework 
portrays three value-perspectives in terms of evaluative standards. Welfare, choice and effectiveness are 
three distinct standards by which to appraise a given course of action. They form three value-perspectives. 
How then can different value-perspectives be balanced? Empirical findings do confirm the reality of value 
conflict and thus the need for negotiation. This negotiation need not be arbitrary, however. There is no 
necessary appeal to authority, for which VBP is criticised (Thornton, 2014). Instead, conflict between two 
values can be adjudicated according to the third. For example, in decision-maker D’s eyes, welfare endorses 
course of action A as what is best and choice endorses course of action B as what is best. If A and B are 
incompatible courses of action, then there is value conflict; the decision is not obvious and needs to be 
negotiated. However, D’s evaluative resources are not exhausted; she can weigh up the pros and cons of A 
and B according to a distinct evaluative standard: effectiveness.  
There remains ambiguity in this trivalent framework. For instance, decision-maker D is just one person 
amongst many who are working together to alleviate needs. How do different viewpoints inter-relate? This 
returns us to the question that challenges VBP: how are different (and conflicting) points of view to be 
balanced? This concerns the role of different people in decision-making within a healthcare setting. 
Nevertheless, a trivalent framework still aids the VBP model in part. In addition to conflict between people 
who express views, there is conflict between values in decision-making within a healthcare setting. In 
particular, there can be conflict between the evaluative standards welfare, choice and effectiveness. 
Portraying conflict as between evaluative standards is of benefit to VBP with regard to its ‘premise’, which 
functions as a fundamental value: respect for persons. This ambiguous and contentious phrase can be 
characterised a little further with the help of a trivalent framework. What does it mean to respect persons? 
At least within an AMS, this could be taxonomized in three ways:  
1. Doing what is good for persons in terms of welfare. 
2. Doing what is good for persons in terms of choice. 
3. Doing what is good for persons in terms of effectiveness. 
Is preventing Emily from killing herself an instance of showing respect for persons? Sharon and Ryan might 
say “yes”, and appeal to welfare. Emily herself might say “no”, and appeal to choice. Does Tony show respect 
for persons when he refuses to admit Stuart to a bed overnight even though an insistent Stuart cannot stand 
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his aunty at home? Stuart might say “no” and appeal to choice. Tony might say “yes” and appeal to 
effectiveness with a wider group of persons in view: “that’s not society’s problem” (Tony). 
A trivalent approach does not prevent misunderstandings about what it means to show respect for persons. 
In this sense, it does not help VBP. How it does help, however, is to characterise different interpretations of 
‘respect for persons’ in order to help us understand misunderstandings. 
In sum, VBP is both affirmed and challenged by a trivalent approach. A trivalent approach affirms the 
necessity of negotiating diverse and potentially conflicting value-perspectives. However, VBP is challenged 
to not merely characterise such conflict in inter-personal terms but also in terms of evaluative standards 
(which can be inter-personal or intra-personal).  
A trivalent approach also affirms the reality of dissensus; not all conflict can be ironed-out, hence the reality 
of futility, cacophony and value conflict.  Decisions often need to be negotiated. However, rather than the 
arbitrary notion of balancing in VBP, a trivalent approach identifies a third value by which conflict can 
potentially be negotiated. 
A trivalent approach can also affirm the moral significance of respecting persons. However, VBP is challenged 
to acknowledge the diverse interpretations that this phrase affords.  VBP’s value foundation is cracked into 
three pieces. Specifically, ‘respect for persons’ can be characterised within an AMS by appeal to welfare, 
choice and effectiveness. 
9.2.3.2 Values based medicine 
Miles Little’s decision-making model of Values-Based Medicine (VBM) is, like VBP, a form of foundationalism 
about values. Unlike VBP, VBM is a genuine values-pluralist framework. The foundational, universal values 
of survival, security and flourishing are seen as necessary for the propagation of human society (2014b). 
I discuss VBM in two stages. Firstly, in light of ethnographic findings, I question the claimed universality of 
VBM’s foundational values. In this way, a trivalent approach challenges VBM. Secondly, I explore VBM 
further to expose its implicit values of welfare, choice and effectiveness. In this way, a trivalent approach 
affirms VBM. 
9.2.3.2.1 Universality 
According to VBM, survival is a universal foundational value (Little, 2014b, 2014a). That is to say, in theory 
all people want to live. However, this is difficult to reconcile with the empirical reality: sometimes people 
want to die. Survival can be negatively valued. Recall the case of Emily the “regular attender” (Sharon), who 
repeatedly tries to harm and kill herself: 
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I was once asked “are you scared of dying?” I was like “no. I’m actually scared of living!” I’m afraid of 
trying to survive. It’s hard. It’s really hard. [Emily, 259-260]. 
The staff, who know Emily very well, find looking after her upsetting and there is clear disagreement about 
what is  best for her. The disagreement in her case, however, is not merely in Little’s A and P values; there is 
fundamental disagreement about whether her survival is a good thing.  
Even if one were to undermine the validity of Emily’s evaluation on the grounds of mental illness or 
incapacity, damage would still be done to the universality of Little’s foundational values. Rather than being 
universal, foundational values would be generalisable insofar as the agent is thinking properly. Such a notion 
of rational propriety would not only be highly contentious (Foucault in May, 1992: 226), it would make 
implicit appeal to a fourth foundational value: the standard by which a patient’s thinking can be judged 
proper. 
It is not self-evident that suicidal inclination is always caused by mental illness or mental incapacity. This was 
exemplified in the case of Kerrie Wooltorton, who presented to Norfolk and Norwich University Hospital in 
2007 having tried to kill herself by drinking anti-freeze (BBC News, 2009). Like Emily, Miss Wooltorton was a 
frequent attendee as an acute medical admission to hospital. Unlike Emily, a psychiatrist’s assessment of 
Miss Wooltorton did not support implementing involuntary life-extending treatment on the grounds of the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 or Mental Health Act 1983 (Stammers, 2015). As a result, treatment without Miss 
Wooltorton’s consent would have been unlawful (BBC News, 2009). The medical team palliated Miss 
Wooltorton until she died from her ethylene glycol intoxication; a course of action the responsible consultant 
considered ethically justified because it respected her autonomy (Stammers, 2015). Like Emily, Miss 
Wooltorton did not pursue survival. If ‘death is the end of flourishing’ (Little, 2014b: 180), she did not pursue 
flourishing either. The same could be said for security. 
The rejection of survival is not restricted to cases of suicidality. Mr Whitehead is the man with white wispy 
hair who was keen to die of his metastatic cancer at home with his grandsons. As he said to Kylie: 
 “I don’t want to get better; I want to die!” [6b] 
The conversation between Gloria’s son (Bill) and consultant Harriet expressed a similar attitude towards 
survival: 
 Bill: If it was our dog, I would have no hesitation in putting it down  [3d] 
 Harriet: It might be that the best thing for her is a blood clot  [3d] 
Or as Dr Taylor put it: 
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“…after all a PE might not be a bad thing for [Mr Jenkins]. You’ve got to die of something”. [6c] 
As these examples demonstrate, Little’s notion of the universal pursuit of survival as a foundational value is 
out of touch with reality. In wanting to die, people sometimes disvalue survival. In so doing, they implicitly 
reject security and flourishing too. What’s more, sometimes people disvalue the survival of others. As Upshur 
comments: 
‘…without an argument of a Kantian nature about the dignity of humans or the embrace of a 
cosmopolitan world view, some further justification regarding the survival criterion is needed, as 
large numbers of humans have spent massive amounts of time and effort to ensure that other 
humans do not survive’ (2014: 216). 
In Little’s defence, the foundational values take on their particular meaning within a lived societal and 
cultural context.  Perhaps such instances of wanting to die are still cases of pursuing ‘survival’, where 
‘survival’ means something along the lines of narrative continuity: that the memory of the person, the impact 
of the person or the principles by which the person lives, may ‘live’ on. This would relocate the disagreement 
into the A or P values.  
However, for ‘survival’ to mean ‘death’ requires the VBM-user to display an absurd performance of 
hermeneutic acrobatics. Furthermore, even if this poetic licence were granted, the usefulness of 
foundational values would be dramatically compromised because a ‘descriptive category’ that can describe 
anything consequently describes nothing. After all, ‘much of the evolving debate in ethics over the centuries 
concerns exactly what is meant by such terms’ (Upshur, 2014: 216). To allow such interpretative diversity 
would undermine the ability of ‘survival’ to be in any way pre-normative, as it would be profoundly unclear 
what the norm is to which it is preparatory. 
As the empirical findings of this study show, survival is not always valued as a good thing. Whilst survival may 
be a good thing according to the value of welfare, it is not always desirable according to the value of choice. 
A trivalent approach thus challenges the foundations of VBM.  
If the foundational values of VBM are not in fact universal, then VBM becomes vulnerable to the instability 
of value-pluralist frameworks that was described in literature review. If F-values are not universal, then there 
is potential for value conflict. For example, someone’s view of flourishing may entail non-survival. Similarly, 
a person’s view of flourishing may entail risk-taking that compromises that person’s security. In such 
instances, commitment to a course of action requires one value to trump another (or to trump the other 
two values), rendering a pluralist account in theory a monist account in practice. 
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A trivalent approach challenges VBM in two ways. Firstly, the universality of VBM’s foundational values is 
brought into question. It is empirically demonstrable that people sometimes disvalue foundational values 
such as survival, according to the value of choice. Secondly, the coherence of VBM’s foundational values is 
brought into question. If an F-value is not, in fact, universal, then there is potential conflict between 
foundational values. Given his presumption that F-values are universal, Little provides no theoretical means 
by which such conflict is to be reconciled. This leaves his pluralist model in danger of collapsing into value-
monism, if one value trumps another in times of value conflict. 
9.2.3.2.2 Latent trivalent framework 
As well as challenging it, a trivalent approach also affirms the decision-making model of VBM. In fact, in what 
follows I will try and show that VBM is itself a latent trivalent framework. 
At first glance, this ethnography’s three values of welfare, choice and effectiveness do not appear to fit with 
VBM’s foundational values of survival, security and flourishing. Instead, all three of VBM’s values appear to 
be closely related to welfare. In What’s best, the pursuit of survival, safety and best interests were all 
instantiations of welfare concerns (in contrast to quality of life, preference and capacity). These, in turn, 
approximate to VBM’s survival, security and flourishing. Thus, VBM seems initially to emphasise only one of 
the values of a trivalent approach: welfare. However, further exploration of Little’s account of VBM will help 
expose a latent trivalent framework in the model. To this end, I focus on Little’s illustrative case of a 
haematological patient being prescribed recombinant Factor VII off-licence (2014b). 
The way in which Little demonstrates how a VBM framework could be employed in decision-making in this 
imaginary case shows that, as well as welfare, he emphasises the value of choice. Little does not simply 
evaluate the objective circumstances; he describes an appraisal of the circumstances from different points 
of view. It is ‘from a doctor’s point of view’ that ‘the patient’s survival is paramount’ (2014b: 180). He 
appreciates the subjectivity of the clinician who will need to be able to say with conviction “I did everything 
I could” (2014b: 180). That every step should be taken to preserve life is not construed as a free-floating fact 
but as a priority that is conceived ‘from society’s point of view’ (2014b: 180). In terms of a trivalent approach, 
then, VBM concords with the evaluative standards of both welfare and choice. 
What about the third of a trivalent framework’s values, effectiveness? Questioning the pre-normative status 
of Little’s foundational values brought to light a key difference between VBP and VBM. Where Fulford 
appeals to a foundational premise of ‘respect for persons’, Little does not. Survival, security and flourishing 
are foundational values not because they are true or good according to a propositional ideal. Instead, they 
are what works. The three F-values are what make human society sustainable: ‘Because that is the way 
humans are’, or ‘Because societies cannot function any other way.’ (2014b: 172). In other words, survival, 
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security and flourishing are not VBM’s foundational values because of their goodness (welfare) or desirability 
(choice) but because of their effectiveness. They work. 
The role of effectiveness as an evaluative standard in VBM is implicit in Little’s worked clinical example, as 
the following excerpt demonstrates. Speaking of the priority of survival: 
‘…every possible step should be taken, because life is precious, and the use of Factor VII is still within the 
means of most Western societies. That may change, but holds true for the moment’ (2014b: 180). 
The pursuit of welfare is not unbridled; it must acknowledge practical limitations such as what is within the 
means of Western societies. Were the same patient and clinician facing this decision within the context of a 
poorer society, the step towards providing Factor VII is less likely. The affordability factor is an interplay 
between the value of welfare and the value of effectiveness. What is good for patients is considered in 
conjunction with what is feasible in the circumstances.  
As was the case with VBP, a trivalent approach relates to VBM with ambivalence. VBM fails to make contact 
with reality61 to the extent that people within an AMS disvalue its foundational values. As such, VBM’s 
foundational values are not in fact universally held. The non-universality of foundational values creates the 
potential for conflict between foundational values and a collapse into functional value-monism. In this way, 
VBM is challenged by a trivalent approach.  
The manner in which VBM is applied demonstrates not just welfare considerations but also considerations 
of choice and effectiveness: a latent trivalent framework. In this way, VBM does make contact with reality 
within an AMS and is affirmed by a trivalent approach. 
9.3 A trivalent approach to the philosophy of medicine 
So far in this chapter, I have summarised the conclusions of the preceding data chapters in a trivalent 
framework and applied this to clinical decision-making models. Each model has been met with ambivalence, 
a trivalent approach both affirming and challenging the models considered. As I have presented it, a trivalent 
framework offers a non-arbitrary means of progressing through the paternalism - anti-paternalism dualism, 
a means of expanding cognitive continuum theory to trivalent continuum theory and a means of appraising 
values-based decision-making models. 
Next, I turn to medical concepts that are influential in decision-making within an AMS and that were explored 
in the literature review: sickness and futility.  
 
61 The depiction of good science as making contact with reality is original to Michael Polanyi (Lightcap Meek, 2017; Nye, 2017).  
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9.3.1 Medical concepts 
9.3.1.1 Sickness 
In Chapter 2, I surveyed different approaches to the concept of sickness. These different accounts can be 
grouped into three broad camps, one objectivist (biomedical model) and two subjectivist (biographical 
disruption and genealogy). I proceeded to identify the fundamental value which is implicit in such 
conceptions of sickness. Where the biomedical model prized welfare, the biographical disruption model 
prized choice. These two positions could be paraphrased in terms of bioethical principles. Welfare-based 
models tend to prioritise the principle of beneficence and choice-based models tend to prioritise the 
principle of respect for autonomy. Arguably, many of the prominent bioethical theories can be categorised 
into one of these two groups (Fry, 1992). In this way, the question of medicine’s fundamental value is of 
major bioethical importance. 
The third concept of sickness, genealogy, proved something of an overlooked younger sibling when 
compared to the biomedical model and biographical disruption. Specifically, it was unclear what its 
complementary model of well-being is and what its fundamental value is. Neglect of the architectural and 
genealogical element in medical concepts may explain the inability of the four principles, and medical ethics 
generally, to account for the political dynamic involved in healthcare decision-making, hence the critique of 
it as ‘myopic’ (Sherwin, 1992: 22).  
How does this empirically-derived trivalent framework contribute to the antithesis between welfare and 
choice, and the historical neglect of the political dynamic in healthcare decision-making? 
Decision-making within an AMS is concerned with problems. Not only the problems of functional deviation 
and psychological distress but also the problem of logistical disruption. Likewise, decision-making within an 
AMS is concerned with needs. Not only professional and personal needs but also organisational need: the 
(departmental) show must go on. Accordingly, decision-making within an AMS involves values: not only the 
values of welfare and choice but also effectiveness. 
Whilst it is beyond the scope of an ethnographic study to explore the historical background of clinical 
institutions and their power structures, nevertheless the value of effectiveness is sensitive to dynamics of 
power within decision-making. According to effectiveness, a course of action is good if it has the potential to 
alleviate organisational need; it is good if it has the ability to achieve the goal of addressing disruption. This 
is generally conceived in terms of discharge from hospital rather than the patient “getting stuck forever” (Dr 
Taylor). The evaluative standard of effectiveness appreciates the power of a course of action to get the 
patient out. In view of the never-ending cohort of patients that is rapidly coming “through the doors” (Tony), 
a course of action is good in terms of effectiveness if it looks after the health of the hospital by maintaining 
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“flow” (Dr Morrison), giving a “push” towards discharge (Dr Taylor) relieves the “pressure” from 
management (Fergus) and prevents a “crisis” of beds (Sophie). By its attention to the power dynamics 
involved in the evaluation of a course of action within an AMS, the value of effectiveness could be described 
as the fundamental value of a genealogical conception of sickness; what is good is what procures the agenda 
of those in charge, such as ward staff, management and the hospital as a whole. 
A trivalent framework offers a means of locating the different conceptualisations of sickness within a unified 
model. In Chapter 2, I observed the connection between epistemological approach, ontology and values. 

















Subjectivist Organisational flow Effectiveness 
Table 9.1: Concepts of sickness 
Each of the three models of sickness presupposes a different fundamental value: the biomedical model 
prizes welfare, the biographical disruption model prizes choice, and the genealogical model prizes 
effectiveness. According to a trivalent approach, to divorce one value from the other two is not just 
reductionistic, it is unrealistic. In this way, all three models of sickness require integration within a trivalent 
framework in order to make contact with reality within an AMS. 
A benefit of being able to integrate the three models of sickness is that it transcends the objectivist – 
subjectivist dichotomy that has divided sickness definitions since Parfit’s theories of well-being (1984). 
Instead of sickness being either objective (biomedical model) or subjective (social constructionism), sickness 
is both. This synthesis is not achieved by inserting a new and nebulous term such as ‘patient-centredness’ 
into the debate. It is achieved by reframing the debate: rather than appealing to competing fundamental 
values, sickness can be conceptualised by the integration of three interdependent values, namely, welfare, 
choice and effectiveness. Practically, the clinical decision-maker who is mindful of trivalent framework is 
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more able to acknowledge the multifaceted nature of problems and needs, to articulate a value conflict that 
is causing moral distress, and to provide a normatively holistic justification for what course of action is best. 
In summary, a trivalent analysis of the concept of sickness both affirms and challenges the three broad 
theoretical camps of the biomedical model, biographical disruption and genealogy. Each approach to 
defining sickness emphasises one of the trivalent framework’s values; on that basis it is affirmed. However, 
each approach is reductionistic and unrealistic by neglecting the simultaneous contribution of the other two 
values; on that basis it is challenged. 
9.3.1.2 Futility  
9.3.1.2.1 Complex telos 
In Chapter 2, I commented on the potency of the category of futility as well as the shallowness with which it 
has been characterised. Schneiderman et al’s two-part depiction of futility as impact-plus-benefit (1990) is 
still faced with the daunting problem of defining benefit. The philosophical problem concerning futility was 
summarised as follows: 
‘In the most controversial cases in which futility is invoked the disagreement between doctors and 
families is not about the probability that an intervention will work but about the goals that it will 
serve’ (Weijer and Elliott, 1995: 684). 
Clarity regarding the criteria of futility depends on clarity regarding the proper goals of healthcare. All major 
frameworks of the goals of healthcare in the philosophy of medicine are of two kinds: goal-pluralism or goal-
monism. In controversial cases, goal-pluralism in theory collapses into goal-monism in practice. Contrariwise, 
in controversial cases, goal-monism in theory disintegrates into goal-pluralism in practice. Thus, in 
controversial cases, neither kind of framework can be consistently and realistically applied. Neither kind of 
framework provides sufficient clarity to support further clarification of the criteria of futility. In Chapter 2, 
this disappointing conclusion led to an investigation of values instead of goals. 
However, frameworks of the values of healthcare also share the shortcomings of frameworks of the goals of 
healthcare. All major frameworks are of two kinds: value-pluralism or value-monism. In controversial cases, 
value-pluralism in theory collapses to value-monism in practice. Contrariwise, in controversial cases, value-
monism in theory disintegrates into value-pluralism in practice. As with goals, so with values: neither kind of 
values framework provides sufficient clarity to support further clarification of the criteria of futility. This 
disappointment is worse if pluralism and monism exhaust the range of possibilities. 
However, a trivalent framework is not quite pluralism and not quite monism. It could be considered non-
binary. It is a single complex of interdependent values, whose diversity is united and whose unity is diverse. 
240 
 
Does this paradoxical framework fare any better at characterising the goals and values of healthcare and 
thereby clarifying the criteria of futility? 
In Restoring order, I described the single aim of decision-making within an AMS: to restore order. This is not 
simple goal-monism; there are three different kinds of disorder: the problems of deviation, distress and 
disruption. Nor is this simple goal-pluralism; the three kinds of problem are interdependent and addressed 
simultaneously, as one.  As such, the telos of an AMS is not simply one and not simply three; it is one-in-
three. It is not quite the unity of monism and not quite the diversity of pluralism; it is the transgressional 
category of a diverse unity. It is not quite singular nor multiple; it is complex. 
9.3.1.2.2 Complex futility 
As described above, disagreements about futility in controversial cases are typically not about whether  a 
treatment will work (technically) but whether it will achieve a legitimate goal (ethically) (Weijer and Elliott, 
1995: 684). It is in such moments of contestation that it is most apparent that healthcare cannot isolate 
‘technique from purpose’ (Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1981: 34). 
If futility is the failure to achieve a legitimate goal, then the concept of futility is in a way the mirror-image 
of the goals of healthcare. That is to say, if there is only one legitimate goal, then there is only one kind of 
futility. For example, if making patients happy were the only goal of medicine, then the only possible way in 
which a technically-impactful treatment could be futile is if it failed to make a patient happy. In other words, 
goal-monism yields futility-monism. Likewise, goal-pluralism yields futility-pluralism. If there are many 
separate goals of healthcare, then there are many separate ways in which a course of action could be 
deemed futile. In short, there are as many ways to go wrong as there are to go right. 
What, then, if the goal of healthcare is one-in-three, a diverse unity, a complex? If there is only one goal of 
an AMS, to restore order, then there is only one way in which a course of action is futile: it fails to restore 
order. However, if there are three manifestations of dis-order (problems), then there are simultaneously 
three senses in which a course of action is futile: it fails to address deviation, distress or disruption. Thus 
futility is both singular and plural; it is complex. 
A trivalent account of futility could also be put in terms of values. Affirming Schneiderman et al’s account, a 
course of action is futile if it incurs no benefit; it is no good. In this way, there is only one kind of futility. 
However, how good a course of action is can be appraised within an AMS according to three evaluative 
standards: welfare, choice and effectiveness. Challenging Schneiderman et al, there are therefore 




The empirical findings of this ethnography thus respond with ambivalence to contemporary accounts of 
futility. Affirming literature on futility, a trivalent framework echoes the criterion of goal-oriented benefit. 
Challenging literature on futility, a trivalent framework expands the meaning of futility to be one-in-three; a 
course of action can fail to incur benefit by failing to address three problems according to three evaluative 
standards. Futility is therefore not singular (monism) nor multiple (pluralism) but a trivalent complex. 
By proposing that values are operational as a complex, a diverse unity, a trivalent conception of healthcare’s 
telos enables the concept of futility to be characterised a little further. However, proposing a trivalent 
framework for decision-making within an AMS only goes so far. It does not answer every question about 
values in decision-making; it does not eliminate the difficulty of making decisions in practice; it does not 
eliminate misunderstandings regarding what is worthwhile and what is futile. In part, this may be due to the 
brief nature of this account, in contrast to the vast and longstanding nature of the issues it addresses. In 
part, this may be due to my methodological approach; an ethnography is limited by the standpoint and 
viewpoint of the ethnographer, amongst other things, and is not intended to provide comprehensive 
knowledge.  
However, the proposal of a trivalent framework does make a significant contribution to healthcare decision-
making models and concepts within the philosophy of medicine. Firstly, it provides an account of the role of 
values in decision-making within an AMS that is more realistic than current clinical decision-making models.  
Secondly, it identifies conceptual connections between epistemological approaches (objectivist, 
subjectivist), ontological categories (well-being, sickness) and ethics (fundamental values). Thirdly, it 
provides a means of characterising the manner in which a particular decision is difficult. Fourthly, with regard 
to what is worthwhile and futile, it provides a realistic means of understanding misunderstandings. 
9.3.2 Values and foundationalism within an AMS 
So far in this chapter, I have summarised a trivalent framework which is derived from the ethnographic and 
interview data presented in Restoring order, Working together and What’s best. I used this framework as a 
means of critically appraising clinical decision-making models. These clinical decision-making models 
included shared decision-making, cognitive dual process theory, values-based practice and values-based 
medicine. A trivalent approach both affirms and challenges each model.  
The interaction between a trivalent framework and the medical concepts sickness and futility is similarly 
ambivalent. Each of three major definitions of sickness is both affirmed and challenged: affirmed in its affinity 
to a value but challenged in its isolation of it. The most prominent conception of medical futility was affirmed 
in its construal of impact-plus-benefit but challenged to characterise such benefit trivalently. 
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In what follows, I juxtapose a trivalent framework with problematic areas of value theory that were identified 
in Chapter 2. After considering a trivalent framework’s relation to the ontology and epistemology of values, 
I then draw this chapter to a close by returning to Chapter 7’s metaphor of an AMS as a dance. 
9.3.2.1 The ontology of values  
9.3.2.1.1 Monism and pluralism 
How many values are there? This is a question of ontology; a question of what exists. In the words of 
philosopher Isaiah Berlin: 
‘There is not an infinity of [values]: the number of human values, of values which I can pursue while 
maintaining my human semblance, my human character, is finite – let us say 74, or perhaps 122, or 
27, but finite, whatever it may be’ (2001: 12). 
Setting the numerical ceiling at finitude, however, is only the beginning. Whether the number of values is 
one (monism) or more than one (pluralism), problems remain.   
Philosopher Charles Taylor sees the problematic nature of value monism expressed in political history: 
‘What should have died along with communism is the belief that modern societies can be run on a 
single principle’ (1991: 110). 
Taylor claims that such a value-monist environment can have a tyrannical effect by compromising 
individuals’ authenticity in the collective pursuit of a simplistic evaluative ideal (1991.). In Chapter 2, I 
presented an additional problem with value-monism. Value-monism is inconsistent and unrealistic when 
implemented. This is because any single value affords a diverse range of interpretations. As such, value-
monism in theory disintegrates into value-pluralism in practice. This was encountered in this chapter’s 
analysis of VBP, whose fundamental premise of ‘respect for persons’ is hermeneutically fertile ground. 
The problems of value-monism within healthcare are certainly not limited to VBP, however. As surveyed in 
literature review, there are a range of competing claims for the fundamental value in contemporary 
healthcare. These include patient-centredness (Atkins and Ersser, 2008; Barry and Edgman-Levitan, 2012; 
Francis, 2013a; Coggon, 2016; Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2018), choice (Jensen and Mooney, 1990; 
Veatch and Spicer, 1994; Department of Health, 2010), trust (Archard et al., 2013; General Medical Council, 
2013), welfare (Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1981, 1988; Shinebourne and Bush, 1994) and care (Noddings, 
1984; Fry, 1992; Ross Boyer and Lindemann Nelson, 1992; Kittay, 1999; Mueller et al., 2008; Sloane, 2016). 
Whilst each of these depictions of value monism in healthcare has its original contribution to an evolving 
dialogue, none breaks free of the inherent shortcomings of monism as a species. To borrow an image from 
GK Chesterton, they free the tiger from its cage but not from its stripes (1908: 28). 
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Value-pluralism also has its problems. In a multiplicity of values, it becomes ambiguous how to actually 
evaluate a situation. As summarised in literature review: 
‘If one state of affairs is better than another just in case it contains more value than the other, and 
there are two or more basic intrinsic values, then it is not clear how two states of affairs can be 
compared, if one contains more of the first value, but the other contains more of the second’ 
(Schroeder, 2016). 
Diversity of evaluative standards causes a stalemate. Where, in monism, one poor chef is doing all the work, 
in pluralism, too many cooks are spoiling the broth. In situations of unavoidable value conflict, the 
justification of a course of action requires the recommendation of one evaluative standard to out-compete 
another. One value trumps the other(s). Value-pluralism in theory collapses into value-monism in practice. 
The shortcomings of value-pluralism are evident in VBM (see above) and were observed in cases such as 
Emily, who saw her survival as incompatible with her flourishing. Similar shortcomings can be expected in 
other pluralist accounts, such as the NHS values (Department of Health, 2015; Groothuizen et al, 2018), the 
Care Quality Commission (2016) and professional guidance such as the six Cs of nursing62 (Cummings, 2013). 
9.3.2.1.2 Trivalent framework 
A trivalent framework is not quite monism and not quite pluralism. Like pluralism, it features a range of 
values by which to appraise a situation. Unlike pluralism, these values are simultaneously operative ‘as one’. 
Values come into conflict and can result in a compromise but no value is eliminated. When two values are in 
conflict, arbitration can be made by reference to the third value rather than by the arbitrary defeat of one 
conflicting value. As such, the three remain a single triad. This triad is reflected in the triad of problems and 
the triad of needs which are persistently at stake. This may be reflective of the persistently triadic nature of 
an AMS, which remains a single entity despite its three aspects as a medical specialty, an organisational unit 
and a place for healing. 
Like monism, a trivalent approach features a single framework by which to appraise a situation: is this course 
of action best? Unlike monism, this framework features diversity, operating as a ‘three’. Values are all 
simultaneously operative in the same situation and sometimes in the same individual, but values do not 
merge into one another; the framework remains a triad, hence the possibility of value conflict. This value 
conflict is reflected in problems, where value conflict is sensed as futility; value conflict is also reflected in 
needs, where value conflict can be sensed as cacophony. This is reflective of an AMS as a whole, which, like 
other medical wards, is a multifaceted, complex intervention (Pannick et al., 2014, 2015). By transgressing 
 
62 Care, compassion, competence, communication, courage and commitment. These six values have been endorsed by NHS 
England as applicable to all health and social care staff (2015a). 
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the categories of value-monism and value-pluralism, a trivalent framework opens up an area for further 
study: the place of complexity and paradox63 in the philosophy of medicine in general and bioethics in 
particular. 
A trivalent framework seems to be reconcilable with Ronald Dworkin’s well-known taxonomy of goods 
(1993). Each kind of good in Dworkin’s account loosely approximates to an evaluative standard in this 
narrative of decision-making within an AMS. Dworkin describes three main kinds of good: intrinsic goods are 
good for their own sake, objectively (welfare); subjective goods are good according to their desirability for 
someone (choice); instrumental goods are good for achieving some other good (effectiveness). On the other 
hand, a trivalent framework simultaneously challenges Dworkin’s account; where Dworkin’s goods are 
independent and hierarchical, a trivalent framework’s values are interdependent and non-hierarchical. 
However, strictly speaking, Dworkin is accounting for things which are valued rather than things which are 
values.  
9.3.2.2 The epistemology of values 
Whilst foundationalism has enjoyed some prominence at least since the time of René Descartes, it is not the 
only epistemological system. As mentioned in the literature review, other approaches include coherentism 
and pragmatism. Coherentism rejects the construction metaphor of foundationalism, instead considering 
knowledge to be justified by its consistency with a network of other held beliefs (Bonjour, 2005). 
Pragmatism, on the other hand, considers knowledge to be justified on the grounds of its effect: knowledge 
is what works. One of pragmatism’s main proponents, Richard Rorty, considered foundationalism and 
coherentism to have both succumbed to a flawed metaphor in which the mind mirrors reality (1979). 
Instead: 
[The pragmatist] drops the notion of truth as correspondence with reality altogether, and says that 
modern science does not enable us to cope because it corresponds, it just plain enables us to cope’ 
(1982: xvi–xvii). 
With empirical findings in mind, I now return to these epistemological approaches to see how a trivalent 
approach to decision-making interacts with them. 
 
63 There is some commonality here with the concept of a personal trinity in Christian theology. Values involved in decision-making 
within an AMS are three-in-one and one-in-three. To avoid plain contradiction, the three-ness and the one-ness of values must 
have different senses. In theological terms, a case has been made for the number three being conceptually unique in that only a 





Knowledge is more than belief that happens to be true. In philosophical circles, one popular definition of 
knowledge is justified true belief64 (Pollock, 1986). According to a foundationalist scheme, a belief is justified 
on the basis of its support from a second, more established, belief. That second belief is justified on the basis 
of its support from a third, yet more established, belief and so on; it is turtles all the way down. ‘A potential 
regress of epistemic justification looms, with scepticism as the threatened outcome’ (Bonjour, 2005: 518). 
In order to avoid an infinite regress, a set of foundational beliefs is posited. These have also been termed 
‘basic beliefs’, which provide epistemic warrant to more superficial beliefs (Plantinga, 1993). 
Foundationalism, in turn, is sub-divided into hard and soft foundationalism, according to whether 
foundational beliefs are considered defeasible (Klein, 2005).  
In view of its similarity with the foundationalist frameworks of monism and pluralism, a trivalent approach 
loosely fits  a form of foundationalist justification. After all, the evaluative standards of welfare, choice and 
effectiveness enable appraisals which provide grounds for a commitment to a course of action. In my 
discussion of futility (above), I claimed that these three values are standards by which to characterise benefit. 
Arguably, then, a trivalent approach is a three-fold set of foundational values: ‘welfare is good’, ‘choice is 
good’ and ‘effectiveness is good’65. 
However, it could be argued that a trivalent approach does not quite fit into a foundationalist model. It is 
questionable that the three values are capable of functioning as basic beliefs which justify other beliefs (such 
as the belief ‘course of action x is best’). In what way do they actually provide epistemic support for a more 
superficial belief? Foundationalism alone is insufficient to explain how values (within a trivalent framework 
or otherwise) can support other beliefs (Bonjour, 2005). 
9.3.2.2.2 Anti-foundationalism  
9.3.2.2.2.1 Coherentism 
A trivalent approach also loosely fits a coherentist conception of justification. The evaluative standards of 
welfare, choice and effectiveness interact with one another and can come into conflict. Just as in Restoring 
order participants sought to avoid futility and in Working together participants sought to avoid cacophony, 
so in figuring out what course of action is best (in What’s best) participants sought to avoid value conflict. 
Putting it in propositional terms, the claim that ‘course of action x is what is best’ must cohere with the 
fundamental values ‘welfare is good’, ‘choice is good’ and ‘effectiveness is good’. To fail to do this, within an 
 
64 This definition has been challenged since 1963 by some instances of knowing that fail to meet these criteria, and some instances 
of meeting these criteria that fail to count as knowing (Gettier, 1966). 
65 Conceiving values as evaluative standards, it might be more precise to say ‘welfare is goodness’, ‘choice is goodness’ and 
‘effectiveness is goodness’. 
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AMS, results in a sense of futility and stressful cacophony. A trivalent approach is thus a coherentist 
foundationalism.  
There are, however, outstanding problems with this amalgamation. Firstly, there are times when such a 
coherentist foundationalism is simply not feasible. Sometimes, conflict between the values of a trivalent 
framework is inevitable. This occurs when one value lends support to a belief that a course of action is best 
whilst another value lends support to its negation. For example, consultant Tony assessed Stuart’s need for 
an extended stay in hospital during a bed crisis: 
“[Stuart] was febrile, but not neutropenic. To be honest, if there were beds I probably would have kept 
him in and kept an eye. But as it is, I had to send him home.” [6d] 
According to welfare, admission to hospital is best; according to effectiveness, discharge from hospital is 
best. It is incoherent to suggest that extending hospital stay and not-extending hospital stay are both better 
than the alternative. 
Secondly, it is not clear that ‘coherence’ is itself coherent when predicating foundational values. Empirically, 
‘conflict’ is what I understood to be going on; an evaluation of the situation according to the value of welfare 
can conflict with an evaluation of the situation according to the value of choice, for example. Coherence is 
an attribute of information according to a principle of logical consistency (Bonjour, 2005: 520); to propose 
that coherence is a property of foundational values is to perform a cognitivist reduction, which my 
ethnographic interpretation expressly challenges (see: Cognitive speed).  
Thus even when foundationalism is combined with coherentism, which some authors have termed 
‘foundherentism’ (Upshur, 2014), such an epistemological approach is insufficient to account for how people 
figure out what course of action is best within an AMS. 
9.3.2.2.2.2 Pragmatism 
These three problems are alleviated, in part, by also conceiving of a trivalent approach within a pragmatist 
epistemology.  
Firstly, a trivalent approach features the evaluative standard of effectiveness. In order to be justified in 
claiming that a certain course of action is best, decision-makers must appraise whether the course of action 
is what works. In this way, a trivalent approach has an element of pragmatist epistemology built-in. 
Secondly, the problematic notion of ‘coherence’ with its reductionistic cognitive connotations is expanded 
by conceiving a trivalent approach within a pragmatist epistemology. The conflict in values described in 
What’s best includes informational content but cannot be reduced to that content. Conflict in values tends 
to result in futility and an experience of stressful cacophony for participants within an AMS. A sense of futility 
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and an experience of cacophony are not merely informational phenomena; they are experiences of people 
in certain circumstances. Conflict is not simply an incoherence-driven ‘rational over-ride’ (Croskerry, 2009); 
it is a compromise which is negotiated by people in practice. 
Thirdly, a pragmatist approach does not seek (or permit) a decontextualized approach to knowledge. As 
Wittgenstein famously described, the meaning of a term is determined by its usage within a form of life 
(1967: 238–242) or, as a contemporary author puts it: 
‘Meaning emerges from and is influenced by the contextual discourse. During interactions, words 
assume a gestural significance’ (Kontos, 2004, in Hughes, 2011: 50). 
 According to pragmatism, knowledge is what works within a form of life and truth is ‘what our peers will… 
let us get away with saying’ (Rorty, 1979: 176). Putting linguistic and pragmatist insights together, then, the 
meaning of what is known depends on its usage within a form of life. 
With regard to a trivalent approach, the meanings of welfare, choice and effectiveness can be found in how 
I have used them as an ethnographer within this AMS. To the extent that these three terms become 
abstracted and universalised, they become slogans which are as meaningless as liberté, égalité and fraternité 
would be if they were divorced from their context of the 1789 French Revolution. However, to the extent 
that these terms are understood within the narrative of this ethnography and then used interpretively by 
others in similar but different circumstances according to their ‘horizon of significance’ (Taylor, 1991), they 
retain their usefulness; they require re-contextualisation, not de-contextualisation. With its emphasis on 
usage within a form of life of concrete particulars (Rorty, 1982), a pragmatist epistemology loosely fits a 
trivalent approach to figuring out what course of action is best within an AMS. 
In summary, a trivalent approach approximates to foundationalism but foundationalism does not adequately 
characterise the way in which values justify judgments of the best course of action. The shortcomings of 
foundationalism are supplemented by conceiving of a trivalent approach also within a coherentist 
epistemology. Likewise, the shortcomings of coherentism are supplemented by conceiving of a trivalent 
approach within a pragmatist epistemology. As such, a trivalent approach to figuring out what course of 
action is best could be described as a pragmatist coherentist foundationalism. Rather than aggregate 
syllables, however, it may be more useful to simply acknowledge once again the paradoxical ambivalence of 




9.4 Realism and reductionism 
The role of values in decision-making within an AMS is complex. According to my interpretation of empirical 
data, three values are involved: welfare, choice and effectiveness. People within an AMS use these evaluative 
standards in order to know what course of action is the best way of working together to restore order. In 
this way, the three values are closely related to the problems that people work to address and the needs 
that people work to alleviate. Both problems and needs are things-that-ought-to-be-corrected within an 
AMS, and the three values are standards by which a course of action that corrects such things is appraised. 
However, the three values operate simultaneously and interdependently as a triad; none can be divorced 
from the others because each presupposes the others. In this sense, the three values are also one; they are 
a single means of assessing how good a course of action is, and whether it is what’s best. Despite an 
abundance of healthcare literature portraying value-monist and value-pluralist frameworks, my theoretical 
analysis of them suggested that such frameworks may be unrealistic (see: Chapter 2 How many values are 
there?). My interpretive analysis of empirical data supports this suggestion. Neither value-monism nor value-
pluralism is a realistic account of the role of values in decision-making within an AMS. Instead, values operate 
as a diverse unity, a triad, a complex. 
9.4.1 Back to the dancefloor 
A diverse unity of values can be simplistically misunderstood in two broad ways. Firstly, by emphasising 
diversity without unity: a pluralist reduction. Secondly, by emphasising unity without diversity: a monist 
reduction. Whilst simpler, such frameworks are less realistic. Simple-but-unrealistic is a luxury that patients, 
relatives and clinicians within an AMS cannot afford.  
I return briefly to the allegory of Chapter7: an AMS is a dance. In this peculiar scene, there are a series of 
threes. Firstly, the multi-coloured autographs represent personal need; the grey-suited classical pianist 
represents professional need; the cemented metronome with a blue-and-white logo represents 
organisational need. Secondly, the anxious dancers with paint on their hands represent patients in distress; 
the proper-dancing dancers in grey pyjamas represent professionals dealing with deviation; the blue-and-
white dancefloor, which is fitted with an alarm, represents the organisation preventing disruption. Thirdly, 
the multi-coloured headset button represents the diverse nature of choice; the grey button represents 
welfare; the blue-and-white button represents effectiveness; these are ways of selecting what’s best. 
A monist reduction fails to distinguish between a grand piano, a pianist and a metronome. A pluralist 
reduction places each of these in a separate room. Neither monism nor pluralism accounts for needs that 
are different-but-together within an AMS. 
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A monist reduction fails to notice the different styles of dancers. A pluralist reduction would place white-
and-green dancers, grey dancers and the dancefloor in separate rooms. Neither monism nor pluralism 
accounts for problems that are different-but-together within an AMS. 
A monist reduction fails to notice the three different music channels. A pluralist reduction insists that 
different music channels are danced to in separate rooms. Neither monism nor pluralism is able to account 
for values that are different-but-together within an AMS. 
9.4.2 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this thesis has provided two arguments for a trivalent framework of values in decision-making 
within an AMS. The first is a negative argument, identifying what the role of values in decision-making within 
an AMS (and healthcare generally) is not: 
1a. All monist and pluralist frameworks of values in decision-making within healthcare are unrealistic. 
1b. All frameworks of values in decision-making within healthcare are either monist or pluralist. 
1c. Therefore all frameworks of values in decision-making within healthcare are unrealistic. 
The second is a positive argument, presented through an interpretive analysis of ethnographic and interview 
data, of what the role actually is of values in decision-making within an AMS: 
2a. Decision-making within an AMS involves three distinct values of welfare, choice and effectiveness. 
2b. The three distinct values of welfare, choice and effectiveness operate interdependently as a single 
triad (a trivalent framework). 
2c. Therefore decision-making within an AMS involves three distinct values that operate 
interdependently as a single triad (a trivalent framework). 
This positive argument shows premise 1b to be false. A third clarificatory argument can now be put as 
follows: 
3a. The framework of values in decision-making within an AMS is either monist, pluralist or trivalent. 
3b. The framework of values in decision-making within an AMS is neither monist nor pluralist66. 
3c. Therefore the framework of values in decision-making within an AMS is trivalent. 
Indeed, the trivalent approach described in this thesis is more than merely a framework of values but an 
account of the role of values. An account of the role of values includes the way values operate in decision-
 
66 This was theoretically suggested in Chapter 2 and empirically supported in Chapter 8.  
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making within an AMS, such as during times of value coincidence and value conflict. An account of the role 
of values also includes a broad depiction of values, couched within a narrative of the work of an AMS, which 
is oriented around problems and needs. The implications of this account of the role of values in decision-





Chapter 10. Conclusions 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the interaction between empirical findings and theoretical issues 
identified in Chapters 2-4 with regard to the philosophy of medicine and clinical decision-making models. In 
this chapter, I summarise the conclusions of this interaction. Each major theoretical issue from the literature 
review is followed by an empirically-informed response.  
10.1 Philosophy of medicine 
The difficulty in finding a consensus on the concept of sickness reflects the difficulty in finding a consensus 
on the fundamental value of healthcare. Prominent models of sickness include the biomedical model, 
biographical disruption and genealogy. These models tend to prize a value of welfare, choice and something 
else. 
 A trivalent framework provides a means of accommodating these three models into a single 
conceptual scheme. The ‘something else’ of genealogy could be the evaluative standard of 
effectiveness. Rather than any one value being dominant, each of three values presupposes the other 
two; they are interdependent. In this way, each prominent model of sickness can function as an 
aspect of a trivalent conception of sickness. 
The difficulty in characterising the concept of futility reflects the difficulty in establishing the telos of 
healthcare. Monist and pluralist frameworks of the goals of healthcare prove inconsistent and unrealistic; 
unity diversifies and diversity unifies. 
 A trivalent framework provides an alternative to monist and pluralist conceptions of healthcare’s 
telos. The complex notion of a diverse unity makes contact with reality within an AMS. The single aim 
of an AMS, to restore order, entails addressing three problems: deviation, distress and disruption. 
These problems are interdependent; they are a triad; the telos of an AMS takes the form of one-in-
three.  
As a result of a complex telos, the concept of futility within an AMS is complex; it is both singular and 
plural. A course of action can be futile in only one way: it fails to restore order. At the same time, a 
course of action can be futile in three ways: it fails to address deviation, distress or disruption. Like 
the aim of decision-making, futility is triadic; it takes the form of one-in-three. 
There is ongoing dispute as to the value-base of medicine. There are abundant proposals for both value-
monism and value-pluralism. Such disputes involve disagreement over the number of fundamental values 
as well as the content of the value-base.  
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 A trivalent approach offers a new alternative to monism and pluralism. Rather than a simple unity or 
a simple diversity, a trivalent approach describes a complex, a diverse unity. This framework is 
supported in two ways.  
Firstly, monism and pluralism result in a reductio ad absurdum when translated from theory to 
practice in controversial cases: monism disintegrates into pluralism and pluralism collapses into 
monism. As a result, neither is consistent and realistic. Secondly, a trivalent approach is supported 
by an interpretive analysis of how people within an AMS deal with problems and needs: courses of 
action are appraised by three distinct values of welfare, choice and effectiveness. However, these 
three values operate simultaneously and interdependently and result in a single appraisal of whether 
a course of action is what’s best; they function as a triad. A trivalent approach offers an empirically-
supported conceptual scheme that transcends the current antithesis between monism and pluralism. 
One area of agreement between value-monist and value-pluralist frameworks is a presupposition of a 
foundationalist theory of values. This is evident in grey literature as well as academic bioethics literature. 
The majority of bioethical theories can also be characterised by their value-foundation. Thus, a 
foundationalist epistemology is widespread in literature concerning good clinical care and bioethics. 
 A trivalent approach to decision-making both affirms and challenges foundationalism about values. 
Affirmatively, welfare, choice and effectiveness could be said to provide grounds for a belief that a 
course of action is what’s best. In this way, they constitute a three-fold value foundation. However, 
my interpretation of empirical data emphasises the importance also of the interaction between 
values; this resembles a coherentist system of justification. In addition, judgments of what course of 
action is best entail an assessment of what is likely to work in the particular circumstances; what has 
the power to bring about an effect. This is emphasised by the third value, effectiveness. Therefore, a 
trivalent approach to knowing what course of action is best also features elements of a pragmatist 
epistemology. 
10.2 Clinical decision-making models 
The historical tension between paternalist and anti-paternalist decision-making is a manifestation of a 
difference in fundamental values. Paternalist models such as substituted decision-making tend to prize 
welfare; anti-paternalist models such as supported decision-making tend to prize choice. The most 
prominent attempt to transcend this dualism is the model of shared decision-making. However, just as 
paternalism and anti-paternalism are arbitrary in their selection of value-base, so shared decision-making is 
arbitrary in its delineation between its paternalist preparatory phase and anti-paternalist executive phase. 
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 According to an interpretive analysis of how decisions are made within an AMS, neither welfare nor 
choice predominates. Rather, welfare and choice are two out of three equally fundamental values. 
What is more, this triadic structure enables a non-arbitrary adjudication between competing 
evaluations. For instance, where one course of action is deemed best according to the evaluative 
standard of welfare, and another course of action is deemed best according to the evaluative 
standard of choice, which course of action is indeed best can be justified according to the third value 
of effectiveness.  
Recent developments in cognitive psychology have given rise to new models of decision-making, including 
clinical decision-making. An adaptation of dual process theory and cognitive continuum theory describes two 
kinds of thinking: fast, intuitive reasoning and slow, deliberative reasoning. Transition from one to the other 
is influenced by the degree of coherence between a diagnostic category that is proposed and the clinical 
data that are apparent. 
 Empirical findings within an AMS affirm dual process theory to some extent. Decision-making, 
especially from clinicians’ perspectives, involves a psychological change of gear. Some decisions are 
obvious and fast; other decisions are slow, difficult and involve negotiation. However, the difference 
between obvious and negotiated decisions is not adequately characterised by the notion of 
coherence nor any other cognitivist category. Decisions are obvious when a proposed course of 
action exhibits value coincidence; the same course of action is appraised as what’s best according to 
welfare, choice and effectiveness in unison. Decisions are negotiated when a proposed course of 
action exhibits value conflict; the same course of action is appraised as what’s best and not-what’s-
best according to welfare, choice and effectiveness in synchrony. A more realistic account of decision-
making within an AMS would thus be trivalent continuum theory. 
Out of growing awareness of the role of values in healthcare decision-making, decision-making models have 
been proposed that complement the well-established movement of evidence-based practice. One such 
model is KWM Fulford’s Values-Based Practice (VBP). Although purportedly value-pluralist, VBP is effectively 
monist about values, with ‘respect for persons’ as its fundamental (meta-)value. VBP faces an 
epistemological problem: how are diverse value-perspectives to be balanced? VBP also faces a normative 
problem: what does ‘respect for persons’ mean? 
 A trivalent framework of values in decision-making does not resolve these problems but does help to 
characterise them further. With regard to VBP’s epistemological problem, a trivalent approach 
identifies a second dimension of conflict which VBP overlooks. As well as diverse value-perspectives 
of different stakeholders, there can also be diverse value-perspectives within the same stakeholder. 
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Namely, an individual person can appraise a course of action according to three values 
simultaneously; hence the unpleasant sense of futility, the stress of cacophony and the difficulty of 
value conflict; value conflict can be intra-personal, not just inter-personal. 
With regard to VBP’s normative problem, a trivalent approach enables an initial characterisation of 
‘respect for persons.’ Namely, the range of meanings of ‘respect for persons’ can be taxonomized 
according to each of trivalent framework’s values: welfare, choice and effectiveness. This does not 
help the decision-maker know what to do, nor does it provide more than a trace of anthropology. 
Instead, it may help an individual decision-maker to understand the evaluative aspect of their moral 
distress, and it may help a group of decision-makers to understand their misunderstandings. 
An alternative model of values-conscious decision-making in healthcare is Miles Little’s Values-Based 
Medicine (VBM). This account claims that survival, security and flourishing are universal, pre-normative 
descriptive categories. However, the meaning of these terms is unclear, and their universality is 
questionable. 
 The very base of VBM is challenged by my interpretive analysis of ethnographic and interview data. 
Specifically, it is evident that survival is not universally valued. As well as contradicting one of VBM’s 
basic tenets, this phenomenon creates the possibility of conflict between values, for which Little’s 
VBM is unprepared. However, as well as this challenge, VBM is affirmed by this study’s empirical 
findings. Putting aside the de-contextualised terms survival, security and flourishing, Little’s 
application of VBM is consonant with the trivalent approach to decision-making described within an 
AMS. Namely, deciding what course of action is best involves an interplay of concerns in terms of 
welfare, choice and effectiveness.  
10.3 Further research 
The account of decision-making within an AMS that is described in this study contributes a new framework 
of values by which to approach theoretical issues in clinical decision-making and the philosophy of medicine. 
Further research is required, however, in order to address questions such as the following: 
 To what extent is the triadic framework of values reflective of the three aspects of an AMS, which is 
simultaneously a medical specialty, a place for healing and an organisational unit? 
 I defined values in Chapter 2 as ‘the standards by which things are judged good or bad, which are in 
turn shaped and sustained by such judgments’. In what ways are welfare, choice and effectiveness 
shaped and sustained by decision-making within an AMS? 
 In what ways does a trivalent approach to decision-making manifest in other healthcare settings? 
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 Are there only three kinds of problem, only three kinds of need, and only three values? Would the 
three-ness and triadic relation of values be evident to a different researcher? Are they equally 
evident within a different AMS? 
 By appeal to the concepts of complexity and paradox, I claim that a trivalent approach transcends 
the dichotomy between value-monism and value-pluralism. Are there other dichotomies that could 
be transcended in a similar way in the philosophy of medicine, bioethics and clinical decision-
making? 
 What is the relation between a trivalent framework and key notions in bioethics that are mentioned 
in this thesis, such as patient-centredness, trust, care and respect for persons? 
 What should be the role of values in decision-making within an AMS? 
The final question I have positioned last for a reason. There is no shortage of prescriptive literature on clinical 
decision-making. However, unless prescriptive models first take account of descriptive models, they may fail 
to make much contact with reality, a reality which is loaded with value-conflict and value-complexity. Before 
claiming generalisability and reaching for authoritative endorsement, models of how decisions should be 
made and what the role of values should be must first take care to understand how decisions currently are 
made and what the role of values currently is in particular situations. I hope that this interpretive account of 
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Appendix A. Information for Ward Staff 
A.1 Email to ward manager and clinical lead 
The following email was sent on 13/06/2017 for dissemination to non-medical staff by the 
AMS ward manager and to medical staff by the AMS clinical lead: 
 
Dear ward staff 
 
From June onwards, we will have a researcher, Dr Luke Martin, starting with us on the ward. Some 
of you will know Luke from working with him at [Southside hospital]. He is a doctor who is currently 
doing a PhD in acute medicine, looking particularly at decision-making. He is hoping to observe ward 
activities and do short interviews with staff, patients, and relatives. If you’re interested in finding out 









A.2 Information sheet for ward staff 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR STAFF 
Values and decision-making in acute medicine 
Introduction 
This ward is supporting a research project which is sponsored by [our NHS Trust]. If you are willing, we would 
like you to be involved. This is an information sheet to let you know what the research is about. If you would 
like to know more about it, please feel free to ask the researcher (Dr Luke Martin) more about it when he is 
on the ward. Alternatively, there are contact details at the bottom of this information sheet. 
What is the purpose of the study? 
Luke is a medical doctor who is currently doing PhD research in Acute Medicine. He is looking at how we 
make decisions in Acute Medicine, and the role of values in those decisions. Values are judgments of what 
is good and what is bad, what is appropriate and what is inappropriate67. Our decision-making in Acute 
Medicine uses a mixture of facts and values. Sometimes decisions are simple and easy; other times decisions 
are complex and difficult. This study will look more closely at how staff, patients and relatives use values in 
our decision-making. 
What will the researcher be doing? 
Even though Luke is medically trained, and some of us know him as a clinician, he is here solely as a 
researcher. He will not be contributing to decision-making or acting as a clinician while he is here. The only 
situation where he would make suggestions is where there is a risk of harm to a patient. 
 OBSERVATION 
Luke will be with us on the ward, observing a wide range of clinical interactions. He is not here to criticise 
what we are doing, but to observe and understand it. The information he gathers will all be anonymised; he 
will not record any one’s name or personal information. 
Luke will join in with ward rounds, drug rounds, meetings, and general ward activities. On these, he will be 
observing how decisions are made. He is interested in our perspectives, as members of staff, and may 
 
67 This information sheet was drafted and disseminated at an early stage in this research. The definition of ‘values’ used in this 
study was subsequently adapted to refer to the standards by which judgments are made rather than the judgments themselves 
(see: Chapter 2 What are values?). 




sometimes ask questions. But he does not intend to ‘get in the way’ or slow us down on busy shifts. Luke 
will also spend time observing from patients’ bedsides. 
 INTERVIEWS 
In order to hear our thoughts and experiences, Luke would like to interview some staff, as well as patients 
and relatives. Whatever your role, he may invite you for a short interview. The aim of the interview is not to 
test or criticise, but rather to understand in more detail how decisions are made, and our perspective on 
them. These interviews will be recorded on Dictaphone. Quotations may be used from interviews when 
writing up the research but all information will be anonymised. The kinds of topics covered in interview 
might be: imaginary cases, recent cases, difficult decisions, our thoughts on how values are used in decisions. 
Interviews may be between 10 mins and 45 mins, as time allows, and might be on the ward or elsewhere in 
the hospital. 
Luke will also be interviewing some patients, on the ward, as well as some relatives, on the ward or 
elsewhere in the hospital. Again, this is not to rate the care that they have received, but to better understand 
their perspective on how decisions are made and what values are in play. The only situation where he would 
break confidentiality is where there is risk of harm to a patient. 
What will happen to the information? 
Audio recordings of interviews will be stored securely in a locked cabinet at [this NHS trust] and Newcastle 
University. Once they are typed into computerised form by the researcher, audio recordings will be deleted. 
Signed consent forms and declaration forms will be stored in a locked cabinet at [this NHS trust] and 
Newcastle University for no more than ten years. Only the researcher and authorised staff from [this NHS 
trust] and Newcastle University can access these. 
All other information, including what is quoted when the research is written up, will be anonymised. No 
participant’s name will be mentioned when the research is written up. 
Do I have to take part?  
No. Nobody has to take part who does not want to. All participation in interviews is voluntary. If you would 
like to not be involved even in the researcher’s general observation of the ward, then please let Luke know 
either in person or by the contact details below. If you are unsure whether to take part, or if you are keen in 
principle but it depends what is required of you, there is no rush to decide. You can take time to think about 
it, or to withdraw participation from this study at any time. 
Who can I discuss the project with? 
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Luke will be around on the ward and is very happy to speak about this study with anybody who is interested 
or who has questions. 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have any concerns about this study or how it is being conducted, there are various people who you 
could contact. You can contact the researcher at any point. His contact details are listed below. In addition, 
the contact details for the consultant and research supervisor for this study, Dr Katie Frew, are also listed 





Dr Luke Martin 
[Work email address] 
 




Dr Katie Frew 
[Work email address] 
 







If you wish to make a complaint about this study or something related to this research study, please contact 
the Patient Advice and Liaison Service (PALS) using the information below. This route is independent of the 














Patient Advice and Liaison Service (PALS) 
 
[Email address]  







Appendix B. Research Study Notification 
 
‘VALUES AND DECISION-MAKING IN ACUTE MEDICINE’ 
 
In order to improve the standard of healthcare in our hospitals, we are 
supporting a research study on this ward. 
 
Luke Martin is a researcher who will be observing 
different clinical situations and inviting participants for 
short interviews relating to decision-making in acute 
medicine. This will take place from June 2017. 
 
If you would like to opt out of this study, please inform a member of 
ward staff. If you would like more information, please contact the 
researcher either in person or via his contact details below. 
Dr Luke Martin 
Teaching and Research Fellow 

















C.2 Guiding principles 
i. Maintaining patient safety 
Throughout this study LM will adhere to the GMC guidance to ‘take prompt action if you think that patient 
safety… is being compromised’ (2013a: 2). This prompt action may take the form of direct intervention or 
timely liaison with other members of healthcare staff. Which course of action is most appropriate is a matter 
of situational judgment by the researcher, informed by clinical experience. Patient safety is compromised 
when a situation or course of action is likely to, or has the potential to, cause significant harm to a patient’s 
well-being. The action taken must be sufficient to maintain patient safety. The action taken must not be 
excessive in a way which would undermine the public’s trust in the clinical team, or undermine the integrity 
of the study unnecessarily. 
ii. Maintaining integrity of the research study 
GMC guidance on research practice advises that ‘the safety, dignity and wellbeing of participants take 
precedence over the development of treatments and the furthering of knowledge’ (2013b: 3). Respecting 
this priority, LM will endeavour to maintain the integrity of this study. This requires a clear understanding 
from participants regarding his non-clinical role. Misinterpretations and ambiguities of the role of the 
researcher may distort the research process and research data. As such, LM will limit his interventions to 
situations where patient safety is at risk, or professional misconduct is clearly exhibited. 
iii. Maintaining trust 
Throughout this study, LM will ‘work with colleagues in the ways that best serve patients’ interests’, and will 
not ‘abuse… patients’ trust… or the public’s trust in the profession’ (GMC, 2013a: 2). When poor clinical 
practice is witnessed during study observations, this requires LM’s action to work with the clinical team in a 
manner that best serves patients’ interests. When providing intervention or information in an instance of 
witnessed poor practice, LM will do so with honesty and integrity, to maintain the public’s trust in the 
medical profession and the broader clinical team. 
 
C.3 References 
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Appendix D. Sample Consent Form 
Participant Identification No:__________  
    CONSENT FORM FOR PATIENT: INTERVIEW 
Name of Researcher:  
Name of the Patient: 
Please initial box 
I wish to take part in this study. 
I have had the opportunity to consider the information on the information sheet (version 2.1) 
and ask questions, which have been answered satisfactorily. 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw my participation 
at any time, without giving any reason. This would not affect my legal rights or medical care. 
I understand that the information collected during the study will be stored on secure 
computers in [this NHS trust] and Newcastle University. 
I understand that information collected during the study may be looked at by individuals with 
responsibility for this research, from [this NHS trust], Newcastle University or regulatory 
authorities. 
I understand that my interview with the researcher will be recorded. 
If I were to become unwell and be unable to give this consent, I wish for information previously 
gained to be used in data analysis. 
If I were to become unwell and unable to give this consent, I wish to carry on participating 
in this study.  
_________________       ________________          _________________________ 
 ______________ 
Name of Participant Date                                Signature   D.O.B. 
___________________         ________________          __________________________ 
Researcher    Date   Signature
Yes / No 





I would like to receive a summary of the results of this research:  


















Appendix E. A Selective History of Philosophical Hermeneutics 
The purpose of this brief survey of philosophical hermeneutics is two-fold.  
1. To characterise a general outlook of this movement, which highlights interpreting as 
an essential feature of all human being-in-the-world.  
2. To describe the two dimensions of the so-called hermeneutic circle: there is 
interdependence between the whole and its parts, and between the object and the 
subject.  
It is these insights in particular that have significance for the analytic methodology of this 
study. 
Schleiermacher and the hermeneutic circle 
In his review of the historical development of theological hermeneutics, Werner Jeanrond 
comments that ‘only since the Enlightenment has hermeneutical reflection been able to free 
itself from the predominance of theological concerns’ (1991: xii). It took a philosophically-
minded theologian to furnish this opportunity, who has come to be heralded by many as the 
father of modern hermeneutics (Mueller-Vollmer, 1986: 72; Jeanrond, 1991; Frame, 2015): 
Daniel Friedrich Schleiermacher. 
Writing in Germany at a time when the Romantic movement was opposing the dry rationalism 
bequeathed to European thought by philosophers such as Descartes, Schleiermacher 
appealed to the Romantic notion of world-Spirit (Weltgeist) in his writing. This meant ‘a kind 
of creative, intelligent life force that sustained the cosmos, animating both human beings and 
nature’ (Zimmerman, 2015: 25). This world-Spirit served as the unifying ingredient which 
enabled a meaningful integration between the mind and the world, and the whole and its 
parts (Zimmerman, 2015: 25). A part is understood by its relation to the whole; a whole is 
understood by its composite parts. This interdependence of part and whole came to be known 
as the hermeneutic circle68, which Jens Zimmerman proposes as a defining feature of 
hermeneutics: 
 
68 The concept of a circular relation between part and whole predated Schleiermacher but he is accredited for 




‘hermeneutics… refers to the sort of understanding by which we integrate facts into a 
meaningful whole’ (2015: 2). 
Schleiermacher’s popularity was in part a product of his time. Cartesian epistemology had 
assumed knowledge-formation to be an individualist, cognitivist spectator sport performed 
by self-sufficient minds, an anthropology later termed the ‘disengaged self’ (Taylor, 1996). 
Subsequent Enlightenment epistemologies, whether rationalist or empiricist, had struggled 
to bridge the gap between the mind and the world (Zimmerman, 2015). By positing a world-
Spirit, Schleiermacher’s ontology translates epistemology into hermeneutics; thinking is part 
of a whole (being); being is part of a whole (world). The circular interdependence of part and 
whole is evident for Schleiermacher ontologically and relationally: ‘both in the macrocosm of 
the world and the microcosm of human communication’ (Zimmerman, 2015: 26). 
Schleiermacher to Gadamer 
Wilhelm Dilthey followed Schleiermacher in overcoming the division between mind and world 
but sought to do so without the need for supernatural realities such as world-Spirit. Instead, 
for Dilthey, the ground for the unity of human knowledge was to be found in common 
experience, namely, the already-meaningful experience of life itself (Mueller-Vollmer, 1986: 
25–26). 
Dilthey’s focus on the inherent meaningfulness of human experience was developed by 
Edmund Husserl, who noted that ‘objects always appear to human consciousness as endowed 
with meaning’ (Zimmerman, 2015: 33); all seeing is therefore seeing as; perception is 
‘apperception’ (Husserl, 1986: 185–186). For phenomenologists such as Husserl, human 
consciousness is the starting point for understanding meaning (Zimmerman, 2015: 34). 
Husserl’s student, Martin Heidegger, extended the insights of phenomenology by describing 
the meaningfulness of objects as not revealed to us conceptually so much as practically. 
Heidegger’s famous example is that of a hammer. Rather than perceiving a hammer as an 
object to be examined, we typically perceive it as a tool to be used; it is not simply physically 
present (vorhanden) but usefully ready-to-hand (zuhanden) (1927a). In stark contrast to 
Descartes’ disengaged self (Taylor, 1996), a Heideggerian knower arrives at understanding 
through purposive engagement with the world. Rather than emptying oneself of assumptions 




historical situatedness, as these are what make understanding possible (Zimmerman, 2015: 
38). 
Hans-Georg Gadamer was another German philosopher, and one who synthesised many of 
the insights of Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Husserl and Heidegger (Zimmerman, 2015: 39). It is 
with the publication of his major work Truth and Method in 1960 that philosophical 
hermeneutics became established as a discipline in its own right, one concerned with 
‘understanding understanding’ (Gadamer in Zimmerman, 2015: 7). Gadamer contended that, 
whilst interpreting may involve principles of method, it cannot be reduced to these principles 
(Jeanrond, 1991: 9; Grondin, 1994: 106–108). Furthermore, knowledge is not something we 
obtain and possess but something in which we participate; the subject is part of the object; 
we are a part of the history we study. For this reason, Gadamer suggested not speaking of our 
‘consciousness of history’ so much as our ‘historically effected consciousness’ (2013). 
Following on from Heidegger’s portrayal of human beings as interpreting animals 
(Zimmerman, 2015: 35), Gadamer likened human participation in language to a fish moving 
through water (2013). Our immersion in language is the common ground that makes 
understanding possible: 
‘Language is the middle ground in which understanding and agreement concerning 
the object take place between two people’ (Gadamer in Jeanrond, 1991: 71). 
To characterise the nature of understanding between two people, Gadamer used the 
metaphor of the ‘fusing of horizons’ (Horizontverschmelzung) (2013). When two people 
communicate with one another, they do so from different positions. Such distance is not 
merely physical, however, it is also temporal and cultural; they have different locations of 
tradition. This can be described metaphorically as having different ‘horizons of significance’ 
(Taylor, 1991). However, there is nevertheless ‘similarity in difference’ (Zimmerman, 2015: 
48) and this makes connections between the two horizons possible. Tradition, then, is not a 
hindrance to understanding but a precondition of it: 
‘To acquire a horizon means that one learns to look beyond what is close at hand – 
not in order to look away from it, but to see it better within a larger whole and in truer 




Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics is a major break from much of modernist 
epistemology, according to which appeals to tradition are antithetical to proper knowing, 
‘inherently bad because they shackle our freedom of expression and independent thought’ 
(Zimmerman, 2015: 44). In contrast, Gadamer reinstates the role of tradition in knowing. As 
Zimmerman paraphrases, ‘tradition furnishes the web of conceptions within which we live, 
move and have our historical being’ (2015: 44). In a deliberate blurring of the Cartesian 
subject-object dichotomy, Gadamer describes human understanding of the world and of 
ourselves as a single project; it is ‘the conversation that we are’ (2013: 386).  
Gadamer and the hermeneutic circle 
Thus, by the time of Gadamer’s Truth and Method, there has developed a second dimension 
to the hermeneutic circle. As well as the dialectical relation between part and whole, there is 
also a dialectical relation between subject and object. By participating in the stream of history 
(our effective-historical consciousness) and embodying an epistemic tradition (pre-
judgments), the second dimension of the hermeneutic circle is made concrete (Jeanrond, 
1991: 67). The interpreting subject is inseparable from the interpreted object; sight requires 
fore-sight (Heidegger, 1927b: 223) and understanding requires pre-understanding (Jeanrond, 
1991: 5); philosophical hermeneutics transforms the one-way microscope to a two-way 
conversation. 
Does the hermeneutic circle apply only to the interpretation of texts? A hermeneutic 
philosopher is likely to answer both “no” and “yes”. No, in that all aspects of our symbol-laden 
life require interpretation, from actions to events to gestures. Yes, in that all such aspects 
could be construed as textual. As Jeanrond states, ‘a text is more than the sum of its words 
or sentences. A text is a meaningful whole, a structured whole’ (1991: 84). 
The postmodern writer Jacques Derrida disputed the notion that only written text requires 
hermeneutic effort. Even speech and direct interaction is essentially interpretive behaviour. 
If textuality is a precondition for interpretation, then there is nothing which is beyond-text69. 
Interpreting is a way of life from which we cannot excuse ourselves; we are ‘condemned’ to 
 
69 ‘Il n’y a pas de hors-texte’ is Derrida’s original phrase which famously captures this sentiment (1976: 158) 




it (Merleau-Ponty in Cooper, 2003: 39). This feature of human existence came to be known 
as the universality of hermeneutics (Gadamer, 2013; Malpas, 2018). 
Hermeneutic philosophers such as these, and more besides, provide a deeper 
characterisation of what is involved in the process of understanding. I am indebted to them 
in my portrayal of what methodology and methods enable me, as researcher, to come to an 
understanding of the role of values in decision-making within an AMS. For an application of 
these insights to the context of ethnography and semi-structured interviewing, see Chapter 5 
Analytic methodology. 
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Index of Ethnography Participants 
The table below indicates the chapter section in which each ethnography participant is first 
presented in chapters 6-8. 
Name Section Role 
Alan 6.1.3 Patient 
Albert Jenkins 6.3.2 Patient 
Alison 7.2.2 Psychiatry liaison team 
Amanda 7.3.3 Nurse 
Amber 7.2.2 Psychiatry liaison team 
Arthur 6.1.1.2 Patient 
Audrey 6.2.1 Patient 
Beatrice Jones 6.1.3 Patient 
Bill 6.3.2 Relative 
Brandon 6.3.3.3 Patient 
Brenda 7.2.4.2 Phlebotomist 
Brigitte 6.2.1 Patient 
Charles 6.1.3 Consultant 
Charlotte 6.1.3 Patient 
Chris Jones 6.1.3 Relative 
Deanne 6.2.2 Relative 
Dr Morrison 6.1.2 Consultant 
Dr Taylor 6.1.1.2 Consultant 
Dr Williams 6.1.1.1 Consultant 
Emily 6.3.3.1 Patient 
Emma 7.1.1 Nurse 
Faisal 6.3.1 Trainee doctor 
Fergus 6.1.1.2 Pharmacist 
Gary 6.1.1.2 Patient 
Gloria 6.3.2 Patient 




Harriet 6.1.2 Consultant 
Heidi 6.2.2 Patient 
Helen 7.3.1 Nurse 
Jackie 6.3.1 Trainee doctor 
Jane 7.2.3 Ward clerk 
Jenny 6.3.2 Relative 
Ken 6.1.3 Trainee doctor 
Kerry 8.2.4 Healthcare assistant 
Kiran 8.4.1 Consultant 
Kylie 6.2.2 Palliative care liaison team 
Laura 6.1.2 Trainee doctor 
Ling 7.3.3 Trainee doctor 
Mark 7.3.3 Nurse 
Maureen 6.2.1 Patient 
Meghan 7.2.2 Psychiatry liaison team 
Mike 6.2.1 Patient 
Mr Johnson 7.3.3 Patient 
Mr Whitehead 6.2.2 Patient 
Nick 6.1.3 Consultant 
Rachel 7.2.3 Nurse 
Rahul 6.1.3 Physiotherapist 
Rosemary 7.2.3 Nurse 
Ryan 6.1.2 Nurse 
Sandra 6.1.1.2 Nurse 
Sarah 6.1.1.2 Nurse 
Sharon 6.3.3.1 Healthcare assistant 
Sheila 8.2.5 Patient 
Sophie 6.2.3 Trainee doctor 
Stuart 6.2.3 Patient 
Suzie 6.1.3 Patient 




Tony 6.1.1.1 Consultant 
Victoria 7.1.2 Nurse 
Zoe 8.2.5 Trainee doctor 
 
